ICAR News Network
The Three Requirement Rule and How America's Foreign Policy is Shortchanging Israel-Palestinian Dialogue
Joel Censer, ICAR Intern
Posted 08/09/07
In the early 1990s Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts claimed that because the ethnic conflicts destroying Yugoslavia resulted from ancient hatreds, ultimately no foreign intervention could stop them. Bill Clinton read the book, causing some to blame Kaplan for the lack of earlier American intervention to stop aggressive zealots, such as Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic. The idea that the United States should avoid foreign entanglements that are outside any nation’s ability to negotiate has never taken precedence in the Israel-American relationship. In fact, the United States has been highly involved, investing large amounts of financial and diplomatic resources in support of the 1993 Oslo accords, supplying financial aid ($2.5 billion a year) and weapons (F-16 fighter jets) to Israel, and supporting the Palestinian Authority as well. Although U.S. policy towards Israel and the Palestinians at the beginning of George W. Bush’s presidency has been described as a hands-off “let them bleed,” the U.S., facing the pressures of a new global landscape after 9-11, quickly resumed a more active role in support of Israel.
Many scholars, however, agree that self-interest drives the difference in America’s approach to Israel and the Balkans. Israel is a regional base for U.S. interests as it serves as a listening post, Middle East ally, proxy fighter, and has a military ethos that (throughout history) has shown an ability to combat Arab terrorism effectively. Israel also shares American values, particularly a commitment to democracy, and there is an extremely influential pro-Israel lobby. With this in mind, recent American policy against Hamas, the political group which won a majority of the Palestinian parliamentary elections and has taken over Gaza, begins to make sense. Indeed, America has now withdrawn funding from the Palestinian authority in Gaza (while still working with Fatah which currently rules the West Bank) because of Hamas’ radical political refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state and use of terrorism against Israel. Furthermore, for the United States to resume financial support, Hamas would have to accept three conditions: recognizing Israel’s right to exist, ending terrorist attacks, and adhering to the Road Map for Peace, a compromise developed by President George W. Bush in 2002 in which Israel cedes land in return for the Palestinian promise to stop terrorism.
So has America’s response of “no recognition, no dialogue, no aid” been a proper response to the rise of Hamas? Many Israelis and Pro-Israeli-Americans believe it is, and history shows Israel becoming more aware over time of both the Palestinian presence and the need for peace. Israel has also efforts in the peace processes, agreeing (in theory) to a two-state solution and promising to relinquish large portions of the occupied Palestinian territories. In 2000, Israeli and American sources claimed they offered Palestine the entire Gaza Strip and 92 percent of the West Bank (Palestinians add that this offer refused any “right of return” or any future discussion.)
Thus, while advocates of Israel often point to the Palestinians as the primary obstacle to peace, emphasizing their inability to recognize Israel and control terrorism, and their insistence on the “the right of return,” Israel has also made policy decisions which have exacerbated the rift. They refuse to acknowledge the “right of return” which is the idea that Palestinians who left what became Israel during the 1948 war have a right to either their old homes or reparations for years spent in refugee settlements. While this idea has no historical precedents in the Arab World, it is in accordance with United Nations Resolution 242 which outlines the practice of payment for land seized during war. Israel’s West Bank settlements, which too much of the world are Israel’s greatest wrong against the Palestinians, cause similar problems. Indeed, Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and refusal to leave the settlements on the West Bank (claiming it provides a buffer from missiles despite the fact that the Jewish settlement is not in delimited, easily defended bands, but instead scattered and intertwined throughout) have continued Palestinians’ cynicism about Israel’s two-state solution by effectively removing a number of resources from a possible Palestinian state. Furthermore, the occupied territories have been isolated from the rest of Israel, accentuating Palestinian grievances (particularly economic ones) and making Israelis an overbearing occupying power. Clearly, Israeli policy has made many Palestinians feel disrespected and irrelevant.
Similarly, the rise of Hamas is not the result of a terrorist group of Palestinians taking over the government but instead shows compliance with the American insistence on democracy. The U.S. wanted an end to corruption in Palestinian politics, and democratic, free, and fair elections, and that is exactly what happened with Hamas’ political victory. Additionally, the reasons Hamas won are understandable. Since the second Intifada, Israel has withheld tax revenues from Fatah, making a weaker, more corrupt, and increasingly authoritarian Palestinian Authority. This has been partly responsible for the PA’s inability to create an effective domestic policy, encourage economic development, control terrorism, or contain Jewish West Bank settlements. Clearly then, Palestinians, especially refugee dwellers who live in occupied territories that are extremely impoverished, radically anti-Israel, and partially self-governing, are going to vote for a group that better represents their material interests. Hamas provides that by not only offering a radically pro-Palestinian political platform, but also by providing social services to areas often in desperate need of them. Hamas’ rise unmistakably has partially resulted from the U.S. insisting on democratic elections in Palestine where lots of people would naturally be more inclined to vote for a political group that is not in disarray and is willing to more competently stand up for Palestinian rights.
The United States’ economic sanctions regarding Hamas are understandable. How can America support Israel while allowing a polemical political group which, while offering a wide range of social services, still supports terrorism and at its core refuses the peace process and any right Israel (an economic, political, and military ally that has made an effort for coexistence) has to exist? Yet despite America’s natural proclivity to support Israel, the three-requirement rule regarding relations with Hamas is still unfair. First, the boycott punishes Palestinians for ultimately following the democratic path the U.S. encouraged. Punishing them is not only unreasonable, but also makes American claims of “wanting democracy in the Middle East” seem illegitimate. Moreover, the boycott of funds not only discriminates against Hamas, but punishes groups totally unrelated to Hamas as well. For example, an NGO in Bethlehem which focuses on conflict mediation and is run by a group of Christian Palestinians lost its funding as well. Finally, the embargo seems to encompass the general values of recent American policy toward the general Arab world where they have given the complete benefit of the doubt to Israel (despite the fact that it too has caused problems). This carte blanche is a problem because it has encouraged Israel to bomb Lebanon, which has neither helped maintain or enhance Israel’s regional security and stability.
So what can be America’s role in this peacekeeping situation? First, for the United States to take a positive role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is critical to act in the present and avoid historical and religious claims. While Hamas reflects the demands of some Palestinians, most just want their own state. In fact, even Hamas is not unified in a radical anti-Israel position. Members on the West Bank are more amenable to compromise and see themselves as better educated than those in Gaza. Similarly, in Israel, most wish an end to the terrorist attacks, even if that means an abandonment of the West Bank. Consequently, peace and stability seem the most desirable effect for both parties, and a two-state solution seems to make the most sense.
Plainly, embargoing aid to Hamas until the group cuts its ties with terrorism and agrees to recognize Israel is not completely fair and it is not as clear cut as good versus evil. But American policy, unlike Robert Kaplan’s view of the Balkans, should not be drastically inadequate for solving deep-seated ethnic problems. U.S. policy can help in Israel, as long as the role of America is that of mediator rather than Israeli cheerleader. Because Hamas is popular for a variety of reasons, (many the fault of Israel and America), angering the people that support it (particularly those in refugee camps) has proved counterproductive. If there is ever going to be peace, relationships and dialogue must exist. Does this mean that Hamas has any right to promote terrorism and the end to Israel? Clearly not, and it should be the role of America to convince the group to abandon these methods However, if a two-state solution is ever going to happen, a mutual relationship built on some semblance of trust needs to exist. Unfortunately, the United States’ three-requirement rule seems to take none of these factors into account, and will continue to polarize, instead of provide loftier goals in the region.
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