From bryancap@ocf.Berkeley.EDU Fri Sep 10 23:05:36 1993 Received: from monsoon.berkeley.edu (monsoon-ether.Berkeley.EDU) by phoenix.Princeton.EDU (5.65c/1.113/newPE) id AA25170; Fri, 10 Sep 1993 23:05:34 -0400 Received: by monsoon.berkeley.edu (5.65c/CHAOS) id AA07942; Fri, 10 Sep 1993 20:05:30 -0700 Date: Fri, 10 Sep 1993 20:05:30 -0700 From: Bryan Caplan Message-Id: <199309110305.AA07942@monsoon.berkeley.edu> To: bdcaplan@phoenix Status: R Hello Steve, I've been thinking about our discussion after the Tuesday section. Here are some of my ideas and questions. 1. You agreed that at least part of discrimination IS due to the Posner-signalling/information costs view. Well, how much? If blacks, for example, earn 27 cents less on the dollar, how much of this is due to the fact that there are negative work characteristics that objectively correlate with race, and how much due to purely malicious discrimination? 2. If perfect competition is such an important assumption, then we should expect to find that discrimination correlates with market structure. Does it? One obvious counter-example that comes to mind is rental housing. Here is a VERY competitive market (many, many sellers, easy substitution, etc.) if not entirely perfect. (As you point out, nothing is. I might make an exception in the case of the stock market.) But as far as I can tell, people think that discrimination is rampant in the housing market. It probably is, but not the way that is usually assumed. Namely, it is likely that race correlates to a high degree with failure to pay rent, among other things. Most landlords that I know of would rent to anyone who would pay the rent on time and not damage the property. But if they know that there is a correlation between race and lower landlord earnings, they will indeed "discriminate." And THIS kind of discrimination does not get competed away. But is it at all plausible to you that landlords would discriminate in the malicious sense to any important degree if this correlation were illusory? Moreover, do you think it at all plausible that landlords would SYSTEMATICALLY overrate the magnitude of the correlation? 3. You mentioned that you have had jobs where black workers were paid less. Haven't you also had jobs where indistinguishable workers of the SAME RACE were paid different amounts? (Even more common is paying different quality workers the same amount.) How much of this do you think is due just to randomness, and how much to discrimination? 4. If discrimination really ISN'T due to the signalling theory, then firm profitability should POSITIVELY correlate with the strictness of anti-discriminaton laws. That is, if discrimination is malicious rather than based on actual correlations between race and work performance, then if the government forbids discrimination, profits should go up! Has this pattern ever been discovered? If not, then the signalling theory has more support. Note that this test would also make sense if the signalling theory were, as you said, correct but exaggerated. (I.e., you said that hirers probably overestimate the differences in racial job performance). In that case, the anti-discriminaton law would just push firms closer to th cost-justified differential. 5. I found it interesting that you agreed with me that anti-discrimination laws and affirmatie action "short-circuit" market checks by making it illegal for firms to take advantage of cost differentials (in the former case) and, (in the latter case) making a diploma from Harvard differ in expected value according to the race of the holder. (I.e., since admission requirements are lower for one group than for another, the value of their respective diplomas differs). Doesn't this show that the laws are at least partially counter-productive? 6. I've been thinking about whether the assumptions of perfect competition, mobility, and information really matter. You seem very confident that they do. I'm not so sure. The really crucial assumption is profit-maximization. Even a monopolist would have lower profits if it hired less qualified whites over more qualified minorities. The assumption of market strcute matters, though, because the more firms there are, the wider the spread of "tastes for discrimination" there will be. But do we really need an infinite number of firms before it is reasonable to believe that at least ONE firm will be managed by non-discriminators? Imagine that there are only 10 firms. One of these will be managed by relatively non-discriminatory people. Shouldn't that firm therefore gain market share relative to its more racist competitors? It doesn't seem like you need more than a handul of firms before there will be a sufficiently wide range of tastes for discrimination that less racist firms will out-compete more racist ones. So I don't think that we need anything like perfect competition before the Becker competition process will kick in to an appreciable extent. Second, I don't think we need PERFECT information. Your statistics are hardly perfect, but if they were valid, there is a HUGE profit gain that firms could win by shifting to black workers. They don't need to know its magnitude PERFECTLY to know that it is large. (Assuming you're right.) Third, perfect mobility, while helpful, isn't necessary either. So long as there is SOME mobility, racist firms lose out to non-racist ones. Gee, if we really enforced this perfect mobility assumption to ALL of labor economics, there wouldn't be much left to the field. We would just say there were a millions of monopsonies in the labor market and have nothing more to say. I have more thoughts, but I have to go to class now. My e-mail address is bryancap@ocf if you'd like to reply. Sincerely, Bryan Caplan Hello, Steve. If I haven't already beat the subject to death, here are some more of my thoughts about our previous discussion. 1. You said that you thought that people who "caught-up" given a worse initial endowment were likely to be at least average, maybe above average. That's possible, but not too plausible. Other things being equal, wouldn't we always have been better off if we had more opportunities, a better early education, more interested parents, etc.? Even among immigrants, probably the most motivated and ambitious segment of the population, it usually takes a generation to catch up to the national average. One anecdotal case dear to my heart are my girlfriend's parents. They are Romanian immigrants, and they are the hardest working people I have ever met. But despite their education and ambition, they just haven't caught up to what they would have had if they didn't have language problems, years of wasted time, and so on. It would be quite amazing if, for example, people let in under affirmative action with, on the average, lower preparation, would, if they survived at all, be perfectly average. As for your group that you tutored, don't you think that there is massive self-selection? That is, aren't the very best students more likely to pursue extra help? If so, it should come as no surprise that THEY were all in the top half of their class. 2. I mentioned that restrictive laws in the pre-1960's south explain why the market's checks didn't stop discrimination. If I understand it, that is precisely the point of scholars like Roback and Walter Williams -- namely, racists typically make discrimination MANDATORY to prevent the market's natural tendency toward non-discrimination from emerging. Don't you at least think that pro-discrimination laws explain SOME of the problem? A common example given is the Davis-Bacon Act, which, I believe, requires that prevailing wage rates be paid to all federal construction workers. Wasn't the motive for that law to prevent blacks from competing away construction jobs by offering lower prices? One might also make the argument that discrimination is a sort of public good for all racists, so that if the government doesn't enforce racism, each racist might "free ride" on the discrimination of others. (Assuming that what racists want is a racist society rather than for THEIR particular firm to be racist.) This is another reason why really racist societies often mandate rather than merely permit discrimination. 3. One irony is that I think that most discrimination in our society is social rather than economic. I know of no of theory that shows that races will all learn to love each other due to market forces. But I do know of an economic theory that says that racist employers get outcompeted by non-racist ones. To the extent that market performance is related to certain social connections, and so on, you have an argument. 4. You mentioned that stockholders might want discrimination and thereby accept a lower return if their firm were racist. I find this very implausible, because (a) Most stockholders know little more about the firms in which they hold stock besides their profitability and (b) If they know anything at all, they will know if their firm is "socially responsible" or not. Since firms try to promote "socially responsible" images to investors as well as customers, it is quite likely that things cut the other way; being racist makes investors less rather than more likely to hold your stock. Incidentally, I was discussing the "social sanctions" theory of discrimination with Prof. Dickens, and he conceded that in our society, the social sanctions for being racist are probably much greater than the social sanctions for hiring minorities. Hence social sanctions encourage de-segregation rather than cementing racism, at least in our society. 5. Another theory of discrimination that I entertain (besides the signalling theory and the worse initial endowments theory) is that it is caused by a principal-agent problem. Hirers may substitute their own preferences for those of the stockholders and managers. In short, just as they might steal office supplies, they might steal firm profits by hiring less qualified whites over more qualified minorities. I'm sure this happens, but as I said, if management believed that this were common, they could INCREASE firm profits by adopting intra-firm quotas. They might tell their racist hirers: "Hire 20% blacks." This would prevent the hirer from substituing his own preferences for the good of the firm. Well, if this kind of discrimination is common, wouldn't you do that if you were the CEO? Are you confident that it would increase profits? 6. If you talk to any businessperson, they will tell you that people differ radically in all sorts of unmeasurable attributes: effort, interest, creativity, responsibility, etc. Since current wage equations can only account for (if my memory does not fail me) 30% of wage differences, isn't it plausible to think that non-measurable differences between people are ubiquitous and large in magnitude? Isn't it just perverse to do statistics on wages, and then attribute EVERYTHING unexplained to one factor: discrimination? Imagine, as I suggested, that we surveyed people's taste for discrimination and tried to explain wage differences on the basis of it. Wouldn't that like show that discrimination doesn't matter much, but rather "EVERYTHING ELSE" explains most of the differences? 7. If the signalling theory is right, then the crucial thing is to permit free flow of information. For example, my theory predicts that women get discriminated against because, among other reasons, employers fear that they will get pregnant and leave work after the firm incurs training costs. But if women could sign a contract saying that, for example, they forfeit their medical benefits if they get pregnant, then discrimination against women who have no intention of getting pregnant would disappear (though the wages of women who DID intend to get pregnant would fall still further). This system makes most people react with horror; but isn't it fairer to let women who want to get ahead and don't want children prove it to potential employers? 8. You mentioned imperfections in the capital market as an explanation for why you, for exAmple, couldn't start up a firm hiring minority workers who have been discriminated against. Well, capital markets sure aren't PERFECT. But do you seriously believe that if you could show a bank or investors that you were certain to make a profit that you STILL couldn't get a loan/investors? I think that the main imperfection in capital markets is in the area of human capital, since it is hard to offer collateral. But it is hard to believe that business ventures that would demonstrably make money (and with 27% lower labor costs, it sounds like a sure thing) could not get a loan. UNLESS... the discrimination is due to signalling. 9. After the riots, all sorts of shows came on comparing the living conditions of whites and blacks. Blacks, for example, are much more likely to come from a broken home, to have illegitimate children, to be on welfare, etc. Many people, including many blacks, discussed the problem of self-destructive cultural values in relation to this. That is, there are many poor groups that neverthless don't have these problems. (If you take the whole history of immigration, the case is clearer still.) Well, given this, why is it so unspeakable to suggest that cultural values influence economic success? Does anyone seriously believe that the economic success of Jews and Asians has nothing to do with their cultural emphasis on work and education, their family structure, etc.? What is so amazing about this idea? I agree that it is hard to measure, but it is evident that many groups with severe disadvantages, such as immigrants, get ahead because they have good values -- work ethic, ambition, etc. Why must we never discuss this in relation to racial discrimination? None of this is to blame people who had a bad starting point. But whatever your starting point, you are much better off if you adopt these values. ONLY talking about racial inequality as stemming from irrational hatred, and never from oneself is, I submit, implausible. 10. I must admit that I think that you really overestimate how racist people are. I am half-Jewish, but I have never once in my life heard an anti-Semitic comment said to my face, even though most people think I'm Anglo-Saxon. Are businesspeople really that demonic? I suspect that most businesspeople would PREFER to hire equally qualified people who have been treated unjustly in the past. Why don't they? Because statistically, the differences are real, and your profits go down if you follow your conscience. Sad, but, I think, true. Sincerely, Bryan Caplan