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Posted June 3, 2003
By Pamela Harris

Review of 3rd JCCP E-Symposium: 'Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? How Can Peace Be Achieved in Palestine, Chechnya and Other
Conflict Zones?

By Dennis J. D. Sandole
ICAR Professor

Loaded language and daunting questions: yet another set of challenges posed for members of the concerned international community motivated to participate in this 3rd lively, "virtual" exchange of views organized by the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (JCCP).

As I look over the various contributions to this symposium, I find that first impressions are the strongest: what one sees and feels depends on who one is, what one's experiences have been and continue to be, and on one's overarching worldviews. The challenge for the professional third party conflict intervener -- including this reviewer -- is how to negotiate the psycho-emotional, cultural, religious, political, social, and other divides that separate, say, those who advocate ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Palestine
versus those who advocate the termination of the brutal Israeli occupation of Palestine as among the necessary conditions for eliminating terrorism.

Second impressions are equally compelling: those who are prepared to kill others, and even to die in the execution of their acts -- whether viewed as terrorist or heroic -- are often hypothesized to have been frustrated in their efforts to achieve a kind of individual sovereignty or self-determination; frustrated in their efforts to celebrate their cultural, ethnic, religious and other identities; and therefore frustrated in their efforts to achieve recognition and
security.

Clearly, neither Palestinians nor Chechens are secure; and given their frustration-based attacks against their perceived oppressors, neither are Israelis and Russians. Security, therefore, seems to be nonzero-sum. And in the case of the Russians and Chechens, Israelis and Palestinians, negative sum as well; e.g., Israelis and Palestinians are less secure today than they were before Ariel Sharon took his walk on the Temple Mount in late September 2000.

How third party intervenors negotiate the various divides that separate parties to conflicts is affected by whether they wish to prevent the house from catching on fire (violent conflict prevention = preventive diplomacy); failing that, prevent the fire from spreading (conflict management = peacekeeping); and failing that, forcefully stop violent manifestations of the conflict (conflict settlement =
coercive peacemaking). Through the pursuit of any of these modes of intervention, third parties might facilitate achieving "negative peace" among the various parties: the absence of "hostilities" or at least reduced expression of ad hominem views.

But with only "negative peace," the parties might still resemble the Tower of Babel -- letting a thousand flowers bloom is great for getting all voices heard, but it does not necessarily lead to the kind of consensus that enhances prospects for effective action. Such might be more forthcoming from the application of two additional modes of third party intervention leading to "positive peace":

[a] Dealing with the underlying causes and conditions of the fire once it has been extinguished (conflict resolution = noncoercive peacemaking). And eventually,

[b] Working with the survivors of the fire on their long-term relationships and in the process, helping to create new mechanisms for collaborative problemsolving, so that next time the parties have a problem, they do not have to burn down the house, the neighborhood, the community, and the region (conflict transformation = peacebuilding).

According to the work on "contingency approaches" to third party intervention associated with Ronald Fisher, Loraleigh Keashly, and others, combinations of these third party objectives may be selected, rather than any of them alone, depending on where any particular conflict is at the outset in terms of "intensity." Once the "temperature" has been reduced, then other, less lethal modes of intervention can be contemplated and implemented. In effect, an
integrated, coordinated third party team of multi-level, multi-task practitioners could, over time, endeavor to prevent violent conflict; failing that, to manage, settle, resolve, and finally, to transform it.

How the third party decides to function in any particular conflict setting also depends on who he or she is psychologically, culturally, religiously, politically, etc., what their experiences have been, and what their overarching worldviews are, especially with regard to "human nature" and the nature and role of conflict in human affairs.

For example, if one views conflicts only in terms of their symptoms -- number of suicide bombings; terrorist attacks in general; fatalities; monetary losses implicit in destroyed property -- then one might be predisposed to a Realpolitik, law-and-order approach, focusing on the use of police and military forces to achieve violent conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict settlement: in effect, achieving and maintaining "negative peace." This is where the media are, "embedded" with the frontline troops, where the
entertainment industry is ("Blackhawk Down"), and where most of our attention is directed. Although this is clearly where the action is, it is not the most effective way to deal with the problem of terrorism, whether such efforts are articulated by the U.S. in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mindanao; the Israelis in Occupied Palestine; or the Russians in Occupied Chechnya.

This takes us to another level where, under symptoms, we have relational processes between:

-- individuals (husbands and wives; employers and employees);
-- groups (Irish and Italian neighbors in New York City in the 19th century; Israelis and Palestinians; Catholics/Republicans and Protestants/Unionists in Northern Ireland; Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots; Russians and Chechens);
-- organizations (labor and management); and
-- states (India and Pakistan).

The nature of relationships at each of these levels determines the kinds of symptoms -- indicators -- of them we will observe from time to time as static snapshots of the underlying dynamics. Depending on the "health" of the relationships, for instance, parties may attempt to avoid conflict, accommodate their adversaries, confront one another violently, compromise, or engage in collaborative problemsolving leading to integrative solutions. Clearly, Israelis and Palestinians, Russians and Chechens are confronting each other violently, with the Indians and Pakistanis threatening to give the world its first nuclear war, over Kashmir.

Under relational processes, we have another level, deep-rooted causes and conditions, where few people direct their attention, except for those who specialize in conflict resolution and transformation. Rarely, for instance, are track-1 governments or the media "downhere!" Indeed, if more "multitrack" people were at this level, debates about whether those who kill others -- especially innocent civilians -- were terrorists or freedom fighters, might be moot.

As I look further at the various comments made by the participants to this 3rd E-Symposium, I think it is safe to say that, implicit in many of them, is the view that if parties to conflict -- including third party interveners -- remain at the level of symptoms, ignoring underlying relational processes and deep-rooted causes and conditions of those processes, then the world is going to experience more and more political violence undertaken by more and more frustrated, marginalized minorities whose basic needs for identity, recognition,
and security are consistently being violated.

This, of course, means more terrorism -- both "NGO" and state terrorism -- and the self-fulfilling realization of a "clash of civilizations" dynamic in the relationship between the modern and the traditional, plus further reinforcement of Robert D. Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy."

The power and utility of the E-Symposium organized and coordinated by the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (JCCP) -- with explicit appreciation to Ms. Deborah Sharp for this 3rd one -- is that we know that we can do better than achieve and maintain a progressively deteriorating negative-sum relationship with others! If the "Road Map" can produce that more positive impact for the Israeli and Palestinian relationship, then, among other things, it might serve as a model for conflicts elsewhere, plus have an overall dampening effect
on terrorism worldwide.

This symposium just might contain some insights to enhance the
prospects for the "Road Map" having precisely that kind of impact!