Youth Spaces in Haunted Places:  
Placemaking for Peacebuilding in Theory and Practice

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Abstract
Drawing on theory and examples from several different conflict settings, this paper evaluates the potential for ‘placemaking’ as a post-conflict peacebuilding tool. Theorists of ‘place-making’ distinguish between a space which is a geographical location and a place which is ‘space plus meaning’ (Donofrio, 2010, 152). Spaces become places through rhetorical acts of attributing symbolic value to a particular terrain. Placemaking records and revises history and creates and mediates conflicts, shaping identities in the process. The fluid and socially-interactive nature of placemaking suggests a potentially close relationship with the slow, evolving process of peacebuilding. But the nature of place as a repository of memories holds particular challenges for ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding. Based on an analysis of official documents, news articles, and interviews conducted by the author with Belfast youth and youth workers, the paper closely examines the Northern Ireland case. In Northern Ireland, many official projects including mural re-imaging, conflict museums, and historical, commercial enterprises, such the Titanic Quarter, reflect a policy of transforming ‘contested spaces’ and creating ‘shared space’. These official interventions are affected by at least two dynamics related to youth: young people possess little official placemaking authority, but they nevertheless seek to colonize and create their own spaces and reinterpret places. While placemaking has significant potential as a peacebuilding strategy, some post-conflict spatial interventions may be associated with old ‘ghosts’ of territoriality and exclusion, under the guise of liberal peacebuilding.

Introduction: Space, Place, Youth and ‘Placemaking’
In the broadest terms a public space is a socially-constructed territory or terrain that represents, shapes, controls, manages or guides social interactions and is distinguishable from both private space and from wilderness. Churches, parks, nightclubs, market places, museums, schools, sports grounds, and courthouses, are all contemporary examples of space that have been organized to instruct, to encourage some activities and discourage others, and to foster or inhibit certain kinds of exchanges between people. Complicating matters, public spaces can also be privatized spaces and they can further the political goals of distinct groups and institutions. War and political violence also create specific, socially-constructed, conflict spaces, including but not limited to buffer zones, ‘no man’s lands’, refugee camps, ethnic enclaves, and massacre sites.
A place, according to theorists of ‘place-making’, is more than a physical space. A place is ‘space plus meaning’ (Donofrio, 2010, 152). Maarja Saar and Hannes Palang explain:

Place for us is socially constructed and operating, including interaction between people and groups, institutionalized land uses, political and economic decisions, and the language of representation’ (Saar and Palang, 2009).
Theresa Donofrio, writing about political contestation surrounding the 9-11 memorial site at Ground Zero, names the power to rhetorically transform space into place as ‘place-making authority’ and notes that claims to this authority were made by several different groupings, including the families of 9-11 victims, scholars, as well as other actors with political and economic interests (152). Placemaking is a process with an indefinable end. While places have a material reality, their meanings evolve over time and not in wholly predictable or controllable ways. Places are constantly reinterpreted and reconstituted, and entail ongoing power struggles and negotiations. Placemaking, therefore, has a potentially intimate connection with the social, cultural and political processes of peacebuilding. To date, though, placemaking practices have been studied mostly within the disciplines of cultural anthropology, human geography, and urban studies, and not within peace and conflict studies.

This paper pursues three broad objectives: first it attempts to clarify what placemaking entails and where, how, and why it has been applied as a peacebuilding tool. Second, the paper analyzes the different spatial peacebuilding approaches being implemented in ‘post-conflict’ Northern Ireland to draw some conclusions about the existing and potential role of placemaking in peace processes. Third, the paper explores the problem of young people’s ‘authority’ in placemaking, theorizing links between young people’s development, adult territoriality, and the ethno-political and psycho-cultural boundaries that structure life in conflict zones, to identify knowledge gaps and potential new avenues for investigation by peace researchers.

There are several core elements of placemaking according to existing theory and practice. Placemaking entails intentional spatial design and organization to create shared meanings associated with public space (a place of social interaction). Placemaking entails understandings of social space as places of imagination, constitutive of identity, and often as sacred (including representing existential threat or survival). Anthropologists such as Keith Basso sees ‘place-making’ as ‘retrospective worldbuilding’ (Basso, 1996, 5), a process that not only records but revises history and shapes and reflects identities. In his analysis of the Western Apache, Basso states: ‘We are in a sense the place-worlds we imagine’ (Basso, 1996, 7). Basso also argues that everyone makes places without ‘special sensibilities or cultivated skills’ (5). In fact, he asserts that ‘place-making is a universal tool of the historical imagination’ (Basso, 1996, 5). The meaning of a place is grasped through the experience of being within it, participating in its activities, and telling stories about it, which allows for places to shape people’s identities and values.

In placemaking, a transformational role for the space is envisioned, including the aims of changing material realities, social capacities, and narratives. Geographer Robert David Sack argues that place-making results from human beings being ‘incapable of accepting reality as it is’ (Sack, 2003, 4). Place, according to Sack, ‘is an area of space that we bound and to some degree control with rules about what can and what cannot take place. Place can be any size, from the small-scale of a room or a sacred grove, to the large scale of a farm or a city, to a vast territorial unit such as a nation-state or empire’ (Sack, 2003, 4). Humans create places as ‘tools’ for pursuing certain projects such as education, childrearing and government, states Sack, in an effort to transform one kind of reality into a better one, into ‘the reality that ought to be’ (Sack, 2003, 4). This same transformational motive drives our ‘manipulation’ of
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places whether they entail redecorating a room at home, building a place of worship, or planning a war of occupation, according to Sack. This view of ‘place-making’ suggests a clear link with normative projects of peacebuilding and conceptualizes placemaking as an organic social practice, which young people will inevitably be involved in.

In theory, then, both ‘places’ and ‘place-making’ can be employed as peacebuilding ‘tools’, in strategies that seek to transform war and its legacies into a different and better reality. But, there are certainly practical challenges entailed in such a move, requiring considerable reflection on the complexity of the placemaking peacebuilder’s role and on the problem of exclusion/inclusion. Both organic, slowly evolving forms of placemaking, and formal political processes of (re)configuring public space, involve multiple contestations, transactions, and expressions of, and challenges to, power. All placemaking involves boundaries of various kinds - for example, there are the physical limits of the place itself and rules for use of and engagement within the space - but at the same time placemaking processes are unpredictable and may yield unintended narratives as well as boundary challenges.

In most societies, exclusions of young people from, often arbitrarily, proscribed spaces go relatively unnoticed, as David Sibley points out, and mask a deeper level of adult territoriality (Sibley, 1995, 69). The life-worlds of young people are bounded by rules created by adults, marking boundaries (re)establishing and naturalizing a moral division between adults and children. Adults employ ‘self’ and ‘other’ distinctions as they define and contain children and youth, who are treated as temporarily ‘wild’ and ‘imperfect people’ (Sibley, 1995, 69), properly contained within a private sphere. A similar process occurs at the group level:

The construction of community and the bounding of social groups are part of the same problem as the separation of self and other. Collective expressions of a fear of others, for example, call on images which constitute bad objects for the self and thus contribute to the definition of the self (Sibley, 1995, 45).

In the conflict resolution literature, these processes, intensified by the high stakes of survival, are understood as enemy imaging and intra-communal deterrence whereby group solidarity is encouraged and dissent is discouraged. Intriguing possibilities exist for analyzing the linkages between the ‘othering’ boundaries that adults place on children and youth and the physical, economic, ethnopolitical, and psycho-cultural boundaries in conflict zones. Youth are framed and defined by discourses of global policy, and in post-conflict situations, local peace process politics, as well.

This paper shows that placemaking involving youth is complicated by at least the following:

1. Young people do not officially have what Donofrio terms ‘placemaking authority’ (2010, 152) but they seek to exercise such authority anyway. Young people participate in (sometimes illicit) social practices of placemaking through hanging out, playing games, visibly marking territory in some way such as graffiti, vandalism, and other activities such as protest and riot;
2. Adolescence is an experience of being displaced, of liminality, and of seeking a place of one’s own. Young people confront and negotiate multiple boundaries, e.g. the boundaries imposed by physical structures of war, biological development, self/other distinctions, and increasing recognition of their own agency.

3. In contexts of political violence and/or protracted social conflict, attempts to create youth space may also involve haunted places, that is, spaces that have particular meanings because of traumatic conflict narratives that may not be known or well understood by the next generation(s).

In Northern Ireland, particularly but not exclusively in areas that were most affected by the Troubles, each of these themes is reflected in the ongoing troubled relationship of young people to space in the post-agreement period; and a significant amount of effort in Northern Ireland has been placed on strategies for transforming public space. In Northern Ireland official re-branding campaigns attempt to neutralize ‘post-conflict’ places with safe and nostalgic images, and the promise of commercial benefits. Tourism-generating projects, linked to local regeneration, imply reconciliation without actually representing it, and include the ‘ghost tours’ of the Titanic museum and of the Falls/Shankill conflict murals which are promoted by the Northern Ireland Tourist Board and listed in the Lonely Planet Travel Guide. Transforming public space has also involved mono-cultural memory competition, and mono-cultural neo-isolationism, whereby unassimilated or chosen traumas, are maintained within walls, real and figurative, with some communities framing themselves as glamorized ghettos for post-conflict tourism and others being framed as the pariah ethnoscapes of an easily revived past. For some young people the contradictory valorizations and repressions of past violence and discrimination, as represented through transformed post-conflict spaces, may promote ‘transgenerational haunting’ and the (re)transmission of trauma and violence. Among the concerns raised by the paper is that the triangle of transgenerational trauma, adult territoriality (which determines when and why youth are allowed to be political) and socio-economic exclusion, points the way to youth resentment, alienation and various forms of political action that may not help sustainable peacebuilding. Before turning to this case in more detail, the next sections of the paper briefly examines war placemaking and then the theory, practice, and impact of different spatial interventions that are being used as part of peacebuilding strategies in a variety of different locations.

**War Placemaking**

Some of what is usually called territoriality in conflict analysis is also ‘placemaking’ – the creation of bounded physical spaces with shared meanings and (resisted) systems of control. These war places are discrete militarized territories with multiple meanings connected to the experience of war, meanings connected to how they been invaded, occupied, barricaded and internally policed. In each of these cases, the territory that is contested or destroyed is much more than bricks and mortar, beautiful terrain, or even prized ‘real-estate’. Places have meaning and people form deep attachments to them because places constitute identities and can have sacred or
existential significance. Buffer zones, country borders and community interfaces may remain contested long after an end to fighting or a peace agreement, as they are in Cyprus and Northern Ireland, for example. Young people help maintain the messy, ritual battles at the local level in war’s left-over contested spaces. By colonizing and leaving their marks on physical space, youth contribute to the creation or reproduction of meaning.

The ‘place-making’ of armed conflict extends beyond the most visible military or repressive architectures to incorporate the erased landscapes, invisible boundaries, and (mobile) sites of trauma. Territoriality in armed conflict is a strategy of control and shapes the identities and subjectivities of people in war-zones while inviting resistances. The different ways in which war’s placemaking constitutes identities, creates trauma, and entails conflicts make a case for employing placemaking as a peacebuilding strategy, but also demonstrate the challenges to doing so effectively. At least, four types of war place-making can be identified, including (a) Territorial strategies that attempt to erase organic places and/or memories of shared placemaking practices; (b) Intra-group place-making to consolidate ethnic or other collective identities and ensure compliance with community norms; (c) The building of specific war structures such as barracks and prisons with practical and symbolic/performative functions; (d) Forms of counter-war place resistances, including the creation of sanctuaries or ‘zones of peace.’ For the latter, see the groundbreaking volume of that name edited by Chris Mitchell and Landon Hancock (2007).

The destruction of religious and cultural sites and identity spaces, including spaces that allow memories of a shared past, is not only an outcome of war but often a distinct war aim, as it was in the Balkans wars in the early 1990s. Attacks on places imply physical and spiritual annihilation. In Urbicide, Martin Coward contends that buildings are ‘more than merely equipment for living’, but are, in fact, ‘constitutive’ of people’s lives (Coward, 2009, 16). Coward identifies the wars in the Balkans, and house demolitions and ‘administrative destruction’ of Palestinian homes by the Israeli government, as examples of urban destruction in war that are about more than physical land/buildings alone, or about the deaths or dispossession of people. He argues that their significance lies in the powerful combination of what buildings and people mean to each other. Ridding the landscape of evidence of a multi-ethnic history – like mosques, museums, libraries - and of places for meeting as a community such as markets and cafes, is more than symbolic ethnic cleansing. It is an attempt to destroy plurality and community (Coward 2009) and to make people forget. Since buildings also house and school, their destruction means an assault on family, childhood, education and memory. Attacking cultural property during war can help prolong conflicts when, for example, it leads to looting of archaeological sites, and feeds trade in artifacts to support illicit economies and fund insurgencies, as apparently happened in Iraq (Van der Auwera, 2010).

Moreover, destruction of cultural sites and multi-ethnic public spaces are attacks on indigenous placemaking. Erasing indigenous places makes it more difficult to draw on local cultural knowledge, people, and resources to effect ‘peacebuilding from below’. Post-conflict placemaking strategies may be able to recover and revive these indigenous forms, including those social practices of creating harmonious,
shared space. But after long periods of conflict, such as that in Northern Ireland, such a recovery cannot rely on direct memory alone, but on transgenerational transmission of memory and the reconstruction and evaluation of knowledge about the past. Young people appear to be involved in all of forms of war placemaking, to varying degrees and with different roles, depending on the context. In addition, the particular social and developmental position of young people in their societies, such as their liminality, likely interacts in interesting ways with war placemaking processes, and is an area ripe for further study by scholars of peace and conflict.

**Placemaking for Peace**

Given how ‘placemaking’ occurs as an aim and an outcome of war, intervention strategies aimed at creating places of peace could also capitalize on existing norms of intra-group solidarity, address physical war structures that have potent symbolism, revive indigenous placemaking, and identify counter-war resistances and bounded spaces that already contribute to peace. Existing theories of ‘placemaking’, as summarized in the introduction suggest that it is possible to create bounded territories that serve these objectives, though it may be more difficult to ensure that such spaces have collectively understood meanings as ‘places of peace’. Viewed through the lens of peacebuilding theory, placemaking for ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding would entail the following:

1. **Countering- territoriality**; preventing, violence and managing conflict, by addressing physical war structures; and creating demilitarized, secure zones and/or violence-free zones;

2. **Building capacity** through creating places that practically, and nonviolently, address the underlying causes of conflict, including structural violence, and that do not reproduce conflict or structural violence; they may revive indigenous placemaking practices;

3. **Promoting transitional justice**, healing of trauma, and reconciliation between groups in conflict, through spaces that allow ‘multidirectional memory’ (Rothberg, 2009) and change negative narratives.

All of these approaches come with potential risks and pitfalls, and are complicated by the tensions between adults and youth/children.

1. **Violence Prevention and Conflict Management**: Employing Sanctuaries, Barriers, and Infrastructural Demilitarization to Manage Conflict and Create (Direct) Violence-Free Zones.

A place is a bounded area of physical territory with rules of engagement and collectively understood meanings (Sack, 2003) and placemaking can, therefore, be a strategy to offer protection from violence. Support for such an application of placemaking is found in the findings of Mitchell and Hancock (2007) who have studied the role of sanctuaries during on-going conflict. Mitchell and Hancock argue that some of the defining features of sanctuaries or ‘zones of peace’ are a set of rules about how outsiders should treat the space and about how insiders should behave within it, such as that they are impartial and abstain from acts that would offend
outsiders. Additional factors that make a sanctuary more likely to succeed in fulfilling its purpose are that: it has some legal or ethical basis for existing; its boundaries are clearly marked; it has an effective and legitimate collective leadership structure and conflict resolution mechanisms; it provides a range of activities and projects, beyond protection from violence; it does not pose a threat or contain ‘valued goods’; and it has an external patron or protector (Mitchell and Hancock, 2007, 212-3). Some of these findings may be significant for creating shared space in post-conflict situations.

The ‘locational protection’ that these arrangements offer might be precursors to the development of ‘shared spaces’ in post-conflict situations, or the outcome of such strategies. However, it should be noted that these authors find that ‘geographical and sociopolitical remoteness’ from centers of armed conflict are another factor contributing to the sustainability of a zone of peace. In many cases, including in Northern Ireland, this remoteness is impossible and might defeat the purpose of a place of peace. Nevertheless, this work helps bridge the gap between the peacebuilding literature and the literature on public space.

In the short to medium term post-conflict period, another way in which ‘placemaking’ is employed for direct violence prevention purposes is through spatial interventions to separate people in conflict – such as through the building of walls or barriers between groups – or for demilitarization, by removing military structures and other hostile symbols. The construction of structures to divide and control - like the Israeli security barrier/wall and the ‘peace lines’ in Belfast - are examples of spatial interventions to ostensibly mitigate violence but that also hide and create trauma and injustice. Wendy Brown argues that political walls like these and others such as the US-Mexico border barrier, ‘have always generated performative and symbolic effects in excess of their obdurately material ones’ (Brown, 2010, 39). Like Coward, she argues that physical structures shape lives, create identities, and ‘produce the content of nations’ (Brown, 2010, 41). Moreover, much is communicated through the architecture of war about the ‘psychological needs and desires’ of those who build them (Brown, 2010, 41). They are expressions of ‘spectacularized power’ (39) that try to tell a story of domination while tacitly admitting that their control is fragile. They signal the failures of imperial power and the erosion of the sovereignty of states (Brown, 2010). As Louise Purbrick et al. (2007) writes succinctly, ‘To erect a wall or construct a prison is an announcement of power as well as a mechanism through which it is exerted’ (1).

The use of barriers approach, more so than the sanctuaries approach, has been utilized in Northern Ireland so far. But more needs to be known about how young people living within the shadows of the physical infrastructures of conflict such as walls and security fences, integrate those barriers into their development and identities and how the ‘performative’ (Brown, 2010, 39) function of walls stimulate related performances, such as graffiti or protest, by young people. Young people also encounter boundaries and transition of many different kinds – biological, legal, moral, psychological and political - that also shape their nationalisms, subjectivities and identities in conflict zones. The relationships between physical barriers like walls or military installations and those other boundaries, such as social mobility, that youth face are, therefore, worth carefully considering during peacebuilding.
Another important insight from the placemaking theory is that places are tools for pursuing projects of social improvement (Sack, 2003). Research in the fields of leisure tourism, urban development, and community gardening also provides empirical support for the positive communal effects of certain spatial interventions. The potential of placemaking as a strategy for building capacity has been shown in research on community gardens in the US, Canada and the UK. Such studies have identified positive benefits for participants in terms of health and well-being, self-esteem, identity, food security, social capital and expanded networks (Irvine, Johnson and Peters, 1999; Glover, 2003; Glover, Parry and Shinew, 2005a; Schmelzkopf, 1995), as well as its benefits for democracy (Glover, Shinew and Parry, 2005b), and environmental justice and equity (Ferris, Norman and Sempik, 2001).

The potential for community gardens to function as shared space during armed conflict and in post-conflict situations has not been studied in depth. However, such an approach is being utilized in Bosnia (as an American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) project) with a view to promoting reconciliation in an organic way through the social activities within the garden:

The perfect reconciliation for them is coffee time [...] We have two soldiers from opposite sides sitting in the garden and playing chess together. That’s the best reconciliation, because, very soon, after a couple of chess parties and drinking coffee, they realize that even though they are on opposite sides politically, they are in the same position as people. They were both just told lies, lies, lies, and that’s why they picked up the guns and started to fight. Now they are sitting together.

We never come and officially say, ‘Today we will have a meeting about reconciliation at 10:00 or 11:00.’ We only have meetings when there is something to discuss about agriculture, we post a notice saying, ‘today will be about composting or rainwater harvesting.’ Then they will know that everyone should come and participate. But, never meetings solely for reconciliation. (Brdanovic, nd, 250-252)

The impact of community gardens on racial relations/integration has been explored in the United States mostly by leisure studies scholars. Studies in the US about whether community gardening promotes positive inter-racial contact have drawn conflicting conclusions, however, and these studies are very important for post-conflict peacebuilding because they suggest that change in relationships wrought by meeting in shared space will be slow. Karen Schmelzkopf (1995), for example, shows that such gardens are also ‘contested spaces’, which may include racial and ethnic conflict, as well as local political conflict over low-income versus market housing development. Nevertheless these studies do consistently find that a sense of community belonging is enhanced (Shinew, Glover and Parry, 2004; Schmelzkopf, 1995). A post-conflict peacebuilding strategy may be to redefine community and community belonging through spatial intervention. Garden spaces offer incredibly rich
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canvases for complex and nuanced expressions of history and identity, through choices of plants for example, and thus visual, aural and olfactory elements, and they replicate the slow, evolving process that peacebuilding entails. While gardening may seem initially unappealing to youth, the interest of many young people in environmental activism, as well as the benefits of nature education for children’s development, make these uses of space very important to consider as a peacebuilding tool/strategy. Moreover, self-sufficiency and health through local food production provide material benefits and may help transform negative narratives.

Troy Glover (2003) argues that community gardens (in the context of urban revitalization in a declining area of a US city) can change the narrative a community has developed about itself, counter negative narratives imposed from outside, and result in a new more positive collective identity:

By converting decaying urban spaces into ornamental or vegetable gardens or both, residents transform neighborhood liabilities, namely abandoned, dilapidated lots, into tangible (e.g., fresh produce, beautification, sitting gardens for recreation) and intangible neighborhood assets (Glover, 2003, 191-2).

The intangible ‘assets’ include community empowerment and ‘individual development and psychological wellbeing’ (Glover, 2003, 192). The relevance of these ‘assets’ for people who have lived through violent conflict is obvious. ‘[L]eisure episodes’ like community gardening can be ‘the social lubricant for social capital production’ (Glover, Parry, Shinew, 2005a, 450), and result in women’s empowerment (Parry, Glover and Shinew, 2005). Changing narratives within and about communities that have been marginalized or demonized during a conflict, is another possible benefit of community space/gardening project in post-conflict settings. For example, one group of young women interviewed in Belfast, described an experience of moral exclusion because their housing estate, Mount Vernon, was viewed as a nest of paramilitary thugs and drug dealers and colloquially called ‘Mount Vermint’ (see McEvoy-Levy 2006). The role that placemaking interventions can make in transforming the stories that people tell about themselves and about their communities are clearly important to explore as part of peacebuilding.

3. Place-making to support transitional justice and reconciliation: spaces for remembering, healing and envisioning peace.

Internationally, a lot of attention has been paid to transforming conflict-related space to constructively deal with the past, and promote learning, respect, understanding and healing. Built specifically to recognize, remember and understand the roots of political violence, trauma and human rights violations, many memorials and museums about the history of conflicts and its victims and survivors exist. Museums are vital repositories of memory and places of narrative creation and education. However, they are relatively fixed entities, and even in country’s not emerging from armed conflict, they are politicized, and seen to exclude certain groups. Young people may be particularly skeptical about the museum experience, as it may seem dry and boring.
Interactive and living history museums aim to counter some of the traditional museum tendencies. The Robben Island Museum (RIM) in South Africa is created on the site of a prison that, among many other political prisoners, once held Nelson Mandela. RIM’s mission entails memorialization, education, and ecological preservation. Others like the District Six museum, also in South Africa, recognize an early local history of integration which was followed by forced removals of blacks. The museum integrates intergenerational dialogue and the collection of oral histories into its activities allowing collaboration with schools and a multi-generational educational function.

Museums and heritage professionals emphasize ‘the therapeutic effect of the return journey’ (Purbrick, 2007, 5) and the educational functions that installations of this kind provide for future generations. In this way, museums can contribute to violence prevention, to healing and to justice by recognizing suffering and injustice. However, these underlying ideas are subject to challenge. Some scholars argue that reusing sites of trauma and conflict to help build peace may not be desirable because: ‘Fixing the meaning of a site of conflict usually entails imposing one version of events over another, that of the victorious over the disempowered’ (Purbrick, 2007, 3). Memory representation cannot be shaken loose from power relations and identity development, they claim:

The experience of entering a space, crossing a border, hitting a wall, returning to a jail, is connected to the practices of representation of identity. To feel or to know a space as enclosing or expansive, comforting or alien, empowering or oppressive, depends upon power relationships that are established both in and around that place. (Purbrick, 2007, 4)

Other analysts, like Michael Rothberg, however, dispute the inevitability of the ‘competitive memory’ paradigm, which views memorialization as a ‘zero-sum struggle’ for recognition and dominance (Rothberg, 2009, 3). Instead, Rothberg conceptualizes memory as ‘multidirectional: subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing and borrowing’ (2009, 3). Well planned museums can represent complexities and challenge the competitive memory model. Rothberg argues:

Our relationship to the past does partially determine who we are in the present, but never straightforwardly and directly, and never without unexpected or even unwanted consequences that bind us to those we consider other. When the productive intercultural dynamic of multidirectional memory is explicitly claimed […] it has the potential to create new forms of solidarity and new visions of justice (Rothberg, 2009, 5).

Multidirectional memory is also dialogical and world-building, according to Rothberg, suggesting yet further links with the practice of peacebuilding. In designing museums for peacebuilding, the actors involved, such as The International Coalition for Sites of Conscience, attempt to translate the theoretical power of Rothberg’s statement about new forms of justice into policy. Sites of Conscience offers useful resources on museums that educate about peace and human rights and has also developed
assessment models to explore their impact (http://www.sitesofconscience.org/). Other peace-educating/peace-symbolizing spaces include bi-national or integrated schools, shared community centers that offer informal education programs, and alternative peace communities. There are also parks that integrate symbols of different ethnic identities in nuanced ways through landscaping, such as multicultural gardens or, like the Viva Grimaldi Peace Park in Chile, that promote human rights through education programs.

In many post-conflict contexts where tensions are ongoing, such as in Northern Ireland, a concern is how to address the past without glamorizing and encouraging violence. Local memorialization projects that valorize the struggle and its combatants may sit uneasily with parental silences about their participation (see McEvoy-Levy, 2011), as well the concerns of victims/survivors. A young person’s struggle out of childhood dependency on adults can become understood in relation to a people’s struggle for independence, and vice versa. A variety of boundaries come into play: political and economic limitations, and the boundaries of adult territoriality and of gender norms. Sibley claims that boundaries can be ‘constructed, demolished and energized’ (Sibley, 1995, 32). Peace researchers can consider how developmental boundaries between childhood-youth-adulthood are energized, for example, by memorialization and/or by failure to transmit information about the past.

As important as dealing with the past history of violence, is articulating a future story of peace. Such a normative task may not find its home in a traditional museum setting. While many examples exist of attempts to representing the idea of peace in physical form within public space, the job is artistically, as well as politically, challenging. While quicker to create, individual monuments and memorials are yet more fixed than museums, which can at least change collections, themes and installations. Fixed structures like monuments reflect the culture and politics of the time, and can reduce war and peace to clichés and reinforce stereotypes. For example, Gough (2003) comments on how ‘Peace’ in London war memorials is represented as a female figure that is inferior to Victory. It may be that peace is hard to represent in a traditional hard, sculptural form like a monument, especially if the intention is to appeal to a broad audience.

Designers of the Peace Wall in Paris built a glass structure incorporating different languages in an attempt to engage multiple audiences. Modeled on the ‘Wailing Wall’ in Jerusalem, the Paris Peace Wall, allows visitors to leave notes and messages, for example. Similar structures were built in Saint Petersburg and Hiroshima (wallforpeace.com). Sculptures that recycle weapons fashioning them into symbols of peace are another example of the use of spatial, artistic interventions to represent a transformational process and/or desire (see Peace Art Cambodia). There seems to have been little research, however, on the relationship between artistic public representations of peace and post-conflict peacebuilding. Such work could usefully inform the design of shared, post-conflict spaces. In the Northern Ireland case, it complements efforts to transform sectarian or militarized imagery and art, and young people already utilize public space as canvas for graffiti and street art.

While some contributions to transitional justice, such as the creation of conflict museums, may intentionally involve ‘placemaking,’ place-based interventions for peacebuilding ‘often fall between the cracks of existing policies for historic
preservation, human rights, education, transitional justice, urban planning, and tourism’ (Sites of Conscience, 2008, 14). And there is a problematic lack of interdisciplinary research in place studies itself (Sar and Palang, 2009). With the notable exception of Hancock and Mitchell’s volume examining sanctuaries in ongoing conflicts, discussions of ‘place-making’ have not been integrated into the scholarship on international conflict and peacebuilding. Basso points out that placemaking is a ‘cultural activity’ and ‘it can be grasped only in relation to the ideas and practices with which it is accomplished’ (Basso, 1996, 7), necessitating close local studies. Placemaking can occur through social compact or imposition from above but, in either case, will invite resistances because considerable ambiguity and contestation surrounds who or what constitutes ‘place-making authority’ (Donofrio, 2010, 152). Therefore, the paper now turns to look more closely at one case - Northern Ireland – and at how space and place issues are being incorporated into post-conflict peacebuilding strategies in this location.

**Youth Spaces in Northern Ireland**

Space and place issues have been central to the concerns of youth and youth workers interviewed in Belfast over the last 10-15 years. A repeated concern of young people in Northern Ireland is that, despite being in a post-conflict period, they experience the fear and threat of sectarian violence in public, most notably and routinely on the street, as a function of going about daily life. Because Belfast remains a segregated ‘urban ethnoscape’ (Gaffikan et al. 75), as do many other parts of the north, young people experience insecurity and can create insecurity for others simply by trying to complete ordinary rites of passage. Youth may make everyday passage, to shops, school, jobs and college, by routes that are adjacent to ‘peace walls’, cross peace lines, or travel close to areas that make them feel insecure because they are ethnopolitical enclaves, or they may make plans that avoid certain routes. One legacy of the Troubles for those young people who are living in still segregated working-class areas is a lack of mobility. Due to both real and imagined fears of leaving their area, and crossing into or through ‘enemy’ territory, they lose access to leisure facilities and other opportunities. Schools were seen as sanctuaries by some during the conflict. Today they remain mostly segregated and in many contexts both schools and youth centers are mono-cultural islands within highly contested areas. Many youth relevant to this discussion are no longer in school, are unemployed, and do not have the funds or confidence to travel, even short distances to the commercial and leisure facilities of the city center. Therefore, many youth have experienced closure within communities rather than an opening up of experiences in the post-conflict period.

It should come as no surprise then, that many youth are also involved in protest and (post-traumatic) play at interfaces and surrounding parades that entails conflict with ‘the other’, as well as with local adults and the police. The different roles that young people play in relationship to community interfaces, peace walls, murals and other symbolic boundaries include: using flags and graffiti in marking certain territory as exclusive; helping to police such territory through preventing incursions of other kids, verbal aggression and making raids on the other side, throwing stones and petrol-bombs; placing peace messages on the walls, and making friendly attempts to cross
the barrier, through dating the other, for example, but also deterring and punishing such transgressions. Youth are active in messaging and the marking of territory not only through sectarian and political tagging but also using outcast monikers, like UTH (Up the Hoods) and FTPSNI (Fuck the Police Service). These territorial claims can reproduce inter-group antagonism and entail conflict with paramilitaries and police and they contribute to a shadowy tapestry of signs, a landscape of trauma and threat.

For young people, a sense of one’s own space is based on several different forms of group identity involving age, locality, ethnonationality, class, and gender (McEvoy-Levy 2006) and is fluctuating. While it is important to understand why young people participate in violence through group engagements that either mimic or attempt to revive the Troubles, such as protests, riots and marches at the interfaces between the two communities, it is also noteworthy that much conflict between youth and adults is intra-communal, involving the temporary colonization of space for socializing that is not related to sectarian or political tensions and violence. Young people are also individually grappling with the process of making a place for themselves as well as achieving mobility across spaces. While adults recognize these youth desires, they also express frustration about how to police and maintain public space. In turn, youth workers often express dissatisfaction with the top-down government strategies which reflect suspicion and risk-aversion when it comes to youth, default to conflict management, and prioritize neo-liberal forms of urban regeneration. Most youth workers recognize a lack of youth spaces and identify that gap as a problem that contributes to anti-social behavior such as public drinking, vandalism and ‘recreational rioting’. One noted:

Where are the youth facilities? Young people want youth spaces that they can call their own. Not structured youth centers. They want to be trusted. When you give young people a chance they will follow through (Farrell, Interview, 2009).

However, some also expressed skepticism, as did some young people, about the notion of creating youth spaces, responding to the question with a dismissive, ‘they’d only wreck it.’ Youth work professionals are acutely aware of tensions associated with space and place as part of their own histories. For example, one youth worker recounts his own history as being involved with rioting and getting into trouble with the police before becoming involved in peacebuilding. He readily admits, as many do, that interface rioting was both fun and activated a feeling of being involved in community defense. Similarly, his first forays into cross-community work in the early 1990s were motivated by a desire for something to do: ‘[I] thought it would be good, sit in the park with a carry-out, canoeing and some cross community work.’

In fact, he was paid fifty pounds a week to work with another young person from the opposing community to develop summer youth activities to take place in a park which was a site of clashes between the communities. Armed with a new purpose and a financial incentive, they together developed a festival for the park, but shortly into the project the Northern Ireland Office constructed a fence running through the park to prevent trouble between rival groups.
It was completed in the first week of the IRA ceasefire in 1994. The NIO put the fence in. We tried to get in contact with whoever was responsible but it was difficult. No phone number. The fence just went up. We eventually were able to tell them that we’re doing a cross-community scheme and they stopped building for a while. But we went away on a residential, and when we came back [the fence] was completed. The fence hasn’t solved problems [of violence]. There are people jumping over to try to jump people. It hasn’t solved it at all.

One interesting aspect of this narrative is the lack of control local young people and their mentors had to use space for nonviolent, cross-community peacebuilding purposes, even though such cross-community work with youth has been heavily promoted both during the Troubles and in the post-conflict period. Interviewed 15 years after these events, this youth worker believes that post-conflict violence, such as in recreational rioting, involves young people because of ‘boredom, history, and territorialism’ and has both differences and similarities with past violence:

They’ve heard about defending the area from grandparents etc. and they would call me a bit hypocritical for trying to stop it now because I was involved then. [Today] Technology has made it easier to get a crowd together and riot. When we were young, there were no mobile phones. The only person with a mobile phone was a drug dealer. Now they have each other’s numbers, from the other side, they get numbers through BEBO and through girls meeting fella’s, and they are texting and calling the other side. [They] could be just talking but then also slabbering at each other and arranging riots. Over the summer they [the riots] are a more daily occurrence. There’s a break over the winter. From St. Patrick’s Day on, it becomes a regular thing. But there have been riots on Christmas day and shootings. It used to be every Sunday at 3pm people came out of a shebeen and there was trouble. What’s changed is that the oldest person would now be about 21 or 22. If adults are on the scene now, it is to calm it down. It’s more about young people from the area not able to go to sports facilities or the swimming pool without being facilitated to do so. They know where the boundaries are - may be a lamp post – and it’s still dangerous. It will take years to change. (McKevitt, Interview, 2009)

Noting the large number of suicides in the area since the peace agreement, including one of his friends who hanged himself on the children’s climbing frame in the same park discussed above, the youth worker alludes to the possibility of post-conflict loss of meaning wrapped up with mental impact and economic exclusion: ‘I suppose they think, it’s supposed to all rosy and all with the peace process, but it’s not rosy for me.’

One positive approach, he argues, would be more democratic youth centers with ‘an open door policy’:

Lots of youth centers are not reaching out as they should. People need to be held accountable. There are youth clubs that are 100 meters from an interface and young people are not using them. But we need to model the kind of club
young people want. When I was young I’d rather be on the streets, involved in anti-social stuff, than in a structured youth center. [But] I saw the benefits of a youth worker talking to us. I worked with young people involved in trouble. You need an open door policy. Ask young people what they want. Is it a drop in, [or] a youth-run youth club? Very few young people have a major say in what happens in a youth club. Youth clubs should have young people (under 25) voting and in control. (McKevitt, Interview 2009).

But another youth and community worker explains that in some areas, the issue of youth spaces is compounded by a more general demographic pressure. In some Catholic areas of Belfast there is a very high population density, insufficient housing, and a large percentage of youth in the population.

A major dilemma exists, therefore, in reassuring adults, particularly older community members, that they are safe from crime, while also allowing young people to colonize public spaces in the absence of other alternatives. For example, one area called ‘The Grotto’ – a small shrine to the Virgin Mary - was a place that young people would congregate to drink and have sex. Another bar corner was the location of a mix of 120-140 young and older people involved in drinking, fighting, and public urination. In another park location, youth attacked traffic and pedestrians. This youth worker continues with other stories:

Kids gather in the stairwells of senior citizens flats for drinking and glue sniffing. There are stories of older people being terrorized to the degree that they wouldn’t answer the door. One woman who is 75, and whose only family is a brother who comes up every two weeks from the Republic, doesn’t even have a phone. Young people were shouting in the letter box that they were going to rape her. We went down to talk to them. It was just a joke to them. But, you know, then it becomes a dare. Each of these spaces has led to a confrontation with residents. People want something done.

Consequently, an ‘us-and-them situation’ develops between young people and the rest of the community, leading to little support for ideas about ‘youth spaces’.

People would ask, where is the [available] space? What about insurance issues? Who is responsible for it? What about the police etc.? If we had time, resources, and energy we could do it [create youth spaces]. But most people would go, ‘what?’ (O’Neill, Interview 2009).

The general local skepticism about giving young people their own space is shaped by experience, such as destroyed street art/graffiti projects, and by a wider sense of uncertainty about who is in control. Paramilitary ‘rough justice’ is no longer an option, because of the peace process, and for many, the police are still not reliable or trusted. Older Republican activists, for example, who were now committed to the peace process, noted that dissidents were filling a vacuum by ‘putting their chests out’ and offering ‘vigilante’ solutions to youth crime and nuisance behavior. The default position, therefore, is spatial conflict management, such as attempts to re-route youth
into centers for diversionary activities and the building of fences. In relation to a local children’s playground that was vandalized and became the staging-post for attacks by youth on Fire Service personnel, the official response was again to erect fencing. As a community worker involved commented: ‘We wanted to hire a space shaper consultant to alter the physical space but were told there was no money. Eventually they (the NIO) were persuaded to put up 30-40,000 pounds worth of fencing.’ (O’Neill, Interview, 2009). Ideas about irrational, destructive youth behavior combined with a history of insurrection versus state control, combine to promote a default position of replicating past conflict management strategies through creating fences and barriers and camera surveillance. This kind of response is prompted not only by the fear of anti-social nuisance behavior by young people, but also old modes of control thinking, or adult territoriality; there is wariness of uncontrolled young people and for some a concern about a loss of power to a new generation of activists and gangsters. Yet, conflict management in terms of visible barriers is a short term fix, and as several different youth workers testified, can inhibit longer-term peacebuilding processes that are likely to be more effective.

Gaffikan et al. point out: ‘Belfast is not unique – it is subject to the same pressures as most international cities in terms of the ‘privatisation’ of public space, the extension of protective surveillance, the dominance of private transport and the needs of excluded minorities’(2008, iv). However, the meaning of these systems of control and exclusion, and their impact on local identities, is for many still interpreted and felt through the ideological and emotional lenses of the British-Irish conflict and the Troubles. These lenses have altered, adapted to ceasefires and a peace process, as well as changes in regional and global politics and patterns of migration, but evidence of the continuity of sectarian narratives and transgenerational traumas is clear in the residential landscape of Northern Ireland. For example, while universities and student unions and some sites of leisure activities enable interaction, development of hybrid identities, and counter-territorial/sectarian practices, strikingly, residential patterns for students continue to support segregation. As Gaffikan et al. (2008) note, in the Queen’s University area of Belfast, some housing (such as the Holyland area) is considered primarily to be for Nationalist/Catholic students and other areas (such as the Lisburn Road) understood as more for Protestants/Unionists.

Moreover, for some young people, the class-related experience of off-limits places, such as the city center, university area, and the new Quarter entertainment and consumption spaces, operates in mutually reinforcing dynamic with sectarianism. For example, working class Protestant girls did not want to participate in a museum project in a middle class area because they were worried that Catholic university students would attack them. In the end, though, these girls overcame their fears due to patient trust-building by their adult mentors (Smyth, Interview, 2009). As this last example illustrates, youth experience barriers, and participate in the reconstruction of boundaries, that may be invisible, or even seem ridiculous to adults, but that are nevertheless very real and that can be constructively addressed. Access for youth to new spaces, and with them, new experiences can be hampered by psychological and economic barriers. They can also be affected by how the roads and public transport system are organized, and in Belfast attention been placed on the need to achieve greater practical connectivity between the different parts of the city (Gaffikan 2008).
Some factors, being more concrete, are easier to address than others. Transgenerational and unassimilated traumas are, perhaps, the most difficult of all.

Protests and riots involving youth have been routinely depoliticized by police, politicians, former paramilitaries, civil servants as well as many youth and social work professionals, and presented as merely ‘recreational’, manipulated by shadowy older adults, and drug and alcohol fuelled. However, interviews with young people and adults show that youth violence is influenced by all of these factors, but also by attempts to curtail, police, divide and control youth space, and perhaps even further by transgenerational trauma and forgetting (see McEvoy-Levy, 2011).

Psychoanalytic studies have suggested that ‘trauma is not locatable in the simple violent or original event in an individual’s past, but rather in the way it’s very unassimilated nature – the way it was precisely not known in the first instance – returns to haunt the survivor later on’ (Caruth, 1996, 4). Perceiving a similar process they termed ‘transgenerational haunting’, whereby unassimilated trauma of violent experience passes to successive generations, Abraham and Torok (1994, 171) suggest such processes can be collective as well as individual. In this light, repetitive behavior, such as recreational rioting and residential segregation, could be seen as a form of unconscious post-traumatic play, and an expression of the interplay of knowing and not knowing for conflict survivors. ‘What returns to haunt the victim…is not only the reality of the violent event but also the reality of the way its violence has not yet fully been known’ (Caruth, 1996, 6). For surviving generations, such violence cannot be fully understood but is known at the same time. This dynamic can be particularly acutely felt in the relationships between ex-prisoners in Northern Ireland and their children (McEvoy-Levy, 2011). At the collective or national level, a fine line may exist between therapeutic or harmful interventions, and the nature of the British-Irish conflict – sovereignty and territory at its core – suggests that efforts at transforming space, will be experienced unconsciously, as well as directly, not just as a reconfiguring of territorial landscapes but a retreading of traumatic experience. Rather than avoidance of the conflict’s legacy such interventions will need to engage with it, given the post-traumatic need both to know and to heal through constructive play/repetition. An additional and new factor is the touristification of some of these spaces, through conflict murals tours, for example, and a contradictory negation of memory within families and communities (McEvoy-Levy, 2011), as well as efforts like the Titanic Quarter in Belfast that commodify and repackage memory to attract tourists. These and other expensive or difficult to access consumption/leisure spaces, affect young people’s self-perceptions and group identities in ways that have not yet been closely studied.

Many of these activities of youth discussed in this section of the paper have shown the reproduction of division in action and the significant role that young people play in the regeneration of conflict. This is a role that young people play in collaboration with the official police and government policies and with local adults, because it is the interaction between young people and these actors in the shadow of the physical structure of the wall, mural, or community interface that performs the conflict reproduction role. Likewise, young people can play a role in the de-escalation and transformation of conflict, removing divisions, literal and figurative. But such a role also requires significant collaborations between young people and adults,
including ‘placemaking authority’ and sharing power with authority figures with the express purpose of changing conflict dynamics with very deep roots. To develop further knowledge of how such processes operate and to identify youth participation strategies that support peacebuilding, there is a need to document and analyze projects aimed at youth with attention to how power is distributed. In this context the evolving Peace and Reconciliation Action Plans lead by Belfast City Council are interesting to consider because they intentionally engage young people and of the more than 12,000 people involved in projects from 2009 to 2011, 54% were aged under 25 (Belfast City Council b., 2) in a strategy focused on creating ‘shared space’. These activities and others are discussed later in the next section.

Place and Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland is emerging as a location of groundbreaking post-conflict ‘shared spaces’ strategies. For example, since the late-2000’s, Belfast City Council’s Good Relation’s Unit had lead a partnership to develop and implement Peace Action Plans for the city funded by European Regional Development Fund (Belfast City Council a. and b.). One of its main objectives is to remove interface barriers and transform contested spaces and the plan for 2011-13 includes the goal of ‘long-term engagement with young people at flashpoint areas’ (Belfast City Council a., 22). In addition to spatial demilitarization strategies, and attempts to transform contested spaces such as interfaces, official policies have increasingly included ‘shared space’ strategies, without mentioning ‘placemaking’ per se, that are aimed to help build capacities for peace and reconciliation. These action plans envisage ‘a shared, peaceful, welcoming and open city, where people are connected in a common citizenship’. Four of the objectives in realizing this vision are:

1. securing shared city space
2. transforming contested space
3. developing shared cultural space
4. building shared organisational space

(Belfast City Council b., 2).

An examination of ideas and practices currently shaping spatial interventions in Belfast that have at least some intentional link to ‘post-conflict’ peace, and development in Northern Ireland, reveals efforts to deploy placemaking in support of (direct) violence prevention, capacity building and reconciliation, and shows how such activities overlap and are interwoven. It is not possible to analyze all of these interventions in this paper, but some in each category are discussed. Areas where data related to youth appears to be lacking and that are ripe for future scholarship are also identified. The extent to which ‘shared space’ placemaking in Northern Ireland is creating youth spaces is unclear, despite the fact that many projects have youth as their primary target groups, because transfer of ‘placemaking authority’ from adults to children would also need to happen, and to date has not been documented. Stability
and prosperity seems to have dominated policies in the medium term leading to a focus on conflict management and peace promotion through economic development and tourism, but a tentative shift can be observed in the recent peace action plan.

Placemaking for Violence Prevention and Conflict Management

The transformation of space to help prevent violence has been attempted in several ways in Northern Ireland since the 1998 peace agreement and has involved the removal, building, and adaptation of conflict-related structures. First, removal or transformation of conflict architecture such as military barracks or the fortifications on police stations was an important demilitarization and confidence-building strategy during the early peace process. A gradual process of removing army observation posts and bases was publicly announced as part of the ‘normalization’ strategy of ‘phased reduction of troops to peacetime levels.’ (Ingram, Minster for Armed Forces, March 28, 2006). Such change provided essential incentives to Nationalists to continue support for the peace process. Given that the consistent concern of young people (regardless of political identity) is harsh or unfair treatment by the police, changes to the visible security architecture could have had a value-added purpose. Young people did not have much of a role in these processes at the time, however, at least at the officially sanctioned level. Indeed, youth-led efforts to hasten the demilitarization of British war structures – such as Sinn Fein youth damage to a watch tower in Glassdrumman in South Armagh in 2001 – were looked upon as potentially undermining their peace strategy of their party’s leaders. It is certainly worth considering whether the study of the dynamics of adult territoriality in relation to youth action in peace processes could help undermine tendencies towards dissident revivals as well as young people’s anti-social behavior.

Second, the erection of walls or ‘peace-lines’ to separate communities is another example of spatial transformation for conflict management. The number of Belfast ‘peace walls’ – concrete structures to divide some Protestant and Catholic communities - increased after the Good Friday Agreement and were built by the Northern Ireland Office (NIO). From the government and policing side, such barriers are seen as a stop-gap measure to ‘keep the peace’. But the ‘peace walls’ (re)create the fact of ethno-national division, while also, following Brown, indicating the failures of imperial power and declining state sovereignty, as they certainly imply a lack of other ideas for what to do. If these walls are representatives of ‘spectacularized power,’ as Brown describes in relation to Iraq and Israel, they are done with the collaboration of local people from both sides, however. On the 10th anniversary of the Agreement, the US-Ireland Alliance raised the issue of removal of the walls and commissioned the first ever poll of people living in their proximity. Of the 1000 people polled, 80% wanted the walls to come down eventually but over half of them said it was still not the right time to do so (Vargo, 2008). The honoring of the reluctance of local people to recommend removing the peace walls suggests that some ‘placemaking authority’ does lie in the hands of residents. However, with the physical security the walls provide, there is produced another insecurity about whether or not there will ever really be peace.

While local people experience safety through separation, it seems to be officially theorized that ‘good fences’ provide the necessary short-term separation to
make longer-term reconciliation possible, an argument that is also made in relation to the Israeli security fence/barrier. Yet, the local experiences and avowed official aspirations may well be incompatible, as walls create the fact of division on the ground which reproduces the ideology, psychology and politics of division. The walls help create meaning about the dangers of the other.

To examine an alternative possibility, however, it is clear that an important relationship does exist between violence prevention and reconciliation. These walls also provide concrete symbols that can be physically removed as a gesture of trust, stability or reconciliation. They have perhaps a tangible function as a marker of progress on a peace trajectory. And, as already indicated, in Belfast they have perhaps an advantage over some of other barriers, such as the Israeli security fence/wall, in that they are not constructed unilaterally, at least in the sense that they have majority approval from both local peoples. In 2008, the opening of the barrier at Ledra Street in Nicosia, Cyprus, which was erected in 1963, was greeted as an important symbolic peace-promoting event, and it indicates that removal of such barriers is possible in time. In the meantime, the relationship between walls and transgenerational identity development, as well as the impact of walls on youth aspirations, needs to be studied and responded to.

Third, removing paramilitary flags and other emblems of division and repainting some sectarian murals with less belligerent themes provides another example of placemaking for short-term goals of violence prevention/conflict management with a view to longer-term reconciliation. Supported by the Offices of the First and Deputy First Ministers, the Arts Council, and the International Fund for Ireland among other groups, a ‘Re-Imaging Communities’ Initiative aimed to transform perceptions and relationships through removal of some hostile images and symbols and creation of new public art which is viewed as a part of urban regeneration (http://www.artscouncil-ni.org/news/2008/new07032008.htm; Belfast City Council http://www.belfastcity.gov.uk/re-image/). Local communities were given funding for projects to remove graffiti, and choose new artworks to replace inflammatory sectarian images, and sometimes young people were involved in that process designing art works on local sports figures, for example. Still, some of the new murals have dubious peace credentials – simply replacing masked paramilitary murals (the ‘Grim Reaper’) with older historical images of war with a singular appeal to one group (William of Orange) - and a significant limitation in that they not accompanied by any contextualizing information, descriptions, rationale or other practices of a curatorial or ongoing educational nature. There has also been a return of the more militaristic forms of paramilitary murals in some areas in last couple of years and some have never been removed. The Re-imaging Communities project illustrates a strong understanding of the extent to which the territorialism of war-placemaking can be, even if only incrementally, transformed by recognizing the significance of shared visual narratives in public spaces, but it has certainly been contentious. Bill Rolston (2012) analyzes the complex evolution and politics of the murals and mural re-imaging in Northern Ireland and notes that while the initiative is part of ‘a well-meaning liberal, even radical agenda, which is far removed from the conservatism and elitism of much that passed as art administration in Northern Ireland over many decades,’ a missionary ideology of redeeming the people through art is evident:
‘Justice’, ‘empowerment’, ‘inclusion’ and ‘participation’ are key promises in this approach, but for all that, the initiatives involved are top-down, involving professionals and sections of the state in helping to organise supposedly atomised and marginalised communities, helping those who cannot help themselves.’ (457).

In fact, the conflict murals of the troubles were a grassroots expression of self-worth, identity and solidarity. Many of the new murals, in contrast, offer trite visions of peace, designed to appeal broadly and offend no-one, they celebrate children, saying no to drugs, and nostalgia for shipbuilding and dance halls. The use of images of children, childhood and family in the liberal iconography of the peace process – not just in reimaged murals - is striking and compared with some of the local conflict memorialization represents a denial of children’s historical and political agency that demonstrates adult territoriality and trauma at work again. Young people also still use these sites sometimes to repudiate authority, as noted earlier, predictably the police and paramilitaries with graffiti such as UTH and FTPSNI or to add in ‘bullshit’ on a children’s rights mural (McEvoy-Levy 2011). The mutually constitutive nature of youth territorialism with the roles of authority figures, past and present, such as police, politicians, civil servants, and paramilitaries is physically represented and remade through walls and murals which also serve as modes of communication and education. Again, the long-term transgenerational impact of such initiatives needs to be studied in more depth.

The most recent iteration of Belfast City Council’s Peace Action/Shared Space plan defines the goal of ‘Transforming Contested Space’ as ‘to reduce inter-community tensions and conflict and to support the integrated regeneration of those communities at the interface, having dealt with the legacies of conflict.’ It identifies three key objectives:

• To support the reduction and removal of barriers and support the regeneration of interface areas of the city.
• To undertake work on tension monitoring around interfaces and to reduce the impact and incidence of community tensions with a focus on tackling manifestations of sectarianism and racism.
• To support long-term engagement with young people at flashpoint areas.’

These goals mark a significant shift in strategy from conflict management to conflict transformation, whereby barriers are to be removed, ‘long-term’ engagement with youth is planned, and new politics of racism is a central factor.

Projects supported by Belfast City Council’s Peace plan have included an Ashton Community project to use tours to decrease misperceptions between Loyalist Mount Vernon (mentioned above as ‘Mount Vermin’) and the Nationalist New Lodge that included an interface street party for children (Belfast City Council b., 5). Other activities attempt to create a kind of sanctuary that also builds capacity, as in the community garden in Waterworks Park, developed under a Belfast City Council
Siobhan McEvoy-Levy

GROW project. Initial evaluations suggest that the garden has begun to increase inter-community contact in an area of intergroup tension, violence and separation by fences and walls and ‘a growing sense of shared space in the park’, according to the Council. One indicator used by the council is that ‘despite anti-social behaviour in other parts of the park the garden has thus far not been the subject of any vandalism and all feel that this is as a result of the shared sense of ownership amongst participants, residents and partners working on the project.’ (Belfast City Council b., 4). Since 2009 Belfast City Council’s shared space programming has included four community gardens, including Waterworks Park mentioned above. While still new and small scale, such initiatives suggest that spatial interventions can produce violence-free zones or and may help change negative narratives between communities in conflict.

Another example, involving the creation of political space for youth to address issues that affect them is the Public Achievement WIMPS project (also supported by Belfast City Council). Driven by concern about the lack of opportunities for young people to be involved in political discourse, and in partnership with young people, Public Achievement created the WIMPS (Where Is My Public Servant) project that enables youth political journalism by bringing media technology to different locations around Northern Ireland. The WIMPS mobile contains laptops, lights, cameras and other equipment necessary for mobile film making. Such a travelling space for youth, addresses some of the practical problems of youth clubs: ‘When you go to youth clubs, they either lack computers or are broken,’ notes one of the project directors. ‘Kids who are disengaged from school really take to it. They love the technology and the medium, the storyboard and the scripting.’ (Smyth, interview 2009). The young people also received training from local journalists. ‘An innovative unit in government’ was convinced to fund the project which was an important step because ‘the biggest challenge is changing politics and civil service mentality about not taking risks’ in the youth and community sector, and adult moral panics about young people that distract from the important insights that young people have about violence and politics (Smyth, Interview 2009).

In the Belfast Peace Action Plan for 2011-2013, a projected 850 thousand pounds is targeted for a Youth Engagement Project (YEP), in its conceptualization, the project captures well the concerns of many youth workers and young people interviewed, in that it identifies the most marginalized young people as vulnerable to recruitment to gangs and paramilitaries because of a lack of alternative routes to status and identity, and seeks ‘to address mental health issues including youth suicide (potentially connected to a society emerging from conflict)’. The tentative links being made here between anti-social behavior, violence and the transition out of armed conflict are an important shift in rhetoric away from the depoliticized recreational rioting framework to one more appreciative of the complex legacy of the troubles in communities and the experience of exclusion.

‘This programme aims to improve the quality of life for communities in interface areas by working with marginalised young people in a partnership programme which provides hope and purpose and diverts involvement in gang or paramilitary activity. The proposed programme would engage with ‘hard to reach’ young people involved in, or on the periphery of, local paramilitary or
In the job description recruiting for the project’s manager, specific emphasis is given to the requirement of the manager ‘to ensure that the project delivers the expected change with the peace building impact of the project felt in real terms’. In both documents (the plan, and the job description), the language describing the program illustrates well the dynamics and politics of adult territoriality. The project seeks to protect space (interface communities) from youth, rather than make space for youth. Still, while the project certainly prioritizes the safety and ‘quality of life for communities’ by reducing violence, it aims to do so by working in ‘partnership’ with youth to ‘improve their life chances.’ However, the qualifications for the position of the YEP project’s manager are listed as a degree in criminology/social work related fields and/or:

‘at least three years’ experience in three of the under-noted five areas;
1. Leading on partnership working and liaising at a high level with other organisations in the public and private sectors to develop and implement joint delivery;
2. Managing and improving the performance of services and projects;
3. Implementing and developing complex projects;
4. Managing community engagement; and/or
5. Engaging with young people.’

Not only is engaging with youth listed last, it is possible for the YEP manager to have had no experience in building partnerships with youth according to these criteria. Possibly, these documents illustrate the political balancing act necessary to convince adults, local powerbrokers, bureaucrats and politicians that youth engagement is in their interests and is a meaningful and necessary activity.

Since the agreement, planners in ‘post-conflict’ Northern Ireland have been attempting to create ‘shared space’ within a paradigm that continues to reproduce mistrust of the other, violence, hostility and segregation. Contestations surrounding ‘placemaking authority’ involving Nationalists/Unionists, grassroots actors and bureaucrats, are expected and planned for. In evaluations of the first phase of the shared space strategy, women’s groups and ex-prisoners asserted their need to be involved and consulted further (BCC a.p. 9). These indicate a fairly strong body of civil society advocates, asserting the needs or marginalized groups, seeking partnership with government, and general desire to work consultatively. But layered on top of this challenge is a more hidden politics, one of adult’s territoriality, their mistrust of youth, and momentum in favor of liberal peacebuilding priorities. Placemaking theory recommends attention to the kind of places (placeworlds) that are being created when policies attempt to transform space. As these new policies are implemented, peace researchers can track whose goals and ideas dominate, as contested spaces are transformed? And how do the politics of adult territoriality create meanings associated with the new places that result?
Building capacity: Securing and Sharing Commercial, Cultural and Organizational Space

Another aim of the Belfast plan is to make city space/commercial space welcoming and violence-free conceptualized in neo-liberal terms. Under the section of BCC’s Peace Action Plan on ‘impact on poverty’, for example, it is noted that: ‘Labour mobility is critical in reinforcing peace in the city and the wider region as is promoting Belfast as an attractive global city where its resident talent pool is able to move freely and safely, as well as attracting the best international employers to the city and increased numbers of visitors with a corresponding beneficial impact upon local communities through increased investment and visitor spending’ (12). Indeed, spatial transformation over the last decade has been dominated by top-town strategies to create tourist attractions and investment opportunities through commercial building and business regeneration projects. The post-conflict reimagining of Belfast has resulted into its division into seven commercial/cultural ‘quarters’ designed to draw on some aspect of that locality’s history, existing use, or culture, but remade into destination spots for dining, sight-seeing and shopping. The Belfast Titanic Quarter is a good case in point. Titanic Quarter is a privatized public space developed by Titanic Quarter Inc. The $6.17 billion 15-year project is designed to bring in investment and create jobs. The first of its five phases emphasized large investment opportunities, luxury apartments, a large Waterfront Hall concert and event venue, the Odyssey entertainment center with a cinema, night clubs, cafes and video-game arcades. Although the site is not yet fully developed, tourists may take a boat trip and buy Titanic Fudge and T-shirts with slogans like ‘She was alright when she left here’ and ‘Built by Irishmen. Sunk by an Englishman,’ a reference to the English Captain of the Titanic, Edward John Smith. ‘The Titanic is one of the strongest brand names in the world,’ according to Mike Smith, CEO of Titanic Quarter (Hawley, 2007).

The ideological framework for the project which emphasizes leisure consumption and high-end apartments both appeals to and excludes working class young people. The relocation of Belfast Metropolitan College to a new further education campus in the Titanic Quarter might be considered as addressing exclusion, but some critics noted that, in fact, the plan moves the currently ‘neutral’ city center location of the college to a less neutral area, while at the same time cutting teaching jobs by 20%. Critics of the plan noted also that the existing building in city center is an ‘architectural jewel’ suggesting the destruction of authentic place to create an artificial place, and the corporatization of history and education, a design that excludes undesirables, including youth, through both economic and sectarian barriers. There is the potential for a Titanic project to utilize multidirectional memory, including encouraging exploration of sectarianism and socialism in the shipbuilding history of Belfast, for example, or human rights education. Perhaps there is a perverse, though arguably appropriate, symbol for war, and lesson about structural violence, in those passengers’ preventable deaths. As a symbol for a peace process, however, the Titanic, perhaps sunk by the hubris of its political/commercial/professional elites, could also be a warning. The impact of romantic nostalgia for the Belfast linen mills and shipyards, and “gentrification” of architecture of war (such as the peace walls and
murals) on the next generation requires further study, but, locally some worry that: ‘While new political structures shift sectarian conflict into formal patterns of competition over resources, the strategy of creating a city of Quarters, dressed up in recycled, nostalgic motifs that celebrate notions of locality, community and place, has arguably reinforced division’ (Hadaday).

However, another interesting aspect is how the thinking of planners seems to be evolving, suggesting room for cautious optimism. Frank Gaffikan et al. (2008) note in a paper commissioned by Belfast City Council that: ‘Public policy in the recent past has tended to ‘parcel’ the city into a spectrum of spaces – ethnic (largely residential), neutral (city centre), shared (e.g. integrated schools) and cosmopolitan (Titanic Quarter).’ (2008, iv). In the Plan for 2011-13, shared space is not seen as ‘neutral space’ but is defined as is ‘a place where identity can be expressed in an open and non-hostile environment’ and a key emphasis is on connectivity to create links between different parts of the city. The 2011-13 Belfast Peace Action Plan identifies urban development strategies to protect existing shared spaces and expand them, to ensure safe access for all to key roads and recreational facilities, thereby, increasing mobility of people within the city, and to provide support for ‘mixed’ protestant and catholic communities through ‘inter-generational health and wellbeing’ programs (a. and b).

Another priority is the development of ‘shared cultural space’: ‘To celebrate and give place to the different backgrounds and traditions of the citizens of Belfast and build a collective responsibility to ensure there is a place for identities other than our own’. In planning, shared cultural spaces do not seem to be conceptualized as new bounded territories or structures but, within existing civil society structures, government-funded/sponsored interactions, entailing dialogue, learning about and developing respect for difference, and providing support for new minorities such as migrant workers. Most of these activities mirror cross-community contact work of the last 30 years, however. Apart from proposed early childhood intervention to promote ‘quality contact’, there is no specific mention of youth inclusion in the shared commercial and cultural spaces of the city.

The fourth goal of the plan to build ‘shared organizational space’ is the least specific. It refers to the promotions of institutions that promote tolerance, peacebuilding and reconciliation. “To build and sustain institutions which are fair and accessible to all, are committed to change through dialogue, and in which every citizen knows that they are represented and can participate.” (Belfast City Council b., 22). The extent to which youth are included in institutions is quintessentially a function of adult territoriality. Young people do not create or work in institutions, though they are socialized in several, such as schools, churches, and families. They are not represented by most political institutions until they are 18, though youth can participate in youth shadow governments and forums with no real power.

Youth-excluding places, particularly ones billed as youth spaces (like the Odyssey Center in Belfast) make peacebuilding more difficult. If some city and cultural spaces are inaccessible because of class/financial constraints or perceived as unwelcoming to some young people, then marches and parades, riots and anti-social behaviors, that impose on forbidden territory, become all the more attractive. They are mechanisms by which youth can participate in taking control of space and asserting
rights to move between spaces that, in the everyday, are not open. For that reason, policies addressing mobility, opening up travel routes and access to leisure and job opportunities seem to be good ones, where inclusion can be guaranteed. But transformation of institutions so that they are places of shared power between adults and young people is likely to be one of the last changes, as well as the most productive. Another interesting outcome of both grassroots and top down strategies to remember the past in Northern Ireland is how commercial and cultural spaces have been merged, eliding memorialization and tourism, as discussed further in the next section related to reconciliation.

_Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Healing though Remembering and Not Demilitarizing the Past_

Recovering lost history of good relations is one element of developing shared spaces. This process was one of the inspirations for an innovative play written by a former Republican prisoner Lawrence McKeown and performed with Belfast City Council funding in the early post-agreement period. Titled ‘Two Roads West’, the play tells the story of a woman who left the Nationalist Falls area of Belfast in 1968 and returned after the peace agreement with ideas about reconnecting with a former boyfriend. Her memories of him prove to be incorrect as she is surprised to learn that he lives in the Protestant, Shankill area of Belfast. But the unique nature of the play lay in its performance in a taxi cab with only two actors and five audience members per show. In Belfast, Black taxis are synonymous with working class community and in travelling in one on the Falls and Shankill roads, crossing the Peace Line/Walls, the writer intended participants to experience how small the area is (at about 2-3 square miles), and while literally crossing the boundaries between the two communities. They are also encouraged to reflect on space and change through the dialogue of the play. Performances were enhanced by ‘the element of the unknown’: the taxi broke down on one occasion, they once met a hearse, and another time encountered a traffic accident. Through this medium, the audience became a part of the action, even sometimes slipping into dialogue with the actors. When the female lead hesitates about entering the boxing club where her ex-boyfriend is supposed to be, some audience members urged her to ‘go on, go for it. It’s your only chance,’ recalled McKeown. The narrative is complicated by the actor/taxi driver’s own history, being from the Shankill, having experienced imprisonment, and having a socialist father. The play is about ‘memories and how you hold on to them’, says McKeown, noting that a lot of people ‘haven’t made the emotional transition.’ (Interview, Laurence McKeown, 23rd July 2009). The play ran three times a day during the Cathedral Quarter Festival, and although only involving a small number of participants, it appears to be a good example of how small-scale, local efforts can prompt exploration of the imaginaries of conflict/post-conflict. Such art forms have significant potential for addressing the important issue of the transgenerational transmission of trauma and ‘transgenerational haunting’ processes which affect young people (see McEvo-y-Levy, 2011), but are not easily accessible to sizeable numbers of youth. Moreover, all efforts at remembering the past, by definition include youth as recipients or beneficiaries of
knowledge of the past and not initially as the authors or creators of history. Because contemporary youth were not part of that past, they are migrants into memorialization.

Managing and transforming traditionally mono-cultural street parades including Orange Marches and St. Patrick’s Day parades, both of which considerably involve youth, are also politicized spatial interventions. Some efforts have been made in Northern Ireland to transform St. Patrick’s Day Celebrations and Orange Marches into community festivals with the idea that they would promote reconciliation by recovering older habits of shared celebration. It can be argued that the St. Patrick’s parades, more so than Orange festivals, are emerging as tentative experiments in Rothberg’s ‘multidirectional memory’ as opposed to competitive memory (Rothberg, 2009). One parade in Downpatrick, Co. Down, an important historical site connected with St. Patrick, has been particularly highlighted for its ecumenical aspirations. In 2011 a debate emerged about the St. Patrick’s Cross and the decision of a Sinn Fein councilor to carry an Irish Tri-color instead, but it did not lead to violent protest. In fact, local newspapers published many letters to the editor that discussed the different origins and meanings of regional flags illustrating a local understanding of multidirectional memory and rejection of a competitive memory paradigm. Still it seems unlikely that many young people were among those correspondents.

Moreover, it can also be threatening to adults/powerbrokers when youth seek to insert themselves in the narratives of the conflict or be politically active in ways that seem uncontrollable or potentially disruptive to political or economic strategies. Even when danger to strategy is slight, the perception of damage by youth indicates a lot about how adults see/experience youth. In an example, in 2008, a Republican youth group organized a political education tour to ‘Narrow Water’ near Warrenpoint, the site of the killings by the IRA of 18 British soldiers in 1979. The visit offended many because it defiled a death site in the eyes of the survivors and others who interpreted it as morbid triumphalism. Yet, in writing about the event, a contributor to a Republican blog framed it in terms of the next generation’s access to internal political recognition, stating: ‘Are the younger generation of republicans the bastard sons & daughters of a failed political experiment? Are we detritus doomed to stand in the shadow of dinosaurs living on the back of a cult of personality rather than progressive republicanism?’(quoted on McIntyre/Pensive Quill blog). For this person, the meaning associated with his/her presence in a particular space, was about finding a place in the future, and whether inclusion or revolution are desired is unclear. Yet, it is evident that a confusing context exists, where the attempted touristification of some sites of conflict - the murals and peace wall are listed in the Lonely Planet Travel Guide – meets the discouragement of sectarianism and dissidents. There seems to be a need not only for memorialization, but also for inter-generational conversations about, and in, such sites, such as interfaces, prisons, and the locations of political killings. Fear of political fall-out, of damage to power-sharing writ large, works against youth inclusion is this kind of risky dialogue.

This is a challenge for the plan to transform the Maze/Long Kesh prison into a peace and conflict museum. Efforts to develop the Long Kesh/Maze Prison into museum of the conflict created controversy for a decade with Unionist opposition to any plan interpreted as creating a ‘shrine’ to terrorism. Last year, plans were unveiled for a Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution Facility on the site that will celebrate the
successes of the peace process, share experiences with other conflict zones, and retain some of prison buildings, including those related to the 1981 Republican Hunger Strike. Agreement seems to have finally come about, in significant part, because of the site’s economic potential to provide jobs. But the ongoing demilitarization of conflict sites and their transformation into mechanism for remembering, could involve attention to the kind of places being made, and how they might affect the next generation. Peace researchers and theorists generally see conflict resolution museums and education centers as places to intentionally plan for interaction between successive generations of people and the generation of memory that is ‘multidirectional’ (Rothberg 2009). The appointment of Daniel Libeskind, the American 9-11 memorial architect, to plan the site, may offer hope for forms of memorialization at the Long Kesh/Maze site that transcend intransigent localisms, perhaps ‘explicitly’ involve inter-communal ‘cross-referencing and borrowing’ (2009, 3) to reach ‘new visions of justice’ (Rothberg, 2009, 5). Certainly, those involved in the 9/11 memorial’s design and implementation should be well-versed in the challenges of struggles over ‘placemaking authority’ (Donofrio 2010). A true multidirectional memory approach would entail intergenerational dialogues about the past that do not draw definitive conclusions or lines under history, and that open up political space legitimizing new voices and generations. However, because of how adults tend to see youth – as a potential threat or as innocents that need to be protected – it will be necessary to be alert for any momentum towards producing narratives with a simplistic moralizing approach oriented to socializing the next generation against the politics of the past. The latter approach would reinforce young people’s immigrant status – their alienation - in the politics of post-conflict reconciliation.

**Conclusion:**

This paper shows that placemaking for peace can take many forms, involving interventions for violence prevention and conflict management, for demilitarization of conflict architecture and terrain, for building up local capacities for sustainable peace, and for healing and reconciliation. Post-Conflict Placemaking practice in Northern Ireland has taken four main forms:

1. **Conflict Management Interventions**: e.g. removal of symbols and structures of conflict, hostility, and difference, such as barracks and flags, and the addition of peacekeeping barriers/peace walls; evolving into efforts aimed at transforming contested spaces by removing barriers, changing attitudes to violence and difference, and engaging marginalized youth.
2. **Liberal Economic Placemaking** where the market is seen to be the answer to entrenched hostility: e.g. involves urban regeneration through promoting tourism, luxury housing development, and upscale consumption spaces, and rebranding of Belfast as hip, friendly and cosmopolitan, with nostalgic nods to the past before the Troubles.
3. **Hybrid Liberal/Localist Peace Placemaking**, involving state and EU funded strategies that attempt to transform contested spaces, prevent violence, and build shared space by engineering contact and dialogue, building capacity,
Youth Spaces in Haunted Places

transforming monoculturalism displays, and promoting diversity and anti-racism; e.g. mural re-imaging; early childhood interventions to promote tolerance/understanding; conflict tours; community festivals and gardens.

In each of these aspects, placemaking strategies can be considered for their impact on youth and/or how they are influenced by (ideas about) young people. Shared space implies shared power which, in addition to being challenging across political lines, is sometimes difficult for adults and young people to practice in relationship to each other. Formal processes of utilizing public space for peacebuilding purposes, while worthy, may still be exclusionary, because certain groups, including the young, have little culturally and politically accepted place-making ‘authority’ or opportunities to change, redefine or renarrate the material landscape of their everyday lives. Placemaking is also complicated by transgenerational silences and by the transmission of trauma. Conflict-scarred spaces, marked with flags, murals, and memories, are haunted places, and emotionally valuable real-estate.

But these challenges are common to other methods of building peace and, while necessary to consider, arguably do not make placemaking any more risky than other forms of intervention. Indeed, as is argued in this paper, the nature of war placemaking and the relationship between youth and space/place-seeking makes placemaking an important approach to include in the peacebuilding toolbox, whether or not it is risky. The emerging post-conflict policy in Northern Ireland does not entail creating youth spaces, but it does prioritize engaging youth in projects to transform contested space, and youth participation is already recorded at quite high levels. It would be further interesting to ask how many of the young people participating were girls, or children and grandchildren of ex-prisoners, for example. Engaging youth in placemaking involves more than reaching or exceeding benchmarks for youth participation, however. The quality of engagements with youth, specifically related to shared power between youth and adults, and the contestations surrounding ‘place-making authority’ need to be more fully considered. Interviews with young people and youth workers in Belfast demonstrate the importance for youth of having a sense of place, as well as having mobility to cross boundaries.

This research suggests that youth spaces are territories that youth ‘can call their own’, where young people have placemaking authority; spaces they identify, name, design, makes rules for, arrive at shared meanings about, where they are free to imagine, create and risk mistakes, with porous boundaries (literal and figurative) that enable new experiences and social interactions as well relationships with adults and with history. An interim approach to the lack of youth spaces and the dilemmas of post-conflict politics may be found in mobile youth spaces, such as the WIMPS mobile project described in the paper. Mobile placemaking might seem like a contradiction in terms. But it may be that creating bounded territories, even for peacebuilding, underlines and reinforces territoriality, and that counter-territorialism as a peacebuilding strategy is preferable. Mobile youth spaces may entail flexible boundaries that transform rather than reproducing patterns of hostility and conflict.

The evolving policy of peacebuilding through addressing issues of territoriality and space in Northern Ireland is an important case study. Shared space strategies offer essential support to the peace process in the north, illustrating growing local understanding of and attention to how urban spatial interventions can help support
peacebuilding, even if they do not reference ‘placemaking’ theory and practice per se, and offers potential lesson for other contexts. Since youth are a central focus of peace/shared space interventions in Northern Ireland, the relationship between youth, boundaries of various kinds, and peacebuilding needs to be further recognized and theorized. Those interested in evaluating peacebuilding or incorporating placemaking into peace process, can consider, what ‘place-worlds’ (Basso, 1996, 7) are being imagined and created by spatial planning interventions and other projects? Who is imagining them? What do different stakeholders, including various communities of youth, imagine? Recognizing that placemaking occurs outside of readily visible and planned moves, and that the stories that places tell are not wholly predictable, how are the post-conflict places being created interpreted by the next generation(s)? Answers to these questions will help us understand whether placemaking interventions are promoting or hindering sustainable peace.

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