UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA II

HEADQUARTERS: Mogadishu

DURATION: April 1992 to present

STRENGTH: Approximately 15,000 military and police personnel and over 2,500 international and locally recruited staff

FATALITIES: 133

SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Mr. James Victor Gbeho (Ghana)

FORCE COMMANDER: Lieutenant-General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar (Malaysia)

BACKGROUND

The downfall of President Siad Barre in January 1991 resulted in a power struggle and clan clashes in many parts of Somalia. In November, the most intense fighting since January broke out in the capital, Mogadishu, between two factions - one supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the other supporting the Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aidid. Since then, fighting persisted in Mogadishu and spread throughout Somalia, with heavily armed elements controlling various parts of the country. Some declared alliance with one or the other of the two factions, while others did not. Numerous marauding groups of bandits added to the problem.

The hostilities resulted in widespread death and destruction, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes and causing a dire need for emergency humanitarian assistance. Almost 4.5 million people in Somalia - over half of the estimated population - were threatened by severe malnutrition and malnutrition- related disease, with the most affected living in the countryside. It was estimated that perhaps 300,000 people died since November 1991, and at least 1.5 million lives were at immediate risk. Almost one million Somalis sought refuge in neighbouring countries and elsewhere.

The political chaos, deteriorating security situation, widespread banditry and looting, and extent of physical destruction compounded the problem and severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Furthermore, the conflict threatened stability in the Horn of Africa region, and its continuation occasioned threats to international peace and security in the area.

EARLY UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS

Despite the turmoil that ensued after the overthrow of President Siad Barre, the United Nations continued its humanitarian efforts in Somalia and, by March 1991, was fully engaged in that country. Over the following months, the volatile security situation forced the United Nations on several occasions to temporarily withdraw its personnel from Somalia, but it continued its humanitarian activities to the fullest extent possible, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non- governmental organizations (NGOs).

The deteriorating and appalling situation in Somalia led the United Nations Secretary-General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), to become actively involved with the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

On 27 December 1991, then Secretary-General Javier P,rez de Cu,llar informed the President of the Security Council that he intended to take an initiative in an attempt to restore peace in Somalia. Accordingly, after consulting incoming Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, he asked then Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs James O.C. Jonah to visit the area.

In early January 1992, despite continued fighting in Mogadishu, Mr. Jonah led a team of senior United Nations officials into Somalia for talks aimed at bringing about a cessation of hostilities and securing access by the international relief community to civilians caught in the conflict. During that visit, support for a cease-fire in Mogadishu was expressed by all faction leaders, except General Aidid. Unanimous support was expressed, however, for a United Nations role in bringing about national reconciliation.

The results of the visit were reported to Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who then consulted with the members of the Security Council on the appropriate course of action. On 23 January, by its resolution 733 (1992), the Security Council urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, and decided that all States should immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. The Council requested the Secretary-General to increase humanitarian assistance to the affected population and to contact all parties involved in the conflict to seek their commitment to the cessation of hostilities, to promote a cease-fire and to assist in the process of a political settlement of the conflict.

On 31 January, the Secretary-General invited LAS, OAU and OIC, as well as Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid, to send their representatives to participate in consultations at United Nations Headquarters from 12 to 14 February. The talks succeeded in getting the two factions in Mogadishu to agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of the cease-fire, and to a visit to Mogadishu by a joint high-level delegation composed of representatives of the United Nations and the three regional organizations to conclude a cease-fire agreement.

The joint delegation arrived in Mogadishu on 29 February 1992. On 3 March, after four days of intensive negotiations, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed an "Agreement on the Implementation of a Cease-fire". This Agreement also included the acceptance of a United Nations security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, and the deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the cease-fire. At the same time, the joint delegation undertook consultations regarding a national reconciliation conference to which all Somali groups would be invited.

On 17 March, the Security Council adopted its resolution 746 (1992), supporting the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch to Somalia a technical team to prepare a plan for a cease-fire monitoring mechanism. The Council also requested that the team develop a high-priority plan to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The team visited Somalia from 23 March to 1 April. Following discussions with the team, Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed on 28 and 27 March 1992, respectively, Letters of Agreement on the mechanisms for monitoring the cease-fire and on arrangements for equitable and effective distribution of humanitarian assistance.

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNOSOM

On 24 April 1992, in response to a recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council adopted resolution751 (1992), the Security Council requested the Secretary- General to deploy immediately 50 observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu. It also agreed, in principle, to establish a security force to be deployed as soon as possible, and requested the Secretary- General to continue his consultations with the parties in Mogadishu in this regard.

On 23 June, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that both principal factions in Mogadishu had agreed to the immediate deployment of the unarmed observers. The observers would be drawn from Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco and Zimbabwe. The Chief Military Observer, Brigadier-General Imt­az Shaheen of Pakistan, and the advance party of UNOSOM observers arrived in Mogadishu in early July 1992. On 12 August, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that, after considerable delays and difficulties, agreement had been reached with the principal faction leaders in Mogadishu to deploy 500 United Nations security personnel in the capital as part of UNOSOM. The Government of Pakistan had agreed to contribute a unit for the purpose. The first group of security personnel arrived in Mogadishu on 14 September 1992.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Between 4 May and 19 July 1992, the Secretary-General's Special Representative undertook extensive consultations with various Somali leaders and Elders and other personalities throughout the country. On 22 July, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on the complex political and security situation in Somalia, as well as the desperate situation the country faced in terms of needs for humanitarian assistance, recovery programmes and institution-building. The Secretary-General concluded that the United Nations must "adapt" its involvement in Somalia and that its efforts needed to be enlarged in order to bring about an effective cease-fire throughout the country, while at the same time promoting national reconciliation.

On 27 July, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General's report and urged all parties, movements and factions in Somalia to facilitate United Nations efforts to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population. The Council strongly supported the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch another technical team to Somalia.

ENLARGEMENT OF UNOSOM

Following the technical team's visit to Somalia from 6 to 15 August 1992, the Secretary-General submitted his further report, dated 24 August, to the Security Council, in which he described a number of urgent steps, being planned or already taken, to mitigate the widespread starvation in the areas of Somalia most seriously affected by the civil war and drought and to prevent the incidence of hunger escalating in other parts of the country. Noting that the United Nations and its partners were ready and had the capacity to provide substantially increased assistance, the Secretary-General stated that they were prevented from doing so by the lawlessness and lack of security prevailing throughout Somalia. Looting, by heavily armed gangs, of supplies from delivery and distribution points, as well as attacks on incoming and docked ships and on airports and airstrips, prevented the assured delivery of humanitarian assistance by overland transport.

Given the difficulties, the Secretary-General concluded that the airlift operations - already being carried out by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), as well as by ICRC - needed to be enhanced substantially, with priority given to central and southern Somalia. In addition, a "preventive zone" on the Kenya-Somali border should be established for special deliveries of food and seed, in an attempt to reduce famine-induced population movements.

The Secretary-General recommended the deployment of four additional United Nations security units, each with a strength of up to 750, to protect the humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia. Also, in accordance with his earlier proposal, the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of four zone headquarters of UNOSOM. Each would be headed by a civilian official who would assist the Secretary-General's Special Representative in all aspects of his duties.

On 28 August, the Security Council, by its resolution 775 (1992), approved the Secretary-General's report and authorized the increase in strength of UNOSOM. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue, in close cooperation with LAS, OAU and OIC, his efforts to seek a comprehensive solution to the crisis in Somalia.

On 8 September, the Security Council also approved the Secretary-General's plan to deploy three logistic units totalling up to 719 personnel to support the enhanced UNOSOM operation. Consequently, the total strength of UNOSOM was to be 4,219 all ranks, including the unit of 500 authorized in Mogadishu and 719 for logistic units.

100-DAY ACTION PROGRAMME

There have been six main United Nations organizations at work in Somalia coordinating overall humanitarian efforts: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), WFP and the World Health Organization (WHO). In addition, more than 30 NGOs were working in Somalia as "implementing partners" of the United Nations. Moreover, ICRC has continued to provide assistance under the most difficult of situations. There are also many local NGOs that work with the United Nations and the international NGOs.

Between 10 and 12 September 1992, as part of the overall effort to accelerate humanitarian relief activities, the then United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Jan Eliasson, led a high- level inter-agency mission to Somalia. A major outcome of the mission was the decision to develop a 100- Day Action Programme for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance, for the period until the end of 1992. The 100-Day Programme was reviewed at the First Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held in Geneva on 12 and 13 October 1992 under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia.

The Programme sought to highlight priority actions which were needed to prevent famine and the unacceptably high levels of death and deprivation in Somalia. The emphasis was placed on those areas and populations of the country needing priority attention. The Programme also identified the additional resources required to meet its eight main objectives: massive infusion of food aid; aggressive expansion of supplementary feeding; provision of basic health services and mass measles immunization campaign; urgent provision of clean water, sanitation and hygiene; provision of shelter materials, including blankets and clothes; simultaneous delivery of seeds, tools and animal vaccines with food rations; prevention of further refugee outflows and promoting returnee programmes; building institutions and civil society rehabilitation and recovery. Donor response to the Programme was generally prompt and generous. Of the $82.7 million requested for the implementation of the Programme, $67.3 million was received.

From 3 to 5 December 1992, the Secretary-General convened the Second Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, at the Conference Centre of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Meeting was attended by representatives of donor countries and other Governments, Somali political and community leaders, and Somali NGOs, as well as regional and subregional organizations, United Nations agencies and international NGOs. The Meeting provided an opportunity to review the progress achieved in the implementation of the 100-Day Action Programme, the obstacles encountered and the work that remained to be done. The discussion also went beyond the scope of the Action Programme to address further relief activities, as well as the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia. One of the conclusions of the meeting was that the 100-Day Programme should be followed by a new plan for 1993. Subsequently, it was decided that a United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia would be held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 to review the Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for 1993 and receive pledges from donors.

SITUATION DETERIORATES

In October and November 1992, despite all efforts by the international community, the United Nations Secretary-General and his new Special Representative for Somalia, Mr. Ismat Kittani,1/ the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate. Somalia remained without a central government with which to negotiate. Mogadishu was divided by rival militias. Throughout the country, a dozen or more factions - some torn by internal divisions - were active. The resulting political chaos and the extensive physical destruction severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Widespread looting of aid supplies, robbery, armed banditry and general lawlessness compounded the situation.

Several of the Somali de facto authorities refused to agree to the deployment of United Nations troops to secure delivery of aid in areas of greatest need. UNOSOM troops in Mogadishu were fired upon and their vehicles and arms taken. Relief ships were prevented from docking, threatened and even shelled. Airports and seaports came under fire. Large sums of cash and relief aid were being extorted from donor agencies and organizations, and the lives of their personnel attempting to distribute supplies to starving people were being put in danger.

The net result was that, while relief supplies were ready and in the pipeline, only a trickle was reaching those in need. According to some estimates, as many as 3,000 persons a day were dying of starvation in Somalia, while warehouses remained stocked. Unless the problems relating to security and protection of relief supplies were resolved, it was believed that United Nations agencies and NGOs would be unable to provide the assistance in the amounts and on the urgent basis needed.

SECRETARY-GENERAL SUGGESTS OPTIONS

In a letter to the Security Council on 24 November 1992, the Secretary-General reported on the deteriorating situation in Somalia, with particular reference to the factors preventing UNOSOM from implementing its mandate. The Secretary-General stated that he did not exclude the possibility that it might become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort there. He cited the lack of government in Somalia, the failure of various factions to cooperate with UNOSOM, the extortion, blackmail and robbery to which the international relief effort was subjected and the repeated attacks on the personnel and equipment of the United Nations and other relief agencies.

The members of the Council discussed the Secretary-General's letter during informal consultations on 25 November. They expressed the view that the situation in Somalia was intolerable and asked the Secretary- General to present specific recommendations on how the United Nations could remedy the situation.

In response, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a further letter, dated 29 November, in which he outlined, for the Council's consideration, five options for creating conditions for the uninterrupted delivery of supplies to the starving people of Somalia. The Secretary-General also informed the Council of a visit he received on 25 November from Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, then Acting Secretary of State of the United States, who indicated that, should the Security Council decide to authorize Member States to ensure the delivery of relief supplies, the United States would be ready to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate.

According to the Secretary-General's letter, the first option would be to continue and intensify efforts to deploy UNOSOM in accordance with its existing mandate. The second option suggested that the idea of using international military personnel to protect relief activities be abandoned, and that humanitarian agencies make the best arrangements they could with the various faction and clan leaders. However, the Secretary-General considered neither of these two options to be an adequate response to the crisis.

As to the other three options, the Secretary-General stated that their purpose would be to ensure, on a lasting basis, that the current violence against the international relief effort was brought to an end.

The first of those three options would be for UNOSOM troops to undertake a show of force in Mogadishu in an attempt to discourage those abusing the relief efforts. However, the Secretary-General contended that a countrywide operation would be required to have the desired deterrent effect.

The next option would entail a countrywide action by a group of Member States authorized to do so by the Security Council. The Secretary-General mentioned in this connection the offer by the United States to organize and lead such an operation. In such a case, the Secretary-General would advise the Council and those Members taking part in the operation that they find a way to recognize the Security Council's legitimate interest in the manner in which it was carried out.

The remaining option was also for a countrywide enforcement action, but one carried out under United Nations command and control. This would be consistent, the Secretary-General stated, with the recent enlargement of the Organization's role in the maintenance of international peace and security, and would strengthen its long-term evolution as an effective system of collective security. However, the United Nations Secretariat did not currently have the capability to command and control an enforcement operation of the size required. He concluded that there was no alternative but to resort to the enforcement provisions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

The Secretary-General stressed that whether an action was taken under United Nations command, or by Member States with Security Council authorization, it should be precisely defined and limited in time, "in order to prepare the way for a return to peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building".

COUNCIL AUTHORIZES USE OF FORCE

On 3 December, the Security Council adopted, unanimously, its resolution 794 (1992), authorizing the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council authorized the Secretary-General and the participating Member States to make arrangements for "the unified command and control" of the military forces that would be involved. It called on all Member States that were in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make contributions in cash or in kind, and requested the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contributions could be appropriately channelled to the States or operations concerned.

The Security Council requested the Secretary-General and Member States contributing troops to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and their military forces, and invited the Secretary-General to attach a small liaison staff of UNOSOM to the field headquarters of the unified command. Further, the Council requested the Secretary-General and the States concerned to report regularly to it on the progress in establishing a secure environment in Somalia. It requested the Secretary- General to submit a plan to ensure that UNOSOM would be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command.

As to the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Somalia, the Security Council decided that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel of UNOSOM, authorized by resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August, should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary- General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground.

UNIFIED TASK FORCE DEPLOYED

The first elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), spearheaded by the United States, were deployed in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. In the following weeks UNITAF forces2/ expanded their operations to major relief centres in Somalia. UNITAF's principal goal was to establish in Somalia a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance. Once that was accomplished, the military command would then be turned over to the United Nations. In the meantime, UNOSOM remained fully responsible for the political aspects and for humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Good coordination on the ground and at United Nations Headquarters was established between UNITAF and the United Nations. UNOSOM remained in the capital, and continued to liaise with UNITAF and plan for the transition to normal peace-keeping functions.

On 19 December, the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a report in which he described actions taken to implement resolution 794 (1992) and set out his thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM and the transition from UNITAF to continued peace-keeping operations. The Secretary-General recommended that the Council defer its decision on such a transition until it became clear whether UNITAF had achieved its goal. He suggested that it should await the establishment of a cease-fire, the control of heavy weapons, the disarming of lawless gangs and the creation of a new police force.

In his further report to the Council, dated 26 January 1993, the Secretary-General congratulated UNITAF for rapidly and successfully securing major population centres and ensuring that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed without impediment. As to UNOSOM, he indicated that its major preoccupation at that juncture was the planning for the transition from the operations of UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The planning exercise, the Secretary-General pointed out, was proceeding smoothly in close cooperation and consultation with the Command of UNITAF.

PEACE AGREEMENTS

In the meantime, the Secretary-General convened an informal preparatory meeting at ECA headquarters in Addis Ababa from 4 to 15 January 1993, for a national reconciliation conference envisaged under United Nations auspices. A total of 14 Somali political movements took part in the meeting, along with the Secretaries-General of LAS, OAU and OIC and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn, as well as the representatives of the current Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

The following three agreements were concluded and signed at the meeting: (a) General Agreement of 8 January 1993; (b) Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament; and (c) Agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to help resolve the criteria for participation at, and the agenda for, the conference on national reconciliation, as well as any other issues pending from the informal meeting. Among other things, the informal meeting agreed on the convening of a conference on national reconciliation in Addis Ababa on 15 March 1993. The Somali parties requested the United Nations, in consultation with the relevant regional and subregional organizations, to provide logistic support both prior to and during the conference.

TRANSITION TO UNOSOM II PROPOSED

On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report containing his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He indicated that since the adoption of Council resolution 794 (1992) in December 1992, UNITAF had deployed approximately 37,000 troops in southern and central Somalia, covering approximately 40 per cent of the country's territory. The presence and operations of UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. He pointed out, however, that despite the improvement, a secure environment had not yet been established in Somalia and incidents of violence continued to occur. There was still no effective functioning government in the country, no organized civilian police force and no disciplined national armed force. The security threat to personnel of the United Nations and its agencies, UNITAF, ICRC and NGOs was still high in some areas of Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. Moreover, there was no deployment of UNITAF or UNOSOM troops to the north-east and north-west, or along the Kenyan-Somali border, where security continued to be a matter of grave concern.

The Secretary-General concluded, therefore, that, should the Security Council determine that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the latter should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter so as to be able to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia. To that end, UNOSOM II, under the mandate recommended by the Secretary-General, would seek to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure.

The mandate of UNOSOM II, covering the whole territory of Somalia, would include the following military tasks: (a) monitoring that all factions continued to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they had consented; (b) preventing any resumption of violence and, if necessary, taking appropriate action against any faction that violated or threatened to violate the cessation of hostilities; (c) maintaining control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which would have been brought under international control pending their eventual destruction or transfer to a newly constituted national army; (d) seizing the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements and assisting in the registration and security of such arms; (e) securing or maintaining security at all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; (f) protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, ICRC as well as NGOs, and taking such forceful action as might be required to neutralize armed elements that attacked, or threatened to attack, such facilities and personnel, pending the establishment of a new Somali police force which could assume this responsibility; (g) continuing the programme for mine-clearing in the most afflicted areas; (h) assisting in the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia; (i) carrying out such other functions as might be authorized by the Security Council.

Concerning disarmament, the Secretary-General stated that on the basis of the Addis Ababa agreements, a planning committee composed of senior officers from both UNITAF and UNOSOM developed a "Somalia cease-fire disarmament concept". This concept would require the establishment of cantonment, for storage of heavy weapons, as well as transition sites for temporary accommodation of factional forces while they turned in their small arms, registered for future governmental and non-governmental support and received training for eventual reintegration into civilian life. Cantonment and transition sites would be separated from each other to prevent any possibility of factions or groups seizing the heavy weapons. Those failing to comply with timetables or other modalities of the disarmament process would have their weapons and equipment confiscated and/or destroyed.

According to the Secretary-General, UNOSOM II military operations would be conducted in four phases. Phase I would concentrate on the transition of operational control from UNITAF. Military support to relief activities and the disarming of factions would continue throughout the transition. Phase II would be designed to consolidate United Nations operational control and would conclude when UNOSOM II was deployed and operating effectively throughout Somalia and the border regions. In phase III, major efforts would be made to reduce UNOSOM II's military activity and assist civil authorities in exercising greater responsibility. That phase would end when a Somali national police force became operational and major United Nations military operations were no longer required. Phase IV would concern redeployment or reduction of the UNOSOM II forces. The exact timing of transition from phase to phase would be determined to a large extent by political reconciliation efforts and rehabilitation programmes.

The deployment of UNOSOM II would be at the discretion of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the Force Commander acting under the authority of the Security Council; the deployment would not be subject to the agreement of any local faction leaders.

The Secretary-General estimated that it would be necessary to deploy a military component of 20,000 all ranks to carry out the assigned tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide the logistic support. In addition, the United States Government agreed in principle to provide a tactical quick reaction force in support of the Force Commander of UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II would also include civilian staff of approximately 2,800 individuals.

The Secretary-General suggested 1 May 1993 as the date of transfer of budgetary and administrative control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. It was subsequently decided that the transfer of the military command would take place on 4 May.

On 5 March 1993, the Secretary-General appointed Admiral Jonathan T. Howe (Ret.) of the United States as his new Special Representative for Somalia for an initial period of three months, effective 9 March 1993. He was asked to oversee the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, in addition to continuing the tasks of "promoting political reconciliation, coordinating humanitarian assistance and paving the way for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country". Earlier, the Secretary-General had appointed Lieutenant- General €evik Bir of Turkey as Force Commander of UNOSOM II .3/

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTS

On 26 March, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, adopted resolution 814 (1993), by which it decided to expand the size and mandate of UNOSOM in accordance with the Secretary-General's recommendations. It authorized the mandate for the expanded UNOSOM for an initial period through 31 October 1993. The Council demanded that all Somali parties comply fully with the commitments they had undertaken, and in particular with the Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament, and that they ensure the safety of the personnel of all organizations engaged in humanitarian and other assistance to Somalia. All States, in particular neighbouring ones, were called upon to cooperate in the implementation of the arms embargo established under resolution 733 (1992).

In other provisions of the resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, and with assistance from all relevant United Nations entities, offices and specialized agencies, to provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation. Such assistance should include economic relief and rehabilitation of Somalia, the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons within Somalia, the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country, the re-establishment of Somali police, mine-clearance and public information activities in support of the United Nations activities in Somalia.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CONFERENCE

As noted above, the deployment of UNITAF forces improved the security situation and facilitated the flow of food and other emergency relief supplies into the neediest areas of Somalia. The level of malnutrition and death from starvation fell dramatically in many areas. In spite of the improvements, however, the humanitarian and political situation in many parts of the country remained complex and tense. In the southern and central parts of Somalia, large numbers of people remained destitute and totally dependent on relief food assistance. Measles, diarrhoea and other infections continued to take a heavy toll, particularly on small children. Lack of access to clean water sources and poor sanitation continued to present major health threats.

In his 3 March 1993 report, the Secretary-General pointed out that a secure environment remained essential for the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the reconstruction of Somalia. He identified three major challenges facing the United Nations in 1993: facilitating the voluntary return of approximately 300,000 refugees and internally displaced persons; providing jobs and work for the many millions of unemployed Somalis, including members of armed gangs, militias and various private armies; and helping the Somalis in rebuilding their society and rehabilitating the decayed infrastructure.

To achieve these objectives, the United Nations, with the active participation of the Somalis, United Nations agencies, ICRC and NGOs, put together a new Relief and Rehabilitation Programme for the war- and drought-ravaged country. The Programme was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, held from 11 to 13 March 1993 in Addis Ababa under the chairmanship of the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. The Conference was attended by some 190 Somali representatives, as well as senior representatives of donor Governments, international agencies, regional organizations and NGOs.

The Programme, covering the period from March to December 1993, included activities in 10 priority areas: re-establishment of local administrative capacity; re-establishment of national and local police forces; support services for women, particularly those victimized by violence and trauma; return of some 300,000 refugees and over 1 million displaced persons within Somalia; development of a food security system; establishment of a basic health care system; increasing the availability of potable water and of sanitation; expansion of agriculture and enhancement of livestock; work opportunities for the unemployed; and re- establishment of primary education and vocational training.

At the Addis Ababa Conference, over $130 million was pledged by international donors towards the implementation of the Programme, which was estimated to cost some $166.5 million. It was anticipated that further resources would be forthcoming as the implementation of the various projects gained momentum.

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE

As the Secretary-General indicated in his 3 March report, ultimately all the efforts undertaken by the United Nations in Somalia were directed towards one central goal: to assist the people of Somalia to create and maintain order and new institutions for their own governance.

The Secretary-General and his Special Representative continued to give high priority to national reconciliation in Somalia. As agreed at the January 1993 informal meeting and following considerable preparatory work, the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia was convened on 15 March 1993 in Addis Ababa. The Conference was chaired by the Secretary-General's Deputy Special Representative for Somalia, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate of Guinea, and attended by the leaders of 15 Somali political movements, as well as the representatives of LAS, OAU, OIC, the Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn and the Non-Aligned Movement.

After almost two weeks of intensive negotiations, the leaders of all 15 Somali political movements signed, on 27 March 1993, an Agreement of the First Session of the Conference of National Reconciliation in Somalia. At the closing session of the Conference on 28 March, the agreement was unanimously endorsed by all the participants, including representatives of women's and community organizations, as well as elders and scholars.

The Agreement comprised four parts: disarmament and security, rehabilitation and reconstruction, restoration of property and settlement of disputes, and transitional mechanisms.

In the agreement, the Somali parties resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile their differences through peaceful means. They also agreed to consolidate and carry forward advances in peace, security and dialogue made since the beginning of 1993. They reaffirmed their commitment to comply fully with the cease-fire agreement signed in Addis Ababa in January 1993, including the handing over of all weapons and ammunition to UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

The agreement provided for a transitional period of two years, effective 27 March 1993. The transitional mechanism was to consist of the following four basic organs of authority:

Transitional National Council (TNC), to act as the repository of Somali sovereignty and serve as the prime political authority having legislative functions during the transitional period. To consist of 74 members - three (two men and one woman) from each of the 18 regions of the country, one from each of the 15 political movements, and five from Mogadishu;

Central administrative departments, to be responsible for the re-establishment and operation of departments of civil administration and social, economic and humanitarian affairs, thus preparing for the restoration of a formal Government;

Regional councils, to be established in all 18 existing regions of Somalia, comprising 3 representatives from each district council in the region;

District councils, to be established in the existing districts in every region. Members to be appointed through election or through consensus-based selection in accordance with Somali traditions.

The agreement also provided for the appointment by TNC of a Transitional Charter Drafting Committee, to draft a transitional charter, guided by the basic principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Somalia's traditional ethics.

In the agreement, the Somali parties invited the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to extend all necessary assistance to the people of Somalia for its implementation.

The Secretary-General welcomed the agreement as an important achievement of the Somali people and noted that it represented the first positive step following the adoption by the Security Council on 26 March of resolution 814 (1993). He urged the Somali leaders to proceed without any delay to work out the practical arrangements for implementing the Agreement.

UNOSOM II ACTIVITIES

THE 5 JUNE 1993 INCIDENT

As required under the Addis Ababa agreement and mandated by the Security Council, one of the crucial tasks that fell to UNOSOM II after it took over from UNITAF on 4 May 1993 was the disarmament of all Somali factions and armed groups who terrorized the people and obstructed humanitarian activities. The priority that UNOSOM II gave to disarmament generated the hostility of a few clan leaders, fearful of losing their power, towards UNOSOM. They had not only refused to disarm, but they had resorted to violence in order to frustrate efforts of UNOSOM II to bring relief, peace and development to Somalia. On 5 June, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 were missing and 54 were wounded in a series of ambushes and armed attacks against UNOSOM II troops throughout south Mogadishu by Somali militiamen, apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The bodies of the victims were mutilated and subjected to other forms of degrading treatment.

The Secretary-General, on 6 June, strongly condemned this "treacherous act" against peace-keepers "who were on a mission of peace, reconciliation and reconstruction", and urged "prompt and firm action" against "the perpetrators of this crime". The Secretary-General's Special Representative stated that the soldiers were "murdered as they sought to serve the neediest people in the city". He said that 12 of the soldiers were helping unload food at a feeding station "when they were foully attacked by cowards who placed women and children in front of armed men".

The Security Council, having heard the Secretary-General report on the incident, adopted its resolution 837 (1993) on 6 June. By that resolution, the Council strongly condemned the unprovoked armed attacks against UNOSOM II which "appear to have been part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate". It reaffirmed that the Secretary-General was authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks and for publicly inciting them, including their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment. The Council requested him to investigate the incident, particularly on the role of the factional leaders involved.

The Council demanded that all Somali parties comply fully with their commitments regarding political reconciliation, cease-fire and disarmament. It re-emphasized the crucial importance of the early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties and of neutralizing radio broadcasting systems that contributed to the violence and attacks against UNOSOM II.

On 8 June, 11 Somali parties condemned the attacks against UNOSOM II personnel and expressed support for Security Council resolution 837 (1993).

UNOSOM II ACTS

Immediately following the adoption of resolution 837 (1993), UNOSOM II began preparations for its implementation. On 12 June 1993, UNOSOM II initiated decisive military action in south Mogadishu. In a series of air and ground military actions, UNOSOM II removed Radio Mogadishu from control of USC/SNA, and disabled or destroyed militia weapons and equipment in a number of storage sites and clandestine military facilities. The Secretary-General, in a statement released on the same day, said that the objective of the action was to restore peace to Mogadishu "so that the political reconciliation, rehabilitation and disarmament process can continue to move forward throughout Somalia". He stated that this should be seen in the context of the international community's commitment to the national disarmament programme endorsed by all Somali parties at Addis Ababa on 27 March 1993.

The actions undertaken by UNOSOM II were strongly supported by the Security Council in a Presidential statement issued on 14 June. At the same time, the Council expressed deep regret at any civilian casualties caused, adding that an investigation was under way into the incident on 13 June which had involved such casualties among the Somalis. Preliminary reports indicated that General Aidid and his supporters had used civilians, including women and children, as human shields for attacks on UNOSOM II.

On 18 June, the Security Council condemned the practice of "some Somali factions and movements in using women and children as human shields to perpetrate their attacks against UNOSOM", and deplored the civilian deaths that had resulted "despite the timely measures adopted to prevent this from happening".

In parallel with its disarmament operations, UNOSOM II instituted an investigation of the 5 June incident, as requested by Security Council resolution 837 (1993). On 17 June, with mounting evidence implicating SNA militia in the attack, the Secretary-General's Special Representative called on General Aidid to surrender peacefully to UNOSOM II and to urge his followers to surrender their arms. He directed the UNOSOM Force Commander to detain General Aidid for investigation of the 5 June attack, and of the public incitement of such attacks. General Aidid would be treated "decently, fairly and with justice", the Special Representative said. However, attacks on UNOSOM II by General Aidid's militia continued.

In his 17 August 1993 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General pointed out that the short- sighted attitude of leaders of a few factions aggravated the already difficult situation. The ambushing of UNOSOM personnel on 5 June and on subsequent occasions left UNOSOM II with no choice but to take forceful action to effect the disarming required by all Somali factions under the Addis Ababa agreement.

The Secretary-General again pointed out that effective disarmament of all the factions and warlords was a pre-condition for implementing other aspects of UNOSOM's mandate, be they political, civil, humanitarian, rehabilitation or reconstruction. He also added that Somalia would not enjoy stability unless and until the criminal elements were apprehended and brought to justice as demanded by Security Council resolution 837 (1993).

RESOLUTION 865

On 22 September 1993, the Security Council, in resolution 865 (1993), reaffirmed the importance it attached to the successful fulfilment, on an urgent and accelerated basis, of UNOSOM II's objectives - facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the restoration of law and order and of national reconciliation in a free, democratic and sovereign Somalia - so that the mission could be completed by March 1995. In that context, the Council requested the Secretary-General to direct urgent preparation of a detailed concerted strategy with regard to UNOSOM II's humanitarian, political and security activities. The Security Council also approved the Secretary-General's recommendations relating to the re- establishment of the Somali police, judicial and penal systems.

THE 3 OCTOBER 1993 INCIDENT

Following the June 1993 events and as mandated by Security Council resolutions, UNOSOM II pursued a coercive disarmament programme in south Mogadishu. Active patrolling, weapons confiscations, and operations against USC/SNA militia depots were undertaken, together with a public information campaign to ensure that the population understood UNOSOM activities. Concurrently, UNOSOM II encouraged "cooperative" or voluntary disarmament by the Somali factions. UNOSOM II also continued its efforts to apprehend those responsible for instigating and committing armed attacks against United Nations personnel.

On 3 October 1993, United States Rangers4/ launched an operation in south Mogadishu aimed at capturing a number of key aides of General Aidid who were suspected of complicity in the 5 June attack, as well as subsequent attacks on United Nations personnel and facilities. The operation succeeded in apprehending 24 suspects, including two key aides to General Aidid. During the course of the operation, two United States helicopters were shot down by Somali militiamen using automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades. While evacuating the 24 USC/SNA detainees, the Rangers came under concentrated fire. Eighteen United States soldiers lost their lives and 75 were wounded. One United States helicopter pilot was captured and subsequently released on 14 October 1993. The bodies of the United States soldiers were subject to humiliating treatment.

Following the events of 3 October 1993, the United States reinforced its Quick Reaction Force with a joint task force consisting of air, naval and ground forces equipped with M1A1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. At the same time, President Clinton announced the intention of the United States to withdraw its forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994.

On 9 October 1993, USC/SNA declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM II forces. After this declaration the situation was generally quiet, but Mogadishu remained tense and, in the capital and elsewhere, major factions were reportedly rearming, apparently in anticipation of renewed fighting.

SECRETARY-GENERAL VISITS THE REGION

In October 1993, the Secretary-General travelled to the Horn of Africa region to consult with the leaders of the region on UNOSOM II's future concerted strategy for humanitarian, political and security activities, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 865 (1993). He discussed the situation in and relating to Somalia with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, President Hassan Gouled of Djibouti, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. The Secretary-General also visited Baidoa and Mogadishu, where he held talks with military and civilian officials of UNOSOM II as well as with Somali elders.

During his visit to Africa, the Secretary-General attended a meeting convened in Cairo by President Hosni Mubarak, then OAU Chairman, with the participation of the Secretaries-General of OAU, LAS and OIC, in an effort to help to promote peace and reconciliation in Somalia and to lay the groundwork for its continued reconstruction and development.

INTERIM EXTENSION OF UNOSOM II MANDATE

In a letter to the Security Council, dated 28 October 1993, the Secretary-General requested the interim extension of the UNOSOM II mandate, which was to expire on 31 October, to allow time for the preparation of an in-depth report and for "other related consultations".

The Security Council, by its resolution 878 (1993) of 29 October, extended the UNOSOM II mandate until 18 November 1993 and asked the Secretary-General to report before that date on recent developments in Somalia, so that it could decide on a further extension of the mandate. The Council reiterated its commitment to a future concerted strategy for UNOSOM II and to undertake "in-depth consideration" of the mission's humanitarian, political and security activities" on the basis of the Secretary-General's specific suggestions.

SECRETARY-GENERAL REVIEWS SITUATION

The primary responsibility of UNOSOM II was to ensure the safe distribution of humanitarian assistance, and to carry out an extensive programme for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia. Despite the deliberate attempts to prevent UNOSOM II from performing its tasks, the overall situation in Somalia underwent a major transformation: humanitarian assistance was reaching its destinations protected from attacks and banditry; starvation was largely eradicated; nutrition and immunization programmes were successful in significantly reducing the number of deaths from preventable diseases; return and repatriation programmes for refugees were initiated; schools, closed for three or four years, were reopening. Staff attached to the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM II were deployed in all the regions of Somalia and were working together with Somalis, United Nations agencies and NGOs in expanding rehabilitation schemes.

On 12 November 1993, the Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council, described the situation in Somalia and set forth his observations and recommendations. Stating that the situation in Somalia had changed in some important aspects, he pointed to the most dramatic and visible success in reducing starvation deaths and conditions of famine in the country. Significant improvements had been made also in the fields of public health, education, agriculture and other areas.

HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMMES

Education.

In the field of education, the Secretary-General reported that United Nations agencies, UNOSOM II and NGOs provided substantial assistance in rehabilitating the education sector. A large number of schools were rehabilitated. United Nations agencies and NGOs were assisting in re-opening schools, supplying school lunches, providing education kits, textbooks and incentives to teachers.

Health.

By November 1993, some 32 hospitals were operating throughout the country as well as 81 maternal and child health centres. One hundred and three mobile vaccination teams were covering the country, working towards sustainable immunization coverage. It was estimated that about 75 per cent of children under 5 years of age received vaccination against measles. Medicines, supplies, and other equipment were being made available to hospitals, health centres and pharmacies through United Nations agencies and NGOs.

City water supply systems in a number of cities, including Mogadishu, were rehabilitated. United Nations agencies and NGOs were continuing to pursue sanitation and employment projects with food-for-work programmes. In Mogadishu alone, there were 120 such projects that provided food for teachers and hospitals. Similar projects were supported throughout Somalia.

Agriculture.

According to the Secretary-General's report, in agriculture - which, historically, had been responsible for two thirds of Somalia's employment and nearly three quarters of the country's foreign exchange earnings - a good measure of success was achieved in reactivating food production and the livestock sector. The provision of seeds and agricultural tools, together with good precipitation, resulted in a substantial increase in the rainy season harvest. The delivery of relief food aid was adjusted to take into account the availability of local food supplies. In the livestock sector, the supply of veterinary drugs and the vaccination of animals facilitated the resuscitation of exports. An estimated quarter of a million head of livestock were exported since April 1993.

Commerce.

Commercial and trading activities were also showing encouraging signs of recovery. Commercial traffic at Somalia's ports increased dramatically since December 1992. Civilian ship movements at Mogadishu port increased tenfold in the first half of 1993. Joint ventures between Somali and foreign investors were on the rise. Telecommunication services became available in parts of Mogadishu. Local companies were also providing fuel throughout the country.

Reconstruction and recovery.

A draft framework for planning of long-term reconstruction and recovery was prepared, at the request of UNOSOM II, by a task force comprising donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs, under the coordination of the World Bank. The objectives of the framework were: (a) to establish a common vision of the economic and social reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of Somalia; (b) to identify criteria and establish priorities for reconstruction and rehabilitation; (c) to construct a mechanism for coordinated action in an environment of constrained human and capital resources. The third informal meeting of donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs, organized by the World Bank, was held in Paris on 22 October 1993. Participants reviewed the draft framework and discussed the next steps.

Refugees and resettlement.

By November 1993, of some 1.7 million people displaced as a result of the turmoil and the famine in Somalia, more than 1 million crossed into Kenya and Ethiopia. Over 250,000 persons moved to Mogadishu, and about 60,000 persons to Kismayo and Baidoa. The northern regions were supporting at least 250,000 refugees and internally displaced persons.

The number of refugees returning from camps in Kenya was increasing. It was estimated that about 70,000 refugees in the Mombasa area had returned by boat to Kismayo, Mogadishu and Bossasso. Assistance was being provided to approximately 800 refugees a week returning to the Gedo region and to those spontaneously moving into the Lower and Middle Juba areas.

POLITICAL ASPECTS

Speaking of political aspects, the Secretary-General reported that his Special Representative and his staff continued their efforts to rebuild political institutions in Somalia. Thirty-nine district councils - considered to be a foundation for civil government - were established out of a total of 73 districts, excluding the districts in the north-west and Mogadishu. In Mogadishu, consultations began on the establishment of district councils. Efforts were continuing to expedite the formation of regional councils - the next layer of political reconstruction. By November 1993, regional councils were established in six areas.

National reconciliation.

UNOSOM II continued to attach high priority to the national reconciliation process in Somalia. In this regard, it undertook to resolve conflicts at the regional level and to assist in reconciliation among the Somali people. A regional peace conference - convened in Kismayo, one of the most conflict-ridden areas of the country - brought together 152 elders from throughout the Juba region; on 6 August 1993, the conference participants signed the Jubaland peace agreement in which they committed themselves, on behalf of their clans, to end all hostilities among the more than 20 clans that inhabit the region. A series of similar reconciliation meetings were held in other regions of Somalia.

In the north-east and central regions - from Bossasso to Galkayo - the Deputy Special Representative and UNOSOM II political affairs officers facilitated the reconciliation of two competing wings of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) leadership in the area. Similar efforts by UNOSOM II included the reconciliation of clans in the north-west in Erigavo, and in the Gedo region. In Mogadishu, several meetings were held between UNOSOM II officials and a 47-member supreme committee of the Hawiye sub-clan. From 30 September to 1 October 1993, an all-Somali conference attended by 600 delegates was supported by UNOSOM II. Another pan-Hawiye conference took place in Mogadishu from 14 to 16 October 1993 with the participation of Habr Gedir sub-clan.

Re-establishment of Somali police.

With regard to the re-establishment of a neutral and professional Somali police force, as well as judicial and penal systems, the Secretary-General stated that UNOSOM II continued to support small locally based police forces in its areas of operation. Since May 1993, 5,000 former Somali policemen were hired to assist in the performance of police functions. UNOSOM II was finalizing a basic police training programme for Somali policemen. The United States announced a $6 million grant for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems, as well as a $2 million assistance programme for the police force and up to $25 million-worth of equipment. Norway contributed $1 million. Cash contributions were also pledged by Japan ($10 million), Italy ($4.5 million), Germany (1.5 million), Denmark ($0.5 million), the Netherlands ($0.5 million) and Sweden ($1.6 million). A number of countries provided police advisers or trainers.

In order to investigate violations of international humanitarian law, UNOSOM II was planning to establish an Office of Human Rights. A team of international specialists, in cooperation with Somali police, were to investigate violations such as mass murder of Somali citizens and attacks and threats made against international assistance workers and UNOSOM II personnel.

THREE OPTIONS PRESENTED

Despite the progress achieved in many areas, however, the Secretary-General stressed that UNOSOM II was at a critical juncture, as the situation in Somalia was continuously evolving. There was still no effectively functioning government in the country, no disciplined national armed force, and no organized civilian police force or judiciary, although impressive progress had been achieved in initiating the recreation of the police and judiciary.

UNOSOM II's record of general progress throughout most of Somalia was seriously marred by the incidents that had taken place between 5 June and 3 October 1993. Those incidents challenged the cause of disarmament and reconciliation in Somalia, created a situation of instability in south Mogadishu, and stimulated factional elements elsewhere to prepare for a future of renewed fighting.

The Secretary-General reiterated his firm belief that "without effective disarmament of all the factions and warlords in Somalia, it would not be possible for the country to enjoy lasting peace and stability". He stated that comprehensive disarmament would require the cooperation of the Somali people and of neighbouring countries, and would have to be conducted in phases, beginning with the demobilization and rehabilitation of the heavily armed militias. At the same time, disarmament must not destabilize the security balance and must equitably reduce the threat to all segments of the population.

The Secretary-General noted that voluntary disarmament did succeed to some extent both during UNITAF and in the early weeks of UNOSOM II. It was only after 5 June 1993 that it became necessary for UNOSOM II to resort to coercive methods to enforce disarmament in south Mogadishu. In this connection, he welcomed the unilateral declaration of cessation of hostilities by USC/SNA with effect from 9 October 1993 and invited USC/SNA to join the other factions in a meaningful dialogue.

The situation in Somalia, the Secretary-General observed, would continue to remain complex and complicated for the foreseeable future, and the Security Council would have to display flexibility as well as firmness in any decision that it would take while renewing the mandate of UNOSOM II.

Before presenting his recommendations on a renewed mandate for UNOSOM II, the Secretary-General pointed out that, following the events of 3 October 1993, the United States had announced its intention to withdraw all its combat troops and the bulk of its logistics support troops by 31 March 1994. He stressed that the troop-contributing countries could not be expected to maintain their generosity forever, nor could Member States be expected to maintain funding on the present scale. The Governments of Belgium, France and Sweden had earlier announced their decisions to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II. The Secretary-General wrote to 42 Member States inviting them to contribute, or to increase their contribution, in terms of troops and logistics support.

In light of the changing circumstances, the Secretary-General went on to present three options for the Security Council to consider in re-examining the mandate of UNOSOM II. Although it was not necessary for the Council to choose one of the options at the present stage, the time might soon come for the Council to respond to prevailing conditions and choose an appropriate course of action.

In the first option, the present mandate of UNOSOM II would remain essentially unchanged as laid down by the Security Council in its resolutions 814 (1993), 837 (1993), 865 (1993) and 878 (1993). UNOSOM II would not take the initiative to resort systematically to coercive methods to enforce disarmament. It was hoped that all factions, including USC/SNA, would cooperate to ensure peaceful conditions in the country. In Mogadishu, USC/SNA would have to remove its roadblocks and strong points throughout the city so that UNOSOM II could escort humanitarian convoys from and into the city. Should these expectations not be met, UNOSOM II must retain the capability for coercive disarmament and retaliation against attacks on its personnel. UNOSOM II would also pursue its present plans to re-establish an impartial and professional Somali police force and judicial system. The objective would be to create and maintain secure conditions for humanitarian assistance, foster national reconciliation, and implement other elements of the existing mandate.

Under this option, UNOSOM II would need the reauthorization of its present troop strength, as well as the deployment of an additional brigade. In addition, the Member States must fulfil their financial obligations, promptly and in full, of approximately $1 billion for one year.

In the second option, the Security Council would decide that UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods anywhere in the country, rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties in discharging its mandate, and use force only in self-defence. Disarmament would be entirely voluntary. Under this option, UNOSOM II would have to retain some capability to defend its personnel should inter-clan fighting resume. The emphasis would be on ensuring the unimpeded flow of humanitarian assistance, the rehabilitation of the Somali infrastructure, the repatriation of refugees, political reconciliation, the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system and keeping secure the main supply routes between Mogadishu and outside areas.

The troop requirement under this option would be approximately 16,000 all ranks, with one brigade deployed in Mogadishu, one assigned to convoy duty and one for the security of refugees and of critical areas in need of assistance. A Force Logistics Supply Command of about 2,500 all ranks would also be needed. The financial requirements for this option would be considerably less than the first option.

Under the third option, UNOSOM II would be limited to keeping secure the airport and port in Mogadishu, as well as important ports and airports in other parts of the country, to maintain open supply routes for humanitarian purposes. It would assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid, help development agencies and programmes, and continue training a Somali police force. That option would presuppose cooperation of local authorities and would focus on the regions, rather than on Mogadishu. It would call for the deployment of about 5,000 all ranks and a financial requirement substantially less than the other two options.

The Secretary-General further noted that, in the meantime, UNOSOM II troop strength was adequate for the present purpose. UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods to ensure a secure environment which, by and large, was lacking mainly in south Mogadishu. UNOSOM II would continue its efforts to initiate a political dialogue with all the factions, including USC/SNA. In this, UNOSOM II would seek and welcome support from Somalia's neighbours, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, and from OAU, LAS and OIC. At the same time, UNOSOM II would stand ready to protect its own personnel as well as the personnel of other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. UNOSOM II might also have to be prepared to use force to keep open the lines of communication and supply routes in Mogadishu and elsewhere.

On 16 November 1993, the Security Council adopted resolution 885 (1993). The resolution authorized the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry, in further implementation of its resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties among them. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to appoint the Commission at the earliest possible time.

Soon thereafter, the Security Council, based on the recommendations of the Secretary-General, established a three-member Commission of Inquiry. The Commission comprised The Honourable Matthew S.W. Ngulube, the Chief Justice of Zambia, as Chairman; General Emmanuel Erskine (Ret.) of Ghana; and General Gustav Hagglund of Finland. Mr. Winston Tubman of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs and former Minister of Justice of Liberia was designated as Executive Secretary of the Commission's secretariat. In accordance with the decision of the Council, pending the completion of the report of the Commission, UNOSOM II suspended arrest actions against those suspected, and, by the end of November 1993, all but eight detainees of General Aidid's faction had been released.

On 17 January 1994, the Secretary-General gave instructions to his Special Representative for Somalia to release the remaining eight detainees. He ordered their release in view of the Hirab peace agreement, reached on 16 January in Mogadishu between the Habr Gedir and Abgal sub-clans, as well as the written and oral report he received from Enoch Dumbutshena, the independent jurist and former Chief Justice of Zimbabwe, who had been asked to review the cases of detainees. The agreement emerged from the four-day Hirab Peace Conference which brought together 176 delegates, including chiefs, community and religious leaders, politicians, scholars and representatives of the Hirab sub-clans. Neither Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed nor General Aidid attended the Conference.

UNOSOM II'S MANDATE EXTENDED

On 18 November 1993, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, renewed the mandate of UNOSOM II for a period of six months, expiring on 31 May 1994. By adopting resolution865 (1993) regarding the establishment of an operational police, penal and judiciary system at the regional and district level as soon as feasible.

Emphasizing the relationship between rehabilitation and progress in national reconciliation, the Council encouraged donor countries to make contributions particularly to rehabilitation projects in those regions where progress on political reconciliation and security had been made. Member States were also urged to make funds available directly or through the Somalia Trust Fund for priority projects, including the re- establishment of the Somali police and removal of land mines. The Council welcomed the forthcoming convening of the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia in Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993.

The Council called on all Member States that had not yet done so to contribute troops and financial support to UNOSOM II on an urgent basis. It also called on donor nations to contribute to short-term, high impact development projects to establish links between political progress and reconstruction assistance.

Expressing concern at the destabilizing effects of cross-border arms flows in the region, the Council called for the cessation of such flows and reaffirmed the obligation of all States to fully implement the embargo on weapons and military equipment to Somalia.

In addition, the Council condemned the continued armed attacks against persons engaged in humanitarian and peace-keeping efforts and paid tribute to those troops and humanitarian personnel who had been killed or injured while serving in Somalia.

Also by the text, the Council welcomed and supported the ongoing diplomatic efforts made by Member States and regional organizations in bringing all parties in Somalia to the negotiating table.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

As requested by Security Council resolution 886 (1993) of 18 November 1993, the Secretary-General submitted a further report on 6 January 1994, in which he described the results achieved by UNOSOM II in fulfilling its mandate in the three interrelated fields - political, humanitarian and security.

POLITICAL ASPECTS

National reconciliation.

Having said that progress in political reconciliation and reconstruction was central to the success of development efforts and the securing of international assistance to Somalia, the Secretary-General pointed to two primary obstacles on the political level: (a) deep divisions between the two main factional alliances, the Group of 12 supporting Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed and USC/SNA led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid; and (b) the continued rejection by USC/SNA of all political initiatives undertaken by UNOSOM II.

A further attempt to stimulate Somali national reconciliation was made at a political meeting following the Fourth Humanitarian Conference convened by the United Nations at Addis Ababa. From 2 to 11 December 1993, at the invitation of the Ethiopian Government and with the support of UNOSOM II, representatives of the two main alliances, the Group of 12 and USC/SNA, met to discuss outstanding matters and disputes between them. Despite warnings from the international community that failure to achieve progress on the political front could drive away the needed international assistance, the factional representatives failed to agree on a structure for face-to-face talks between their leaders.

There were also sharp differences of opinion between the Group of 12 and USC/SNA on a number of other key issues, including the status of the district and regional councils, and USC/SNA's suggestion that the Addis Ababa agreement be revised. Moreover, USC/SNA continued to insist that the United Nations had no role to play in political reconciliation in Somalia, preferring this to be done by regional Powers, while the Group of 12 held the view that UNOSOM II should remain in Somalia and that the United Nations must play a key role in the Somali political process.

In his report, the Secretary-General stated that a key task of UNOSOM II would be to try to assist in efforts to facilitate the national reconciliation process among the Somali factions. Simultaneously, UNOSOM II would continue to convey the message to

Somali factional leaders that the international community was not prepared to wait indefinitely for an improved security environment in which to work on behalf of the Somali people.

District councils.

The Secretary-General reported progress in the establishment of district councils throughout the country. Fourteen additional councils were certified during November and December 1993, bringing the total to 53 out of 81 districts (excluding the north-west).5/ In addition to establishing new district councils, efforts continued in strengthening those councils already established. A team of UNOSOM II staff paid visits to each district to assess the particular support needed by local governments.

According to the Secretary-General, one of the primary obstacles to the effective establishment of district councils in Somalia had been the opposition of USC/SNA, which had refused to participate in the process and which had in some instances attempted to block the formation of councils through intimidation or the creation of shadow USC/SNA district councils.

Regional councils.

Since the Secretary-General's 12 November 1993 report, two additional regional councils had been formed, bringing the total number of regional councils to 8 out of the 13 in Somalia, excluding the north-west. Three more regional councils were expected to be inaugurated in the near future. In accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement, the primary task of the regional councils was to implement humanitarian, social and economic programmes in coordination with TNC and to assist in the conduct of the internationally supervised census.

Transitional National Council.

The Secretary-General reported that, with the exception of the USC/SNA faction, participants in the Addis Ababa political meetings expressed a strong intention to work towards the rapid establishment of TNC. So far UNOSOM II had received nine nominations for representatives from the 15 political factions, each of which might nominate one representative to TNC. In addition, regional councils, to nominate three representatives each, began deliberations for the selection of their representatives to TNC.

Police and justice.

Progress was made in the re-establishment of police forces and justice systems in Somalia. This was particularly important in the north-east, where no United Nations military forces had been deployed. UNITAF/UNOSOM II had re-established 107 police stations in Somalia's districts. Nationally, there were 6,737 policemen at the regional and district levels, 311 judicial personnel in 8 regions and 26 districts, and over 700 prison officers in two regions. It was also planned to put in place a Somali police rapid deployment force, known as Darawishta, by March 1994.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

In the humanitarian field, the Secretary-General stated that UNOSOM II had renewed its effort to place humanitarian programmes at the forefront of its work in Somalia. However, despite successful efforts to end famine in the country, there were indications that malnutrition levels were on the rise again in parts of Somalia, including Mogadishu and the Juba valley, two areas of ongoing conflict and insecurity. Consequently, the Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of UNOSOM II, United Nations agencies and NGOs had stepped up efforts to provide emergency food relief and medical treatment to the affected population.

Although insecurity in parts of Somalia slowed and complicated resettlement programmes, the Secretary- General pointed out, UNOSOM II continued to cooperate with UNHCR and other agencies to facilitate the safe and orderly return of Somali refugees and internally displaced persons. Particularly successful resettlement projects were undertaken in the Juba valley, where, since October 1993, over 3,000 persons had returned from camps in Kenya, and from those in Kismayo and Mogadishu.

At the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, held at Addis Ababa from 29 November to 1 December 1993, representatives from Somali regions, political movements and the international donor community reaffirmed their commitment to accelerate Somali control of the rehabilitation and development process. In the Declaration of the meeting, the participants reaffirmed the commitment of the international community to provide unconditionally essential emergency assistance to vulnerable groups. They also stated their agreement that the Somali people should be fully involved in the rehabilitation and development process and must bear responsibility for ensuring an environment conducive to it. Assistance would be provided in those areas where stability and security had been attained. According to the Declaration, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts should be sustainable and should contribute to enhancing efficient operations of the private sector in a free and open market system.

The Declaration called for Somali initiatives in establishing viable civil institutions and appropriate mechanisms to facilitate the reconstruction and recovery of Somalia. The Somali representatives committed themselves to establish preconditions to end insecurity; to establish regional development committees to prioritize regional development activities and mobilize resources; to establish a development council, composed of representatives of those committees; to accept the principle of the right of voluntary return of all displaced persons and refugees and establish inter-party committees to solve issues relating to returning refugees; and to establish mechanisms at the district level to ensure effective delivery of services.

The donor community, while regretting the absence from the meeting of important elements of Somali political leadership, recognized the readiness of many regions to create conditions necessary for rehabilitation. The donors agreed to support fully mechanisms established to determine rehabilitation priorities, funding modalities and implementation, and to develop a common approach among themselves for the allocation of resources.

They also agreed, among other things, to identify common security and institutional criteria for providing assistance to the regions; to provide assistance to prioritize development activities; to establish mechanisms for channelling recurrent cost funding in a sustainable manner, and to coordinate donor strategies for supporting Somali institutions of management and economic governance.

For its part, UNOSOM committed itself to work with all concerned agencies and organizations to strengthen coordination of all aspects of the United Nations efforts throughout Somalia - humanitarian, political and peace-keeping.

The Declaration called for an aid coordination body composed of representatives of donors, United Nations agencies and programmes, NGOs and other multilateral and regional institutions and organizations. Technical support for the regional committees would be provided by the United Nations Office of Development, under the umbrella of the Humanitarian Division of UNOSOM II. The Office would also serve as secretariat for the development council and for the aid coordinating body. The participants agreed that the Declaration should be translated into a plan of action.

SECURITY ISSUES

In his January 1994 report, the Secretary-General expressed his concern about the security situation in many parts of Somalia. Banditry continued to plague parts of the countryside. There were outbreaks of localized inter-clan fighting. A number of incidents involving threats and actual attacks against international agencies in outlying regions forced several NGOs to temporarily suspend their operations.

In Mogadishu itself, while direct armed confrontation between USC/SNA and UNOSOM II forces was avoided, armed banditry grew considerably, making movement for Somali commercial traffic, UNOSOM personnel and international humanitarian relief supplies increasingly dangerous. Security for international staff remained a troublesome issue. In a number of separate incidents, casualties were suffered by UNOSOM civilian and NGO staff, both international and local, on the streets of Mogadishu. As a result, there was a significant reduction in the presence of international NGOs willing to work in such an environment.

Disarmament and demobilization.

The Secretary-General reaffirmed that general disarmament was a prerequisite for the establishment of the peaceful and secure environment required for national reconciliation, rehabilitation and economic reconstruction. However, despite UNOSOM II efforts to promote voluntary disarmament by the Somali parties, there were growing indications that the major factions were actively rearming in anticipation of renewed hostilities in the coming months. The Secretary-General appealed to the parties to commit themselves once again to the disarmament process agreed upon at Addis Ababa and to work constructively with UNOSOM II in order to determine how to implement these commitments.

Deployment.

With regard to the deployment of UNOSOM II, the Secretary-General recalled having indicated in his 12 November 1993 report that - UNOSOM II would require an additional brigade to accomplish the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council. This would have brought the authorized troop strength of UNOSOM II to over 32,000 all ranks. However, over the preceding few months, a number of Governments had informed the Secretary-General of their intention to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II. Consequently, the strength of UNOSOM II at the end of March 1994 was anticipated at 19,700 (see Composition of UNOSOM II, below).

OPTIONS BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In concluding his report, the Secretary-General stated that progress in various fields notwithstanding, the mandate of UNOSOM II was far from being fully accomplished. He would consider UNOSOM II's mandate completed only when the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993 was fully implemented, culminating in the holding of general elections and the installation of a popularly-elected Government. Needed towards that end were the creation of a spirit of cooperation, compromise and commitment on the part of the Somali people and the continued involvement of the international community.

Assessing the situation in Somalia, the Secretary-General stated that without the continued stabilizing presence of an adequate United Nations force, there would be an early resumption of civil strife and an unravelling of all that had been achieved. The peace-building process, therefore, would depend on the willingness of United Nations Member States to see the Somalia operation to its successful conclusion.

The Secretary-General, however, expressed doubt that UNOSOM II would have the required level of resources after 31 March 1994, when the military strength would be reduced to 19,700. Although the Secretary-General had approached a large number of United Nations Member States for contributions to UNOSOM II's military component, not a single positive response had been received. Another important question was the availability of timely and adequate financing for UNOSOM II operations.

The Secretary-General recalled that in his 12 November 1993 report, he had outlined three options relating to the mandate and functioning of UNOSOM II as regards security. He had indicated at the same time that whatever option was selected, the United Nations would continue its efforts to promote national reconciliation and institution-building.

The first option, preferred by the Secretary-General, had to be excluded, however, due to inadequate human, material and financial resources. He therefore recommended the second option for consideration by the Security Council.

Under that option, UNOSOM II would not use coercive methods but would rely on the cooperation of the Somali parties. In the event that inter-clan fighting resumed in different parts of the country, UNOSOM II, while not becoming involved in the fighting, would retain some capability to defend its personnel. UNOSOM II would protect the important ports and airports in the country as well as the essential infrastructure of Somalia; keep open the main supply routes between Mogadishu and outlying areas; pursue as a matter of utmost priority the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial systems; and help with the repatriation of refugees. UNOSOM II would also continue its efforts to provide emergency humanitarian relief supplies to all in need throughout the country.

With respect to rehabilitation and development, UNOSOM II would coordinate its activities in such a manner that programmes of assistance of the international community were supported in areas of their choice. In this regard, the Secretary-General recalled that the donor community had made it clear at the Fourth Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa that aid would go only to those regions where security prevailed and where counterpart Somali institutions were available. As for the political processes in Somalia, UNOSOM II would continue to play a role as desired by the Somali people.

In recommending this option, the Secretary-General stressed that the success of UNOSOM II would depend on the cooperation of the Somali parties. It was "indispensable" for all concerned to promote national reconciliation in parallel with the re-establishment and strengthening of the Somali institutions of police and justice. "Should these efforts fail, we might witness renewed fighting and civil war in Somalia", the Secretary-General concluded.

SECURITY COUNCIL REVISES MANDATE

On 4 February 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 897 (1994), approved the Secretary-General's recommendation for the continuation of UNOSOM II, with a revised mandate for the following: assisting the Somali parties in implementing the Addis Ababa Agreements, particularly in their cooperative disarmament and cease-fire efforts; protecting major ports, airports and essential infrastructure; provide humanitarian relief to all in need throughout the country; assisting in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system; helping with the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons; assisting in the political process in Somalia; and providing protection for the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies as well as of NGOs providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

The Council authorized a gradual reduction of UNOSOM II to a force level of up to 22,000. In that context, it underlined the vital importance of providing UNOSOM II with the material means and military assets needed for discharging its responsibilities and defending its personnel. It encouraged Member States to contribute urgently troops, civilian personnel, equipment, financial and logistical support to the Operation.

Expressing serious concern at reports of a rearming and troop build-up by Somali factions, the Council called upon all parties to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II and respect all cease-fire arrangements and other commitments. It demanded that the parties refrain from acts of intimidation or violence against humanitarian or peace-keeping personnel.

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for setting up viable institutions and reconstructing their country, the Council approved that international reconstruction resources should be directed first to those regions of the country where security was being re-established. Resources would also be directed to local Somali institutions ready to cooperate with the international community in setting development priorities as contained in the Declaration of the Fourth Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa.

The Council requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with OAU and LAS, to consider establishing contacts with Somali parties to agree on a timetable for implementing the Addis Ababa Agreements. The objective would be to complete the process by March 1995.

The Secretary-General was further requested to report, as soon as the situation warranted, and in any case before 31 May 1994, on the situation in Somalia and the implementation of the resolution.

SOMALIA AID COORDINATION

The inaugural meeting of the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB), whose membership includes major bilateral and multilateral donors, United Nations agencies and non-governmental groups, was held in Nairobi on 1 and 2 February 1994. SACB was formed in response to the Declaration of the Fourth Humanitarian Conference on Somalia, which called for the creation of a new coordinating mechanism for rehabilitation activities. SACB is mandated to identify means of involving Somalis and their organizations in its efforts.

At the meeting, SACB endorsed the Plan of Action, prepared as a follow-up to the Conference, which reconfirmed that international rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance would be provided to areas of Somalia able to achieve sufficient levels of peace and security to allow long-term donor involvement. Participants discussed plans for donor missions to those regions. They also agreed to prepare a schedule for donor involvement and to plan for future emergency needs.

In view of the long-term nature of reconstruction and development programmes, the Secretary-General approved the transfer of the Development Office from UNOSOM II to a UNDP project on 15 March 1994. The Development Office would function as an integral component of United Nations activities in Somalia and in that context would cooperate closely with UNOSOM II.

NAIROBI DECLARATION

In February 1994, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Lansana Kouyate,6/ launched an initiative to normalize the relationship between UNOSOM II and SNA, and to assist the Somali faction leaders in restoring dialogue and personal relationships among themselves. To this end, the Acting Special Representative held a series of informal consultations on the overall political and security situation in Somalia with leaders of Somali political factions.

The informal consultations in Nairobi that the Acting Special Representative succeeded in convening in March to deal with the situation in Kismayo, where inter-clan fighting had continued since early February 1994, also provided an opportunity to reactivate the political process in Somalia. On 17 March 1994, Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed of the Group of 12/Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, leader of SNA, met in Nairobi, under the auspices of the Acting Special Representative. It was the first meeting of the two political leaders since December 1992.

On 24 March, after a series of intensive consultations in Nairobi, Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid signed, respectively for the Group of 12 and SNA, the Declaration of National Reconciliation. In this Declaration, the Somali faction leaders, inter alia, repudiated "any form of violence as a means of resolving conflicts" and committed themselves to implement "cease-fire and voluntary disarmament throughout Somalia". They also agreed to "restore peace throughout Somalia, giving priority wherever conflicts exist".

It was agreed that in order to restore the sovereignty of the Somali State, a National Reconciliation Conference would be convened on 15 May 1994 to elect a President and Vice-Presidents, and to appoint a Prime Minister, and that the Somali factions which had signed the March 1993 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and the Somali National Movement (SNM) would meet on 15 April 1994 in Mogadishu to prepare for the Conference. They would also discuss the establishment of a Legislative Assembly after the formation of a national Government.

In addition, on 27 March, the parties directly involved in the conflict in Kismayo - the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and SNA - signed an agreement calling for a cease-fire as of 27 March and a Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference to be convened on 8 April 1994 in Kismayo. The parties also agreed to appoint a committee to work out the details of its agenda.

The Secretary-General welcomed the signing of the Nairobi Declaration and congratulated Somali political leaders for showing wisdom and political maturity during the negotiations. He urged the leaders to implement fully the commitments undertaken in the Declaration and pledged the full support of the United Nations in helping the Somali people achieve peace and stability.

However, the ongoing factional disputes and conflicts and disagreements concerning modalities led to repeated postponements of the preparatory meeting for the National Reconciliation Conference.

As to the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference, after considerable delays, it was held from 24 May to 19 June 1994 at Kismayo. The Conference resulted in the signing of a nine-point agreement including a general cease-fire to take effect in the region on 24 June 1994. On 19 June, General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan" (SPM) and Mr. Osman Atto (SNA) - the leaders of the two dominant factions in the area - signed a statement pledging the support of their factions for implementation of the Agreement.

UNOSOM'S MANDATE FURTHER EXTENDED

The Secretary-General further reported to the Security Council on the situation in Somalia on 24 May 1994. He informed the Council of the difficulties encountered in convening the preparatory meeting and the National Reconciliation Conference. The security situation in Somalia was deteriorating; inter-clan fighting and banditry were on the rise, and various factions were making an effort to rearm. Personnel from UNOSOM, as well as those from humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations, were threatened, attacked and sometimes kidnapped by uncontrolled armed elements.

In reviewing the humanitarian situation, the Secretary-General stated that despite the progress made in 1993, the emergency situation continued and the welfare of large numbers of Somalis remained at risk. Security problems still plagued relief efforts, affecting both the safety of humanitarian personnel and the regularity and efficiency of delivering assistance. While the repatriation of the Somali refugees continued, security problems and shortfalls in resources slowed the programme, forcing UNHCR to issue an urgent appeal for additional funds.

The Secretary-General noted further that the outbreak of a cholera epidemic in February 1994 had created an unexpected health emergency. Under the auspices of UNOSOM, a Cholera Task Force had quickly been established to coordinate the efforts to contain the epidemic. Responses to new outbreaks had been prompt, resulting in a low fatality rate. The epidemic, however, was not expected to be fully under control before the end of June.

In the report, the Secretary-General also described the police and justice programme, as well as programmes relating to disarmament and demobilization, and demining.

In concluding, the Secretary-General stated that, despite his negative assessment of the political and security situations, he believed that "the Somali people deserve a last chance". But this must be firmly tied to evidence of serious and productive pursuit of the reconciliation process, strict observance of the cease-fire and cooperation with UNOSOM II in preventing the recurrence of clashes and resolving local clan and factional conflicts. He recommended that the Security Council extend UNOSOM II's mandate for a six- month period.

The Secretary-General noted that his recommendation was based on the assumption that the Somali leaders would prove able and willing to pursue the path to political reconciliation. Should that not be the case, he stated that he would not rule out recommending that the Council consider the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in part or in full.

The Security Council, by its resolution923 (1994) of 31 May 1994, renewed the mandate of UNOSOM II until 30 September 1994, subject to a review no later than 29 July, after which the Council might request the Secretary-General to prepare options regarding UNOSOM's mandate and future operations.

The Council demanded that all parties in Somalia refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against personnel engaged in humanitarian or peace-keeping work in the country. The parties were strongly urged to cooperate fully with UNOSOM II, carry out their commitments and implement the agreements which they had signed, including those relating to voluntary disarmament, and to pursue without delay the negotiations aimed at achieving national reconciliation.

LITTLE PROGRESS REPORTED

As requested by the Security Council, the Secretary-General submitted his report on 18 July 1994. In that document he reviewed the humanitarian, political and security situation in Somalia. He stated that UNOSOM II continued efforts to improve the overall situation in the country, which was significantly better than when UNOSOM had first been deployed but worse than at the time of his 24 May 1994 report.

In the humanitarian field, the Secretary-General reported some progress in overcoming the emergency situation and moving into the recovery phase by improving the situation of the most vulnerable, particularly women and children, and finding lasting solutions to the plight of the refugees and internally displaced persons. In many regions daily life was returning to normal and agricultural production was recovering. The potentially catastrophic cholera outbreak had been contained. The Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of UNOSOM II continued its efforts to coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance throughout the country. There had been, at the same time, several important setbacks, which included the interruption, for security reasons, of the activities of WFP in Kismayo as well as those of UNHCR in Afmadu and Buale and the Save the Children Fund (United Kingdom) in Mogadishu.

Analysing the security situation, the Secretary-General noted that it had been marred by clashes among clans and sub-clans, especially in Mogadishu, and by a further increase in banditry. The recurring outbreaks of inter-clan fighting had brought, for several weeks, all humanitarian activities in Mogadishu and its immediate vicinity to a near-standstill. In addition to the deterioration in the security situation, there had been attacks against UNOSOM II personnel resulting in a number of fatal casualties.

In accordance with its concept of operations, UNOSOM II had focused on consolidating activities both inside Mogadishu and in outlying areas by securing key installations and facilities, maintaining presence along key routes and within areas of responsibility through patrolling, and providing security for humanitarian aid convoys. In addition, UNOSOM II had intensified its work related to the training of local police personnel. As of 8 July 1994, police recruits totalled 7,869, and 96 of the 125 police stations had become operational. The mission also continued its work in the judicial, correctional, juvenile justice, crime prevention and human rights fields. As at 10 July, the force strength of UNOSOM II was 18,790.

As to the national reconciliation process, the Secretary-General stated that no progress had been achieved in this regard, and that the repeated postponements of the National Reconciliation Conference and its preparatory meeting, the emergence of new subgroups and the lack of a clear reconciliation process had created the impression that the talks between Somali leaders could continue indefinitely. Some of them still seemed not ready to subordinate their personal ambitions for power to the cause of peace and stability in Somalia.

The Secretary-General indicated that the national reconciliation process was advancing at so slow a pace that there was "little or no reason" to believe that the target of completing the process by March 1995 could be achieved. He stressed to the Somali leaders that the international commitment to assist Somalia could not continue indefinitely and that it was essential that they redouble their efforts to reach agreement on the basis of pluralism and mutual tolerance.

The Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had asked his newly appointed Special Representative, Mr. James Victor Gbeho,7/ to prepare an in-depth assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia and that he had decided to undertake a comprehensive review of the current troop strength of UNOSOM II. He observed that any success of UNOSOM II in improving security conditions had been achieved by diplomatic rather than military means. Accordingly, he intended to dispatch a special mission to discuss with the Special Representative and the Force Commander the feasibility of a reduction in the troop level currently assigned to UNOSOM II, taking into account the views of the humanitarian agencies and the non-governmental organizations.

On 28 July, the Council, in a letter to the Secretary-General, expressed concern at the very little forward movement in the Somali national reconciliation process and at the deterioration in the security situation in the country. It welcomed the Secretary-General's initiative and requested him to present recommendations on the future size of UNOSOM II as soon as possible.

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROSPECTS

On 17 August, the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council a report containing an assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia.

According to the report, it was generally acknowledged that conflicts within the dominant Hawiye clan, to which both Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Farah Aidid belonged, constituted the major obstacle to national reconciliation. It was equally recognized that no meaningful progress could be made in the political process without first finding a solution to the conflict in Mogadishu, and in particular the conflict among the Hawiye sub-clans (Habr Gedir, Abgal, Hawadle and Murosade). The root causes of dissension and tension among the 15 factions were also by and large attributable to rivalries within the Hawiye clan. After all, it was the intra-Hawiye feud that had started the crisis in Mogadishu and its environs in 1991 and was the main cause of the resumption of fighting since June 1994.

It was the view of the Secretary-General's Special Representative that if Hawiye reconciliation could be attained and the differences between Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid resolved, the prospects for national reconciliation and the establishment of a national government would be significantly improved. Both General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi had expressed their willingness to participate in a Hawiye reconciliation conference with the cooperation of other concerned factions and political leaders.

The Special Representative believed that with the cooperation of the parties concerned and the support of the international community, the reconciliation of the Hawiye should be achieved in good time to create a favourable climate for the convening of a conference on national reconciliation and the establishment of an interim government in the last quarter of 1994. This would leave three months for consolidating agreed transitional arrangements for the interim government before the scheduled completion of the mission of UNOSOM II at the end of March 1995.

The Secretary-General said that he was inclined to agree with the Special Representative's assessment that the successful conclusion of the Hawiye conference would greatly facilitate the political reconciliation process. Although there were no clear signs that the parties were preparing for a Hawiye conference, he nevertheless instructed the Special Representative to provide all possible support to the efforts deployed by the parties concerned to convene such a conference.

REDUCTION IN STRENGTH PROPOSED

In his 17 August report, the Secretary-General also informed the Council on the results of the special mission dispatched to Somalia to discuss the feasibility of a reduction in the UNOSOM II troop level. The mission had visited the country from 28 July to 4 August 1994.

In the mission's discussions with the Special Representative and the Force Commander, a consensus had been reached to reduce the UNOSOM II force to about 17,200 all ranks by the end of September 1994. The authorized strength of the Force was then 22,000 all ranks and the actual strength as of 2 August was 18,761. The Force would continue to perform the tasks assigned to it under Security Council resolution 897 (1994) of 4 February 1994.

The special mission recommended that any further reductions should be carefully decided and take into account evolving circumstances. UNOSOM II stressed that a troop level of approximately 15,000 represented the critical minimum below which the mandated tasks could not be implemented. The gradual reduction to the level of 15,000 could be achieved by the end of October or during November 1994.

COUNCIL EXPRESSES GRAVE CONCERN

On 25 August, the Security Council, in a Presidential statement, expressed grave concern regarding the deteriorating security situation in Somalia and deplored attacks and harassment directed against UNOSOM II and other international personnel. The Council was also concerned by the lack of progress toward reconciliation among Somali factions, and attached great importance to an accelerated inter-clan reconciliation, in particular, among the Hawiye sub-clans, with the involvement of all concerned.

The Council believed that the Secretary-General's proposed initial reduction of the UNOSOM II Force was appropriate, and stressed that priority attention should be given to ensuring the security of UNOSOM II and other international personnel, including the staff of NGOs. It invited the Secretary-General to submit, well before 30 September 1994, a report on prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia and on the possible options for the future of UNOSOM II.

In the following weeks, the Secretary-General's Special Representative conducted intensive consultations with Mr. Ali Mahdi, General Aidid and the Imam of Hirab, Imam Mahamoud Imam Omar, concerning arrangements for convening the Hawiye peace conference and the national reconciliation conference.

The Imam of Hirab advised the Special Representative that it would be necessary to arrange separate meetings between the Habr Gedir and the other sub-clans before proceeding to a plenary session of the Hawiye peace conference. Several such meetings were convened with some positive results.

As requested by the Security Council, the Secretary-General reported to it on 17 September. That report described the efforts aimed at convening the Hawiye peace conference and other efforts to further the national reconciliation process.

The Secretary-General also referred to the deteriorating security situation which had forced the UNOSOM Force Commander to begin concentrating his troops in four key areas. The purpose of concentration was to avoid the repetition of the kind of incident that occurred in Belet Weyne on 29 July 1994 when a small UNOSOM contingent was overrun by a strong militia force. As a result of the concentration of forces and the reduction process, troops had been withdrawn from Bardera, Hoddur, Wajid and Balad. It was expected that by the end of October, UNOSOM II would be concentrated mainly in three locations: Mogadishu area, Baidoa and Kismayo.

In concluding his report, the Secretary-General indicated that the end of September would be a crucial period for both the national reconciliation process and the continued involvement of the United Nations in Somalia. In view of the current developments, as well as the assessment of the situation on the ground that was being undertaken by the Secretariat, the Secretary-General expected to be in a position by mid-October to submit to the Council his assessment of the prospects for national reconciliation and recommendations for the future of the United Nations operation in Somalia. In the meantime, he recommended that the Council consider extending the mandate of UNOSOM II for a period of one month.

On 30 September, the Security Council, by its resolution 946 (1994), extended the mandate of UNOSOM II until 31 October 1994. It also encouraged the Secretary-General to continue with and intensify preparations for possible contingency arrangements, including the withdrawal of UNOSOM II within a specified time-frame.

SECRETARY-GENERAL ASSESSES SITUATION

The Secretary-General submitted his further report on 14 October. The report also reflected upon the results of the visit to Somalia by Mr. Kofi A. Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations.

In the report, the Secretary-General reiterated his view that the process of national reconciliation had not kept pace with achievements in the humanitarian area and that security had been progressively deteriorating, especially in Mogadishu. The Somali leaders still had not carried out commitments entered into under the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Nairobi Declaration. UNOSOM's goal of assisting the process of political reconciliation was becoming ever more elusive, while the burden and cost of maintaining a high troop level was proving increasingly difficult for Member States to justify.

The protracted political impasse, the Secretary-General continued, had created a vacuum of civil authority and of governmental structure in Somalia, leaving the United Nations with no function to build on. The presence of UNOSOM II troops had had limited impact on the peace process and on security in the face of continuing inter-clan fighting and banditry. If the Council maintained its previous decision to end the Mission in March 1995 and to withdraw all UNOSOM II forces and assets, time would be required to ensure that the withdrawal took place in a secure, orderly and expeditious manner. This might take as long as 120 days. Extensive air and sea support from Member States might also be required.

In the light of those considerations, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council extend the Mission's mandate until 31 March 1995. He believed that the five-month extension would give the Somali leaders time to begin consolidating any positive achievements which might arise from the ongoing process of political reconciliation. Accordingly, the Secretary-General instructed his Special Representative to maintain his efforts to help the Somali leaders achieve national reconciliation.

The Secretary-General noted that the humanitarian organizations were committed to continuing their work in Somalia, but they could only go on doing so in a secure environment. Somali leaders would bear the ultimate responsibility for the safety of international and national relief personnel and their assets.

In concluding his report, the Secretary-General stated that the establishment of a viable and acceptable peace could only come from the Somalis themselves. The international community could not impose peace on the people of Somalia; it could only assist in the process of re-establishing peace and security there. Such assistance, however, could not be sustained indefinitely. But the withdrawal of UNOSOM II would not mean United Nations abandonment of Somalia. Should the Somali leaders succeed in creating and maintaining favourable security conditions, the United Nations and the international community could continue to play a role in the country's rehabilitation and reconstruction. The United Nations could also retain a certain presence after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, to continue assisting the Somali political organizations and factions in the process of national reconciliation. However, the Secretary-General warned that the feasibility of international assistance of this kind would be very much dependent on the degree of security prevailing in the country.

SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION TO SOMALIA

In its resolution 946 (1994), the Security Council declared its readiness to consider sending a mission to Somalia to convey directly to the Somali political parties the Council's views on the situation in that country, and on the future of the United Nations involvement there. At its consultations held on 20 October, the Council decided to send such a mission to Somalia.

The seven-member mission, which was headed by Ambassador Colin Keating, Permanent Representative of New Zealand, left for Somalia on 24 October and returned on 29 October. Its programme of work included meetings with the leaders of the Somali factions, briefings from the Special Representative and the UNOSOM II Force Commander. The mission also had a meeting with representatives of United Nations agencies and NGOs operating in Somalia.

The mission concluded that 31 March 1995 was the appropriate date for the end of the mandate of UNOSOM II. None of the Somali factions had requested a longer extension; nor did the humanitarian agencies or NGOs.

On 31 October, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNOSOM II, which was expiring on that day, for an interim period until 4 November 1994, to allow time to consider the report of its mission to Somalia before completing the review of the mandate of the Operation and deciding on its future.

FUTURE OF UNOSOM II DECIDED

On 4 November 1994, after having considered the Secretary-General's reports dated 17 September and 14 October and the oral report of its mission to Somalia given on 31 October, the Security Council, by its resolution 954 (1994), decided to extend the mandate of UNOSOM II for a final period until 31 March 1995. It affirmed that the primary purpose of UNOSOM II until its termination was to facilitate political reconciliation in Somalia.

The Council decided that every effort should be made to withdraw the UNOSOM II military force and assets from Somalia in a secure and orderly manner. To that end it authorized UNOSOM II to take the actions necessary to protect the withdrawal. It also requested Member States to assist with the withdrawal of the Operation.

The Council demanded that the Somali parties refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against UNOSOM II and other personnel engaged in humanitarian activities. It also urged them to negotiate an effective cease-fire and the formation of a transitional government of national unity.

INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE

In a letter dated 10 November 1994 to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General drew the Council's attention to a statement on Somalia by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).8/

The statement reaffirmed the commitment of the humanitarian agencies to continue emergency and rehabilitation activities in Somalia to the maximum extent possible after expiration of the UNOSOM II mandate on 31 March 1995. In light of the UNOSOM II military withdrawal, the agencies agreed to adopt a common and coordinated approach to retain or replace the essential programme support and operational services formerly provided by UNOSOM II, and to develop a common framework for action with the full support of all operational partners. The IASC proposed establishment of a United Nations Coordination Team of senior representatives of United Nations organizations active in Somalia, chaired by the Resident Representative of UNDP in Somalia, serving also as Humanitarian Coordinator.

The IASC statement urged the Security Council to support the process of transition from UNOSOM- protected humanitarian operations to those following UNOSOM II's departure by: considering possible arrangements for the establishment of protected humanitarian operational bases at essential ports and airports; authorizing the transfer of UNOSOM II equipment and assets to operational United Nations organizations and international non-governmental organizations; making UNOSOM II humanitarian and security staff available to the new coordination arrangement. United Nations organizations also urged that positive consideration be given to funding security requirements through a special allocation so that voluntary funds for humanitarian activities not be diverted.

The statement called for the continued support of the international donor community but noted, however, that international assistance to Somalia would be contingent upon the Somali people ensuring that conditions existed for the effective implementation of emergency and rehabilitation programmes.9/

COMPOSITION OF UNOSOM II

The original authorized strength of UNOSOM II was approximately 28,000 military personnel and some 2,800 civilian staff. Military personnel were provided by the following countries: Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States and Zimbabwe. The civilian component of UNOSOM II consisted of staff members of the United Nations and of personnel seconded from Member States.

In addition, there were approximately 17,700 troops in the United States Joint Task Force in Somalia, which did not form part of UNOSOM II and were not under the operational command of the UNOSOM II Force Commander. This number included the Quick Reaction Force, deployed in support of UNOSOM II.

In the course of 1993, a number of Member States, including Belgium, France and Sweden, informed the Secretary-General of their intention to withdraw their contingents from UNOSOM II by the end of December 1993. In addition, the United States announced, in October 1993, that it would withdraw its troops from Somalia by the end of March 1994. Accordingly, the French contingent (1,100 all ranks), the Belgian contingent (950 all ranks) and the Swedish Field Hospital (150 all ranks) were withdrawn from Somalia in December 19