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Nuclear Black Markets and the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal
Saira Yamin, ICAR PhD Student
Posted: 07/18/07

The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) dossier titled Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of the proliferation networks, (published May 3, 2007) puts into sharp focus the western perception of the proliferation threat. The dossier prepared by Mark Fitzpatrick highlights in particular Dr. A.Q. Khan, the scientist who is considered the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb. Dr. Khan has come under severe international scrutiny in recent years for his role in the illicit trade of nuclear fissile materials and technology to rogue states. The report states that the Government of Pakistan (GoP) which has denied knowledge of Dr. Khan’s activities, has in the post 9/11 scenario taken concrete measures to curtail nuclear black marketing, nonetheless, the threat looms large. Fitzpatrick suggests that since several countries as well as terrorist organizations aspire to possess nuclear weapons, there is strong reason to be vigilant to global nuclear trafficking. Additionally, the IISS dossier mentions lack of international laws with regards to export and trade in nuclear fissile materials, as one of the caveats in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It emphasizes that many countries have not implemented export controls, penalties and investigative procedures that would keep a check on nuclear trade.

Interestingly the IISS dossier acknowledges the security imperatives for the launch of the GoP’s nuclear program. It endorses the fact that Pakistan developed its program in response to India, and the loss of the former’s eastern-wing, now Bangladesh, which was precipitated by India’s military intervention. With a hostile and militarily far superior neighbor it was vital for Pakistan’s defense, to build a nuclear weapons program. In this backdrop, it is important to heed the perspective proffered in the dossier, that Pakistan has been reluctant to sign a nuclear proliferation regime because it cannot afford to give India a nuclear advantage. Fitzpatrick goes on to underscore that if Pakistan were convinced that India would cap its own fissile material production then it “would have no reason to continue enriching uranium, and producing weapons usable plutonium. Nor, in this case, would it have an incentive to keep black market suppliers in place for its own nuclear weapons programme.”

Another report written by David Albright and Paul Brannan at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released on June 21st, 2007 reveals that Pakistan appears to be building a third Plutonium Production reactor at its Khushab nuclear site. The ISIS report adds that both Pakistan and India are vigorously engaged in expanding their nuclear weapons programs including “more powerful weapons”. The document is critical of the Bush administration’s “short-sighted” nuclear cooperation agreement with India, which blatantly undermines the NPT and is fuelling a nuclear arms race in South Asia. It is worth contemplating that while the Bush government may be looking to make profits for American firms by selling nuclear technology to India, it is essentially engaging in nuclear trade, a charge that Dr. A. Q. Khan and the GoP continue to face with admonition. In forging a strong military alliance with India with the underlying motive perhaps to contain China, the US must remain mindful that India and China have evolved a politically cordial and mutually rewarding economic relationship which is now a strategic priority for both states. An asymmetric approach towards Pakistan and India on the part of the US on the other hand, is not only going to affect the power imbalance in the region, it also is ample reason for Pakistan to enhance its own nuclear arsenal.

Historically, great powers have had a complex relationship with global conflict. They sometimes foment conflict and sometimes act as peacemakers between nations. At other times they play the divide and rule game – giving preferential treatment to one over the other and in doing so they sometimes create an environment that engenders turbulence and instability. In the South Asian context therefore, the US must take into consideration very carefully the implications for its relations with the nuclear neighbors. Also in the vicinity lies China, another great nuclear power, and on its north eastern border lies nuclear North Korea. The regional nuclear environment therefore calls for a very thorough review of US policy.

Since independence from British colonial rule Pakistan and India have been engaged in a territorial dispute over Kashmir which has resulted in major wars and perennial low intensity conflict. Kashmir is thus regarded as a nuclear flashpoint. The US could play a critical role in helping resolve the conflict, rather than, pumping nuclear fuel and technology into a region that some US leaders had once referred to as a “nuclear tinder box”. The US-India nuclear deal may have already sparked a contagion effect in the wider South and South East Asia region.

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ICAR News Network Nuclear Black Markets and the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal Saira Yamin, ICAR PhD Student Posted: 07/18/07 The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) dossier titled Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of the proliferation networks, (published May 3, 2007) puts into sharp focus the western perception of the proliferation threat. The dossier prepared by Mark Fitzpatrick highlights in particular Dr. A.Q. Khan, the scientist who is considered the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb. Dr. Khan has come under severe international scrutiny in recent years for his role in the illicit trade of nuclear fissile materials and technology to rogue states. The report states that the Government of Pakistan (GoP) which has denied knowledge of Dr. Khan’s activities, has in the post 9/11 scenario taken concrete measures to curtail nuclear black marketing, nonetheless, the threat looms large. Fitzpatrick suggests that since several countries as well as terrorist organizations aspire to possess nuclear weapons, there is strong reason to be vigilant to global nuclear trafficking. Additionally, the IISS dossier mentions lack of international laws with regards to export and trade in nuclear fissile materials, as one of the caveats in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It emphasizes that many countries have not implemented export controls, penalties and investigative procedures that would keep a check on nuclear trade. Interestingly the IISS dossier acknowledges the security imperatives for the launch of the GoP’s nuclear program. It endorses the fact that Pakistan developed its program in response to India, and the loss of the former’s eastern-wing, now Bangladesh, which was precipitated by India’s military intervention. With a hostile and militarily far superior neighbor it was vital for Pakistan’s defense, to build a nuclear weapons program. In this backdrop, it is important to heed the perspective proffered in the dossier, that Pakistan has been reluctant to sign a nuclear proliferation regime because it cannot afford to give India a nuclear advantage. Fitzpatrick goes on to underscore that if Pakistan were convinced that India would cap its own fissile material production then it “would have no reason to continue enriching uranium, and producing weapons usable plutonium. Nor, in this case, would it have an incentive to keep black market suppliers in place for its own nuclear weapons programme.” Another report written by David Albright and Paul Brannan at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) released on June 21st, 2007 reveals that Pakistan appears to be building a third Plutonium Production reactor at its Khushab nuclear site. The ISIS report adds that both Pakistan and India are vigorously engaged in expanding their nuclear weapons programs including “more powerful weapons”. The document is critical of the Bush administration’s “short-sighted” nuclear cooperation agreement with India, which blatantly undermines the NPT and is fuelling a nuclear arms race in South Asia. It is worth contemplating that while the Bush government may be looking to make profits for American firms by selling nuclear technology to India, it is essentially engaging in nuclear trade, a charge that Dr. A. Q. Khan and the GoP continue to face with admonition. In forging a strong military alliance with India with the underlying motive perhaps to contain China, the US must remain mindful that India and China have evolved a politically cordial and mutually rewarding economic relationship which is now a strategic priority for both states. An asymmetric approach towards Pakistan and India on the part of the US on the other hand, is not only going to affect the power imbalance in the region, it also is ample reason for Pakistan to enhance its own nuclear arsenal. Historically, great powers have had a complex relationship with global conflict. They sometimes foment conflict and sometimes act as peacemakers between nations. At other times they play the divide and rule game – giving preferential treatment to one over the other and in doing so they sometimes create an environment that engenders turbulence and instability. In the South Asian context therefore, the US must take into consideration very carefully the implications for its relations with the nuclear neighbors. Also in the vicinity lies China, another great nuclear power, and on its north eastern border lies nuclear North Korea. The regional nuclear environment therefore calls for a very thorough review of US policy. Since independence from British colonial rule Pakistan and India have been engaged in a territorial dispute over Kashmir which has resulted in major wars and perennial low intensity conflict. Kashmir is thus regarded as a nuclear flashpoint. The US could play a critical role in helping resolve the conflict, rather than, pumping nuclear fuel and technology into a region that some US leaders had once referred to as a “nuclear tinder box”. The US-India nuclear deal may have already sparked a contagion effect in the wider South and South East Asia region. News Network Homepage / Armenia / 2008 Elections / Afghanistan / Diplomacy/ Egypt / Environment / Global Peace Index / Health / Immigration / Iraq / Iran / Islam / Kosovo / Nuclear Proliferation / Pakistan / Palestine-Israel / Russia / Somalia / South America / Turkey /		About ICAR Student Information Prospective Students Faculty and Staff Alumni Career Services Academic Programs Library ICAR In The News Events Technology Resources ICAR Publications Point Of View Center Center for World Religions, Diplomacy & Conflict Resolution