The Peacebuilding Assembly-Line Model: Towards a Theory of International Collaboration in Multidimensional Peacebuilding Operations

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Abstract

Even though post-conflict peacebuilding has gained priority on the international community’s agenda in the post-Cold War era, the scholarly knowledge on how international organizations (IOs) cooperate with one another in multidimensional peacebuilding remains limited. This article develops a theoretical model on the inter-institutional division of labor in complex peacebuilding missions. Borrowing from international relations, organization theory, and economics disciplines, it formulates the Peacebuilding Assembly-Line Model (PALM) for improving the effectiveness of IO collaboration in peacebuilding missions. It analyzes lessons from multidimensional peacebuilding missions in the Balkans, and concludes with general reflections on the applicability of the PALM model on inter-institutional collaboration in multidimensional peacebuilding missions in the Balkans and elsewhere.

Introduction

Ever since the Agenda for Peace document (Boutros-Ghali, 1992) was published, international security architectures have been evolving to successfully meet the demands and challenges of post-conflict reconstruction. Multidimensional or integrated peacebuilding missions are complex missions that aim at restoring the political, economic, and social infrastructure in a post-conflict society to establish governance and the rule of law, as well as social justice and economic development. Peacebuilding operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Timor-Leste, Guinea Bissau, and Sierra Leone are examples of such operations.

Complex missions go ‘well beyond the military elements and involve tasks in all three areas of security, governance and welfare’ (Benner and Rotmann, 2008: 43). They require a wide range of goals to consolidate peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), including constructing stronger state institutions, encouraging broader political participation, undertaking land reform, deepening civil society, and respecting ethnic identities (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Multilateral partnerships between different international organizations (IOs) have become commonplace in peacebuilding operations to address these complex goals effectively (Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, 2012). As IOs fulfill many diverse functions such as supporting democracy through establishing domestic constitutional mechanisms and sharing of information on ‘best practices’ (Keohane et al., 2009; Pevehouse, 2005), regulating the conduct of states through diffusion of norms (Neumann and Sending, 2010; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004), ‘socializing’ states (Checkel, 2005), engaging in conflict management (Wolff and Dursun-Ozkanca, 2012), taking over classical state functions in post-conflict situations, delivering essential services and providing security (Chesterman, 2004), and providing assistance with Security Sector Reform (Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele, 2012), their involvement in peacebuilding missions is instrumental.

Despite the fact that the practice of inter-institutional arrangements in building long-lasting peace in post-conflict environments has gained prevalence in international affairs, peace operations have been under-theorized (Bellamy, 2004), and ‘there is a relative paucity of scholarship that examines … cooperative endeavors [between international organizations] in peacebuilding’ (Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frollick, 2012: 237). Even though the literature on the European Union (EU)-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) relations (Cornish and Edwards, 2001; Dursun, 2005; Yost, 2007; Biscop, 2008), inter-organizational cooperation in the Balkans (Schroeder, 2007; Biemann, 2008; Martin, 2009; Dursun-Ozkanca, 2010; Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frollick, 2012), and the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Euro-Atlantic security frameworks (Peters, 2003; Stefanova, 2009) is growing, the literature has yet to formulate a comprehensive theory for inter-institutional collaboration in post-conflict peacebuilding (Wolff and Dursun-Ozkanca, 2014). Notwithstanding the works of few scholars (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2010; Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-
Frolick, 2012; Paris, 2009, 2000; Biermann, 2008; Bah and Jones, 2008; Jeong, 2005; Biscop, 2005; Van de Ven and Walker, 1984), our scholarly understanding of how IOs cooperate with one another in multidimensional peacebuilding missions remains limited (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2010; Biermann, 2008; Paris, 2000), as the literature mainly focuses on explaining overall peacebuilding success and failure (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Paris, 2004; Call and Cousins, 2008).

What makes this article unique is its attempt at providing a conceptual and theoretical framework for improving the coordination between IOs in complex peacebuilding missions. Contributing to the literature on global governance that dates back to Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986), this article develops a theoretical framework, called the Peacebuilding Assembly-Line Model (PALM), for improving the effectiveness of intergovernmental organization (IO) division of labor in comprehensive peacebuilding missions, which draws on theoretical assumptions borrowed from international relations (IR), organization theory, and economics. The need to come up with a comprehensive conceptual framework to facilitate inter-institutional coordination in multidimensional peacebuilding is not merely theoretical. The effectiveness of peacebuilding missions depends not only on the commitments from the IOs, but also on the ‘orchestration’ – the coordination and coherence of the response – between them (Abbott and Snidal, 2010; Jones, 2002; Smith, 2003; Dahrendorf, 2003; De Coning, 2007; Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick, 2012; Wolff and Dursun-Ozkanca, 2014). If involvement of multilateral institutions is disconcerted and uncoordinated, reconstruction efforts are likely to fail (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2010; Crossley-Frolick and Dursun-Ozkanca, 2012; Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick, 2012). As such, a central aspect of post-conflict reconstruction is the challenge to develop mechanisms of international governance that are capable of promoting sustained and coherent efforts to maintain stability and security. This article first presents a discussion of the perspectives on institutional coordination before offering the PALM model and assessing the applicability of the PALM model in the Balkan peacebuilding context.

**Perspectives on Institutional Coordination**

There is disagreement between neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism on the roles played by international institutions in building the peace. Neorealism rarely acknowledges the independent role played by IOs. It does not place the emphasis on the benefits of having them and typically argues that they reflect power relations between nation states (Mearsheimer, 1995). For neorealism, all actors besides nation states are irrelevant in the study of international politics.

Neoliberalism, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of IOs in fostering international cooperation and reducing security dilemmas (Martin and Simmons, 1998; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Keohane, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Keohane and Martin, 1995). It highlights the benefits of having IOs, including the provision of information, promotion of international norms, and reduction of transaction costs in mitigating anarchy in the international system (Martin, 1992). Some neorealists focus on the role of IOs in supporting democracy via the construction of domestic constitutional mechanisms and sharing of information on best practices (Keohane et al., 2009). Even though neoliberalism emphasizes the benefits of having IOs, it does so mostly from the perspective of nation states. It holds that IOs serve state interests as they provide a less costly and more convenient tool than a direct state intervention. For neoliberals, states are the main agents, which in turn create structures consisting of norms and institutions for their own convenience (Krasner, 1983).

Constructivism, on the other hand, has a more flexible take on the significance of non-state actors such as the IOs. It emphasizes how ideas and identities are created, and how they evolve. According to constructivists, IOs play an independent role in international politics (Ostrom, 1995), learning through their experiences in the field and adjusting their organizational structures and mission mandates accordingly (Benner and Rottman, 2008; Campbell, 2008a; Fosdick, 1999). For instance, one scholar notes that NATO’s highly institutionalized character helps explain why it has been able to survive and adapt, despite the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (McCalla, 1996). Constructivists hold that IOs learn how best to cooperate throughout their interactions with one another in the field, and that this evolutionary process takes some time (Stefanova, 2009; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Constructivism helps reveal the
development of norms of cooperation and the creation of new identities for IOs in peacebuilding. Therefore, it plays an important role in spreading emerging norms and helping solidify new identities for IOs.

The majority of the existing studies are pessimistic regarding the emergence of institutional collaboration in peacebuilding. Many note that even though IOs make international collaboration on peacebuilding more effective, the coordination and cooperation between them is perturbed (Paris, 2009, 2004; Dursun-Ozkanca, 2010; Campbell, 2008b; Fearon and Laitin, 2004; Weinberger, 2002). One study states, ‘Although there have been calls for more formalized partnerships, little progress in this direction has occurred’ (Bah and Jones, 2008: 1). Many studies hold that cooperation between IOs is established unofficially through the ‘informal’ networks among ‘internationals’ in the field (Mayer, 2011; Hardt, 2010). As noted by another study, such ‘partnerships continue to be primarily driven by operational exigencies, and have been managed through ad hoc mechanisms’ (Bah and Jones, 2008: 1). In an attempt to explain the faulty institutional cooperation, others identify the ‘pathologies’ of IOs to describe the instances in which IOs show dysfunctional behavior because of their bureaucratic culture (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999), political disagreements (Gutner and Thompson, 2010), the fear of losing autonomy (Van de Ven and Walker, 1984), and divergent intra-organizational cultures (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).

Others present a more cautious approach and maintain that ‘the international statebuilding system’ is a ‘loosely structured network’ (Paris, 2009: 61, original emphasis), and that even though some progress has been made in ‘resolving technical issues of day-to-day coordination and policy differences,’ there is still ‘overall incoherence in the international response mechanism’ (Eide et al., 2005: 12; Cornish and Edwards, 2001). They identify the lack of coordination as a structural deficiency in global governance (Zürn, 2010).

Many studies look into organization theory (Williams and Mengistu, 2015). Instead of mainly focusing on effects, they analyze the organizational realities of bureaucracies and how they reform. Some pay attention to bureaucracies as learning organizations (Goldsmith, 1996; Campbell, 2008a; Benner and Rottman, 2008) and others focus on the technocratic nature of IOs and its implications on peacebuilding (Donais, 2012; Mac Ginty, 2012). Another strand in the literature emphasizes evaluation of the performance of such organizations (Pouliot, 2008; Gutner and Thompson, 2010; Lipson, 2010; Wolff and Dursun-Ozkanca, 2014), i.e. the role of bureaucrats in translating ideas, concepts, or rules into practice (Wagenaar, 2004; Czarniawska, 2008).

Listed under organization theory, a number of studies following the bureaucratic theory developed by Max Weber posit that IOs are important actors in global governance as international bureaucracies (Ness and Brechin, 1988; Piiparinen, 2008). They emphasize that IOs produce expert knowledge on tackling common problems faced by the international community (Olsen, 2006; Weiss, 1975; Ness and Brechin, 1988; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). Weber’s bureaucratic theory highlights the importance of division of labor and specialization among bureaucracies, while pointing out the turf battles and competition for resources and increased power (Blau and Meyer, 1971). The bureaucratic theory holds that international institutions are motivated by survival instincts, which in turn create further competition and rivalry between these organizations (Dean, 1999). As Graham Allison (1971: 144) notes, ‘the name of the game is politics’: decisions are made through bargaining over turf, budget, and staff. Weber’s bureaucratic theory highlights the importance of establishing clear and hierarchical lines of authority, as these organizations are interdependent and benefit from coordination.

Organization theory distinguishes between three different organization forms – hierarchies, markets, and networks (Powell, 1990; Herrhausen, 2007). Hierarchical organizations (such as bureaucracies) feature both horizontal and vertical differentiation and, therefore, they are a very efficient type of organization for ensuring coordination (Herrhausen, 2007). On the other hand, markets have numerous organizations, each creating its own product and service. Hence, there is a need to create functional differentiation between organizations, rather than within a single organization. In the end, ‘uncoordinated individual activities are brought into order by “the invisible hand”’ (Herrhausen, 2007: 6). The third common form of organization, network, emerges through repeated interactions between...
organizations and results in organizations engaging in ‘loose’ yet ‘durable ties’ (Herrhausen, 2007: 8). Different from hierarchies, networks have a flexible composition, as different organizations may continue/discontinue their participation in the network. There are both centrifugal and centralizing forces in the network organizations. Illustrating the centralizing forces, Herrhausen (2007: 9) notes, ‘Networks may seek to overcome coordination difficulties or outright conflict by installing a hierarchical element,’ where ‘organizations would forgo some of their independence in order to gain efficiency.’ On the other hand, if coordination proves to be difficult, the network would break apart (centrifugal forces), resulting in a collection of disconnected organizations in the market (Park and Ungson, 2001). Organizations involved in the network are limited in number (Thompson, 2003) and they engage in ‘joint problem-solving arrangements,’ which in turn contributes to organizational learning (Herrhausen, 2007: 13). The network model is more flexible and nimble when compared to the hierarchy model (Thompson, 2003).

Accordingly, a number of scholars argue that cooperation should avoid creating a hierarchy or the subordination of one organization or institution to another (Androsov, 1997). Such scholars emphasize the concept of heterarchy between IOs, defined as a ‘system in which political authority is shared and divided between different layers of governance and in which many agencies share in the task of governance’ (Miura, 2007). They maintain a more optimistic point of view and note that interdependence creates transnational networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Slaughter, 2004). Slaughter (2004: 133) classifies networks as horizontal (across national governments) and vertical (between supranational and national officials), and notes that ‘the coercive power of vertical networks is much greater than that of horizontal networks.’ Slaughter (2004: 15) wants to see ‘a system of global governance that institutionalizes cooperation and sufficiently contains conflict such that all nations and their peoples may achieve greater peace and prosperity, improve their stewardship of the earth, and reach minimum standards of human dignity.’ She notes that the evolutionary changes needed to create such a revolutionary change in global governance include the integration of existing networks, an expansion of vertical networks, and the transformation of current IOs. This strand of the literature holds that inter-organizational cooperation increasingly moves beyond the dyad into more complex configurations, taking ‘the shape of a network, with a high density of links and a common perception of boundaries’ (Biermann, 2008: 152; De Coning, 2007). Using network theory, one study concludes that the network of IOs has become ‘more centralized,’ supporting the world systems theory (Beckfield, 2008: 436). As illustrated by this review, even though the literature on IOs is growing, it has yet to formulate a comprehensive theory for inter-institutional collaboration in multidimensional peacebuilding in post-conflict situations. Building on the assumptions borrowed from multiple disciplines, the next section offers a comprehensive model of institutional peacebuilding cooperation.

The Peacebuilding Assembly-Line Model

In an attempt to address the pathologies and inflexibilities of IOs, institutional turf consciousness, and the lack of coordination in the field that cause inefficiencies in institutional collaboration (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Helton, 2001; Jeong, 2005), this article formulates the Peacebuilding Assembly-Line Model (PALM), incorporating assumptions from various theories. Like constructivism and organization theory, it approaches IOs as a separate unit of analysis, making the assumption that IOs are independent actors and that change in their identities is feasible, since they are learning organizations (Campbell, 2008a). From organization theory and bureaucratic politics, it borrows the assumption that IOs are self-interested and rational actors (Kanter and Brinkerhoff, 1981; Seashore and Yuchtman, 1967), and that they exploit their environments to acquire scarce and valued resources for sustaining their functioning (Seashore and Yuchtman, 1967). Like in neoliberalism, it posits that IOs make international collaboration on collective problems more efficient. From economics, it borrows the theory of comparative advantage, developed by economist David Ricardo (1817). Adam Smith (1776) discusses the concept of specialization in his book, The Wealth of Nations. Specialization allows each IO to develop more competencies and capabilities in a specific task related to complex peacebuilding operations. Finally, it holds that the network model of organizations as well as the concept of heterarchy fit perfectly with the
characterization of the relationship between different IOs involved in multidimensional peacebuilding missions, as there are a limited number of organizations that work in this realm and they have no clear hierarchy among them. Network model notes that the limited number of organizations in the network ensures that a shared culture would develop as a result of staff interacting frequently with one another (Lawler, 1988).

Similar to the network model, the PALM model maintains that the total number of organizations within the network is limited (Powell, 1990), and the ‘shadow of the future increases the incentive to cooperate’ and learn from past mistakes, decreasing ‘the incentive to shirk and seek short-term’ profit (Herrhausen, 2007: 21). The PALM model is based on IOs that not only operate in the same geography, but also regularly interact with one another.

Nevertheless, the PALM model also maintains that the IOs are also motivated by survival instincts and want to prove that they are both relevant and effective in a changing security environment. In order to increase their relevance and reduce their dependence on other organizations in international affairs, IOs typically go beyond their competencies. This leads to considerable overlap in missions, which in turn enhances the competition and rivalry between these organizations, and creates further inefficiencies in the implementation of comprehensive peacebuilding missions. Therefore, IOs experience a vital dilemma: whether to continue performing the tasks that have lower opportunity costs for them, or try and expand their mandates to make themselves as relevant as they can in a changing global context and at the cost of creating functional duplications with other IOs on the ground.

IOs are very sensitive when other institutions involved in peacebuilding step on their responsibilities, which leads to turf battles (Jeong, 2005). Functional duplications undermine the effectiveness of international efforts to provide security and stability in post-conflict societies. Accordingly, it is essential for institutions not to infringe upon each other’s mandates. As Jeong (2005: 206-208) notes, ‘Strategic-level considerations instead of ad hoc rationalization of new operational developments,’ as well as ‘coordination structures… to support the needs of parallel functions performed by a multitude of actors’ are important for the success of peacebuilding missions. Such attempts would increase coherence and complementarity between IOs, and create a more effective division of labor in peacebuilding missions.

Consequently, in order to resolve the dilemma identified earlier, the PALM model underlines the importance of the implementation of the comparative advantage principle by IOs. Drawing on the concepts of comparative advantage and specialization, the PALM model argues that each IO should develop and maintain a niche, where they can focus on delivering the particular type of service they accomplish best when compared to other IOs, and use that comparative advantage in complex peacebuilding missions. This would enable them to realize the common, overall goal of building peace more effectively. Like in the network model, it draws on ‘individual organizations’ proficiencies to produce something that one organization could not produce alone, at least not as efficiently and effectively’ (Herrhausen, 2007: 19). It posits that if each organization pursues the types of activities that involve lower opportunity costs, factors that hinder coherence would be eliminated and greater inter-institutional coherence would be achieved. If IOs were to follow the PALM model, they would in fact cut costs by specializing on what they do best. They would not lose visibility either, as they would develop a niche for conducting a specific task.

The PALM model also states that each organization has an incentive to ‘cultivate its relations’ with other network members, since they are ‘aware of the interdependence that results from functional differentiation’ (Herrhausen, 2007: 19). Therefore, the PALM model proposes creating a synergy between IOs involved in peacebuilding. The implementation of the PALM model leads to the increased efficiency and effectiveness in multidimensional missions.

IOs involved in peacebuilding are ‘wary of giving their autonomy over to collective efforts that may prevent them from fulfilling their mandate’ (Campbell, 2008a: 25). According to Roland Paris (2009: 75),
‘the challenge...is to strike a balance between preserving the flexibility of the existing networked structure of international peacebuilding system on one hand, and the requirement for some measure of hierarchy on the other. What is needed, in short, is a directed network that more effectively combines elements of hierarchy and decentralized autonomy.’

Drawing on the concept of heterarchy, the PALM allows IOs to retain autonomy when contributing to collective efforts in peacebuilding.

In the PALM model, IOs are envisioned to share political authority and the task of governance. As the model does not suggest a hierarchical relationship between the IOs involved in the assembly line, the model would not jeopardize the independence of the IOs – the IOs would retain control of their resources. Therefore, IOs might be more comfortable accepting the idea of specializing on tasks with lower opportunity costs.

Furthermore, in peacebuilding missions, IOs are subject to considerable time pressure. The PALM model suggests each institution to use its forte. If IOs could replicate the assembly-line type of specialization and coordination, by repeatedly continuing to practice functions at which they are best, inter-organizational collaboration in peacebuilding missions would gain synergy and pace. The end product of peace would be achieved more efficiently and with a lower cost, just like a factory assembly line, as long as each part of the assembly line completes its respective duties.

The need for coordinated action in the framework of the multilateral reconstruction process is undisputable. Effective reconstruction operations require concerted action among different IOs that operate in the field. The current communication structure between IOs is not sufficient to meet the exigencies of complex operations involving military and political components (Martin, 2009; Helton, 2001). Negotiating ‘interagency frameworks for action that may lead to establishing task teams on specific issues’ may enhance compatibility between different IOs (Jeong, 2005: 214). Hence, there should be more routine formal and multilateral meetings between the IOs that regularly operate in the same geographical context. As Jeong (2005: 214) notes, ‘Clear structures for coordination are necessary for developing a more formal division of labor among key actors.’

Discussion: Evidence for the PALM Model from the Balkans Peacebuilding Missions?

In the Euro-Atlantic context, there is a plethora of IOs contributing to complex peacebuilding missions. Therefore, this section applies the PALM model offered in this article to the ‘rich alphabet soup’ of IOs that operate in the complex peacebuilding missions in the Balkans (Checkel, 2005). While the inter-institutional collaboration in this region has been far from ideal, the analysis sheds light on lessons IOs have learned.

Looking at the inter-institutional division of labor in multidimensional peacebuilding missions in the Balkans, it is safe to argue that several patterns of inter-institutional collaboration have already started to emerge. The leading IOs working in this geographic area, i.e. the United Nations (UN), the EU, NATO, and the OSCE, share similar principles, values, and responsibilities with regard to post-conflict peacebuilding missions. As in a network setting, these IOs share a common overall goal in peacebuilding: establishing the rule of law and maintaining peace and stability. In both Bosnia and Kosovo peacebuilding missions, there was some form of division of labor between different IOs. In both contexts, ‘parallel civilian and military operations’ by the UN and NATO were deployed, where the former provided both ‘a political framework for the military operation and the core political and civilian support to the national authorities’ (Bah and Jones, 2008: 3).

Nevertheless, the division of labor between the organizations in Bosnia was in a much limited and rudimentary state. There, the ‘heavy presence of international organizations with different mandates has complicated coordination’ (Jeong, 2005: 201). The UN Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (UNMIBH) offered policing and the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) provided humanitarian operations in coordination with the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina (OHR) and other IOs, while NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and then Stabilization Force (SFOR) provided
the military element (Jones and Cherif, 2004; Dursun-Ozkanca, 2010). During the transition from the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the UNMIBH, it took the UNMIBH and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) over 6 months to get basic logistical requirements in order. Not only had all essential equipment such as radios and vehicles been given to NATO’s IFOR, but also no arrangements for the medical care of UNMIBH personnel had been made beyond emergency medical evacuation (Dziedzic and Bair, 1998). The mandate of the UNMIBH assigned the OHR a number of executive powers with regard to federal and local branches of government. Nevertheless, the High Representative (HR) in Bosnia did not have an executive authority over the different regional organizations involved in peacebuilding. NATO was responsible for the provision of security; OSCE was responsible for monitoring elections, democratization, and human rights; the Council of Europe was responsible for building legal institutions; and the EU was responsible for economic recovery (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2010).

The NATO Council endorsed the military planning for the multinational IFOR in December 1995. NATO was responsible for the cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of foreign forces, prisoner exchanges, and regional stabilization. These goals were mostly completed halfway through IFOR’s mandated term. After the peaceful conduct of the September 1996 elections, IFOR successfully completed its mission of implementing the military annexes of the General Framework Agreement for Peace. Following that, the period referred to as the transition to peace started. During this period, NATO paid more attention to civilian tasks in cooperation with the other organizations. After IFOR, the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of SFOR for 18 months. The original goal was to withdraw in June 1998. However, due to the fragility of peace in Bosnia, SFOR’s mandate was renewed with the task to ‘deter renewed hostilities and to contribute to a secure environment for the ongoing civil implementation efforts in order to stabilize peace’ (NATO, 1998). In December 2004, the EU deployed a robust military force (EUFOR) at the same force levels as NATO’s SFOR, and slowly undertook the majority of the responsibility for crisis management tasks in Bosnia. This mission signaled the EU’s aspirations for further developing its security and defense policy, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which has been renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

Even though ‘interagency meetings were organized on a monthly basis to exchange information and coordinate overall UN activities with those of other international actors, especially the [OHR]’ (Jeong, 2005: 203), the level of coordination between the IOs involved in the Bosnia peacebuilding mission was nowhere near the level of coordination later demonstrated in the Kosovo case. The fact that the inter-institutional coordination was not well developed in Bosnia is hardly surprising, given that it was the first peacebuilding mission that explicitly engaged in a division of labor between different IOs. While the deadline for the initial peacebuilding mission in Bosnia was originally set to end in 1996 (envisioned to last for only one year), this deadline was later eliminated to give the international community more time to engage in peacebuilding (Paris, 2009).

There has clearly been a learning curve in peacebuilding missions. In Bosnia, cooperative relations between the OHR and other agencies such as the UNHCR and the OSCE have been imperative for the successful management of elections (Jeong, 2005). SFOR and its predecessor, IFOR, provided the OSCE with ‘logistical and technical support, such as transporting ballot boxes to polling stations’ (Jeong, 2005: 204). After their collaborative experience in Bosnia, the IOs felt relatively ‘more comfortable’ in cooperating with one another in Kosovo (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2010: 444). There was an improved and somewhat hierarchical structure between IOs involved in peacebuilding under the UN authority in Kosovo: the UN (along with the EU, the OSCE and UNHCR) provided the civilian and police dimensions of an operation under single command, while NATO provided the military arm of the operation under separate but coordinated command (Jones and Cherif, 2004; Dursun-Ozkanca, 2010).

When compared to UNMIBH, under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), there was a more systematic division of labor in peacebuilding, due to UNMIK’s pillar structure. The Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) had a number of executive powers in Kosovo, which were missing in the case of the OHR in Bosnia. The OSCE used its expertise in training the police force. In coordination with UNMIK, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initially supported
‘capacity building within the KPS’ (Schroeder, 2007: 203). The pillar structure was able to establish ‘a more systematic division of labor by [IOs] in policing, training of police forces, [and] judicial reform’ (Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick, 2012: 239). A Deputy SRSG headed each pillar, which provided a systematic and clear division of labor between different IOs on the ground. Furthermore, the fact that these organizations had a chance to work with one another in Bosnia contributed to the smooth division of labor in Kosovo. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the institutional coordination in Kosovo closely resembles the PALM model offered in this article.

Even then, there were still a number of inefficiencies caused by the duplication of tasks between different IOs in Kosovo. Like SFOR, KFOR was tasked with both military and supportive roles, leading to mission creep criticisms. As noted by one study, ‘the legal relationship between KFOR and UNMIK was never clearly defined, leaving the former significant room to maneuver, subject only to the broadly defined role of coordination attributed to the head of UNMIK’ (Gheciu, 2011: 99). There was also ‘an overlap between the EULEX and OSCE missions on the ground,’ as both missions tackled the rule of law (Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick, 2012: 243).

The main problem was that there were simply too many actors simultaneously involved in the police reform process, and coordination proved to be difficult in practice. Secondly, the SRSG lacked executive authority vis-à-vis the other IOs’ missions in Kosovo (Kristensen, 2006). This raised the specter of uneven and at times incoherent policies on the ground, notwithstanding the formal guidelines of UNMIK’s pillar structure. The international community should therefore ‘develop standardized procedures for information exchange, as well as monitoring and implementation mechanisms for the SRSG and the Force Commander’ to enhance collaboration between the military and the civilian elements (Dahrendorf, 2003: 28).

Another problem was the inability to ensure a smooth civil-military coordination, which may have been better addressed through the appointment of a ‘liaison military officer to the civilian humanitarian coordination office’ (Jeong, 2005: 199). Turf battles continued in the Kosovo operation. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) was marginalized in the Kosovo peacebuilding mission once a team that worked with SRSG was constructed, despite the wealth of local knowledge the DPA possessed (O’Neill, 2002; Jeong, 2005).

In order to improve the inter-institutional collaboration, IOs examined here have been increasing the volume of formal relationships between them. In 2003, for instance, the UN, EU, NATO, and the OSCE promised a ‘concerted approach’ in their policies in the Balkans (NATO, 2003). In August 2005, the UN and NATO signed a UN-NATO Framework Agreement in order to facilitate the cooperation on the ground in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In September 2008, the UN and NATO signed a joint UN-NATO declaration, where they acknowledged the need for closer cooperation. Since then, NATO’s Secretary General regularly reports to the UN Secretary-General on progress regarding the NATO-led operations.

In line with the increasing trend to orchestrate the international community’s efforts in peacebuilding, in 2003, the EU and the UN agreed to establish a ‘joint consultative mechanism at the working level to examine ways and means to enhance mutual co-ordination and compatibility in planning, training, communication, and best practices’ (Council of the European Union, 2003). The multifaceted relationship between the EU and the UN has been recognized in a bilateral report published in 2007 (UNDP, 2007). In June 2012, these two organizations drafted an action plan that outlined the civilian and military capabilities that the EU member states can potentially put at the UN’s disposal (Council of the European Union, 2012). In 2014, the UN Security Council endorsed the relationship with the EU through the adoption of a presidential statement on EU-UN cooperation (European External Action Service, 2016).

Similarly, the relationship between NATO and the EU has been increasingly regulated. At NATO’s Washington Summit in 2000, the then US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, suggested the transatlantic alliance to follow the principles, known as the 3Ds – no duplication, no decoupling of forces, and no discrimination against the non-EU European members of NATO. In December 2002, NATO and the EU signed the Berlin Plus Agreement, which became active in March 2003. In 2003, the EU and NATO published the Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans document, in which they agreed to
continue to meet regularly at all levels and work together in conflict prevention and peacebuilding (NATO, 2003).

NATO has gained clear dominance over time concerning security issues, while the OSCE has been increasingly restricted to specific operational tasks such as civil society building, conflict prevention, non-military crisis management, democratization, human and minority rights (Peters, 2003). The EU mainly contributed to the democratization process and civilian peacebuilding efforts in both Kosovo and Bosnia. In an attempt to address ‘the issue of multiple constituencies with disparate goals’ within the UN system, the UN has initiated the process of ‘integration,’ and established integrated mission structures and integrated planning processes (Lipson 2010: 260). Therefore, one can argue that a preliminary division of labor with each organization’s respective comparative advantage is emerging in the Euro-Atlantic security infrastructures. Such increased horizontal and vertical coordination efforts are excellent illustrations of the emergence of a network organization.

Nevertheless, this promising trend for increased orchestration is jeopardized through a number of different factors. In integrated missions, ‘there is always a danger of miscommunication if each component reports only to its central headquarters without lateral contact’ (Jeong, 2005: 208). There is a need to maintain ‘interagency dialogue’ in order to achieve a ‘mutual understanding of differences in organizational norms, values, and beliefs’ (Jeong, 2005: 211). However, the exchange of security information between the EU and NATO has been blocked with the admission of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU (Dursun-Özkanca, 2016). There are increasing budgetary pressures on both institutions to be efficient in their activities. The ongoing financial crisis in Europe presents additional challenges for the EU and NATO. These factors have caused a strain in the NATO-EU relationship.

Furthermore, since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in November 2009, the EU has initiated a number of very ambitious institutional reforms to present itself as a more credible power in world politics. On 8 May 2010, for instance, the EU published the Project Europe 2030 report (2010), which outlined the challenges and opportunities facing the EU to present itself as an ‘assertive,’ ‘ambitious,’ and ‘transformative’ power in world politics, and called for the EU to increase its military capabilities. In June 2016, the EU released its Global Strategy document, outlining the EU’s desire to have ‘strategic autonomy,’ act in unity when it comes to capacity-building and Security Sector Reform, and the need to use hard power in connection with soft power (European Union, 2016). NATO has also been trying to find a new raison d’être for proving its relevance in the post-Cold War world (Gheciu and Paris, 2011). NATO’s Strategic Concept (2010) similarly made a number of very ambitious suggestions for the future of NATO, including the improvement of its Comprehensive Approach, which combines military and civilian action to respond to crisis management. Therefore, both institutions are aspiring to present themselves as important actors in Europe and beyond, with considerable convergence in their membership, and increasingly run the risk of duplicating each other’s responsibilities and competing against each other.

Even the top leaders of these organizations openly admit the existence of sources of tension and competition between the two organizations (Stoltenberg and Tusk, 2014). The EU’s Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy explicitly acknowledges that formal relations between the EU and NATO in the Balkans and in Afghanistan ‘have not advanced,’ and that this ‘strategic partnership’ should be strengthened ‘in service of our shared security interests, with better operational cooperation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organization, and continued work on military capabilities’ (Council of the European Union, 2008). NATO’s Strategic Concept similarly encourages NATO and the EU to ‘play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security’ (NATO, 2010: Paragraph 32).

Under the increasingly complex operations, bilateral agreements are not sufficient for the provision of efficient and smooth inter-institutional coordination. Such operations would benefit from ‘joint planning mechanisms’ to provide strategic coordination; ‘rehatting troops,’ especially from the lead nation; ‘establishing appropriate and sustainable financing mechanisms for weaker institutions;’ and ‘establishing a common political framework for action’ (Bah and Jones, 2008: 7). There should be more centralized and multilateral efforts to coordinate and orchestrate reconstruction operations under the
leadership of the UN. The establishment of such a framework ‘requires flexibility from each party to understand differences, realign procedures and management cultures, develop common objectives and priorities and agree on a division of responsibilities on the ground’ (Ortiz, 2009: 23).

Finally, in assessing the success of institutional cooperation in conflict regulation, one study identifies ‘the complexity of organizational structures and the degree to which the organization itself is a relatively independent actor (i.e. independent of member states)’ as important factors that determine the effectiveness of internal cooperation and coordination (Wolff and Dursun-Özkanca, 2012: 312). It is important to acknowledge that partnerships with other regional and international organizations, individual states, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are essential to ‘help overcome particular capability deficits of one organization’ and to establish ‘a greater degree of legitimacy of any particular conflict regulation effort among local actors’ (Wolff and Dursun-Özkanca, 2012: 312).

**Conclusion**

Lessons drawn from the Balkans have significant implications for an enhanced understanding of the conditions under which enduring peace is established elsewhere, such as Guinea Bissau, Darfur, and Afghanistan. When multiple international actors are involved in peacebuilding, duplication of functions and uncoordinated efforts can become unintended consequences. Despite common vision and goals, IOs are motivated by survival instincts and want to prove that they are relevant and effective in a changing security environment. IOs typically go beyond their competence in particular areas in an attempt to increase their relevance in a changing security environment. This leads to overlap between these missions on the ground, which contributes to increased inter-institutional competition, institutional turf consciousness, and lack of coordination. This is detrimental to post-conflict rehabilitation. More often, due to protectionist tendencies, IOs are reluctant to share information. The lack of coordination causes a waste of human and financial resources, which consequently leads to further inefficiencies in peacebuilding.

The PALM model developed in this article suggests that IOs should specialize in their institutional comparative advantages. Specialization allows IOs to expand their utility by delivering services in what they are good at and cooperating with other IOs for services that are more costly for them to deliver on their own (Bah and Jones, 2008). An increased degree of coordination and concerted action between IOs involved in peacebuilding may be achieved through the PALM model. Accordingly, the relationship between the EU, NATO, OSCE, and the UN must be based on complementarity rather than overlapping of functions.

Following the comparative advantage principle incorporated into the PALM model, the EU, NATO, and the OSCE should each develop and use their respective institutional comparative advantage. For instance, NATO’s comparative advantage lies in hard security. Instead of improving its civilian post-conflict reconstruction skills, which would make the Alliance enter into competition with the EU and the OSCE, NATO should engage in a more productive relationship with these organizations, which are clearly better equipped with civilian tools. NATO certainly has a much lower opportunity cost of maintaining security and stability, when compared with other IOs. The opportunity cost for NATO to provide civilian reconstruction tasks is higher. As such, it should focus only on fulfilling military tasks, without meddling in the domains of more civilian-oriented organizations. If needed, NATO’s role should be limited to filling temporary gaps and supporting the civilian international actors until they are fully able to perform their tasks.

Similarly, the EU should keep its aspirations to establish an independent CSDP under control, and concentrate on civilian peacebuilding tasks and democratization. For the EU, the opportunity cost to engage in military reconstruction tasks is higher. As one scholar notes, ‘the EU is present whenever there is smoke, but cannot extinguish the fire’ (Busek, 2009). The EU has a much broader range of capabilities at its disposal, when it comes to missions regarding the rule of law, democratization, and development assistance. As such, these missions involve lower opportunity costs for the EU when compared with
military tasks. Finally, the OSCE should concentrate on institution-building and elections monitoring, as these types of activities involve lower opportunity costs for this organization.

These organizations should engage in enhanced, organized, and multilateral communication, establish ‘both vertical and horizontal coordination’ (Jeong, 2005: 208), and keep each other regularly informed at all levels. One venue to orchestrate such dialogue could be the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Jeong (2005: 209) notes, ‘Vertical coordination can take place across levels, passing the local wealth of knowledge to the higher-level agencies in support of strategic decisionmaking’ and suggests vertical policy coordination may be achieved through the placement of public security, finance, and human rights staff at the provincial offices. However, this may prove to be difficult due to the insufficient size of the field-level staff in different institutions, as in the case of the UNHCR in Kosovo.

Admittedly, ‘finding the right balance between generalization and context-specificity is a constant challenge’ (Benner and Rotmann, 2008: 58). While the PALM model provides an ideal model of inter-institutional collaboration in multidimensional peacebuilding operations, it follows a normative approach. As such, the reality of inter-institutional collaboration may not necessarily conform to what Alex Bellamy calls a higher level of abstraction adopted here (Bellamy, 2004).

Furthermore, the implementation of the PALM model might not immediately address some of the issues raised by critics of the Liberal Peace model, such as the need to establish better local ownership in building the peace (Newman et al., 2009; Richmond, 2007; Chandler, 2010; Lemay-Hebert, 2013). Such critics note that the practice of international trusteeship contradicts with the concept of self-government and poses significant hurdles against a more organic form of government (Chandler, 1999; Chesterman, 2004; Knudsen & Laustsen, 2006; De Coning, 2013). They attract attention to the insensitivities of international actors to local contexts, and note that Liberal Peace disempowers local communities and does not deliver the desired outcomes in democratization and the establishment of the rule of law (Richmond, 2006; Pugh et al., 2008; Duffield, 2010). They contend that the international community’s fixation with liberal peacebuilding ‘distracts [attention away] from the realities of policy implementation’ (Cubitt, 2013, p. 112). While such studies are sceptical towards institutional coordination in peacebuilding missions, it is important to recognize that peacebuilding missions are too important for the international community to abandon (Paris, 2000). Since the PALM model would in fact improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts, it might be argued that it would speed up the process in which responsibilities would be transferred from IOs to local authorities, a key issue for Liberal Peace critics. Nevertheless, deliberations on inter-institutional collaboration in multidimensional missions must still be made on a case-by-case basis, with particular attention to the regional and local factors.

References


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