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NPT Provides Blueprint for the Future of Proliferation
Joel Censer , ICAR Intern
Posted: 06/06/07

The debate regarding Nuclear Proliferation is incredibly complex. In fact, while a large range of ideas and feelings regarding the spread of nuclear weapons exists, trying to frame the argument as that between only “optimists” and “pessimists” is an over-simplification. It is true that some scholars and legislators are “optimists” and believe that nuclear proliferation is not very dangerous and often quite beneficial. There are also “pessimists” who feel that more countries gaining nuclear access increases the potential for an attack.

However, to view all optimists and pessimists as being cut from the same cloth is negligent and irresponsible. For example, there are “pessimists,” who encourage nuclear weapons as long as they remain in the hands of a few superpowers. This is vastly different than groups who advocate for an eventual disarmament and end to all nuclear weapons. Consequently, a better understanding of the situation comes from understanding the historical context of the situation and the subsequent policy which has been adopted as a result.

The most relevant piece of legislation regarding proliferation is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT). Written in 1968, the piece of legislation is still utilized and has been signed by 182 countries. Countries who have not signed are India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea who had signed but recently withdrew. The treaty’s primary points are that the five nuclear powers (the United States, China, United Kingdom, Russia, and France all of whom have signed) are required not to sell, help, or encourage non-nuclear states in acquiring nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear states are, however, allowed to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. However, this development is supposed to be carefully monitored by inspectors and various third parties so as to make sure that uranium enrichment for example does not evolve into a nuclear weapon program. Additionally, the nuclear superpowers are not supposed to retaliate and respond to non-nuclear powers attacks with nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the treaty is supposed to create and foster an environment of international trust in which the nuclear powers should feel comfortable enough to ultimately eliminate their own nuclear weapons programs.

The treaty, which officially came into effect in 1970, has had both success and failure regarding proliferation. Its successes include the fact that 182 countries have signed on including all five of the original nuclear powers. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan, at the behest of the treaty, have changed their aspirations for nuclear weapons programs into a focus on peaceful uses of nuclear power or have dropped their nuclear programs entirely. Furthermore, it was the NPT which helped properly deal with nuclear weapons (which were located in newly created non-nuclear countries) after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Additionally, the treaty was renewed in 1995 and has helped paved the way for other anti-nuclear legislation including the Test-Ban treaty of 1996.

Recently, however, the success and effectiveness of the treaty has been in serious question. First, the treaty is undermined by the fact that about forty countries have the capability of creating a nuclear weapon if they wanted to overnight. Also, North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty and successfully (and without any retribution) created a nuclear weapons program, while others such as Egypt and Syria also seem interested. Israel and Pakistan, who have both completely refused to sign the treaty, also have nuclear weapons. Similarly relevant, a precedent of doing nuclear deals outside of the treaty was created when the United States signed the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act which promised that America would help provide India with civilian nuclear reactors despite the fact that India has never signed the NPT. The treaty has been even further undermined by the fact that the United States has repeatedly tried to deny uranium to Iran (seeing it as a type of “rogue state”) even though Iran has worked through the NPT in requesting uranium for peaceful power purposes.

So why after years of non-proliferation are countries beginning to want nuclear arms again, and is proliferation then a reasonable solution? Some would argue that proliferation has been happening forever, and is only now accentuated because the Cold-War paradigm has been replaced by a dangerous “rogue state” one. According to senior diplomat Thomas Graham the NPT was successful because “it relied on a bargain between non-nuclear nations that agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons states that said they would negotiate the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The nuclear powers promised the non-nuclear nations access to peaceful nuclear technologies in exchange for their forbearance and submission to international inspections.” However recently, Graham insists, none of the nuclear powers have shown any likelihood of diminishing or ending their nuclear weapons stockpiles. Furthermore, the United States has taken an incredibly abrasive non-proliferation stance in which, like the India deal, it picks and chooses who can have nuclear technology and who cannot. As a result, proliferation seems to be a response to America’s pessimistic and self-interested attitude regarding proliferation.

Is proliferation necessarily a bad thing then? Optimists would argue that the United States’s “pessimism” regarding proliferation makes the global environment more dangerous. Indeed, starting wars and creating massive unrest among certain countries over nuclear weapons is more harmful than some countries having peaceful nuclear power (and maybe the possibility of having weapons that they probably would not use anyway). Pessimists on the other hand believe that proliferation enhances the chance of a “rogue state” having a nuclear weapon. So should the United States adopt an optimistic policy regarding proliferation and allow more countries to have nuclear capabilities and possibly weapons or should the U.S. continue to often ignore the treaty and decide themselves who can be trusted with nuclear capabilities?

During the Cold War the Soviets and Americans agreed on little. What they did agree on though was the importance of nuclear non-proliferation. The weapons, according to Global Securities Institute head Jonathan Granoff, “are intrinsically immoral. They do not discriminate between current and future generations. They cannot distinguish between civilians and soldiers.” Thus, while diplomacy is good, sharing the ability to end the world is not. This is not to say however the pessimists have it right either though. Their anti-diplomatic efforts and fears often border on paranoia, and help foster a less supportive global community. More relevant, by isolating certain countries and working outside of the treaty the possibility of arms races become a real possibility. So the answer then seems to lie in the NPT itself. Countries that have signed and renewed the arms deal have to live up to the treaty’s pillars of punishing countries that do not sign it and create nuclear programs. Moreover, the five nuclear powers should support non-nuclear states that want nuclear power for peaceful means and have to make a commitment to actually living up to their side of the bargain of eventually depreciating their own nuclear stock and respecting international law. It is only through the strengthening of the treaty where a fair compromise between the optimists, and their insistence on a more open global community, and the pessimists, and their understanding of the immense and unfortunate power of these weapons, can be properly met.

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ICAR News Network NPT Provides Blueprint for the Future of Proliferation Joel Censer , ICAR Intern Posted: 06/06/07 The debate regarding Nuclear Proliferation is incredibly complex. In fact, while a large range of ideas and feelings regarding the spread of nuclear weapons exists, trying to frame the argument as that between only “optimists” and “pessimists” is an over-simplification. It is true that some scholars and legislators are “optimists” and believe that nuclear proliferation is not very dangerous and often quite beneficial. There are also “pessimists” who feel that more countries gaining nuclear access increases the potential for an attack. However, to view all optimists and pessimists as being cut from the same cloth is negligent and irresponsible. For example, there are “pessimists,” who encourage nuclear weapons as long as they remain in the hands of a few superpowers. This is vastly different than groups who advocate for an eventual disarmament and end to all nuclear weapons. Consequently, a better understanding of the situation comes from understanding the historical context of the situation and the subsequent policy which has been adopted as a result. The most relevant piece of legislation regarding proliferation is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT). Written in 1968, the piece of legislation is still utilized and has been signed by 182 countries. Countries who have not signed are India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea who had signed but recently withdrew. The treaty’s primary points are that the five nuclear powers (the United States, China, United Kingdom, Russia, and France all of whom have signed) are required not to sell, help, or encourage non-nuclear states in acquiring nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear states are, however, allowed to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. However, this development is supposed to be carefully monitored by inspectors and various third parties so as to make sure that uranium enrichment for example does not evolve into a nuclear weapon program. Additionally, the nuclear superpowers are not supposed to retaliate and respond to non-nuclear powers attacks with nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the treaty is supposed to create and foster an environment of international trust in which the nuclear powers should feel comfortable enough to ultimately eliminate their own nuclear weapons programs. The treaty, which officially came into effect in 1970, has had both success and failure regarding proliferation. Its successes include the fact that 182 countries have signed on including all five of the original nuclear powers. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan, at the behest of the treaty, have changed their aspirations for nuclear weapons programs into a focus on peaceful uses of nuclear power or have dropped their nuclear programs entirely. Furthermore, it was the NPT which helped properly deal with nuclear weapons (which were located in newly created non-nuclear countries) after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Additionally, the treaty was renewed in 1995 and has helped paved the way for other anti-nuclear legislation including the Test-Ban treaty of 1996. Recently, however, the success and effectiveness of the treaty has been in serious question. First, the treaty is undermined by the fact that about forty countries have the capability of creating a nuclear weapon if they wanted to overnight. Also, North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty and successfully (and without any retribution) created a nuclear weapons program, while others such as Egypt and Syria also seem interested. Israel and Pakistan, who have both completely refused to sign the treaty, also have nuclear weapons. Similarly relevant, a precedent of doing nuclear deals outside of the treaty was created when the United States signed the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act which promised that America would help provide India with civilian nuclear reactors despite the fact that India has never signed the NPT. The treaty has been even further undermined by the fact that the United States has repeatedly tried to deny uranium to Iran (seeing it as a type of “rogue state”) even though Iran has worked through the NPT in requesting uranium for peaceful power purposes. So why after years of non-proliferation are countries beginning to want nuclear arms again, and is proliferation then a reasonable solution? Some would argue that proliferation has been happening forever, and is only now accentuated because the Cold-War paradigm has been replaced by a dangerous “rogue state” one. According to senior diplomat Thomas Graham the NPT was successful because “it relied on a bargain between non-nuclear nations that agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons states that said they would negotiate the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The nuclear powers promised the non-nuclear nations access to peaceful nuclear technologies in exchange for their forbearance and submission to international inspections.” However recently, Graham insists, none of the nuclear powers have shown any likelihood of diminishing or ending their nuclear weapons stockpiles. Furthermore, the United States has taken an incredibly abrasive non-proliferation stance in which, like the India deal, it picks and chooses who can have nuclear technology and who cannot. As a result, proliferation seems to be a response to America’s pessimistic and self-interested attitude regarding proliferation. Is proliferation necessarily a bad thing then? Optimists would argue that the United States’s “pessimism” regarding proliferation makes the global environment more dangerous. Indeed, starting wars and creating massive unrest among certain countries over nuclear weapons is more harmful than some countries having peaceful nuclear power (and maybe the possibility of having weapons that they probably would not use anyway). Pessimists on the other hand believe that proliferation enhances the chance of a “rogue state” having a nuclear weapon. So should the United States adopt an optimistic policy regarding proliferation and allow more countries to have nuclear capabilities and possibly weapons or should the U.S. continue to often ignore the treaty and decide themselves who can be trusted with nuclear capabilities? During the Cold War the Soviets and Americans agreed on little. What they did agree on though was the importance of nuclear non-proliferation. The weapons, according to Global Securities Institute head Jonathan Granoff, “are intrinsically immoral. They do not discriminate between current and future generations. They cannot distinguish between civilians and soldiers.” Thus, while diplomacy is good, sharing the ability to end the world is not. This is not to say however the pessimists have it right either though. Their anti-diplomatic efforts and fears often border on paranoia, and help foster a less supportive global community. More relevant, by isolating certain countries and working outside of the treaty the possibility of arms races become a real possibility. So the answer then seems to lie in the NPT itself. Countries that have signed and renewed the arms deal have to live up to the treaty’s pillars of punishing countries that do not sign it and create nuclear programs. Moreover, the five nuclear powers should support non-nuclear states that want nuclear power for peaceful means and have to make a commitment to actually living up to their side of the bargain of eventually depreciating their own nuclear stock and respecting international law. It is only through the strengthening of the treaty where a fair compromise between the optimists, and their insistence on a more open global community, and the pessimists, and their understanding of the immense and unfortunate power of these weapons, can be properly met. 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