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***Combatting Crime in Southeastern Europe:
An Integrated, Coordinated, Multi-Level Approach***

by

Dennis J.D. Sandole, Ph.D
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR)
George Mason University (MSN 4D3)
Fairfax, Virginia 22030 USA
<dsandole@gmu.edu> <Dsandole@aol.com>

Abstract

This paper advances the argument that any effort to "crush organized crime" in the Balkans must occur within the context of an integrated, coordinated, multi-level framework which locates "organized crime" -- and warlordism and terrorism -- in a comprehensive setting. Such a frame should reflect interdependence and interconnectedness between actors and variables across subregions, regions, and globally.

Against this background, the author re-introduces his 3 *pillar framework* for analyzing complex systems, and one expression of it: a *new European peace and security system* (NEPSS). The author also suggests the "*Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe*" as a basis for coordinating the various dimensions of NEPSS.

Together, NEPSS and the Stability Pact have practical as well as theoretical implications for dealing effectively with organized crime, warlordism, and terrorism and their potential injurious implications for the development of the Balkan states into candidates for eventual membership in the European Union (EU).

INTRODUCTION

Before I begin, let me articulate some basic assumptions underlying organized crime:

[1] Organized crime is probably better *organized* than are all the efforts to deal with it, which may explain in large part its persistence to some degree in many societies across the world (including in the U.S.).

[2] Hence, we can never really eliminate -- or to use the preferred term of this workshop, "*crush*" -- organized crime. What we can do, however, is reduce its intensity and frequency of

expression as a threat to the security of civil society.

[3] Although organized crime is a worldwide phenomenon, it is an especially acute problem in structurally marginalized societies; e.g., "failed states" and states undergoing transition from one set of paradigmatic conditions to another.

[4] Particularly for vulnerable societies, organized crime is *opportunistic* -- as are many diseases (physiological and social). What this means is that we should focus on reducing the opportunities -- i.e., personal motivations and structural incentives -- for organized crime to develop into a significant force threatening the security of civil society, especially in the transitioning societies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

[5] A major problem, however, is that organized crime is not a simple, unidimensional problem to be dealt with in a simple way. It is complex, overlapping and linked with warlordism and terrorism (e.g., in Afghanistan, Columbia, the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and in the not-too-distant future, probably in Iraq as well). What this means is that to deal effectively with any one of these problems, we have to deal with the others as well -- either at the same time or sequentially -- because each one feeds off the others.

As one generic example of such linkage, we have the following account by the International Crisis Group (ICG) of Africa's "first World War" in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC):

At one level it is a conflict between two regional allies -- a "Great Lakes" alliance of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, versus one of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. On another level, it is a violent mixture of national civil wars, including those of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola, all of which are partly fought on Congolese soil. Finally, in the midst of this chaos, the Congo's own stew of ethnic feuds has sparked an explosion of bloodshed in the eastern part of the country. All of these conflicts feed and reinforce one another, and together risk to transform the Congo into a patchwork of warlords' fiefdoms (ICG, 2000, p. 2).

We can add to this mix the Western and other entrepreneurs who have an interest in keeping these complex conflicts ongoing, in order to continue to access and extract their "blood diamonds" and other precious resources for profitable sales worldwide. In a similar manner, organized crime, warlordism, and terrorism feed off each other in South Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

[6] Because we have in this workshop a complex, multi-

thematic subject matter, we have to deal with it in a way that captures that complexity.

Such an approach is what I attempt to articulate in this paper.

ORGANIZED CRIME: THE 'NATURE OF THE BEAST'

By "organized crime" I mean, for example, trafficking in women and children, drugs, and weapons (including weapons of mass destruction); and money laundering, plus some of their consequences: prostitution, "white slavery", political corruption, and political violence (e.g., the recent assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Dr. Zoran Djindjic).

In this kind of political landscape, organized crime bosses = warlords = terrorists: Not only are there similarities and spillover among the three roles, but sometimes they are occupied by one and the same person (e.g., in Afghanistan, Columbia).

Implications of organized crime include:

[1] Members of the international community are reluctant to invest in infrastructure, including economic reconstruction. This is based in part on a fear that the NATO-led SFOR (Stabilization Force) in Bosnia and KFOR (Kosovo Force) in Kosovo will be prematurely withdrawn, either due to "donor fatigue" or because political leaders like U.S. President George W. Bush have threatened in the past to withdraw their forces. And if U.S. forces were to withdraw, others would be sure to follow.

[2] Lack of investment in such societies facilitates conflict dynamics conducive to perpetuation of a Hobbesian "state of nature," where (e.g., in Columbia, Afghanistan, and most recently, Iraq):

men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, ... in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre as is of every man against every man ... where the life of man [is] solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short (Hobbes, 1950, pp. 103, 104).

[3] Such turmoil further dissuades the international donor community from making significant investments in economic reconstruction.

[4] This, in turn, enhances recruitment of locals into organized crime because there are no meaningful alternatives. A case in point: the shocking unemployment rate of 73 percent and poverty rate of 50 percent (of the population of 4.3 million) in the Soviet successor state of Moldova, undoubtedly explain in part the trafficking of Moldovan women to Western and Eastern

Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East (Revenko, 2003).

Specifically regarding Moldovans trafficked to Kosovo:

International Organization for Migration (IOM) statistics reveal that, between February 2000 and September 2002, 53 per cent of the known victims trafficked to Kosovo were from Moldova. About a quarter were from Romania and 13 per cent were from Ukraine, Albania, Bulgaria, Kosovo and the Russian Federation accounted for very small shares.

Of the 322 people assisted by the IOM during this same period, almost 70 per cent came from either "poor" or "very poor" circumstances. Nearly 80 per cent had fallen prey to false job promises, while eight per cent had been kidnapped (*OSCE Newsletter*, 2003, p. 11) (also see *Trafficking in Human Beings in Southeastern Europe*, 2002).

Acutely stressed countries like Moldova are often further characterized by "frozen" intrastate conflicts (see Vorkunova, 2001), plus a self-perpetuating, "no way out" dynamic, where:

- a. Underground economies result from scarce resources and roles. And
- b. Scarce resources and roles are exacerbated by a lack of investment in sustainable development.

A PRACTICAL NEED TO DO SOMETHING!

Because of the scope of the problem -- and of the overlap and spillover between organized crime, warlordism, and terrorism -- there is clearly a practical need to do something about organized crime and its correlatives in South Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

To begin to pursue such a daunting goal, however, we need, first of all, an underlying philosophy to guide the effort. As Anatol Rapoport (1974) reminds us, we need to first have an image of something before we can attempt to achieve it. Are we, for instance, "*crushing*" crime (*Realpolitik*) or "*combatting*" it (*Idealpolitik*)?

If we are "*crushing*" crime, then we are responding "*reactively*" in *Realpolitik* terms only to its symptoms. Such an approach has characterized the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan who "*smoked out*" the Taliban and al Qaeda operatives. It also characterizes Israeli assaults on occupied Palestinian refugee camps following suicide bombings, plus Russian actions in

Chechnya. In such situations, a predominant use of force -- and in these particular cases, *against Muslims!* -- tends to become more a part of the problem than of the solution.

If however, we are "combatting" organized crime, then, in *Idealpolitik* fashion, we are also "proactively" dealing with its underlying root causes and by extension, those of warlordism and terrorism as well (see Sandole, 2002b).

The 3 Pillar Framework

To facilitate dealing with underlying causes and conditions as well as symptoms of violent conflict in general -- which includes organized crime, warlordism, and terrorism -- I have developed the 3 pillar framework for mapping conflict and conflict resolution, where:

[1] **Pillar 1** deals with the **elements of conflict** (such as parties, issues, objectives, means, conflict-handling orientations, and conflict environments).

[2] **Pillar 2** deals with **conflict causes and conditions** (operative at, for example, the individual, societal, international, and global-ecological levels). And

[3] **Pillar 3** deals with **conflict intervention** (featuring 3rd party goals such as violent conflict prevention, management, settlement, resolution, and transformation; plus 3rd party means for achieving these goals, such as confrontational and/or collaborative measures, "*negative peace*" and/or "*positive peace*" orientations, and track 1 and/or multi-track actors and processes) (see Sandole, 1998b, 2002ab, 2003).

An Application of the 3 Pillar Framework: NEPSS

As part of my long-term effort to design peace and security architecture to prevent future Yugoslav-type conflicts in post-Cold War Europe, I have employed the 3 pillar framework as a basis for developing the *new European peace and security system* (NEPSS) (see Sandole, 1998a, 1999a, 1999b [Ch. 7]).

NEPSS comprises descriptive and prescriptive elements; i.e., developments that are actually occurring as well as those that could or should occur, respectively.

Descriptively, NEPSS makes use of existing international organizations in Europe -- e.g., the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Union (EU), Council of Europe (CoE), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) -- using the basic structure of the OSCE as a conceptual and operational framework for enhancing the complementarity and

synergy of all mechanisms working together on common problems.
 Within this framework:

-- NATO represents an example of *political* and *military* aspects of a reframed, more comprehensive sense of security;

-- the EU an example of *economic* and *environmental* aspects; and

-- the CoE an example of *humanitarian* and *human rights* aspects of comprehensive security.

More importantly, each of these heretofore Cold War institutions has been reaching out to its former enemies, inviting them to either become members and/or join together in constituting new, post-Cold War institutions (e.g., NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council [EAPC] and the Partnership for Peace [PfP]: both major components of the infrastructure of the Reichenau Workshops).

This outreach has had the effect of facilitating a genuine "*paradigm shift*" from *Realpolitik*, "zero-sum" *national* security to *Idealpolitik*, "positive-sum" *common* security among former Cold War enemies.

But revolutionary though these developments have been, all these organizations are basically *inter-state* in nature, while the problems posed by conflicts in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere are essentially *intra-state* in nature, although, as in organized crime, warlordism, and terrorism, with inter-state dimensions as well. Hence, there has been a need for something else to deal with the conflicts of the post-Cold War world, as well as organized crime, warlordism, and terrorism. This is where the prescriptive element enters the picture.

Prescriptively, NEPSS is characterized by "Integrated Systems of Conflict Resolution Networks", with vertical and horizontal components. Under the *vertical*, we would have a mapping of, say, South Eastern Europe in terms of the local, societal, subregional, regional, and global levels of analysis, with *track-1* (governmental) and *track-2* (nongovernmental) actors and processes corresponding to each level.

The idea here is that "all conflicts are local". And, assuming an *early warning system* to activate the *preventive diplomacy* envisaged by Michael Lund (1996) and others (e.g., Peter Wallensteen, 1998), conflicts developing at any local level could be responded to by a synergistic combination of track-1 and track-2 resources at that level -- plus, to the extent necessary, societal, subregional, regional, and global levels as well.

Should the vertical dimension fail to prevent "the house

from catching on fire", then there could be a need for the *horizontal* dimension to be activated: the judicious use of *Realpolitik* force, but basically within an *Idealpolitik* framework, to achieve *negative peace* (put the fire out) but only as a "necessary" (although not "sufficient") condition for achieving *positive peace*: the elimination of the underlying causes and conditions!

Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald (1996) -- founders of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) in Washington, DC -- have expanded the track-1/track-2 system into the "*Multi-Track Diplomacy Framework*", where:

- [1] Track 1 remains the realm of official, governmental activity, *peacemaking through diplomacy*, with track 2 (*writ large*) subdivided into the following tracks:
- [2] Track 2 (*writ small*) (nongovernment/professional): *peacemaking through professional conflict resolution*.
- [3] Track 3 (business): *peacemaking through commerce*.
- [4] Track 4 (private citizen): *peacemaking through personal involvement*.
- [5] Track 5 (research, training, and education): *peacemaking through learning*.
- [6] Track 6 (activism): *peacemaking through advocacy*.
- [7] Track 7 (religion): *peacemaking through faith in action*.
- [8] Track 8 (funding); *peacemaking through providing resources*. And
- [9] Track 9 (communications and the media): *peacemaking through information*.

Again, each of these nine tracks would correspond to the local, societal, subregional, regional, and global levels. For example, under Track 1, we could have:

- a. Local: Community policing.
- b. Societal: Community policing (see Duffey, 2003). European Union Police Mission (EUPM) to Bosnia (see Nothdurfter, 2003).
- c. Subregional: Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (see von Münchow, 2003). Transborder Crime Fighting Centre in

- d. Regional: Bucharest, Romania.
 EU.
 Europol.
 CoE.
 NATO
 OSCE.
- e. Global: Interpol.
 UN.
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
 (UNODC) (see Baghdoyan, 2003).

Track 3 would deal with the all-important investments in economic and other infrastructure. Tracks 2, 4, 5, 6, and 8 would deal with various categories of funded, nongovernmental, training, humanitarian, and developmental advocacy and assistance. Track 7 would deal with the role of religion and religious organizations. And Track 9 would deal with the role of the media in combatting organized crime, warlordism, and terrorism.

The media are especially important as they can monitor and keep track of all the other tracks. When truthful or accurate, the media prove to be at least embarrassing to those -- including governments -- they reveal to be in egregious violation of basic human rights and the like. Under such circumstances, the journalists involved risk their jobs and civil liberties, if not also their lives.

The OSCE's Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFM) plays a significant role in monitoring the status of media in all OSCE participating States, especially those in the transitioning societies of Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. The RFM brings violations of democratic media standards to light through

early warning on violations of free expression ... assist[s] participating States by advocating and promoting full compliance with OSCE principles and commitments regarding freedom of expression and free media [and when violations are uncovered] -- for instance ... obstruction of media activities and unfavourable working conditions for journalists -- the Representative seeks direct contacts with the participating State and other parties involved, assesses the facts and contributes towards the resolution of the issue (OSCE Annual Report 2002, p. 79).

The OSCE's RFM also publicizes its activities, further enhancing its visibility and effectiveness as a media watchdog,

through its annual OSCE Prize for Journalism and Democracy, instituted by RFM Freimut Duve in 1996. The winner for 2003 was Russian journalist Ms. Anna Politkovskaya "for her journalistic courage in conflict regions." According to RFM Freimut Duve:

More than 50 times now, Anna has crossed the bridge into a war region that is considered a no-man's land for independent journalism. ... She felt obliged to go to Chechnya again and again. She felt obliged to publish her articles [for the Russian weekly *Novaya Gazeta*] in a book, *The Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya* [2001] (*OSCE Newsletter*, 2003, p. 2).

Ms. Politkovskaya's response to the question, "What does this latest prize mean for you?", was:

All the awards I have received simply mean I have been doing the right thing. It's a difficult situation in Russia right now; there is great pressure on the mass media and any international recognition that a person receives is a kind of protection against Government and official powers. I very much value the awards, as they help me continue my work in the pursuit of freedoms (*ibid.*, p. 3).

In general, it would be useful, perhaps in the context of the Reichenau Workshops, to use the device of "scenarios developmental exercises" to elaborate on each of the nine tracks by exploring problems, "drivers" of those problems, plausible scenarios on their likely development, and strategies for dealing with them; i.e.,

[1] Phase 1: problem identification (e.g., trafficking in women).

[2] Phase 2: identification of factors that "drive" the problem (e.g., massive unemployment).

[3] Phase 3: construction of a "scenario" that indicates how, over time, the "drivers" can shape the problem in either a positive or negative trajectory.

[4] Phase 4: development of a "strategy" for either enhancing prospects for the "best-case" scenario or for undermining the "worst-case" scenario.

Individually, the nine tracks should be framed vertically and collectively, horizontally in terms of John Paul Lederach's (1997, p. 39) three levels of leadership: top-level, mid-level, and grassroots-level. In this manner, vertical and horizontal, as well as diagonal coordination can occur from bottom-up as well as top-down directions.

It is part of Lederach's overall argument that mid-level actors (e.g., ethnic/religious leaders, academics/intellectuals, humanitarian leaders [NGOs]) are best-placed to reach out to both the top (military/political/religious leaders with high visibility) and bottom levels of leadership (local leaders, leaders of indigenous NGOs, community developers, local health officials, refugee camp leaders) (ibid.).

The organizational actor best placed to facilitate such coordination would appear to be the "*Special Coordinator*" of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (www.stabilitypact.org): a vertically mid-level entity which was the theme of last year's Reichenau Workshop (see Jurekovic, et al., 2002).

The Stability Pact, however, is still a "work in progress," with more promise than achievement. Hence, for it to be the "glue" that effectively holds something like NEPSS together and the "oil" which keeps it running smoothly, there will be a need for enhanced commitment -- "political will" -- and more resources. In effect, according to empirical studies of what kinds of third party interventions lead to what kinds of outcomes in civil wars conducted by Federic Pearson and his associates (2003) at Wayne State University in Detroit, there is a need for more *persistence* from the international community: "Provisions for third party guarantees are crucial in settlement outcomes, adding considerably to success probability" (ibid., p. 12). Or as *Newsweek's* Fareed Zakaria (2003) argues:

The key lesson of nation-building over the past decade is, don't leave. In Haiti and Somalia, we left. In Bosnia and Kosovo, we're still there. The corollary: keep sufficient force to maintain order. In Somalia and Haiti, the forces were too thin and too soon withdrawn; in Bosnia and Kosovo, large troop deployments remain for the long term.

As we have already noted, however, there is much more for the international community to do in Bosnia and Kosovo than remain only at the Track-1 level of military peacekeeping, significant though that clearly is.

CONCLUSION

We are all in the "fight" together against organized crime, warlordism, and terrorism. "What goes around comes around," is a clear expression of the validity of *complexity theory*: that everything is connected to everything else, and with great sensitivity of initial conditions (see Waldrop, 1992).

Implication? We must all endeavor to protect the "Global

Commons": a truly significant example of a *superordinate goal* that no one nation can achieve on its own, but only by working together with others (see Sherif, 1967). As Olga Vorkunova (2001, p. 123) put it:

Preventive diplomacy efforts are more effective when major powers, regional powers, and neighboring states consider uncontrolled conflict [plus organized crime, warlordism, and terrorist] escalation as a major threat not only to national and regional security, but to global security as well.

In other words, "global interests" are "national interests," and vice versa. But:

whose business is it to protect global interests...?
... Who is going to worry about global problems such as war, poverty, unemployment, discrimination, alienation, and environmental decay? Our answer is, given the quasi-anarchical structure of today's international system, *no one*. ... In the meantime, concern with global interests will probably continue at the level of private national and international organizations, and among well-meaning academic and business people, who are at times dismissed unfairly as utopians, do-gooders, and eggheads (Couloumbis and Wolfe, 1986, pp. 122-123).

The main difference between now and when Theodore Couloumbis and James Wolfe uttered these sentiments nearly 20 ears ago is that, with the end of the Cold War, the return of genocide to Africa and Europe, and the spectre of catastrophic terrorism, with implications for the use of weapons of mass destruction, global interests have evolved into a practical imperative and not just a theoretical or ethical issue.

Still, it seems to be the case that Track 1 tends to focus more on national than global issues, with the remaining Tracks picking up the slack. This focus/power asymmetry is likely to be counter-productive and self-defeating: the Israelis and Palestinians are clearly less secure now than they were before Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in late September 2000; Russians and Chechens are less secure now than they were when the first Russian-Chechen war ended in 1996; and arguably, the Iraqi people are worse off now, even with the departure of the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein -- with rampant lawlessness, and lack of electricity, water, and sanitation -- than they were before the Americans and British invaded the country.

Until states -- especially the world's pre-eminent and only superpower -- shift or expand paradigms to at least complement their use of *Realpolitik* with *Idealpolitik*, leaving narrow-minded

unilateralism behind as they coordinate among themselves and with Tracks 2-9 in concerted efforts to deal with the "Global Commons," organized crime, warlordism, and terrorism, among other problems, are likely only to worsen. Witness the recent Riyadh suicide bombings, and their impact on the Saudi government which views the attacks as "our 9/11"; the global fear and paralysis caused by the warnings of further "Holy War" on the West reputedly made by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri (a physician), al Qaeda's "no. 2 man".

As Gareth Evans (former Australian foreign minister) and Robert Malley of the International Crisis Group remind us with regard to the U.S.-Iraq war (ICG, 2003, p. 1):

Full assumption of authority by the U.S. would create a serious backlash in the region and, over time, in Iraq itself. A U.S. transitional overseer would provide a constant reminder of the lack of UN mandate for the war and, as we may already have seen, a recruiting tool for suicide bombers aimed at coalition peacekeepers and civilian aid workers alike.

The implication is clear: unilateralist ideology must catch up with multilateral reality.

Against the background of this categorical imperative, Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati (2003) reminds us that the Westphalian system of sovereign states is under assault by, among others, global terrorism and organized crime. Indeed, it is safe to say that Robert D. Kaplan's (1994, 2000) prescient anticipation of "The Coming Anarchy" a few months before the genocidal bloodbath in Rwanda is quickly becoming more the norm than the exception, with Martin van Creveld's (1991) image of the "new" warfare being more reflective of medieval than modern times.

Under the circumstances, we must strive to bridge the gap between unilateralist ideology (*national interests*) and multilateral reality (*global interests*).

Surely, we can do it. We even know that we can do it, as recent coordinated, transparent, information-sharing efforts by governments and others in South East Asia, North America, and Western Europe have shown with regard to "SARS" (severe acute respiratory syndrome) which, given its impact on fears, anxieties, economies, and markets worldwide, would have been -- perhaps even was -- the perfect act of global terrorism!

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