CIVIL SOCIETY AS A FORCE FOR PEACE

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Abstract

In “The Emerging Tool Chest for Peacebuilders,” Chadwick Alger begins with the premise that “we have learned much more about building peace in the Twentieth Century, through research and practice, than we normally tend to apply” (1996: 21). He goes further to suggest that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and people’s movements represent a recent, and potentially most useful, set of tools for peacebuilding. In the time that has passed since he made those observations, non-state entities have indeed proven to be very useful forces for building peace. In doing so, they have added several additional tools to Alger’s NGOs, people’s movements, and civil society drawer, most notably: networking, coalition building, global campaigns, parallel conferencing, and partnerships. This article explores the nature of these peace tools as they relate to the interface between civil society and international institutions. It concludes that Alger’s first premise also remains true. Actual research and practice in international organization and world order continue to exceed what scholars and students of such phenomena tend to apply.

The Expanding Tool Chest for Peacebuilders

Chadwick Alger’s multi-tiered tool chest for peacebuilders has been expanding in size and depth over the years. This chest of drawers is organic, and all the peacebuilding tools in the drawers have been in constant change and transformation. The first tool, diplomacy, is still critically important, yet in various ways it is quite different than it was several decades ago. Today, the Westphalian notion of diplomacy has been superceded by a mode of transnational cooperation that includes a vast array of role partners interacting in ways that transcend the hierarchical Westphalian state-centered order. Transnational cooperation involving both state and non-state entities is seen by many observers and participants alike as being essential for dealing effectively with most threats to peace and human security. Governmental actors at all levels have found it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to solve social, economic, and political problems associated with the vast array of contemporary global issues by using governmental means alone. Similarly, non-state actors seldom possess sufficient resources, authority, or other capacities to independently launch successful large-scale policy initiatives.

In Alger’s most recent formulation (2002a: 95-96), the tool chest contains six tool boxes stacked on top one another, with the bottom layer, or sixth tool box, representing civil society (or what he terms non-governmental organizations (NGOs)/people’s movements). The tools that comprise this sixth box include: second-track diplomacy, conversion, defensive defense, non-violence, citizen defense, self-reliance, feminist perspective, and peace education. The purpose of this article is not to repeat or rework Alger’s excellent analysis, but to probe further the role of civil society in promoting and sustaining peace and human security with the hindsight of further research and practice. In other words, what new tools have been added to the sixth drawer?
The dialectics of discourse and practice in international institutions have opened political space for the expansion of tools in the sixth drawer of Alger’s tool chest for peacebuilders. Networking, coalition building, global campaigns, parallel conferencing, and partnerships have all emerged as important peace tools for civil society. Moreover, the very conception of civil society has become transformed to include many previously ignored or unacceptable “partners.”

Unlike his analyses of the preceding peace tools which were placed explicitly in the context of United Nations (UN) practice, Alger’s (1996: 32-45) discussion of the NGO/people’s movement tools was couched more generally in terms of global governance. In search of additional insights regarding civil society and other non-state entities as forces for peace, the analysis that follows will bring the United Nations and multilateralism more explicitly into the picture. Actually, Alger and two colleagues did so in another article also published in 1996, and the discussion that follows will begin with that analytical framework as a point of departure. Coate, Alger, and Lipschutz (1996: 106-116) examined the interface between civil society and international institutions in the context of various functions performed: information, normative, rule-creating, rule-supervising, and operational functions.

**NGOs and the Information Age**

Information is crucial at all stages of the policy process. It is especially important in the context of the complex, dynamic, and often turbulent world of international organizations and multilateral relations. Access to, and control over, information is very unevenly distributed both across and within societies. Oftentimes member-state governments would prefer to keep UN agencies, as well as their own citizens, information-poor, especially in regard to issues such as human rights, social justice, and internal inequalities. Individuals and groups, who can gather, analyze, communicate, and disseminate (that is, provide or withhold) needed information, have the potential to influence significantly the policy process. In the perpetually financially strapped environment of the United Nations, NGOs, and other civil society actors, have a real edge in this regard.

Many transnational NGOs have developed extensive networks of experts and specialists upon which they can draw. These knowledge networks enable NGOs to play special roles in global governance and policy-making processes. An interesting example is the Neptune Group, an NGO coalition composed of The Ocean Education Project (Quakers), the Quaker Office at the United Nations in New York, United Methodist Law of the Sea Project, and Global Interdependence Center. The Neptune Group hosted an intensive series of seminar workshops for developing country delegates to UNCLOS III, where they brought in dozens of experts to “educate” delegates on the financial, technological, organizational, and legal aspects of law of the sea negotiations. The Ocean Education Project and the United Methodist Law of the Sea Project continued this “peace education” throughout the long, technically complex, and often tedious UNCLOS III conferencing process by publishing a conference newspaper, the *Neptune*, for free distribution at conference sessions which met on average twice-a-year for six weeks each for seven years.
For years, UN agency secretariats have been tapping and exploiting the information-rich resource environment in civil society. In regard to both the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), for example, scientific NGOs were important driving forces. The main locus of UNCHE-NGO engagement evolved around linkages between the conference secretariat and scientific NGOs. Most significant contributions to the conference preparation process came from scientific and professional experts and groups, such as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), International Council for Science (ICSU), and the International Social Science Council (ISSC). The formal involvement of non-scientific NGOs in the preparatory process was not very significant, and the UNCHE secretariat staff did not seem to be interested in dealing with them. This outcome might well have been associated with UNCHE Secretary-General Maurice Strong’s early orientation toward NGOs, which Feraru (1974: 43) suggests was defined largely in unidirectional terms of the support that NGOs could provide.

The story was somewhat different twenty years later at UNCED. This time around, the same individual, Maurice Strong, was back at the helm as Secretary-General of the conference, yet he openly embraced NGO involvement. The basic foundation of the conference, its focus on creating and formalizing global environmental protection norms, was deeply ingrained in and dependent upon the work of scientific NGOs. The importance of scientific NGOs in the UNCED process was underscored by the fact that Strong invited ICSU to become the principal scientific advisor to the UNCED secretariat.

The revolution in information and communication technology (ICT) has been one of the primary forces of globalization, compressing social time and space and drawing more people than ever before into association with each other. While the distribution of ICT is highly unequal, it has served to create enabling environments for civic-based transnational social movement activities, linking grassroots organizations in far apart regions. In a mere two decades, fax machines and telephone lines have been replaced by the Internet and cell phones. Transnational communication has become instantaneous and relatively affordable. Vast networks of community-based organizations have been created and activated by international NGOs who serve as crucial linchpins and clearing houses for information. As suggested by DeMars (1999), perhaps the most important products of transnational NGO activities are the expansive networks, coalitions, associations, and partnerships they promote. It is through these activities that civic-based actors’ information-related roles become manifest.

**NGO Networks and Coalitions: Clearinghouses and Linchpins**

As Ritchie (1995: 513) has reminded us, NGOs have a long history of coalition building stretching back at least to the mid-nineteenth century and the creation of the World Alliance of Young Men’s Christian Associations. In recent decades there has been a blossoming of coalition activity. Immediately following UNCHE in 1972, for example, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Geneva and the Community Development Foundation in New York hosted a series of meetings with NGO representatives out of which emerged two ad hoc committees to serve as liaisons between environmental NGOs and the proposed new United Nations environmental
agency. Then, after the formal creation of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), a World Assembly of NGOs Concerned with the Global Environment was convened in Geneva in June 1973 to work out a process of NGO liaison. Out of this activity emerged the Environment Liaison Centre-International (ELC), which formally opened its doors in 1975 in Nairobi. This coalition of 535 member organizations served to link over 6,000 NGOs around the world with UNEP and other UN agencies working in the environmental area.

There are many styles and models of NGO networks and coalitions. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, for example, which bring together 181 national societies (some of which are actually governmental auxiliaries), operates relatively autonomously from its member organizations and does not speak for them. The IUCN has over 1,000 members in over 70 countries, including 100 government agencies, over 750 NGOs, and numerous individuals. It serves to bridge government and civil society, science and NGOs, and local and global communities. EarthAction is another environmental NGO and represents a network of more than 700 NGOs in over 125 countries. Some NGO coalitions share common orientations, values and missions. Familiar examples include: Oxfam, Amnesty International, and Save the Children. Other NGO networks are comprised of members who possess “sharply contrasting views” (Ritchie, 1995: 514). The International Council of AIDS Service Organizations (ICASO) is a relatively new and diverse network. It is the international network for community-based AIDS organizations. The International HIV/AIDS Alliance, based in London, is the world’s largest NGO dedicated to enhancing the capacity of communities in the developing world to participate in their country’s response to HIV/AIDS. The associations and activities of these HIV/AIDS NGO coalitions reflect the disparate array of social groups engaged in the struggle against HIV/AIDS, including persons with HIV/AIDS, gay and lesbian groups, health care workers, development assistance groups, and sex workers.

Networks can serve a variety of functions, including promoting solidarity and collaboration, exchanging information, communicating ideas, building capacity, monitoring activities, and advocating policies and programs. As Gordenker and Weiss emphasize, “A main function of formal coalitions of NGOs is to develop as far as possible or to harmonise common positions for issues” (1995: 367). They foster cooperation, information sharing and dissemination, and interest aggregation and articulation. Gordenker and Weiss illustrate the nature and functions of NGO coalitions that serve as “bridging organizations.” They can serve to “create both horizontal links across economic and social sectors and vertical links between grassroots organizations and governments...Bridging organizations function as a conduit for ideas and innovations, a source of information, a broker of resources, a negotiator of deals, a conceptualiser of strategies and a mediator of conflicts” (1995: 367).

Coalition strategies are not the exclusive domain of civic-based actors striving to promote social justice, equality, and peace. For example, while members of the Neptune Group were publishing a conference newspaper and conducting educational workshops for developing country delegates, another coalition of civic-based actors was also at work attempting to scuttle a law of the sea agreement. As things progressed in the UNCLOS III negotiations, private corporate enterprises with stakes in seabed mining began their own coalition building. By 1978, eight transnational seabed mining consortia had been
formed. While these transnational consortia provided some capacity for political lobbying, their formation had more to do with risk reduction than politics. However, the situation changed dramatically in spring 1978, when former U.S. Department of Interior official and U.S. delegate to UNCLOS III under the Nixon and Ford administrations and then legal counsel for Kennecott Copper Corporation, moved to create a supercoalition of seabed mining consortia. For a week in early April 1978, for example, representatives of the consortia gathered in Geneva to coordinate their positions. Whether in the form of an aborted law of the sea conference or in unilateral national legislation in their various countries, the members of this supercoalition sought to circumvent potentially restrictive aspects of international law of the sea regime. While this example may seem to stray a bit too far from traditional notions of civil society, as is argued below, one cannot adequately understand the nature and potential of non-state actors as forces for peace by excluding important elements which do not fit a particular normative orientation.

Despite the orientation, one important goal of networking is to have a synergizing effect where the “total effect of things done is greater than the sum of the individual activities” (ICASO, 1997: 2). In terms of using networks as tools for peacebuilding, networking can and often does serve as an important tool of peace education. With respect to dealing with the AIDS pandemic, for example, Elizabeth Reid, former director of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) HIV and Development Programme, argues that, “Without them [networks], people are often merely told what others think they should do. With them, we can strengthen the process of questioning, reflection and learning. They are the places in which an individual in search of help can go, spaces in which communities can seek to understand how, wisely and humanely, they can respond” (ICASO, 1997: 2).

**Establishing Global Norms: Global Campaigns**

Promoting social justice and peace values is the raison d’être of many NGOs and social movement organizations. This is especially true of transnational advocacy networks that seek to mobilize societal actors for transnational action (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997; Leatherman, Pagnucco and Smith, 2003; Thiele, 1993; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; and Edwards and Gaventa, 2001). Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggest that such transnational advocacy networks can have a “boomerang effect,” whereby transnational mobilization comes back to affect and influence governments both directly and indirectly, thus multiplying the impact.

As Kofi Annan (1998a) has reminded us, NGOs have been actively involved in norm setting activities for a long time. It was in large part NGO pressure that led to the 1864 Geneva Conventions, as well as the anti-slavery and early labor conventions. Although NGO strategies for promoting norms and values vary dramatically, one interesting approach has been the launching of global campaigns. Josselin and Wallace provide a concise summary of the global campaign approach:

> Global campaigns, often associating churches, ethnic groups, trade unions, NGOs, even multinational corporations, are becoming more frequent as a myriad of groups borrow the tactics of transnational activists, sometimes
in the defence of their own narrowly defined interests. These include the generation and diffusion of relevant information; the use of ‘universal’ symbols or actions; enrolling the support of powerful actors; and efforts to hold these actors to stated policies or principles (2001: 255).

Alger (1992) has explored the nature and process of four selected human rights campaigns: anti-Apartheid, infant formula (Nestlé Corporation), workers’ right to organize (Coca-Cola Corporation in Guatemala), and anti-militarism in Latin America. The role of NGOs was crucial in every case, with NGOs playing important linchpin functions and serving as platforms for promoting international standards and pressing for implementation and compliance of those standards, “particularly notable was the way in which local campaigns, in regions very distant from the locale of violations, actively supported these worldwide campaigns” (Alger, 1992: 29). The cases indicate that effective transnational campaigns require the clear identification of targets and objects. Each brought together a diverse set of participants - governmental, non-governmental, intergovernmental, and grassroots - across a broad spectrum.

The Baby Food Safety Campaign

The infant formula campaign against Nestlé was a marked success. At the core of the effort was an extensive transnational network, the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN). IBFAN brought together the International Organization of Consumers Unions (ICU), the Inter-Faith Center on Corporate Responsibility, and the Infant Formula Action Coalition (INFAC). This group served as the primary catalyst for focusing world attention on the issue and garnering support from key UN agencies, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and important European governments. In less than seven years, the campaign was able to get WHO to approve a set of recommended standards for marketing infant formula. The final mark of success, however, was achieved in 1984 when the main target of the campaign, the Nestlé Corporation, agreed to abide by the code.

Anti-globalization Campaigns

Anti-globalization campaigns have been directed toward the Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Economic Forum (WEF), and other international economic governance institutions (Cohen and McBride, 2003; Wilkinson and Hughes, 2002). In the early 1980s, a coalition of largely Washington-based environmental NGOs (ENGOs) launched a successful campaign against the World Bank’s environmental policies and activities. Led by the Natural Resources Defense Council, the National Wildlife Federation, and the Environmental Policy Institute, this campaign pursued a multi-level strategy for promoting change. On one hand, they solicited the transnational support of developing country groups and organizations that had been adversely affected by bank policies. On the other, they focused directly on the U.S. Congress, which had the power to block further capitalization of Bank funds. The target in Congress was conservative legislators who were critical of multilateral organizations and U.S. involvement in them - thus, their interest in international financial
institution reform. The campaign also concentrated on building allies within the Bank itself. They did this by establishing an ongoing series of informal and formal contacts with Bank staff and by providing Bank staff as well as Congress and the media with high quality research and analysis. Furthermore, they brought in the media and attempted to mobilize public support by focusing on specific projects, such as the construction of large dams (O’Brien et al., 2000: 122-134).

The People’s Global Action against “Free” Trade and the World Trade Organization (PGA) network is another interesting case. It was launched in 1998 as an effort to coordinate grassroots movements around the world to protest through civil disobedience and “peoples-oriented constructive actions” against “corporate domination,” “corporate rule,” the “capitalist development paradigm,” and “economic liberalization and global capitalism.” The PGA is not a formal organization and has no members. It is a self-proclaimed “instrument for cooperation” that operates on a “confrontational attitude, since we do not think that lobbying can have a major impact” (Sans-Titre, 2002). It seeks to inspire coordinated and centralized demonstrations. Its activities are centered on Global Action Days, which bring together grassroots anti-globalization organizations and movements around the world for demonstrations. The first Global Action Day was called in May 1998 and centered on the Second WTO Ministerial Meeting in Geneva. Subsequent Global Action Days have included the Third WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in November-December 1999, the Fourth WTO meeting in Qatar, the World Bank/International Monetary Fund (IMF) meetings in Washington in April 2000 and Prague in September 2000, the various annual WEF meetings in Davos and New York, and various meetings of the Group of Eight, including Genoa in July 2001 which resulted in loss of life.

**The Movement to Ban Land Mines**

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) provides a good illustration of NGOs as catalysts (Cooper, 2002; Tomlin, 1998; Tomlin et al., 1999; Thakur and Malev, 1999; Hubert, 2000). ICBL was launched in 1992 at the initiative of the ICRC. From its humble beginning, consisting of six organizations - Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, medico international, the Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation - ICBL has grown to include over 1,300 NGOs and groups in over 90 countries working to ban antipersonnel mines. It is largely unstructured and loosely organized and is more a social movement network than a formal international non-governmental organization (INGO). This NGO coalition, however, has been a huge success story. Working against great odds, the ICBL served as the catalyst, bringing together small and medium-sized states to work in partnership with civil society to create a normative international political climate that could not be ignored (Cameron, 2002). These efforts resulted in the landmark 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction. Seldom before has there been such an effective large-scale partnership between NGOs and “like-minded states.” The ICBL and its head, Jody Williams, have been lauded as achieving the unachievable. As put by Cameron (2002: 69), “The movement to ban anti-personnel (AP) mines is a tale of David triumphing over Goliath” - tenacity, creativity and risk-taking leadership winning out
over sheer power. David later was made king; Williams and the ICBL were awarded the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize.

In large part, this success was the result of issue framing in the context of what has become known as the “Ottawa process.” As Cameron observes:

By reframing the terms of the debate on AP mines from an arms control to a humanitarian issue, the ban advocates shifted the focus from military security to human security. The public was encouraged to think of AP mines not in terms of disarmament but as an obstacle to development, a hindrance to humanitarian relief, a form of pollution, and, above all, a source of widespread human suffering…By reframing the problem, AP mines were removed from an exclusive focus on security and shifted into an arena more amenable to cooperative solutions (2002: 71-72).

It was largely the ICBL that was responsible for this reframing and the associated global AP mines peace education initiative. In addition, Cameron suggests that the Ottawa process was characterized by three related components that created an enabling environment: building a partnership between state and non-state actors; bringing small and medium-sized likeminded states into coalition; and “a willingness to operate outside of the normal channels and for a on a diplomatic ‘fast track’” (2002: 76-77).

As suggested by Josselin and Wallace, “[T]ogether with international conferences and summits, such campaigns are contributing to the emergence of common norms and values” (2001: 255). It has been in the context of international conferencing, however, that NGO networks and coalitions have been especially innovative and effective. In this context, normative functions blend into rule-creating functions.

NGOs and Rule-creation

While NGOs have been actively engaged in UN political processes since the San Francisco Conference in 1945, it has been a struggle to secure a meaningful, official place for civil society at the decision-making table beyond the limited provisions for consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) specified in Article 71 of the Charter. Ever ingenious, however, NGOs have devised their own ways to impact on the world body’s rule-creating activities, especially in regard to the primary mechanism employed by member states to solidify and codify new norms and rules - global conferencing.

At UNCHE in Stockholm in 1972, for example, a significant innovation was spurred. As mentioned above, while scientific NGOs were valued participants in the conference planning process, other NGOs were treated on a much more cautious and ad hoc basis. More than 200 NGOs were involved in some aspect of the UNCHE process, but, for the most part, NGOs had to fend for themselves and did this rather well. NGOs designed, organized, and held three parallel conferences: the Environmental Forum, the Peoples Forum, and Dai Dong. However, UNCHE logistics and scheduling, as well as the anti-establishment nature of the NGO parallel conferences, constrained the degree of interaction between government and NGO delegates. To overcome this limitation, two
NGOs initiated the publication of a daily conference newspaper, *The Stockholm Conference Eco*, and each day placed it in delegates’ mailboxes. As already mentioned in the case of UNCLOS III, this was to become a model for subsequent international conferences.

*Conferencing and Parallel Conferencing*

The Stockholm Conference was quickly followed by international conferences on population (Bucharest, 1974), food (Rome, 1974), housing/habitat (Vancouver, 1976), and desertification (Nairobi, 1977). Numerous other international conferences followed over the next two decades. This conferencing grew both in scope and complexity, and NGO conferences and parallel conferences became a permanent fixture on the multilateral scene. Conference after conference and issue upon issue, transnational NGOs, acting in concert, carved out a political space of their own in attempting to influence norm and rule creating activities of international organization. The Westphalian order that characterized the UN system was under siege. Civic-based actors were not only knocking at the door and requesting a seat at the table, they were building their own chairs and tables and developing their own rules of the game. Parallel conferencing provided a venue that member-state governments could constrain, but not control (Otto, 1996: 117-119).

The 1992 Earth Summit (UNCED) was in many ways a watershed for involvement of NGOs and people’s movements in UN affairs. This is not to say that NGOs, in general, were warmly embraced by conference planners. From the UN perspective, NGOs were largely left to their own devices and creativity with respect to preparing for the conference. Nonetheless over 50 NGOs made contributions to the preparation of UNCED and a number of independent parallel events were planned and executed (UIA, 1993: 1471). The process underlying this involvement was innovative. Growing out of two meetings (in Vancouver, Canada, and Nyon, Switzerland) in June 1990, an International Facilitating Committee (IFC) was created to encourage and facilitate NGO participation in the UNCED process. This body was comprised of 25 individuals from various representative NGO sectors. The IFC along with the ELC, played an instrumental role in planning the NGO activities, and most especially the parallel NGO conference, the Global Forum, which brought together 18,000 participants from NGOs and social movements. At a preparatory meeting in Paris in December 1991, NGO representatives produced a statement, the “Brazil Document,” that set forth an NGO perspective on environment and development. Out of this meeting an unprecedented NGO treaty writing exercise emerged. Using a computer network, NGO representatives set out to produce over 30 treaties covering five main topics: NGO cooperation and institution building, alternative economics, environment, food production, and cross-sectoral issues.

While there were 1,400 NGOs accredited as observers to UNCED, logistics in Rio made interaction and dual participation in both conferences quite difficult. The distance between conference sites was substantial, the scope of activities at the two conferences was overwhelming, and the general scale of associated activities was so great that little real interaction occurred. Moreover, the Global Forum was more of a happening or cluster of events than a conference as such. Events were held at over four dozen sites
around the city. Yet, there was ample opportunity for networking and information sharing, which from the perspective of most NGOs represents the real value of such events.

UNCED represented a watershed because out of it emerged a new and more open orientation toward the involvement of NGOs and other elements of civil society in UN affairs. Inherent in the comprehensive development and environment agenda for action (Agenda 21) and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration) that were adopted at the summit was the primary role of people, not states, in creating sustainable development and protecting the environment. Implementation, it was assumed, would require the integrated involvement of all sectors and levels of society, including local and national governmental bodies, scientific communities, private industries, civic groups, social movements, and individuals.

The conferees created a new UN body, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) to oversee the implementation of Agenda 21. The CSD, in turn, was mandated the task of strengthening the role of major societal groups as effective partners in sustainable development decision-making processes. Integrating civic-based actors as participants in governance processes at all levels was underscored in the Rio Declaration. Eight “major groups” were specifically mentioned: indigenous peoples, local governments, workers, businesses, scientific communities, farmers, women, and children and youth. All 1,400 NGOs that had been officially accredited to UNCED were authorized to be eligible for consultative status with CSD.

The UNCED process also gave rise to two other somewhat novel non-state initiatives. One has been a private-sector NGO, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). The WBCSD was the brain child of Swiss industrialist Stephan Schmidheiny, who wanted to carve out a role for the private sector in sustainability issues. Schmidheiny had been recruited by UNCED Secretary-General Strong to coordinate the business input to UNCED. To do so, he brought together the chief operating officers of several dozen large transnational corporations and formed the Business Council for Sustainable Development. Subsequent to Rio, the Council merged with the World Industry Council for the Environment to form the WBCSD in Geneva. The NGO coalition now has 170 corporate members in 35 countries and it cuts across 20 industrial sectors. Its primary mission is to provide leadership from business as a catalyst for promoting sustainable development and efficient, environmentally sound, and innovative corporate social responsibility.

Affiliated with the Council is a regional network of 45 national and regional partner organizations located mostly in developing countries. The Earth Council also emerged out of UNCED. This was the creation of Strong, who saw the need for a private body to serve as watchdog for the implementation of the Rio agreements. Along with over three dozen leading experts in the environmental field, Strong envisioned The Earth Council as serving as a legitimate body for representing the interests of civil society on the work of the CSD. These initiatives served as harbingers of the evolving roles of the private sector and epistemic communities in UN affairs.

*Novel Directions in UN-NGO Relations: A Snapshot*
Much has been written on both formal and informal relationships among UN agencies and NGOs. Alger (2002b), Cooper (2002), Ritchie (1995), and Willets (1996), for example, have all provided good succinct overviews of the present scope of activities of NGO involvement in the UN system. This literature is voluminous and need not be recited here. Instead, the discussion will focus briefly on two informative cases of UN-NGO relations.

The first case is the global response to HIV/AIDS. AIDS broke on the international scene in the early 1980s and quickly moved up the global agenda to a position of importance. In 1987, WHO instituted the Global AIDS Strategy and established the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA). As the newly appointed GPA director, Jonathan Mann, and his staff set about their work, however, they quickly came to realize that WHO and other UN agencies’ familiar sovereignty-based approaches to relations with civic-based actors would not likely yield the desired results outcomes in combatting HIV. The WHO’s traditional counterparts in member-states were national health ministries. Mann perceived these to offer little or no real assistance in addressing the problems underlying and caused by the emerging AIDS epidemic. From the beginning, he moved to bring NGOs on the inside and to get WHO member states to work closely with the NGO sector and to promote the creation of AIDS Service Organizations. He and his staff worked closely with transnational NGO groups and coalitions to create the ICASO network referred to above. The relationship between NGOs and the WHO has not always been smooth. As Söderholm (1997: 155-169) has illustrated, the early attempts by the GPA to reign in and coordinate NGOs from the top down did not sit well with many of the groups trying to be coordinated. However, over the years the necessity to cooperate has served to help work things out. Today, the preeminent role of the GPA has been replaced by the Joint United Nations AIDS Programme (UNAIDS) and five NGOs who serve, alongside governments and UN agencies, as non-voting members, on the Programme Coordination Board which is UNAIDS’s highest decision-making body. Also, there is a NGO/PWA Liaison Committee, comprised of five members and alternates from each region that serves to link UNAIDS to larger civil society.

What is also striking about the AIDS case is that international conferencing on AIDS, unlike most other issues, has been dominated by non-governmental actors. Most of the major multilateral AIDS conferences, which serve as a global diplomatic focal point for HIV/AIDS, have been organized by the International AIDS Society (IAS) in collaboration with a national host, the GPA/UNAIDS, and several international umbrella NGOs. IAS is a scientific NGO and, in the early years, the conferences were largely scientific affairs accompanied by NGO parallel conferences. Beginning in 1991 at the Seventh International AIDS Conference in Florence, an NGO component, Communities Challenging AIDS, was included as part of the regular conference venue. The main focus was clearly science, however, and the NGO component was more an afterthought than a main component. Over the years since, this has changed. For example, the unified format of the Fifteenth International AIDS conference in Bangkok in July 2004, where scientific, social, public health, and community-related areas came together. In addition, these AIDS conferences have been noteworthy in that they have always included the private corporate sector as a component. After a decade-and-a-half, the international governmental response to HIV/AIDS moved into a higher gear in June 2001 when the
UN General Assembly held a special session devoted exclusively to AIDS and established a framework for national and international accountability in the struggle against the epidemic. The foundations of this action have been heavily influenced by civil society input and work.

In a second case, Malone (2002) has illustrated how NGOs are able to exploit political space to gain access to selective policy domains. One of the most important breakthroughs in this regard has been in UN Security Council-NGO relations. In 1995, a small group of New York-based INGOs interested in the work of the Security Council formed a NGO coalition, the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, to facilitate their objectives in regard to promoting Security Council reform. Initiated by Jim Paul of the Global Policy Forum, founding members also included Amnesty International, EarthAction, the Lawyers Committee for Nuclear Policy, the World Council of Churches, and the World Federalist Movement. The Working Group today has a fixed membership of 30 of the largest and most well-respected NGOs working in the fields of arms control and disarmament, humanitarian relief, human rights, and other security related issues. The group has no formal standing in the Security Council, but it organizes off-the-record briefings almost every week with one of the Ambassadors on the Council and has evolved the tradition of meeting with Ambassadors serving in the Security Council presidency. In 2002, for example, the Working Group held 36 meetings with Council delegates, two meetings with foreign ministers, and five meetings with UN officials.

The Working Group does not claim to be representative of global civil society, but it wields significant influence because it is comprised of many of the largest and most effective INGOs in the fields of interest of the Council. The members of the group are briefed by delegates on the work of the Council, and Working Group members brief delegates on what is happening in the field, providing information on key issues, increasing awareness of alternative perspectives on critical issues. What this group has been able to achieve is phenomenal, given that the Security Council has historically been the most resistant element of the UN system in dealing with NGOs (see Global Policy Forum website).

The Operational Side of UN-NGO Relations

For many decades, NGOs have been actively and effectively involved in the operational work of international institutions (Weiss and Gordenker, 1996; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Fowler, 2000). In doing so, they serve as forces for peace, often mundanely but effectively, every day. This activity has perhaps been most visible in regard to humanitarian assistance, human rights and development, but extends to nearly every aspect of UN agencies’ work. In addition to their work in mobilizing public opinion, promoting global standards and norms, generating and providing information that makes it feasible to devise effective enforcement mechanisms, and monitoring compliance by states of such international accords once adopted, non-state actors of all forms serve as mediators, facilitators, contractors and implementers, and numerous other roles in the field. NGOs can often go where international agencies and state actors cannot. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for example, contracts most of its program and budget activities to NGOs. Cooper highlights the roles
that many NGOs play as go-betweens or subcontract facilitators in support of UN agency field operations, “At a functional level, what appears novel is the amount of activity which may be described as micro-mediation. The prime illustration of this trend may be found in the area of negotiated access of relief deliveries in war zones either through non-protected and/or cross-border operations” (2002: 8). NGO staff literally often put their lives on the line to make certain that humanitarian relief gets to all sides in ongoing conflicts.

UN agencies utilize NGOs for operational activities both because they find them useful and effective and because they are sometimes encouraged to do so by agency delegate bodies. O’Brien et al. (2000) focus on the evolving “complex multilateralism” in which NGOs, social movements, think tanks, foundations, business organizations, and other diverse actors engage each other both within international institutions and with international institutions. The lines between public-civic, public-private, and macro-micro have become very blurred. The World Bank justifies its operational reliance on NGOs by arguing that many NGOs possess a comparative advantage in getting the product to the poor (World Bank, 1996: 2). The 1994 “Platform of Action” adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development (IPDC), for example, spelled out in detail the importance of engaging NGOs in critical partnerships to assist in formulating, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating population and development programs and activities. The same was the case with Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. At the 1995 World Summit for Social Development (WSSD), the Programme of Action reiterated the same message, calling for the development and use of community-based organizations among the marginalized and poor. This summit reflected a new approach to conferencing and to sustainable development more generally. It was a dialogue among major stakeholders from governments, civil society, and the private sector. Instead of concentrating primarily on the production of treaties and other outcome documents, the conferees focused on the creation of new partnerships for bringing additional resources to bear to support and enhance implementation of sustainable development initiatives.

*The Global Compact*

Since coming into office, Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his core administrative staff in the UNDP and elsewhere have been working aggressively to establish partnerships between UN agencies, civil society, and the private sector (Annan, 1998b; United Nations, 1997). Annan launched the initiative in Davos, Switzerland, in January 1999 and challenged the world’s business leaders to promote respect for human rights, protection of the environment and equitable labor standards. This initiative brings together the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in collaboration with the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), UNEP, UNDP, and the Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP) and seeks to engage the private sector constructively in helping to make globalization work for all the world’s peoples. Partners to the compact are asked to embrace nine principles drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the ILO’s Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work, and the Rio Principles on Environment and Development. It engages a wide diversity of partners, including: international inter-
sectoral business associations; international, sectoral business associations; national business associations; workers’ organizations; and NGOs.

The main assumption underlying the Global Compact is that development, especially for the less developed countries, cannot occur through governmental or intergovernmental means alone, even with the kind assistance of the multitude of development assistance NGOs. Neither can it occur through unbridled market forces alone. Local, national, and international enabling environments are seen as prerequisites for sustainable human development, and a broad-based partnership involving all relevant “stakeholders” is required.

The Global Compact has been steadily expanding, and, as of February 2003, more than 700 corporate partners had joined the agreement. A year later, the total number of participants listed on the Global Compact database was 1186. One of the principles that underpins the Global Compact is that UN agencies should, in dealing with private sector partnerships, “undertake a deeper examination of issues related to corporate governance” in the context of developing countries’ specific legal, social, and cultural environments in order “to develop and implement international accounting, reporting and auditing standards.” While encouraging information sharing about potential investment opportunities in less developed countries, the UN development framework cautions that “international institutions involved in supporting FDI flows should evaluate the development impact of investment flows in recipient countries, including social development concerns” (UN Doc. A/AC.257/12).

Partnerships as a Tool for Peacebuilding?

The Global Compact represents only one dimension of UN agencies evolving partnership with the private sector. Under the leadership of Administrator Mark Malloch Brown, the UNDP has reprioritized its functions around four themes: advocacy, advice, pilot projects, and partnerships. The partnership function is a wide-ranging one and it expands almost endlessly. It entails building and extending constructive partnerships with civil society, the private sector, and local authorities. Underpinning this strategy is the belief that “people should guide both the state and the market, which need to work together in tandem, with people sufficiently empowered to exert a more effective influence over both” (UNDP, 1993). Critical to this endeavor is creating in these varied constituencies an identity of being “stakeholders.”

Within the developing world this initiative to forge new partnerships has taken a variety of forms and complexities. Two examples will help illustrate the nature and diversity of such partnership arrangements. The Global Digital Opportunity Initiative (GDOI), for example, was launched in February 2002 by the UNDP in partnership with the Markle Foundation in cooperation with Sun Microsystems, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco systems, AOL-Time Warner, the Harvard Center for International Development, Grameen Bank, and other private corporations, NGOs, international organizations, and foundations, who are part of what is termed the GDOI’s International Partners Group. The mission of the initiative is to provide developing countries with expertise and resources to create e-strategies and solutions to advance their development goals. Initial efforts are focused on twelve developing countries to assist them in building the technological capacities required to improve healthcare, education, and economic
opportunities and to reduce poverty. A second example is UNCTAD and the International Chamber of Commerce’s joint initiative to help less developed countries strengthen their capacities to attract investment. This partnership involves 28 major corporate enterprises as well as aid agencies in China, Finland, France, India, and Norway. It is aimed at producing country-specific investment guides to provide information on investment opportunities and conditions and stimulating dialogue between governments and potential investors.

There has been some opposition to UN agency partnerships with the private corporate sector. Many governments resent actions by multilateral agencies that do not respect the sanctity of state sovereignty as a fundamental legal norm. On the other hand, various NGOs and civil society groups have expressed concern about UN agencies becoming too closely involved with private sector entities, especially large transnational corporate enterprises and international banks. The response from UN agencies has been clear. In order to promote sustainable human development in an effective way, they need to find new mechanisms to generate the needed resources and, perhaps more importantly, to get those resources into the hands of those who most need them, especially the poor at the local level.

Furthermore, in the context of the globalization versus anti-globalization debates, numerous actors and forces in the civil society realm vehemently oppose what some have referred to as the commercialization of the UN system. Interestingly, although not surprisingly, another NGO - the International Chamber of Commerce - is one of the primary targets of the anti-private sector NGOs’ attack. They repeatedly call for the UN to break its partnership with the International Chamber of Commerce. Underlying their attack is the argument that such private-sector partnership initiatives undermine state sovereignty and national governments’ effectiveness in governing and promoting the well-being of their peoples and territories.

Yet, it is not clear that in operational settings in the field there is a fundamental difference between the behavior of for-profit and not-for-profit non-state actors. In a recent study by Cooley and Ron of the implications of the increasing marketization of transnational development and disaster relief assistance, for example, the authors argue that most often scholars tend to paint a much too optimistic and uncritical picture of the role of NGOs in promoting human security:

The proliferation of IOs and INGOs operating in the same sector, along with the marketization of their activities, is radically transforming certain sectors of the humanitarian relief world. The UN system itself has become increasingly complex, with four major agencies … joined by at least 40 large aid and relief INGOs and two separate Red Cross groupings, the ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. In addition, hundreds of smaller INGOs are seeking entry to the aid and relief market, hoping to raise funds for future work by raising their flag in media-saturated humanitarian “hot spots.” Although the global INGO relief market is dominated by eight agencies, each of their country offices is forced to compete heavily for individual contracts in particular conflict settings (2002: 12).
Competitiveness and an overcrowded market lead nonprofit INGOs to “respond to contractual incentives and organizational pressures much like firms do in markets” (Cooley and Ron, 2002: 6). Their empirical analysis “uncovered a tacit system of material constraints that shaped INGO actions and, on occasion, subverted nominal agendas…[and] across the board, competitive environments create institutions that not only systematically shape the behavior of donors, INGO contractors, and recipients but also inhibit cooperation” (Cooley and Ron, 2002: 6). The name of the game becomes organizational survival. In this context, INGOs normative agendas may become subverted, because “when placed in competitive, market-like settings, nonprofit groups are likely to behave like their for-profit counterparts” (Cooley and Ron, 2002: 35).

Malone (2002) has raised another point:

A paradox for the NGO world…is that while its component organizations derive much of their legitimacy from their grassroots origins, for NGOs to achieve impact globally some of them at least must operate at the international level, far removed from grassroots constituencies. This reality, along with the frequent incestuous relationship between leading NGOs and governments (which often fund them), leaves NGO credibility ambiguous in many circles (2002: 51).

This debate over what kinds of partnerships should be deemed acceptable and which should not will likely not be resolved nor is it likely to slow the pace of creative partnership formation and practice.

**Foundations for Partnerships as a Peacebuilding Tool**

As illustrated below, examination of the forces and tensions that have propelled the partnership phenomenon in multilateral institutions indicate that partnering is not just another development fad. Moreover, careful inspection of why and how these enabling processes opened up the needed political space for enhancing civil society participation in peacemaking is instructive in regard to how scholars and students of such phenomena might better apply what has been learned through practice.

These special initiatives for building partnerships with diverse elements of society have their foundation in the evolving global development debate and practice. Building on the earlier merging of environment and development into the concept of sustainable development, the global development debate took on a new character in the early 1990s as the concepts of human development and sustainable development became fused in the concept sustainable human development. The UNDP was a pioneer in this regard, and the UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board (Decision 94/14) adopted sustainable human development as a new mission for the technical assistance agency. Like other development concepts before it, sustainable human development was viewed as a key requisite for creating and maintaining security and peaceful world order.

*UNDP Leadership and a New Consensual Global Development Framework*
In its *Human Development Report 1993*, the UNDP provided a basic framework that focused much subsequent discourse. It suggested that the UN’s development work needed to be based on at least five “new pillars” regarding human security, sustainable human development, partnerships between state and markets, patterns of national and global governance, and forms of international cooperation. Each subsequent *Human Development Report* has served to elaborate, extend, and clarify various aspects of the development-human security nexus. The reports catalog the aggravation of poverty and the growing divides between rich and poor both within societies and among them, increasing unemployment, and perpetuating social exclusion. In addition to an overall analysis, each of the successive reports has emphasized a specific theme: funding priorities (1991); global markets (1992); democracy (1993); environment (1994); gender (1995); growth (1996); poverty (1997); consumption patterns (1998); globalization (1999); human rights (2000); sustainable livelihoods (2001); and democracy (2002).

Participation and empowerment, however, have been two of the priority themes running throughout the annual *Human Development Reports*. A new people-centered development agenda places a premium on enhancing the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including especially women, youth, the poor, and other marginalized elements of society, as well as civil society and the private sector. The way to eradicate poverty, the UNDP reports have argued, is to empower the poor and marginalized elements of society to provide for the satisfaction of their own basic needs and values. As argued in the UNDP *Poverty Report 2000*, “if poverty reduction programmes are to succeed, local government must be strengthened” as must popular participation and role of civil society in governance processes (UNDP, 2000).

Here lies an important key to opening the door of increased political space for NGOs and diverse elements of society. These UNDP endeavors provided an increasing realization that national governments, acting individually or collectively, could not solve many, if not most, of the most pressing problems confronting humankind by governmental means alone. Nor could these threats to human security be dealt with effectively with the meager resources available to NGOs and other civil society actors. Moreover, in the vast majority of societies confronting the most serious threats to human security, elements of society other than NGOs needed to be brought into the political process. But the *Human Development Reports* themselves, were not sufficient to make a decisive difference. There were also other, more potent, forces at work.

*Conferencing as a Focusing Mechanism*

Simultaneously, the 1990s also bore witness to an unprecedented and extensive series of multilateral global conferences focusing on development-related issues and problems. The topics of these conferences were normally quite interrelated, and many of the same participants - governmental and non-governmental - were forced to hop from conference to conference without much time to breathe. There was literally never a time during the decade when these participants were not either preparing for, or participating in, this overall conference process.

The evolving series of global conferences during the 1990s helped to refocus and redirect the global development agenda. This list of conferences, which includes regional as well as global meetings and related preparatory meetings, is unbelievably long.

As mentioned earlier, one of the most striking outcomes to emerge from this conferencing process was that the development debate took on a new character as the concepts of human development and sustainable development became fused in the concept “sustainable human development,” which, in turn, became further entwined with the concept of human security. Promoting peace and security, the UN’s primary raison d’être, has come to mean promoting and sustaining “human security.” Capacity building, good governance, and popular participation are all viewed as essential ingredients for promoting sustainable human security and peace, “The primary resource for development is the great untapped reservoir of human creativity and talent of the people of the developing countries themselves; the release of this human potential requires investment in education, infrastructure, public health and other basic social services, as well as in production for the market.” (A/AC.257/12, 18 December 2000). According to this new framework, development needs to be people-centered, not state-centered. Good governance, however, is considered to be essential for successful development. This new people-centered development agenda focuses heavily on integrating and empowering relevant stakeholders, especially diverse elements of civil society including the private sector. Partnerships were increasingly seen as crucial tools for peacebuilding. Yet, there was one other important, more general factor that needs to be brought into the picture to understand adequately why and how partnerships became a fixed feature of the global peacebuilding scene and an indispensible tool in the peacebuilder’s tool chest.

A More Pragmatic Enabling Environment

The demands coming from the global South during the 1970s and early 1980s for the establishment of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) had stalled, and the viability of the Group of 77 as a cohesive mobilizing and caucusing force fizzled out. It has become clear that developing countries lack the power to compel developed countries to respond positively to their policy demands. As the members of the United Nations moved ahead - at least rhetorically - into the Third Development Decade in the 1980s, Northern donor states seemed fatigued by the entire process. With a new administration in Washington bent on reassessing all U.S. multilateral commitments and a like-minded conservative prime minister in charge in Britain, the stage was set for a general lull, followed by hostility, in the global development debate. A more pragmatic, less accusatory approach by Third World diplomats was clearly noticeable at the General Assembly Special Session on Africa in 1987. Attacking the West had gotten them little. Fast-breaking changes in world politics further undermined their calls for an NIEO.
Economic conditions affecting the poorest countries had changed dramatically for the worse. The abstract issues of global equity and social and economic justice that had sustained the North-South acrimony during the NIEO years lost their immediacy. In the context of the early 1980s the full attention of many Third World countries had to be focused on their debts and the deteriorating social conditions that debt-inflicted austerity was causing. Others, particularly the governments and peoples of Africa, had to deal with the combined effects of civil war, economic collapse, ecological disaster and HIV/AIDS. Some states, especially in Asia, showed dramatic economic improvements. But many developing countries did not. The UNDP Human Development Reports drove this home in dramatic fashion. In the context of all of this, official development assistance (ODA) continued to decline to new low levels. Years of forced zero-growth budgets and large budgetary arrears, resulting largely from the United States refusal or inability to pay, were threatening to marginalize, especially in relative terms, multilateral agencies’ capabilities to respond to such threats to human security effectively. New sources for resources needed to be found. Partnerships with the private sector arose as one potential solution to this growing problem.

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of communist control in central Europe, and the breakup of the former Soviet Union distracted attention in the North away from Third World development concerns. This was especially true in Washington, where the South had suddenly become strategically much less important, but this was true more generally throughout the West. Those calling for greater attention to Southern development were searching for a way to capture the attention of Northern donors as development assistance money, in real terms and as a percentage of GDP, decreased. Also associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union was a profound deligitimazation of the state as authoritative actor in the economic realm. In addition, there has been a steady decline in the capacity of the state to help fulfill basic human needs, and the report called for the development of new patterns of national and international governance. As suggested in the 1993 UNDP Human Development Report, the state now is too small for the big things, and too big for little things. Sustainable human development provided developing countries a potential means to recapture some of the lost focus and garner the support and power that they had lost with the demise of the Cold War. In addition, in contrast to the Cold War era, the pendulum now has clearly swung closer to the original liberal agenda assigned to the United Nations as evidenced by the prevalence of good governance, partnerships with the private sector and civil society, democracy, and human rights.

Under these conditions, by virtue of their situation, developing countries still make their long standing demands for debt relief, development capital, technical assistance, access to markets, stabilized commodity prices, food aid, and the wherewithal to satisfy other basic human needs. A good deal of development activity has continued in the UN system. But, much of this activity has been in the form of relief measures, emergency relief, or other stopgap moves designed to stem deterioration rather than to promote development. By the early 1990s the social and economic side of the world organization had resigned itself to being more of an “aid” organization providing technical assistance and facilitating technical cooperation, and less of a “development” organization. The increasing directives from governing bodies to devote more resources to the poorest countries ensured that “Band-Aids,” rather than development of
sophisticated economies, were the overriding orientation of the UN system. The eruption and continuation of civil wars in such places as Somalia, the Republic of the Congo, and Sierra Leone meant that dwindling resources were devoted to stopgap military and humanitarian operations rather than to investment or aid to development. Pragmatism and fragmentation came to characterize the global South in the 1990s, and the ideas associated with sustainable human development seemed to fit well with these attitudes. In all of this, the United Nations came to be looked upon more as a conduit for immediate aid and less as a legitimizer of new principles of global order. Partnerships with diverse elements of society that might reach to the core and address human misery, suffering and poverty, were seen as much less unacceptable than they had seemed just a mere decade before.

This more pragmatic political climate meant an opening up of political space for non-state actors of all sorts. International agencies were confronted with the real prospect of becoming marginalized as their relative resource bases eroded during the 1980s and 1990s. These factors, coupled with rapidly shrinking social time and space resulting from the revolution in information technology and various other globalization processes, served to create a positive reinforcing and enabling environment within which NGOs, transnational social movements, private sector entities, and other diverse elements of society, including sub-governmental bodies and local communities could carve out autonomous action roles. Moreover, as discussed above, UN agencies, seeking to improve their effectiveness, scrambled to embrace them in ever evolving partnership schemes. The challenge to students of international organization, world order, and peace studies is to find ways to understand better all of this.

**Reconceptualizing Our Tools**

The discussion to this point has identified and described five additional tools - networking, coalition building, global campaigns, parallel conferencing, and partnerships - that have made their way through discourse and practice over recent decades into the tool chest for peacebuilders. Furthermore, the essay explores the dynamic set of social forces and tensions that have given rise to them. The article concludes with the argument that, while these tools are there and are being applied daily on an increasingly intensive scale, much hardening, honing, and sharpening needs to be done if academia is to play the important peacebuilding role envisioned by Secretary-General Annan.

*Bringing Academia into the Tool Box*

As part of his “Quiet Revolution” for transforming the UN system, Annan (1998b: 136) argues that “one of the most important relationships is the one the UN has with the global academic community.” He refers to this need as “clear and critical” because:

Good policies and effective programs must be built on sound knowledge and good models. There is much to be known...about the dynamics of global governance...the dynamic interplay of agents and forces that
threaten or degrade human security, and ways that multilateral institutions might better promote security. Furthermore, scholars could assist in producing new knowledge about what international institutions have done and are currently doing to promote partnerships with diverse elements of international civil society...[and] in identifying institutional reforms that would be needed to enhance multilateral institutions’ capabilities for facilitating the development of open societies and promoting human security as well as the initiatives that are necessary, sufficient, and politically plausible for stimulating and bringing about such managed institutional change (Annan, 1998b: 137).

The study of non-state actors is almost as old as the field of study of international organization itself. Pioneers in the exploration of these rapidly proliferating and functionally diverse phenomena include: White (1952), Lador-Lederer (1963), Angel (1969), Skjelsbaek (1971), Feld (1972), Kriesberg (1972), and Alger’s inventive probing (1972, 1974, 1977). What is notable about these early investigations is their eclectic nature and willingness to be open to including diverse elements of society within their purview.

The study of non-state actors has gone through many permutations and gyrations, and has been referred to many ways - NGOs, transnational relations, non-state actors, civil society, and the Third Sector. What has been included as acceptable objects of study inside such conceptualizations has also varied. Authors have invented or borrowed a varied set of terms to refer to these objects of study. Beyond the terms mentioned already, others include: private voluntary organizations (PVOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), grassroots organizations, transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs), quasi-governmental organizations (QUANGOs), government organized NGOs (GONGOs), donor-organized NGOs (DONGOs), and the list goes on.

Given the context of the actual research and practice in multilateral organizations and global governance and the tremendous array of societal elements that are increasingly being brought into global governance processes, these traditional conceptualizations seem much too limiting and even misleading. Dichotomies such as civil society/private sector, governmental/non-governmental, state/non-state, and even the trichotomy of states/government - civil society - markets/private sector probably blind us from more than they permit us to see.

Inherent in everything discussed above is the premise that at the core of global governance lies human social interaction. Social relations give form to world politics. They are not fundamentally based in discretionary interests and powers of participants, but in the formation and maintenance of social groups and networks through which individuals and groups go about satisfying needs and values. These networks tend to become regularized over time and individuals’ roles in them become institutionalized and social structures evolve. The resulting institutions are based on functional relationships that may or may not depend on shared values. These relationships are based primarily on the satisfaction of participants’ needs, values and interests, and the role expectations associated with them. They are also based in identity as related to the larger social environment.
In complex social systems individuals tend to associate with a wide array of these “identity groups.” With respect to any particular issue, individuals may be involved in a large variety of relevant social relationships associated with differing identities. The range of identities is limitless, but for the purposes of understanding global governance, identifying with culture, nation, class, ideology, race, gender, sexuality, clan, religion, and government are among the most relevant. Individuals may also associate together in response to negative identities - that is, identities they see as threatening. Alger (1977) has been a pioneer in exploring the processes by which individual activation is linked to individual and collective encounters with the world in satisfying needs and values.

Identity is a basic human need but has its foundations in social context and history. In this regard, it is helpful to return to basics. Writing almost 45 years ago, Gabriel Almond (1960) has helped more than one generation of students interested in the developing world to understand that models of social organization which may be very useful for understanding social order and politics in advanced Western liberal societies may not be, and probably are not, so useful for understanding such phenomena in other parts of the world. Important cornerstones for understanding the nature and role of groups in society and polity is the way they function and why in aggregating and articulating interests. In this regard, he found it helpful to differentiate four main types of structures involved: institutional groups, non-associational groups, anomic groups, and associational groups (Almond, 1960: 33). Institutional groups include such entities as legislatures, political executives, armies, bureaucracies, and churches. They are formally organized bodies with professional staffs whose main missions are something other than interest articulation, yet can and often do serve as a base of operation for a subgroup to engage in such political activities. Non-associational groups include such things as kinship, ethnic, regional, religious, status, and class groups, whose configuration is relatively informal and interest articulation function irregular. Almond has captured succinctly the nature of anomic groupings. They are “more or less spontaneous breakthroughs into the political system from the society, such as riots or demonstrations” (Almond, 1960: 34). In the anti-globalization campaign discussion above, the GPA, while representing a less rather than more spontaneous activity, would seem to serve as an example of anomic group behavior. At any rate, what happened in Seattle and other similar events do illustrate this. Finally, “associational interest groups are the specialized structures of interest articulation - trade unions, organizations of businessmen or industrialists, ethnic associations, associations organized by religious denominations, civic groups, and the like...Their particular characteristics are explicit representation of the interests of a particular group, orderly procedures for the formulation of interests and demands, and transmission of these demands to other political structures such as political parties, legislatures, bureaucracies” (Almond, 1960: 34). This latter type of aggregation, associational groups, most often dominates the scholarly focus and conceptualization of civil society. It is the world of NGOs.

In large parts of the developing world, associational groups are not the predominant form of social identity. Interest aggregation and articulation occurs more commonly through traditional or non-associational groupings. Processes of globalization, however, may be changing this orientation. But in terms of network building, coalition formation, social movements and campaigns, and partnership creation all forms of interest aggregation need to be in clear purview. In this regard, it is
important for analysts and practitioners alike to understand and be open to processes through which identities become altered and aggregated. This is particularly important when it comes to identifying and mobilizing marginalized peoples whose needs and values are threatened or otherwise intimately affected by global processes. The practitioners in the Rio conferencing process understood this well. That is what the concept of “major groups” is about.

Again, we need to return to basics. Five decades ago, Truman (1951: 511) was arguing this when he distinguished between potential groups and actual groups. A potential group is an aggregation of all persons who, because of a common interest, might be group members. An actual group, according to this distinction, consists of that part of the potential group that is formally organized. Lasswell (1971: 24) understood the same thing, but took a somewhat different tack and differentiated between unorganized and organized participants. Both of these conceptual formulations attempted to convey the notion that in any substantive policy arena there will be persons who are not formally organized yet, because of the nature of the issues at stake, will be affected by and thus inherently linked to the value allocation process. In such cases, these persons constitute potential groups and thus can be aggregated into collective units and taken into consideration. This participant-passive participant distinction should not be viewed as a strict dichotomy. Instead, organization is viewed as a process that can be represented on a continuum from a totally dispersed, unorganized and seemingly amorphous state of affairs to the most highly structured and rigidly formalized unitary grouping.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Alger’s first premise - that actual research and practice in international organization and world order continue to exceed what scholars and students of such phenomena tend to apply - remains true. Much of the discipline of international relations remains grounded in a very different way of thinking. Alger, himself, however, has been and remains a major exception in this regard. Alger has understood these things all along. He learned them at an early age and explored them empirically in the real-world laboratory of Columbus, Ohio.

References


