Report on May Syrian Trip: An In-Depth Report

By Marc Gopin

I took a trip to Syria in May after attending the World Economic Forum at the Dead Sea. That conference was surprisingly revealing in terms of current regional issues and the situation with Syria. The sting of former Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination was still fresh, and one could sense the anger at Syria, especially on the part of the Jordanians. There was an entire multi-media gala event at night overlooking the Dead Sea, and a substantial amount was dedicated to him. In the classic understated style of Jordan, the program referred to him as having “passed away”, not blown up, at the same time that the substance of the program, its emotional depiction of Hariri as the quintessential modernizer, left one with an immense sense of hope, determination, remorse and outrage. Sitting at the only table of Syrians at the conference watching this was quite an experience. All I can see is that everyone was moved and saddened.

In general the pressure for change and reform in the region was palpable and noticeable difference from the previous conference just one year ago. On the other hand, there were some astute observations as to what kind of change will lead to the desired results and what kind of change will look dramatic but actually lead to the opposite of the desired results. It was a given at the conference that the desired results include economic growth more widely distributed among a more educated population, and that liberalization of political life with a steady march toward democracy is a key parallel goal. The United States tends now to push for aggressive, dramatic changes, such as general elections, that are perceived as intrusive and hypocritical by many because pressure is applied selectively to America’s foes and withheld from staunch allies like Saudi Arabia. Entrenched regional interests, by contrast, always push for the rhetoric of ‘evolution’ that becomes a cover for the status quo. Somewhere in the middle is the truth of authentic evolution that is real and measurable but steady enough to be both nonviolent and progressive.

One clearly reformist Saudi businessman, however, made one of the wisest comments at the conference. He said, “The truth is that I don’t want to see elections right now. I know exactly who would come to power in an instant,” referring, of course, to religious extremists. “What we really need is to develop a culture of debate.” That is precisely what we had done in January in Damascus, and in April at our Center. I too have come to see that religious extremism, demagoguery in general, has been taking advantage of democratic elections for many decades now around the world. Far more important a foundation for the future of the region, and democratic governance, is the capacity of diverse interest groups to be able to freely and publicly engage, debate, seek common ground, even debate angrily, as long as it is nonviolent and as long as there is minimal retribution by government agents or ideological extremists.

We all often forget how much the foundations of democracy, at least in the United States, were based on vigorous, articulate debating over many decades. Had those noble debates included blacks and Native Americans we likely could have avoided wars that killed hundreds of thousands, and slavery that tortured millions. Nothing is as fundamental a first step as a culture of debate, and from there the risky process ensues of trusting populations with elections in such a way that they are not duped by demagogues, religious or otherwise. The Saudi businessman was right, the greatest tragedy in his country is not the lack of general elections but the fact that even asking for reform or open debate about reform gets you put in jail by the Minister of Interior, and the United States is still not singling this man out for criticism.

The foundation of the work I pursued about Syria on this trip was rooted in the Center’s program on Syria in Washington a couple of months ago. We learned a great deal about the dynamics of emerging Syrian politics by the unprecedented gathering of Syrians of all political stripes last spring at our Center in Washington. The lively, unplanned debate that ensued between pro-President Bashar reformers, important members of the Syrian embassy staff, and those strongly opposed to the regime, all in the same room, all debating, provided great insight into the changing nature of the political landscape and the opportunities to contribute to it in a positive way. In fact, it was the meeting at our Center that gave me the courage to think that another trip to Damascus could be helpful. It was witnessing the debate that gave me hope; it was actually inspiring.

Looking at the very large picture for a moment, the evidence continues to be overwhelming that cultural and religious actors can play key roles of observation, bridge building and intervention, even when—especially when--official diplomacy is deadlocked. This is what we discovered when Syrian-Canadian attorney Hind Kabawat and I put together an unprecedented interfaith news conference in Damascus days after the World Economic Forum on May 26. The Syrian Public Relations Association worked strenuously and ably on short notice to bring together myself, the Mufti of Aleppo, Ahmad Hassoun, and the Bishop of the Orthodox Church of Syria, Ghattas Hazim. I had met the Bishop the night before but the news conference was the first time I had met the Mufti. On my previous trip in January he had graciously invited me to speak in his mosque on Friday, but I was too sick to go to Aleppo. Now I got to see why this Mufti who expresses such a radical commitment to tolerance and interfaith relations also has a large traditional following. He is a passionate and engaging orator.

We presented the event as a debate, even though we were all committed to moderate religion and a peaceful future. I received many hard questions about Israel despite the fact that I continue to insist that I am neither an official representative of Israel or the United States. But as peoples meet for the first time we cannot help but be symbols and representatives for each other, and I am well aware that my job is to take the hard questions and angry pronouncements and to begin the process of open debate between peoples, religions, and even countries at war in this region. It was not my idea to present this as a debate, but it turned out to be a wise decision because, like it or not, I was a stand-in for a cultural war with the United States and Israel. It was an important no-nonsense frame of communications.

The news conference was an excellent event, even though I was disappointed at the difficulty of getting the international media to take events like this seriously, or to convince enough people there that the presence of international media is critical to the world having a full and complex picture of Syria. The Syrian media gave it its full due, with extensive coverage on television and in print, but the international media seems to focus on the violence of the region. Even when you give them a colorful event full of visuals (see our website), they continue to favor violence as the key mode of international communication of messages and ideas. Thus very few people can see a balance, a struggle inside Syrian culture for a different expression of their cultural identity that is not associated with things military.

As I reflect on the trip and all the conversations I had in the region, as well as in recent months, I have learned some surprising things about the current state of the major players and adversaries. Here are some of the things I have discovered.

I discovered, first of all, that the Jordanians are understandably angry at and fearful of the military side of Syrian society. They feel they have evidence of extensive engagement in supporting terrorists, including many who are trying to destabilize Jordan. The sad reality is that the people of Syria continue to be isolated from the rest of the Middle East because virtually all their neighbors, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Turkey, fear at least certain elements of the Syrian military and intelligence.

I found myself pleading with various figures in the region to remember that there are 18 million people in Syria, and that building stable relations in today’s world entails a variety of transnational channels that can circumvent the old-style, illiberal forms of pursuing national interests. Syria’s neighbors should become more clever at pursuing their own national security by reaching out to reformers within Syria, including moderate elements even within the Ba’ath party.

Speaking of which, the other big surprise of recent months is that there are liberal Ba’athists—I worked with them. They are sticking their necks out, taking chances, and they may hold the key to the evolution of a nonviolent transition in Syrian politics and economics. The key question is how to be helpful at this point, and my conclusion is to pursue a steady stream of engagements with Syrian society that supports economic and political reformers as well as religious moderates.

There are dangers in surprising places. In the zeal for change that expatriate Syrians as well as others are pursuing there is a tendency of some to advocate an aggressive approach to the government of Syria that pushes for quick removal of the regime. Pressure for change is always a good thing on the road to reform and democracy. The problem is that all pressure creates counter-pressure, and the more aggressive the pressure the more likely a violent response from various parts of the military and intelligence. It gets innocents killed and the more killing the more it tends to empower those who take the violent action, at least in the short term. I think a better and less violent option is to open things up in ways that are above reproach, that draw on the strengths of the Syrian people rather than the weaknesses of its political system. Let the pressure be unimpeachably positive but vigorous. If there are allies of reform at the highest level, which we still do not know, then it is this method that will provide them the greatest legroom to move with reform.

Another danger is that there are charlatans afoot outside Syria, people who will claim that they represent the future of Syria, but have no backing from the people because they are known as opportunists or worse. This was the problem with some of the neo-con choices around Iraq. Such people may have no respect among the best of Syrian reformers but might catch the ear of the Washington neo-cons by saying what they want to hear. (I have come to realize from listening to people of the region that the best of the neo-cons may be serious about democracy but they seem to get duped easily.) They may be listened to in Washington by those who have unbridled contempt for Syria now because Americans are getting killed by an energetic network of foreign suicide bombers passing through Syria. This is a perfect environment for American neo-cons to lose their temper again and lose their commonsense, as they did while ignoring good advice on what Iraq was really like.

I also learned in recent months through many conversations that there are many among Israeli military leaders, except Sharon, who want to deal with Syria. Most of the military establishment, despite continued stubbornness as far as mistreatment of Palestinians goes, seem to be finished with any ‘adventurism’ beyond Israel’s borders, seeing it as counter-productive. A nuclearized Iran, of course, may prove to be an exception to this trend.

Israel has received positive signals from Syria any number of times in the last two years, according to many sources, but Israelis are being told by both the Beltway crowd of American leaders and Sharon, or some nexus of the two, to ignore the signals. Some say it is because Sharon, unlike many other military men and politicians, is vigorous about not wanting to give up the strategic plateau of the Golan, but others say it is because this American administration only wants negative pressure on Syria, no carrots, in other words.

This seems to part of a recent pattern that emphasizes punishment as foreign policy wherever this is politically possible even when it is counter-productive. This is all short-sighted because a bilateral thaw in relations with Israel could embolden Syrian reformers, and set the stage for a larger peace process in the coming years, whereas if Syria deteriorates politically the chance could be lost to set the stage for normalization of relations eventually between Syria and all of its neighbors. Furthermore, stagnation and/or radicalization in Syria only makes it a more comfortable location for Palestinian extremists to be a thorn in the side of the PA. So I do not see the logic of completely ignoring Syria, even though aggressively securing a democratic state for Palestinians should be the higher priority of an intelligent American and Israeli foreign policy, a process that seems to be tragically unraveling as I write this.

While pressure for reform is very good and important it continues to rankle Syrians that only they are subject to this kind of perpetually negative scrutiny by America, and not, say, Saudi Arabia or Israel. Everyone knows it is the oil that is the key to this pattern when it comes to Saudi Arabia, but it is still deeply resented and it makes it harder to accept the criticism or to use the pressure to press for change with the Old Guard of Syria. As far as Israel is concerned, the present American administration has made democratization its top priority even at the price of stability, we were told by certain policy makers at the conference. Therefore, I would assume, for both domestic political reasons and for reasons of political ideology Israel will be treated by America as the one reliable example of democracy and a strategic ally at the same time. That is a winning political formula for this administration, and continues to have the solid backing of the American public. This is difficult for people in Syria to understand because they see a steady diet of pictures of one image of Israel, its military confrontation with Palestinians, whereas most Americans see a very different set of pictures and opt for Israel. As usual, most people hardly get the full truth from pictures of highly charged political subjects.

I have also learned that there is a wealthy Syrian business community, uncorrupted by the occupation of Lebanon, or by shady dealings in Iraq, who are eager to join a global community of business and entrepeneurship. It is enormously frustrating to hear them plea for economic relations that will create jobs. It says to me that we need to fund far more opportunities for senior American policy makers and Syrian businessmen to visit each other and conceive of a smarter set of incentives and disincentives that constrain corruption and crime of the Old Guard but reward legitimate business by average Syrians, especially young entrepeneurs. If America took this route, various meetings in Damascus led me to believe that they may be joined more willingly in this by major European countries. The American boycott hurts the good guys only, in other words, whereas a collective global effort to create rigid incentives and disincentives would put far more pressure on the Old Guard to reform. Here too America needs to abandon unilateralism and lead with collective strategies of positive change.

I learned that there is great disappointment with the Syrian government by a growing number of privileged citizens, a sense that time is running out for a peaceful transition to a more open Syria, but there is still an affection for Assad himself. It is as if everyone is waiting for him, impatiently now, to find his courage to stand up for a new Syria and to do what is necessary for that to happen.

I discovered evidence while there that even among the Old Guard economic opportunists there are those who are flirting with joining a reformist approach to a new Syria. One younger member of the Old Guard started spreading rumors when I was there that he was friends with certain reformers. This shocked me, but it suggested A. the effects of the stress being felt by the Old Guard, and B. the way in which offering them a way out might get them to change, at least the younger ones. I explored with some people the various ways in which we may entice Old Guard figures--whose basic problem is greed--to join a global community of international business and to see the positive gain of international partnerships for their businesses, as opposed to narrow monopolies that require political oppression, nepotism, and impoverishment of the masses.

There exists in Syria also the global problem of local Islamic moderates confronted by foreign, Gulf-centered funding of extremist mosques and educational systems that complicate the possibility of evolving a new relationship between the Sunni majority and the current government. This is an effect of external funding that is insidious and powerful, and it is this network that has created the possibility of an underground system of transporting non-Iraqi fighters and suicide bombers into Iraq. Almost none of the suicide bombers in Iraq are Iraqi, and that speaks volumes to the tragedy today of how Islam becomes used by Arab extremism. Syria, like many other countries, suffers from this, but the United States is most bitter and most unforgiving in the Syrian case because the bombers pass through Syria.

I am convinced personally that America made many of its own problems in Iraq, but that does not matter to officials from the Pentagon to the White House. Suicide bombing is the ultimate effective weapon, and I can say truly, after years of watching this happen to Israel’s politics, that suicide bombing makes citizens crazy and political and military leaders rather desperate. This is what worries me about an American move to destabilize Syria, but I hear from many reliable sources that this is not imminent. On the other hand, the insurgency is relying in part on foreign suicide bombers who pass through Syria, at the same time that the Pentagon is feeling more and more pressure from the public and Capitol Hill about the failures of the war. In response, the key leaders of the war all pointed a finger at Syria. (See this Bloomberg news article.) That says to me that they may become more aggressive toward Syria in desperation. That is why now is the time to build up an alternative relationship between Syria, its neighbors, and the West.

Some call for a particularly grand gesture by the Syrian leadership, something that would have to be taken seriously by the West, even by the White House, something that would begin an alternative track of political engagement as opposed to just punishment and threats.

I can think of a number of gestures that would give everyone pause.
In direct response to the war it seems that Syria has been arresting militants here and there who go on to Iraq while at the same time ignoring others. It seems to me that a very public and vigorous set of crackdowns on religious extremists promoting or facilitating suicide bombing could help. Syria could join its neighbors around the Middle East for whom fighting this so-called expression of religion is a top security priority. It creates a bridge between Syria and all of its neighbors, and it mollifies to some degree a very angry Pentagon leadership. This move is good for regional security, but it is also good for religion if the Ba’athists do this in cooperation with the Islamic community.

On the positive side, one gesture that has been suggested at high levels is an offer by President Assad to visit Jerusalem. I would condition this suggestion, however. It should be accompanied by a prior statement that no separate deal with him would be made without a two-state solution for the Palestinians. If Israel refuses it would not be a humiliation for Assad. It would put him in a positive light in the global diplomatic community, and actually increase the pressure for a two-state solution.

Another might be a grand gesture of invitation by Assad to the Jewish community back to Syria for visits, overseen personally by him, and a permanent renewal of extensive cultural and economic relations, as a first step or a thaw in relations with the global Jewish community. This would put pressure on Washington to respond positively.

Another might be that Assad creates an economic free trade zone in Syria that is virtually ungoverned by any of the Old Guard monopolies.

Another might be the launching of a high-level collective security conference together with representatives from all of Syria’s neighbors focused on counter-terrorism, with promises of attendance by senior generals of the Syrian Army. This may force the emergence of a more “liberal” side of the military, thus isolating hard-line rejectionists who do so much damage in Lebanon.

The obvious expectation of a grand gesture has been the closing of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad offices in Damascus. Short of this Assad could make it clear that he supports Abu Mazen and the Palestinian Authority by investing in Palestinian basic services and education. Very little of the millions of dollars pledged by the Arab world has actually reached the Palestinian Authority, and if Syria jumped in first it may suggest an investment in a moderate future for the region and the building of an Arab democracy. The upcoming meeting between Assad and Abbas may be the first signal of this.

Syria is like any other country that cares about its sphere of influence, but there is a strong drive by some extreme elements to interfere destructively with neighbors such as Lebanon and Iraq in order to assure continued Syrian influence and benefit. This is no different than Pakistan’s disastrous interferences in Afghanistan or Iran’s in Iraq, or that of the United States in Afghanistan in the 1980’s. This is basic state interest, and is not likely to disappear in international politics. But the real question from the point of view of conflict resolution is can spheres of influence be mutually beneficial or constructive from the point of view of reform and democracy. For example, I believe an about-face that could occur would be for Assad, together with Syrian reformist expatriates, to set up a fund to encourage the strengthening of civil society and civic participation in Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine, and begin immediate deliveries to major reform groups. What a shock that would cause! Let Assad and his supporters become allies of reformers throughout the Middle East. He may not be able to overturn the Old Guard right now back home, for one reason or another, but he can certainly counteract their most pernicious regional effects. He needs at this time to demonstrate with actions his commitment to reform in the region. This way he extends the influence of Syria in the region but he does it in a way that endears Syria to local neighbors rather than Syria being reviled. This would undermine the Old Guard by competition with their interferences rather than direct confrontation.

Naturally these may be pipedreams, but pipedreams are necessary to at least point the way to new possibilities. Envisioning new reality in an experimental way is a core element of effective peacemaking. It sets the stage for the kind of pressure that can actually lead to positive change when the time is ripe for these ideas to be considered realistic.

Here is a final and most important point. No one really knows for sure what is going on inside the Syrian leadership. My suspicion is that, in addition to the challenge of the simple greed of a few of the Old Guard, a new Syria will have to be a place that guarantees some major role and some protection for the Alewite minority that stands to lose so much from a real opening up of this society. The relationship between the Sunni majority and the Alewite minority is a central crux due to the bitterness of what happened earlier in recent history. What was done to the Sunnis, and what the Muslim Brotherhood did previously to Alewites and Christians is well known by historians, and it is a lived memory of everyone in and out of power in Syria. I met a number of people with first-hand traumatic memories.

A rational way out is to begin the discussions now about how political and economic liberalization can be accompanied by realistic guarantees of freedom of religion and protection of minorities. In this sense perhaps a long-term vision is that the Ba’athist penchant for secularism could evolve into a Middle Eastern paradigm of a democracy that respects religion, that guarantees a culture that is open to everyone, but that does not tolerate intolerance. This would be a true restoration of Syria’s ancient capacity for pluralism, global trade, and high culture. Sunni Islam in Syria, and elsewhere, has to stand the test in an open environment of tolerance of so-called heterodoxies such as Alewite tradition and Shi’ism, and I saw some evidence of moderate Muslims eager to take part in this. Conversely, Alewites need to move toward a political and security environment in which they can be free without the need for an oppressive political structure. These are difficult balances that history is compelling everyone to face, but I am certain that increasingly open conversation about these matters will lead to some new possibilities. This is a matter of utmost sensitivity in Syria that is never really discussed, and that is the best indication that this is where the developing conversations and debates must ultimately go.

The evidence continues to be overwhelming from our observations that: A. cultural and religious actors can play key roles of both observation, bridge building and intervention even when official diplomacy is deadlocked, and B. foundations and the donor community, both governmental and nongovernmental, cannot keep pace with the flexibility of investment that our complex conflict-ridden world requires. They continue to lag behind in understanding and investing in a fast-paced approach to peacemaking that seizes opportunities, openings, and that invests in extraordinary people. Current approaches to funding are sufficiently inflexible and program-driven that the fast-paced and most promising opportunities of diplomatic crises are still not exploited. The most vital opportunities and challenges in many places, especially in Palestine, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, the Gulf, all continue to elude the very nature of funding, and the heroes of those places continue to go unnoticed and impoverished.

Our task then is not only to study opportunities in Syria, but also to provide a paradigm, as I have outlined above, of what kind of support is truly entailed by next-generation methods of effective intervention in fast-paced problems of war and peace facing the global community.

In a word, funding needs to go back to a paradigm of trusting relationships with proven actors and maximum flexibility over the short-term that combines with evaluation that is tailored to the necessary and agreed-upon modest goals of the moment. In other words, the field needs to invest trustingly in proven actors, but also needs to scale back the expectations that words like ‘peace’, ‘reconciliation’ and ‘conflict transformation’ seem to promise. Better to focus on the hard grind of measurable steps, like opening a toe hold in reformist activities in the public sphere of Damascus, because toe holds often become footholds which often become paradigm shifts which sometimes lead to peace treaties—but no starry-eyed promises. Just good, incremental trench work that is rewarded for its clear accomplishments.

We as a field can agree on the many trenches that are worth slogging through, the essential benchmarks on the road to less violence, such small progress in free media, to bits of progress in curriculum development, to women’s groups, to religious meetings, programming and education, to human rights, anti-discrimination and rule of law reform. Then we invest in the people who are making slow incremental headway in that work, or heroes who are making progress in great leaps. But we do not promise anymore ‘peace in our time’, just progress in our time. We leave it to the larger forces of history, or fate, or the Divine, to decide when peace comes, but we do not lay that incredible burden on individual actors and NGO’s. That sets up both actors and donors for disappointment, and we can no longer afford to pursue promises of peace that guarantee a loss of hope. We do not abandon all children in Africa because millions of children continue to die in Africa, but foundations pull out of peace funding because of 9/11. Why? Because we promised Heaven, donors expected Heaven, and then they were hit with reality.

The world of village-based development, by contrast, can promise that a certain number of children will be educated, inoculated, and provided with potable water, all promising and measurable increments. We need to value the increments of peace in their smallest components. The renewed life of a child in a village is a small piece of Heaven, and we should invest, but a single, new warm relationship between two religious enemies is a piece of Heaven also, and we should judge it by its reality and by its measurable impact in terms of networks and transformations of attitude among those affected. If the increments are good but not large enough to make an impact then we scale up the increments, build capacity, not denigrate the increment as useless. Yet so much superficial evaluation work, so many post-mortems that I sit through, do just that.

Ironically the World Economic Forum, unaware of its own impact and not self-consciously invested in peace work, has provided CRDC with exactly the kind of maximum flexibility that we needed to pursue this work in Syria over the past year. The aid with travel to the Dead Sea combined with a place for high-level conversations in a good, safe, neutral environment, all led to new opportunities that were seized upon quickly and decisively based on evaluations of both dangers and possibilities. Our intervention plans that worked could only have been decided upon in the context, not based on months or years of applications to agencies and board-based planning.

It was the product of relationships and flexibility working at their integrated best, and I am deeply grateful to the Forum for providing that backdrop. On a personal note, the Forum has provided me with the most exciting ‘work environment’ of my career. The Forum tends to invest in people, even though it also invests heavily in programming for the few days that it convenes. But a large portion of the time there is devoted to simple networking in pleasant surroundings between extraordinarily powerful people and extraordinarily talented people of great vision. Nothing could have taught me more about what I needed to know at the time than such a free environment with old friends and important figures from many of the major governments. The Forum has also given me a crucial window into a privileged world that responds in varying degrees of honesty and self-scrutiny to the criticisms that come from the rest of us. This has given me important insights into when social change advocates are engaging in effective pressure of global elites and when they are squandering opportunities to work with elites, a challenging balancing act.

Beneath the surface of this positive picture of what we have been able to do at the Center is the sad fact that without having our own program budget and by ‘piggy backing’ on other groups such as the WEF, we have not been able to take the Center to the next stage of activity. This would entail spearheading our own initiatives and timelines of intervention that could feature and include the talents of many gifted people, students included, who are associated with the Center. This requires an independent program budget of some significance.

Recently we raised $2000 in a very successful one-day training seminar, and we will continue to expand our seminar offerings. They can both generate the kind of influence we hope to achieve in the United States in general and Washington in particular, and at the same time generate much needed revenue. But we also need to establish specific funds for specific opportunities, and seminar revenues cannot begin to meet the scale of investments that we need to make.

That is why we are establishing The Syria Fund, which will give us the flexibility to seize opportunities to engage in this vital pursuit where citizen diplomacy can play such a critical role at the present time. There are also opportunities for citizens’ work to positively influence government figures to consider nonviolent approaches to difficult conflicts. Some of that has occurred with regard to Syria and significant meetings have taken place, but it is best not to document that work at the present time. What is clear is that our public efforts have had some wonderful, fascinating and paradoxical impacts. On the one hand, several Jewish newspapers and radio programs have embraced the opening to Syria by the Center, including the conservative Jerusalem Post and the Washington Jewish Week. At the same time Syrian opposition groups have been copying everyone on our initiatives, and finally—and this sent me into shock----Syrian security services have translated my piece, Winds of Change in Syria, into Arabic for the general public! We have also had pieces on religion and peacemaking translated into Syrian Islamic religious journals produced by a wonderful man, Sheikh Shahadi. He wants much more including some basic texts on Judaism. We could do much more with the right resources for this. Finally, our heroic Syrian partner, Hind Kabawat, is now being invited to significant diplomatic and inter-religious events, and this means that our Center has been responsible for giving birth to relationships and networks that will move well beyond our own personnel. I don’t really understand always how positive change occurs, but all I know is that we seem to be striking the right chords to be the bridge we dreamed of between many different enemies in the Middle East.

Please consider helping us figure out how to make The Syria Fund into a substantial resource for flexible and timely interventions, by pointing us to donors who may be interested, or by any other means you can think of. All contributions, large and small, are welcome. This is just the beginning, of course. Eventually we hope to be able to extend this kind of cutting-edge intervention work to Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other regions. Warm regards to you all.

Sincerely,
Marc Gopin,
Director, CRDC
July 11, 2005

©Marc Gopin, 2005