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A Better Non-Proliferation Approach: Ditch the Nepotism, Take a Ride with Russia
Mark Jansson, ICAR Certificate Student
Posted: 07/05/07

Stopping the spread of technology is exceedingly difficult, especially when that technology is fifty years old yet hotter than an iPhone, albeit slightly less accessible. To curb nuclear proliferation, the U.S. must renew its commitment to do so and in concert with the NPT.

Commitment to non-proliferation outright has waned in light of India and Pakistan’s rise to nuclear power and the current panic over North Korea and Iran, which has led many to resolve that the habitually violated NPT has outlived its usefulness. But this conclusion is more a self-fulfilling prophecy than it is the actual truth. In fact, it is the ad hoc non-proliferation strategy that the U.S. has embarked upon that undermines the NPT’s potential moving forward.

The nepotism that characterizes U.S. strategy on non-proliferation increases security anxiety worldwide and invites invidious comparisons wherein nuclear arms are perceived as the unjust prerogative of a few who jealously guard their comparative advantage. This causes more fundamental proliferation problems than the technical and enforcement troubles of the NPT. To halt the cycle of self-fulfilling prophecy and develop a more potent non-proliferation policy, the U.S. must recommit to non proliferation outright and realize that it is beyond our power to single-handedly prevent proliferation through our own ad hoc approach.

In the first place, some understandable fatalism with respect to proliferation has reinforced the optimist’s specious view that with nuclear proliferation comes regional power balances, ergo stability. But the optimism introduces a new, dubious premise: that aspiring nuclear states are themselves stable.

However, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. should be evidence enough that even large, powerful states are not impervious to fracture. And “stable” is probably not the best word to describe conditions in minimally democratic countries such as Iran and dictatorships such as North Korea.

Essentially, the argument that adding nuclear weapons to clusters of unstable states will somehow create regional stability is akin to saying that bringing more beer to a fraternity hazing will help settle things down. Nuclear weapons provide neither intrastate nor interstate stability: they only raise the costs of discord. Therefore, nuclear proliferation is a bad thing and we should do everything we can to stop it.

In the second place, the U.S. is a great power, but the most powerful force behind non-proliferation efforts is not the U.S.’s moral judgment or even an awing missile defense system: it is the NPT. Indeed, the NPT is still relevant simply because 189 nations are party to it and because this treaty, notwithstanding abuse and breaches, has by-and-large kept nuclear proliferation at a minimum over the past forty years.

Today’s proliferation risk is a global problem that no country can solve by itself; we therefore need a framework document. And the sooner we realize that it is still the NPT – not ad hoc U.S. assessments of nuclear aspirants – that forms the most solid and enduring basis for non-proliferation efforts, the better.

Yes, the NPT has problems. The first two “pillars” of the NPT, non-proliferation and drawdowns in extant arsenals, have been difficult to hold up. Even more problematic is its third pillar, which allows countries to peacefully flirt with nuclear power technologies until they are virtually on the brink of an affair with a nuclear weapon. Yet there is hope.

Tuesday’s joint declaration by the U.S. and Russia, though maligned for not taking the form of an agreement on arms reduction, did speak to the important need to provide a safe, transparent and reliable source for nuclear energy. This is significant because establishing a cooperative international format through which (third pillar) nuclear energy rights may be exercised responsibly and transparently strengthens the NPT.

Additionally, it plants seeds for a more positive form of nuclear dependence, whereby states may cooperate in providing something intrinsically useful and not just sanctions for NPT violations. Aspiring nuclear powers will likely respond more favorably to this kind of positive dependence than to the existing negative dependence paradigm centered on cooperative punishment. One should hope, therefore, that Tuesday’s declaration precedes action.

Of course, it may be that peaceful nuclear power is not quite as hot as an iPhone, let alone a nuclear weapon; but it just might suffice as a substitute should the U.S. ditch its policy of ad hoc nuclear nepotism and continue to work cooperatively with Russia.

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ICAR News Network A Better Non-Proliferation Approach: Ditch the Nepotism, Take a Ride with Russia Mark Jansson, ICAR Certificate Student Posted: 07/05/07 Stopping the spread of technology is exceedingly difficult, especially when that technology is fifty years old yet hotter than an iPhone, albeit slightly less accessible. To curb nuclear proliferation, the U.S. must renew its commitment to do so and in concert with the NPT. Commitment to non-proliferation outright has waned in light of India and Pakistan’s rise to nuclear power and the current panic over North Korea and Iran, which has led many to resolve that the habitually violated NPT has outlived its usefulness. But this conclusion is more a self-fulfilling prophecy than it is the actual truth. In fact, it is the ad hoc non-proliferation strategy that the U.S. has embarked upon that undermines the NPT’s potential moving forward. The nepotism that characterizes U.S. strategy on non-proliferation increases security anxiety worldwide and invites invidious comparisons wherein nuclear arms are perceived as the unjust prerogative of a few who jealously guard their comparative advantage. This causes more fundamental proliferation problems than the technical and enforcement troubles of the NPT. To halt the cycle of self-fulfilling prophecy and develop a more potent non-proliferation policy, the U.S. must recommit to non proliferation outright and realize that it is beyond our power to single-handedly prevent proliferation through our own ad hoc approach. In the first place, some understandable fatalism with respect to proliferation has reinforced the optimist’s specious view that with nuclear proliferation comes regional power balances, ergo stability. But the optimism introduces a new, dubious premise: that aspiring nuclear states are themselves stable. However, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. should be evidence enough that even large, powerful states are not impervious to fracture. And “stable” is probably not the best word to describe conditions in minimally democratic countries such as Iran and dictatorships such as North Korea. Essentially, the argument that adding nuclear weapons to clusters of unstable states will somehow create regional stability is akin to saying that bringing more beer to a fraternity hazing will help settle things down. Nuclear weapons provide neither intrastate nor interstate stability: they only raise the costs of discord. Therefore, nuclear proliferation is a bad thing and we should do everything we can to stop it. In the second place, the U.S. is a great power, but the most powerful force behind non-proliferation efforts is not the U.S.’s moral judgment or even an awing missile defense system: it is the NPT. Indeed, the NPT is still relevant simply because 189 nations are party to it and because this treaty, notwithstanding abuse and breaches, has by-and-large kept nuclear proliferation at a minimum over the past forty years. Today’s proliferation risk is a global problem that no country can solve by itself; we therefore need a framework document. And the sooner we realize that it is still the NPT – not ad hoc U.S. assessments of nuclear aspirants – that forms the most solid and enduring basis for non-proliferation efforts, the better. Yes, the NPT has problems. The first two “pillars” of the NPT, non-proliferation and drawdowns in extant arsenals, have been difficult to hold up. Even more problematic is its third pillar, which allows countries to peacefully flirt with nuclear power technologies until they are virtually on the brink of an affair with a nuclear weapon. Yet there is hope. Tuesday’s joint declaration by the U.S. and Russia, though maligned for not taking the form of an agreement on arms reduction, did speak to the important need to provide a safe, transparent and reliable source for nuclear energy. This is significant because establishing a cooperative international format through which (third pillar) nuclear energy rights may be exercised responsibly and transparently strengthens the NPT. Additionally, it plants seeds for a more positive form of nuclear dependence, whereby states may cooperate in providing something intrinsically useful and not just sanctions for NPT violations. Aspiring nuclear powers will likely respond more favorably to this kind of positive dependence than to the existing negative dependence paradigm centered on cooperative punishment. One should hope, therefore, that Tuesday’s declaration precedes action. Of course, it may be that peaceful nuclear power is not quite as hot as an iPhone, let alone a nuclear weapon; but it just might suffice as a substitute should the U.S. ditch its policy of ad hoc nuclear nepotism and continue to work cooperatively with Russia. News Network Homepage / Armenia / 2008 Elections / Afghanistan / Diplomacy/ Egypt / Environment / Global Peace Index / Health / Immigration / Iraq / Iran / Islam / Kosovo / Nuclear Proliferation / Pakistan / Palestine-Israel / Russia / Somalia / South America / Turkey /		About ICAR Student Information Prospective Students Faculty and Staff Alumni Career Services Academic Programs Library ICAR In The News Events Technology Resources ICAR Publications Point Of View Center Center for World Religions, Diplomacy & Conflict Resolution