OPENING THE BLACK BOX: RECONSIDERING NEEDS THEORY THROUGH PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CRITICAL THEORY

Laureen Park

Abstract

Needs Theory (NT) has been a cornerstone for conflict resolution scholarship (CRS) as it was conceived by John Burton and other pioneers of the field. Intuitively, NT makes sense. There are fundamental needs that all human beings have that if violated may cause conflict. Indeed only those conflicts that are due to the violation of such needs can truly be deep-rooted (versus disputes). However, the structural foundations for NT are still not firmly established for a variety of reasons. Psychoanalysis and critical theory help us to understand and establish the various factors that go into constituting needs, in part by critiquing the positivistic framework that has heretofore been primarily utilized in NT scholarship.

I. Introduction

This paper is an attempt to address the challenge posed by Richard E. Rubenstein in his article, “Basic Human Needs: The Next Steps in Theory Development” (Rubenstein, 2001). The very last line of the article reads, “How can the basic needs that, unsatisfied, generate destructive social conflict be identified, described, and satisfied?” Let me emphasize that this question does not appear at the beginning of the paper, which the body of the paper attempts to address, but rather comes at the end, leaving the status of needs a problem yet to be resolved. Why is the theory of human needs – Burton’s “great promise”, according to Rubenstein – so problematic? In one way, it seems so simple and unproblematic. What can be more clear and indubitable than the fact that every human being on earth has needs for material sustenance; to eat, for instance? If such needs are obstructed, then it seems equally clear that some action will be taken, perhaps one that will lead to conflict. A little less obvious, yet still almost universally agreed upon is the idea that there are needs that do not directly bear upon material sustenance like recognition and freedom from coercion that must also not be obstructed lest there be undesirable consequences.
Yet complications remain in understanding and analyzing the various issues that are involved in human needs; not because scholars make them up, but because of the very nature of the subject matter. I hope to clarify why this is the case and offer possible answers using two approaches that have not heretofore been adequately utilized in conflict resolution scholarship (CRS). These approaches are critical theory (CT) and psychoanalysis (PA), especially as they are articulated by Sigmund Freud, Herbert Marcuse and Paul Ricoeur.

There are two main problems that have developed in Needs Theory (NT) that I wish to address. The first problem arises from the humblest attempt at establishing the existence of needs. This is the ontological problem. On a common sense level, their existence is undeniable, but on a deeper level, their ontological status is highly debatable. Although delving into speculative metaphysics may not seem to be a desirable course of inquiry when it comes to this deeply empirical issue, such an inquiry seems unavoidable. I hope to show that the perplexity over their ontological status has to do with the metaphysical framework that NT scholars are using to analyze needs. Specifically, the framework has been based on positivism, or as Rubenstein attributes it, “realism” or “utilitarianism” (Rubenstein, 2001). He rightly recognizes the general scheme that NT scholars have worked under without, I try to show, fully realizing the implications.

The second and related problem in NT has to do with the value of needs, or in other words, their relation to the good and bad, right and wrong. In addressing the first problem, I hope to reveal that the dichotomy between needs and values is not as absolute as it appears. Part of the consequence in approaching NT positivistically has been to dichotomize needs and values as belonging to distinct phenomenal realms. But there are a few undesirable implications in doing this. Firstly, I question whether there can be a truly value-free stance when it comes to analyzing needs and mediating conflict. CT posits that any approach in evaluating needs will have a valued or ideological bent, and ideally, one which is consistent with social justice and critical of market forces. Burton himself, in the same issue of The International Journal of Peace Studies in which we find Rubenstein’s article (it was a special theme issue in honor of Burton), wrote two papers that also urged us to question the influence of market forces upon our quest for a more just society (Burton, 2001). In “Where Do We Go From Here”, he was especially skeptical of the trend in world leadership which were allowing market forces to dictate the development of human rights. In another arena, however, Burton advocates the neutrality of third-party mediators in the mediation process. I think that the insights of CT question this possibility. Underlying the commitment to resolving conflict, there must also be a commitment to social justice, lest the resolution be determined by other forces, like power or the status quo.

Secondly, I also question whether NT scholars have been overly optimistic in their attribution of needs as always or at least primarily benign. As Christopher Mitchell argued in “Necessitous Man and Conflict Resolution”, needs can be transformed into domination and aggression (Mitchell, 1990). He observes that “The need for ‘security’
may easily become the need for ‘dominance’; the need for ‘identity’ could become the need for an outgroup and an enemy; the need for ‘love’ could become the need for ‘admiration’ or ‘status’ or ‘success at the expense of others’.” (Mitchell, 1990: 156) There is a great qualitative difference between “security” and “domination”. We can easily see how security would be a need, but it is not so evident that a person has a need to dominate. Yet I think Mitchell’s point that sometimes needs can be conflict-promoting is something we should consider. We can all disagree with Hobbes when he asserts that man is inherently evil, and yet still acknowledge that in the pursuit of our needs, we may be capable of aggression.

Indeed, sometimes we must limit needs. Marcuse actually saw the limitation of needs as essential to the process of socialization. We should be able to suppress immediate gratification for the sake of higher goals if we want to become mature human beings. But as it stands, NT does not address the possibility of the benign suppression of needs because it views needs as expressions of something inherent in us, and therefore inflexible. PA and CT allow us to see needs as expressions of social conventions as well. The combination of biology and societal conventions can result in creating needs that we may interpret as misguided, and even “false” (using the language of Marcuse). I will more fully address these issues in section IV of this paper.

In the next section, I will further justify my use of PA for analyzing NT, for it has a more controversial status than CT in the literature. I will then go on to demonstrate the problems of positivism as a basic approach, and then the specific problems that result from using it to analyze the biological status of needs. Burton and others look to biology as a transcendental source of needs that would protect needs from social engineering, but I argue that the positivistic view of biology cannot be maintained consistently and that it has negative repercussions. I then go on to articulate Freud’s biological/psychological account. Many people may be unaware that Freud did in fact offer up a purely biological or neurological account of psychology in his early career. It did not hold up, however, for several reasons. I show why this view cannot be sustained, and how Freud expands the biological account to include the social realm. We find in him an ontology that supports both biology and the social influence. After that, I return to NT scholarship to demonstrate the usefulness of such an ontology in analyzing the specific relation between needs and values. I hone in on this dichotomy because it reveals the very tensions that this paper addresses. NT scholars acknowledge the need for unifying the two terms, but cannot seem to find the basis for that unity. I then show how Marcuse, synthesizing the PA and CT approaches, show how needs and values are unified. It is a framework that takes into account subterranean elements, such as power and desire. Irrational elements must not be left in the “wild” as the great Other to reason, but systematically incorporated into a meaningful framework.

There are a few weaknesses in Marcuse, however, which I attempt to make up for with Ricoeur. I make a few suggestions about how Ricoeur’s notion of sublimation may help us to understand the notion of freedom in light of biologically derived needs.
Sublimation is a notion that supports the shift in terminology from conflict \textit{resolution} to conflict \textit{transformation}, as some CR scholars have advocated (e.g. Lederach and Kriesberg). I have an affinity for this shift for it acknowledges the pre-existent conditions that helped to shape the conflict prior to the moment of “resolution”, and it also speaks to the future that the moment has a hand in creating. I also tend to think that there is no final end to conflict, though we may transform it into more manageable forms.

II. The Status of Psychoanalysis in NT Scholarship

Psychological concepts, much less PA, have a shaky place in CRS. In one way, psychology forms the very basis of NT. From the beginning, Burton, and other early NT scholars, embraced psychology as a crucial means towards understanding human persons and their relations. A case in point is their appropriation of the ideas of the American psychologist, Abraham Maslow. His hierarchy of needs became the focal point in analyzing the causes and resolution of conflict. If individuals have inviolable needs, then conflict could be seen as natural and inevitable if those needs were violated. This idea was progress over the idea that individual actions leading to conflict were anomalous or stemming from an evil human nature. This shift in attention to the individual as the focus of concern can be seen in terms of a larger historical trend in the realm of human rights and justice. Discourse on rights and justice has evolved into one centered around the individual and his or her psychological state. The value of this focus has been stated in a number of places, including in Sean Byrne’s article, “Linking Theory to Practice: How Cognitive Psychology Informs the Collaborative Problem-Solving Process for Third Parties” (Byrne, 2003). A person’s psychological state affects the perception of conflict, and therefore conflict itself. A lot may be resolved simply through self-analysis. Organizations like UNICEF have also focussed on psychological well-being as a primary directive.

But psychology is not entirely assured of a secure place in CRS. The ambivalence towards psychology has to do, ironically, with the “great promise” Burton envisioned of NT for resolving conflict. The great promise of developing NT was, to return to Rubenstein’s article, to provide a “relative objective basis, transcending local political and cultural differences…” (Rubenstein, 2001). If one could demonstrate the undeniably absolute, objective status of needs, then there could be no room for relativizing them, manipulating them, or making them a product of social engineering. They would simply be facts to contend with. The trouble with psychological notions, however, is that they are exactly subjective and not always demonstrable “objectively”. This is the main reason why Burton turns to biological and genetic explanations to account for the ontological status of needs. As much as he hopes for a “holistic” approach to conflict resolution, he nonetheless demands it to be “scientific” in the way positivism defines it (Burton, 2001). This fear of psychologism is abetted by another aspect of psychoanalysis
that NT scholars explicitly disassociate themselves from; and that is Freud’s purported pessimism. They interpret Freud to say that aggression and violence is inherent in human nature (an idea which can be used to justify political repression, according to NT scholars). But is the solution to deny that the individual is capable of evil altogether? There are undesirable consequences to denying it altogether as well. I touched on this issue earlier with Mitchell.

Rather than dismiss Freud, Rubenstein, wonders whether we have given him a fair shake. He observes that “there is some indication that, in extracting basic needs from the mental structures postulated by Freud and his successors, the baby was thrown out with the bath water. In effect, the needs theorists put emotional and cognitive dynamics into a “black box,” much as their behaviourist predecessors had done” (Rubenstein, 2001). The early NT scholars may have progressed over behaviorism, but they are still very much informed by the same framework. They avoid opening the neglected box of subjectivity perhaps for fear of unleashing the same torments that haunted Pandora. Or they may think that not much of value is there as the behaviorists thought. At the very least, I want to see how another framework might see the same problems a little differently. I will be opening up the black box to explore their contribution to understanding basic human needs. We may end up allowing dark motivations and irrational wishes to invade the space of inviolable needs. But we may also find that this is not mankind’s undoing.

III. The Problem with Positivism

Positivistic notions have a long history, and can be detected in the earliest atomistic schools in Ancient Greece. But it was Auguste Comte in the Nineteenth century who first articulated it in systematic form. He held that science was the exemplary form of knowledge, and that the prior forms of theology and metaphysics were mere stages to be passed towards it. Positivism took an even stronger and more formal shape with the logical positivists (associated with the Vienna Circle) in the early 20th century. Bertrand Russell was a great influence upon them, and Rudolf Carnap was a well-known figure in the group. They held that any non-scientific claim to knowledge (at least as they defined it) were completely void of meaning – void! Religious and metaphysical speculations might, according to them, express faith or feeling, but not truth. And since then, positivism has been the dominant paradigm for many fields of study in the Western tradition. In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse gives this 3-part definition of positivism: “(1) [T]he validation of cognitive thought by experience of facts; (2) the orientation of cognitive thought to the physical sciences as a model of certainty and exactness; (3) the belief that progress in knowledge depends on this orientation” (Marcuse, 1964: 172). Positivism is fact-oriented and premised upon cognitive thought.
One might ask, “What is wrong with that?” Indeed, if it is true that positivism is the dominant paradigm of the Western tradition, such a question would be expected. Facts (without their subjective conditions) and rationality are the two beacons of objectivity in the positivistic view. There are other, though perhaps more neglected, schools of thought in the Western tradition that provide alternative models for positivism. Some of these include idealism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, post-modernism and critical theory, among others. Phenomenology, in particular, embraces the natural sciences, and believes itself to account for science in a more systematic way than does positivism. The other fields do not explicitly embrace natural science, but can account for it in ways that were not originally intended. I do not hope to cover all the bases in this discussion. But I do want to give a general sketch of why positivism might be a problem for NT.

The three main problems are 1. the status of facts, 2. the status of cognitive thought, and 3. the relation between facts and cognitive thought. In terms of facts, I will problematize their empirical character to show that fundamentally, needs are social phenomena as much as they may be biologically derived. This case can even be made for scientific objects, but I will do so here only as it is relevant to NT.

In the case of cognitive or rational thought, although rationality is crucial in any dialogue and decision, PA and CT problematize it to show that it has a deep relation to drives (the Freudian term for needs) that often manifest in the unconscious. Freud thought unconscious motives dominated psychic life. This is a very uncomfortable idea. We do not want to give up the notion that we can control our irrational life through reason. However, I think that it is important to acknowledge this dimension in human behavior in order to better understand it. Freud did not give up on reason’s ultimate ability to master the drives (if partial), but he thought that it was not possible to do so without fully understanding and confronting how they worked. That is why, for example, therapy is sometimes necessary – sometimes rationality is not adequate to the problem. One must sometimes confront the “dark side” in order to come to terms with it.

Finally, CT problematizes the relation between facts and cognition. In the positivistic scheme, cognition is seen as a passive recipient of pre-established facts. Thus Marcuse describes cognitive thought as seen by positivism as merely “validating” facts. However, three compelling aspects of social facts that this view ignores is that 1. social facts are at least in part created by human endeavors and choices (our ideas help to determine “facts”), 2. social facts can be otherwise (we can change them), and 3. not all social facts are solely rational (like power and violence). So when scholars like Byrne articulate for us the various psychological attitudes that shape the perception of conflict, an important correlate is that such attitudes can be changed (Byrne, 2003). But though Byrne says what some of the attitudes are, the causes of such attitudes are not addressed. I believe that the vision Marcuse offers in his synthesis of PA and CT gives us a deep analysis of social facts, of which needs are a part. Needs are part biology, part social, part rational, part irrational, and can also be transformed (indeed, we should change them
IV. The Biological Basis of Needs

In the following two sections, I evaluate the implications in understanding needs as biological. I first evaluate how such an understanding has developed in NT scholarship, which has heretofore been interpreted through a positivistic framework. I then go on to show how needs are interpreted in the PA/CT framework and show how this new framework might be a better one for NT. The positivistic framework sees needs as a product of biology severed from historical and social determinants. In isolation, it is not clear how needs can be purely biological phenomena. How did needs for identity and belongingness come about without its connection to and interactions with the social sphere? Clearly, such needs have some connection with the social realm as many, if not most, CR scholars admit to, such as Burton, Mary E. Clark, and many others. But without the ontological support necessary to see the unity in the two realms (biology and society), a false dichotomy is set up in which the biological account just seems to be the better, though not perfect, alternative.

But perhaps the reason the insights of PA/CT have been missed thus far is due to the fact that the picture they present seems awfully complicated. I hope I can faithfully represent their picture accurately, whilst being as simple and clear as possible. Freud shows us that instinct, needs, drives, or whatever other term you would like to call the biological influence upon us, are always and already mediated by the social sphere. One example of this is our very ability to be moral. We may say “no” to our need for that piece of candy so that the baby will not cry because our instincts are already inculcated in meaning structures. Our instincts obey “no” because they somehow understand social/rational/moral dictates. In the reverse but proportional way, our moral censors speak the language of instinct – by prohibiting certain actions, it asserts force to counteract the instincts’ irrational make-up. The biological and social influences do not exist one without the other in us. This could be true of other animals as well.

IV.A. The Relation Between Needs and Biology in the Positivistic Framework

Burton often describes needs as biological phenomena (Burton, 1990b: 36). I have already given several reasons why he does so. Primarily, he wants to attribute to needs an absolute objectivity that cannot be socially engineered away or made subject to deprivation by society. In *Violence Explained*, for instance, Burton (1997) argues that conflict results because social structures are not always compatible to the desires and needs of individuals. The premise is that such desires and needs are not flexible, but
social structures are, and therefore must be changed to meet the demands of needs. I agree that there are needs in the way Burton talks about them that require protection and to a large extent, satisfaction. But I think expanding the biological account beyond the positivistic framework will show us that needs are just as much expressions of social conventions and values as they are derived biologically. Indeed, it would support Burton’s contention that changing society changes to what extent we have conflict. This is so not only because changes in social structures may better allow society to meet individual needs, but also because such changes would help shape the very way needs manifest. The need for identity can be channeled in ways that society finds valuable from the start. In the same way, the need for identity could have been inculcated by a culture that has negative aims (e.g. a gang). But I think both are culturally determined.

There is a great deal of literature in philosophy in the continental tradition and even some within the analytic tradition that attempts to expose the error in relying upon a purely physicalist or genetic account of things. One NT scholar representing such a view is Oscar Nudler, who I reference later in a different context. He takes a phenomenological approach, which basically holds that all knowledge of the world, things, and people are mediated, and therefore subject to the conditions of that mediation. The conditions are manifold and include history, society, family, education, personal experiences, etc. This manifold forms a constellation within one’s knowledge that makes up one’s world-view, and indeed a “world” in the phenomenological way.

So when one observes apes for their possible value for understanding conflict, one is making that observation given a certain framework of understanding, which is conditioned by a multitude of elements that form the background. One such element is history. One did not do things like observe animals for conflict resolving behaviors prior to a number of historical events that had already taken place. Some of these include the emergence of socio-biology as a field of study and the emergence of CRS pioneered by Burton and others. Even the very act of observation is itself an interpretation. For example, the assumption behind “natural” CRS, which seems to be a growing trend and validated by Burton himself, is that we may take animal behavior as a valid model for human ones.¹ But we may ask a number of questions of it. For instance, upon which species of animal should we model ourselves? Most often, the animal of choice seems to be other primates, which would make sense as they are genetically closer to us than all other species. But as socio-biologists are well-aware, non-primate animals behave in ways that are closer to us than even apes in some cases. Wolves, for example, form hierarchies that resemble human work groups more so than apes (who are often happy to laze about). Ducks and other animals form pair-bonds, though apes do not.

Other questions we may ask: Which animal behaviors are relevant to us? And which of our behaviors are given to nature and which are dependent on choice? Indeed, the entire edifice of ethics can be seen to depend upon our ability to choose against the grain of our natural constitution. As Aristotle said, “[N]one of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature”
(Aristotle, 1990, 1103A27). We may be predisposed, Aristotle says, to how we acquire virtues, but the rest relies on our chosen and deliberate activities. Countless other thinkers have reflected the same sentiment since then. Should we really be relying on so-called instinctual behaviors to be a model for our ethical ones? We may choose to do so, and we may find the socio-biological observations interesting and potentially helpful, but one cannot in any case avoid having to reflect upon the interpretive framework which shapes the way we interpret the evidence. We need to take responsibility for that framework, make it explicit, and be able to justify it.

In any case, I believe that social behavior (human, animal, and otherwise) cannot be interpreted to be purely “natural” per se. In the NT literature, there is already a healthy skepticism of the biological account of needs. To some extent, every NT scholar shares this skepticism. Although society is often pitted against our “natural” needs in the literature, no one is willing to say that we can do without society and its influence. I am not merely referring to discussions of potential satisfiers in this relation. In general, no one is willing to say that our needs can arise in the way they do without a social environment. But the positivistic framework that most NT scholars take for granted obstructs the full meaning of the social influence upon our “biology”. Society often lurks in the shadows, but is not given a home.

Katrin Lederer, however, in her introduction to Human Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate, questions the tacit assumption that needs are absolute (Lederer, 1980: 7-8). She refers to a conversation she had with Dr. Kinhide Mushakoji, then the vice-chancellor of the UN University, which helped sponsor the conference that formed the core of the book. He told her that in Japan, there was not even an equivalent for the term, “needs”, and furthermore that wishes, wants, desires (the closest relatives to needs) were construed as entirely subjective. She also points out that Gilbert Rist, a contributor to the conference and book, exposes a western bias to the notion of needs, which just did not hold in traditional cultures. There are plenty of anthropological studies that support the idea that the needs on most NT scholars’ list are culturally relative. Anthropologist Isabella Lepri, for example, in her article on identity (a basic need according to Burton) and the Ese Eija of Northern Bolivia, argues that identity is a mutable construct that can change depending on social context (Lepri, 2006). Are needs biological or social? Are they absolute or mutable? I hope to show that these either/or scenarios need not be our only option.

Mary E. Clark, biologist and NT scholar, says much of the same things I want to say, but in a different context. She writes, “The problem does not lie in some biological deficiency that can be overcome only by either genetic or social engineering” (Clark, 1990: 37). The problem she is referring to are negative manifestations of human behavior. She wants to argue against the idea that there is a biological necessity to aggression in the way Hobbes talked about. She does not attribute the problem to nature or nurture, but to the combination of the two that both contribute to the formation of the individual. She writes, “The individual is our central focus, and she or he out of
constraining necessity is embedded in an external “thing” called “society”. The two concepts are considered separately, and frequently at odds” (Clark, 1990: 39). Rather than at odds with the individual, Clark argues that social identity is part and parcel of individual identity. The individual comes with a disposition towards belonging to that “external thing”, and integrates herself in it from the very start.

However, in assessing the nature of that integration, she turns to the “Biological Evidence”. She attempts to understand human potential for group life according to observations of monkey group life (Clark, 1990: 40). She also speculates whether there is something in the brain that codes for attachment (Clark, 1990: 43). I find these paths unsatisfying for a number of reasons, of which I think I have already addressed above. Briefly, the disappointment is in the fact that there is no account of the meaning of sociality independent of biology. It is then quite easy to defer to biology as the default explanation for those aspects of society she cannot explain. But there is, of course, a difference between the two as she so readily acknowledges in the above quotes. I think Clark shows us how difficult it is to conceive of an ontology that is both social and biological. What kind of ontology could account for social life whether it be human or animal? What is the “being” of norms and social behaviors that can have a constitutional role in biology? I think Freudian psychoanalysis can answer these questions.

I will let Rubenstein have the last word on the need for moving beyond characterizing needs in terms of the positivistic view of biology. His issue with such a view is that it forecloses the very inquiry before it can begin. Since it does not seem to be the case that needs are purely biological, this claim needs to argued for which, again, is repelled by the notion that their reality is a foregone conclusion. To some extent any ontological account is going to run into this problem. If it is supposed to be a “fact”, then it is exactly not changeable through debate. I believe that the validation of facts are based on acknowledgement, rather than debate. I suppose I will be relying on such an acknowledgement by the reader when I speak of the biological account of PA, which the reader is perfectly free to disagree with. But just by making such a case, I am opening the discussion to explicit and reflective analysis, and not merely presuming its truth.

Another criticism Rubenstein offers in relying too heavily on the biological account is that by absolutizing needs, NT scholars are also relativizing satisfiers and the values that are attached to them. They simply reverse the dichotomy set up by the positivistic paradigm of “post-war social science” by attributing the good now to the individual, and the evil and irrationalism now to society (Rubenstein, 2001). A new framework is needed that does justice to the subtleties involved in analyzing needs. It is not a black and white picture.
IV.B. Drives, Biology, and Culture According to Psychoanalysis

Sigmund Freud, himself, attempted to account for psychology in a purely materialistic, biological way. His first major work, *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, intended for an audience of neurologists, was an attempt to describe psychology purely in terms of neuronal activity without any recourse to meaning, whether social, literary, or experiential. There is, however, a reason why he never published it. He recognized, almost right away, that the quality of experience could not be entirely accounted for by the quantitative activities of the neurones (his term for the units or cells of the brain and nerves). But he never gave up on the idea that, at bottom, psychology was derived from the “forces” of neuronal activity, which were governed by certain laws, such as the constancy principle (which later becomes the pleasure principle – they both aim for a zero-sum yield).

The flow of forces and the laws that regulate them constitute Freud’s economic view, which along with his topographical view, revolutionized the way we viewed the mind. The economy of our psyches were governed by certain relations of “forces” or “energies”, ultimately deriving from the body and therefore independent of and anterior to rational activity. Freud’s ontology is inclusive of biology as the origin of drives. But as Paul Ricoeur points out, these forces are not manifested “purely” as such. He writes, “…Freud coined the excellent expression *Repräsentanz*. Instincts, which are energy, are ‘represented’ by something psychical. But we must not speak of representation in the sense of *Vorstellung*, i.e. an ‘idea’ of something, for an idea is itself a derived form of this ‘representative’ which, before representing things – the world, one’s own body, the unreal – stands for instincts as such, presents them purely and simply” (Ricoeur, 1970: 35). In other words, instincts are always and already mediated by the psychism, which makes instincts fundamentally amenable to higher order mediation such as its representation in the *Vorstellung*, and further related to all the realms of meaning, including culture.

Let us look more closely at what it means for an instinct to be mediated because it is this phenomenon that gives Freud’s biological account its distinctiveness and its relevance to NT. For Freud, there is a relative distinction between an external world and an internal one, and each develops according to separate principles, though they intersect in fundamental ways. The external world characterized by necessity and the reality principle, which determines the particular material and social shape of culture. This development of the “external” dimension of culture is called by Freud, “phylogenesis”. The internal world is governed by primary processes, the pleasure principle and later the death instinct. The history of an individual’s psyche is constituted by both instinct and culture, and he calls this “ontogenesis”.

Instinctual needs or wishes, such as hunger, are geared towards satisfaction. But in order to be satisfied, instincts must engage reality (e.g. by crying or protesting), and therefore must take the shape of an outwardly expressible form. In the earliest formative
stages, that engagement is wholly *intersubjective*. Infants are helpless and entirely dependent on caretakers to give her what she needs. The social influence shapes our instinctual life from the very beginning, and our instinctual constitution is fundamentally open to that influence.

When, how often, how the infant is fed, put to bed, changed, etc. are determined by parental choices, which in turn are determined by parental values, which in turn are shaped by larger societal values. That baby formula was encouraged in the 1950’s and breast-feeding is encouraged now shape the outcome of the individual’s very biology as well as her mental fitness. One parent might value affection over discipline, and another might encourage independence and self-sufficiency over providing comfort. These decisions reflect parental and societal values that shape, not only the moral life of the infant, but also shape his very needs and desires. There have been studies, for example, that link formula feeding in the infant to obesity in later life. Various explanations have been offered, including the possibility that the biochemical composition of breastmilk may offer future protection from obesity. But the more likely explanation is that breastfeeding promotes healthier eating behaviors, like feeding based on hunger-cues (v. scheduled feeding). If this is right, it shows that our very ability to experience a need can become alienated through training. The implication for CRS is that we should be concerned about “social engineering” well before NT had previously thought. What if needs are corrupted from the inside out? Who is then the violator? Is it social values, the parents who follow them, or the child who has been fundamentally changed by them and perpetuates the alienation through his very actions?

Just as instinct is always and already mediated, we are always and already caught up in a historical period with a certain set of values. The core of moral life in the individual is in the super-ego, and it is shaped by the parents’ super-ego, which is shaped by their parents’ super-ego, and the history of such super-egos can be traced back into an infinite past and affect the present multi-laterally. A collective history shapes individual values. An external historical event, such as the American Revolution, can open up possibilities for individual expressions of needs and their satisfactions that was not there before. Such freedoms can then become internalized to such an extent that they may seem to be natural needs in us, which I think is what is going on in our current interpretations of identity and recognition as “natural” needs. The repercussions of violence and power struggle can also be passed down, though through less obvious mechanisms. Our psyches can bear the scars of familial and societal brutality by unconsciously decoding outward expressions and behaviors that may attest to the contrary. For Freud, one need not witness actual violence to inherit its effects (See Freud, 1955, Freud, 1961 and Freud, 1966b). Our phylogenetic acquisition beholds both explicit, conscious accounts and subterranean, unconscious denials.

“Ontogenesis”, the formative processes that determine our internal moral and instinctual life, is rather darker than is at first apparent. I will now discuss Freud’s topographical view of the mind, or what Marcuse might describe as “depth psychology”.
As I said, along with his economic view, this is the other part of Freud’s revolutionary new way of thinking. Let me first say what is revolutionary about this view and how it is that the unconscious is formed, and then go on to give a more specific account of what it is and how it relates to NT.

Freud’s initial formulation of the topography, the first topography, was to distinguish an explicit, cognitive realm from a hidden, dynamic realm; i.e. consciousness and unconsciousness. The notion that there was an active realm of the mind that was closed to rational inspection was a rather new idea. Prior to that, the mind was seen in a positivistic light – it was rational, self-evident, and certain. It was the source of all insight and justifications, but it itself was self-justifying and needed no further justification. This is still most people’s view of “reason” or “common sense”, but it is no less constructed by the positivistic tradition stemming from Bacon, Descartes, Locke, etc.

The significance of the Freudian unconscious, according to Ricoeur, is that it exactly undermined the belief in an uncomplicated rational mind that is self-sufficient and in control of things.

Why is it significant to undermine this view of the mind? For Ricoeur, it is significant because it would reflect the actual reality, and by shining light on the dark grounds of the mind, we can demystify it. Ultimately, that is important for Ricoeur because he seeks to find a hermeneutics, or interpretive framework, that supports his project of redemption and the sacred. He seeks to establish his framework on solid theoretical ground in part by confronting the irrational forces that always threaten to undermine it. He sees in Freud the appropriate framework for situating aggression, power, depression, lust, etc. And it is not beyond their scope to be transformed by and into a meaningful, spiritual, and ultimately rational framework. Indeed, all good things, according to Freud, come about through a transformation of drives, a process he calls “sublimation”. In this scheme, there is no such thing as a good created out of whole cloth.

But how do forces of instinct become connected to meaning? That question is at the heart of the ontogenetic account. It is the process in which the individual initially governed by the pleasure principle becomes civilized through the reality principle. Primordially, we are biological creatures with biological drives. We are driven to satisfy our needs for basic survival. As I said, the manner of care and timing by the parents shapes needs from the start. Some needs may always be satisfied, some delayed, some prohibited (Freud thought the sexual instinct was the most consistently prohibited in early childhood). This valorizes some needs and negates others. Prohibiting the expression or satisfaction of an instinctual wish leads it to be “banished” from the acceptable realm of explicit consciousness into the rejected realm of the unconscious. The infant cannot afford to have too many unacceptable wishes lest she herself be unacceptable. Such wishes are thus driven underground and dynamically kept from rising again to the surface. Repression of traumatic events and continued repetition of negative behaviors
that are indicative of neurosis, are extreme instances of this phenomenon. But censorship and negation are also a normal part of everyday socialization.

Just because unacceptable wishes are banished from consciousness does not mean that they disappear. The aim of instinct is to be satisfied. It is energetically constituted to fulfill that aim, and that energetic component remains even whilst its content has been rejected. Such unconsummated instinctual wishes accumulate in the unconscious, creating a world unto itself with its own alien order, language, and laws. The frightening aspect of Freud’s thoughts is that this unconscious realm is more primordial and more encompassing than is the conscious one. Our instinctual life precedes our rational maturation, and that has great implications. Freud does acknowledge an ego or a common sense faculty of the mind that can lead us aright, but as his famous analogy goes, it is like the tip of the iceberg that protrudes above the surface of the water. The preponderant bulk, of course, is hidden to view and reaches into the depths below. The unconscious or the id is that bulk below the surface that holds everything up. It conditions, motivates, and determines the thoughts and behaviors that go on on the surface level. But there is hope for the ego. As Ricoeur shows, the influence can go the other way around too, for we nonetheless have choice and creativity.

Now let me discuss more specifically what Freud’s topographical view entails, and what its implications for NT are. As I said, it posits different areas or topoi in the mind, refuting the view of the mind as a uniform, uninterrupted light. Initially, he conceived of two distinct realms, the conscious and unconscious realms. He also posited a preconscious realm that was a middle zone between them. The preconscious was a sort of receptacle for memories, but it was still a part of explicit consciousness. The thoughts and memories of the preconscious could be recollected without any special translation. However, its border with the unconscious is special in that the cross-over would entail the overcoming of energetically charged barriers (the mechanism of repression and anti-cathexis).

Freud’s second topography is an expansion of the first. It does not refute the first topography, but elaborates upon it. The second topography posits three constructs of the mind – the id, the ego, and the super-ego. The id roughly coincides with the unconscious, but the relations are more complicated than that in Freud’s later thoughts. The controversial construct is the super-ego. As I discussed, it is the seat of moral life, but rather than coinciding with consciousness, in Freud’s mature thoughts, the super-ego is related more to the id! The super-ego is an enforcing agency and is therefore constitutionally instinctual as much as it is a moral agency. This basic idea was already evident in the censorship that takes place between the conscious and unconscious realms within the schema of the first topography. How do the censors select which instinctual wish to allow and which to reject? In order to make such judgments, they must obviously have a connection to social values. At the same time, in order to counteract the energetically charged instincts, they must just as obviously be constituted with force as well. In other words, rather than merely instinctual or merely social, the censors are
bilingual. Instincts are similarly bilingual. Dreams, “Freudian” slips, and jokes are examples of instinctual wishes which have bypassed the censoring mechanism in order to find expression. In order to “trick” the censors, they must be able to “know” the language of that other realm where things are supposed to make rational sense and be tasteful. By using the symbology of the conscious order as a cover, instinctual wishes are able to fulfill their aim. The implication of the bilingual character of our instinctual constitution is that they can be influenced by reason. It may not be the easy, direct kind of control that positivism may expect, but nonetheless, even in the Freudian scheme, it is possible to tame the forces that teem inside the black box.

I hope I have demonstrated that it is possible to have an ontology that is both biological and social. I also hope that I have established the validity and value of utilizing this ontology in analyzing the problems that began this paper. I would like to look again at NT scholarship utilizing the framework I have begun to articulate. I will be honing in on the specific dialectic between needs and values as this seems to be a recurring theme in NT that best captures the tensions of this paper’s problematic. I want to show that a unity between the individual and society is sought for by NT scholars, and that this unity cannot be found if the terms are positivistic. The inability to unify the two sides leads to other negative consequences, such as leaving negative tendencies in human beings unmediated and outside the framework of meaningful discourse. I will then go on to show how PA and CT can help to frame the problematic in a way that is able to provide for that sought for unity, and also to reintegrate negative tendencies back into the sphere of reason.

V. The Relation Between Needs and Values

In the following two sections I evaluate the relation between needs and values, first as it has been framed within NT scholarship with its attendant positivistic presuppositions, and then how it could be interpreted based on CT and PA frameworks. The positivistic framework imposes a rift between the two phenomena. It interprets needs as discrete manifestations of biology removed from their ties to society and history. But Hobbes had a neat distinction between general desires and particular desires, which I think is relevant here. (Hobbes, 1970: 30-31) My own spin on this distinction is that we may have basic needs like hunger and thirst, but they are never expressed without their particular social vehicle, like a Big Mac or kimchee. The first may be a result of corporate “branding” and the second cultural imprinting, but they are both a matter of particularizing hunger. Conditions may also make it necessary to accept anything to fulfill that general hunger, but the object of satisfaction would still be shaped by social pressures. This may include the social pressures that have shaped the physical landscape in a certain way that determine the types of food grown or that excludes access to certain
individuals, or social responses to natural occurrences. In any case, I will attempt to show that tensions arise when we interpret needs and values as ontologically distinct.

Marcuse shows how needs and values are shaped by larger historical forces that are embedded in a particular ideological development and power system. Just as needs are expressed through particular vehicles, society does not exist in a general state, but as a particular shape developed out of rational and irrational forces. He believes that modern culture has been defined, in particular, by industrialism. The ideology arising out of industrialism creates certain material conditions—such as factories and corporations—as well as meaning structures with which we interpret human values—the worth of a factory worker and what a quality of life entails. I agree with his analysis of needs as ontologically tied to values. But I do not share his conclusion that we ought to seek refuge from ideological constraints in the realm of phantasy, wherein he finds genuine freedom. I take leave of Marcuse to turn to Ricoeur for the solution. Ricoeur argues that freedom is always a determinate freedom within the confines of our material and social conditions. The key construct will be the ego. The great masters—the world, the super-ego and the id—still cannot prevent the ego from expressing its activities and inherent freedom. Ricoeur calls the creative activity of the ego, ‘sublimation,’ which takes internal and external constraints and transforms them into creative and spiritual objects and ideas through work.

V.A. As NT Scholarship Has Seen It

NT scholars have recognized the perplexity that results from dichotomizing needs and values. I noted Mary E. Clark’s articulation of the problem earlier. I would now like to note how other scholars have situated the problem. I cite Ramashray Roy who shows us the problems that result from positing a rift between needs and values in NT scholarship. But though he articulates the problem well, he is skeptical that a solution can be reached. I, of course, think a solution is possible as I have been arguing. I also cite Oscar Nudler who, though avoiding the pitfalls of positivism, exhibits an over-reliance on rational means of CR, which PA and CT may correct. In this discussion, I bring up Deiniol Lloyd Jones who uses CT to critique the over-estimation of rationality for CR. Finally, I cite Burton himself, who acknowledges a confusion over the relation between needs and values, but is stuck in terms of where to turn for an answer.

In his paper, “Social Conflicts and Needs Theories: Some Observations” (Roy, 1990), Roy criticizes the reified dichotomy between an individual with needs and a society with values, which have no inherent relation to each other. He asks, “If there is no direct relationship between satisfaction of needs and the development of moral sense, how can needs theories be of help either in conflict elimination or conflict resolution” (Roy, 1990: 140)? As I have been trying to show, Roy too sees that needs belong in the same discourse as the “moral sense”. Most needs that are considered basic on any list...
given by NT scholars implicate some sort of dimension in the social sphere – whether it be moral, aesthetic, emotional, etc. Take, for instance, Ronald J. Fischer’s list, which is pretty representative. He lists, in order of importance, self-actualization needs, esteem needs, aesthetic needs, cognitive needs, belongingness and love needs, safety needs, and physiological needs (Fischer, 1990: 19). How are cognitive needs biological? How does the need for belongingness manifest without the social conditions that make it possible? These needs are clearly connected in some way to social conditions. Moreover, some of these needs can be seen to be created by social conditions. Someone who is on the right side of the political and economic spectrum may afford to have needs for beauty and self-actualization, but one does not quite have this luxury if she works in a sweat-shop seven days a week. As Roy writes, “Needs theories ignore the essential role society plays in the development of the individual” (Roy, 1990: 132).

But though he spends a great deal of time showing the undesirable consequences of dichotomizing needs and values, in the end, Roy does not see a way to relate them in a foundational way. He conceives of society merely as an “aggregation” in which the individual finds himself, but with which he has merely an external connection. He writes, “[A]ll aggregations are arbitrary, temporary, and instrumental. They represent at any particular moment the constellation of not the whole identity of individuals but just one or a few components of it” (Roy, 1990: 143). This view of society as merely an aggregate does not support a foundational relation to needs, and in my mind, falls into the trap of positivism. For Roy, like many other NT scholars, he cannot envision a kind of social ontology that affects the core of the individual. But one thinks of Rousseau’s distinction between an aggregate and an association in The Social Contract (Rousseau, 1973). An association, says Rousseau, is a community in which individuals are able to transcend one’s particular interest (the collection of which is an aggregate) for the sake of group interest. This group interest should not be at odds with individual interests, but should also not be beholden to any particular ones. An ability to make group interest one’s own is possible and necessary for any democratic organization, according to Rousseau. Social realities were not simply facts to be passively received for Rousseau, but something that should accord to the right and just even if it meant making that happen.

Roy does not acknowledge the possibility of an association, and without seeing a social ontology that would have a meaningful and tempering relation to particular needs, he rather advocates the out-right pursuit of self-interest. This is what one does in an aggregation, a mere collection of bodies attempting to survive. In this scenario, society is seen as arbitrary and temporary, and individual needs and interests are seen as the only thing real and fundamental. He thus feels justified in instrumentalizing society for individual benefit. Power is such an instrument, and indeed, “serves as the most appropriate instrument of the pursuit of self-interest” (Roy, 1990: 144). I do agree with him that part of human instinctual life entails a certain amount of aggression that I do not think is tractable, however, I also do not think that an unreflective reversion to power is
the solution. Indeed, this reversion is exactly the result of the positivistic framework which keeps power, aggression, and violence outside its purview as the great alien Other. It is then left as something that can never be mitigated and appropriated. I believe this “power” can be integrated into a value system such that it need not be cut off from the field of meaningful discourse. PA and CT make power an explicit issue, and show its use and connection to social values.

Another scholar to address the relation between the individual and society for NT is Oscar Nudler. He takes a phenomenological approach and argues that values are part and parcel of the very outlook of the world, and indeed constitutes the “world” in the special way phenomenology defines it (Nudler, 1990). Thus conflicts for him are conflicts between worlds or systems of needs. By shifting to a phenomenological framework, he offers an interesting solution that avoids the pitfalls of positivism. His solution does not rely on a dichotomy of individuals with needs and society with values. Needs are rather subsumed into the symbolic order of phenomenological worlds. This certainly would explain why needs are capable of being universalized, but are not individuals themselves an important part of an account of needs? Part of Burton’s motivation for grounding needs in biology was to offer them ontological protection from social engineering. I think it is fair to point out with Nudler that needs are not simply equivalent to their relation to the symbolic order. In reverse proportion to Roy, Nudler goes too far in the way of rationalizing the terms, such that needs lose its factual ground. Since the world is “really” constituted by values, he then argues for an entirely rationalized dialogue as a means towards the resolution of conflict (Nudler, 1990: 198).

Certainly, some form of rationality will be entailed in any dialogue hoping to resolve conflict, but it must be framed in the right ways. Whatever rationality means, it is clearly more difficult to assess than some people might presume. Do we have intractable conflicts in the world because people have not been heretofore rational enough? Which side is the “irrational” one then, say, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Is this even a fair question? It does not seem to be enough to simply lay down the dictum as Nudler does that “[m]utual deterrence and mistrust are gradually replaced by dialogue based on an understanding of the other’s needs and ways of representing them” (Nudler, 1990: 198). I am not so sure that focussing on rational means of resolving conflict will automatically ensure that mistrust will melt away. Mistrust and other irrational phenomena require a different discourse. Although I direct my criticism of rational dialogue as the model for CR towards him, Nudler is certainly not alone in his reliance on such a model. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of an alternative to such a reliance because our instinctual constitution is alterior to the very language of reason. If aggression and power are exerting their influence, it does so in a mute and unaccountable way, or at least that is what appears to be the case.
Laureen Park

One CR scholar who criticizes the idea of a purely rational dialogue is Deiniol Lloyd Jones, who uses CT to analyze the role of mediation and CR in international politics. Lloyd Jones contends (along with Palestinian lawyer, Jonathan Kuttab) that the expectation of rational dialogue rests on the assumption of a “false symmetry between the oppressor and the oppressed” and creates a ‘false dialogue’ (Jones, 2000: 655). In any dialogue, there is a context which may include a history of oppression, relations of power, and other subterranean pretexts. I think we all intuitively know that this goes on in the real way conflicts arise, and therefore is important to address. But it is not so easy to frame the discussion in a methodical, systematic manner. Lloyd Jones attempts to show how CT can do this for third party mediation in international politics. Toran Hansen also attempts to show how CT may provide insights into the methods and aims of the field of social work (Hansen, 2008). The goals of social work are not primarily a neutral, cognitive process, but aims to counter-act social injustices and oppression, or so it is argued. My own attempt here seeks a general theoretical foundation that would support the application of CT and PA in these particular fields of study.

There are other CR scholars who attempt to pinpoint the exact relationship between needs and values and individual and society, and yet fail to capture it. But I think it will suffice to address one more scholar, and that is Burton himself. Let me quote him at length in regards to how he sees the relationship between needs and values:

Values are those ideas, habits, customs, and beliefs that are a characteristic of particular social communities. They are the linguistic, religious, class, ethnic or other features that lead to separate cultures and identity groups. Values, which are acquired, differ from needs in that the latter are universal and primordial, and perhaps genetic.

In conditions of oppression, discrimination, underprivilege and isolation, the defense of values is important to the needs of personal security and identity. In this sense they impinge on our needs and can be confused with them. Preservation of values is a reason for defensive and aggressive behaviors. It is the pursuit of individual needs that is the reason for the formation of identity groups through which the individual operates in the pursuit of a wider ego and of security and cultural identity (Burton, 1990b: 37).

One struggles to delineate where needs end and values begin, which is a delineation that Burton would like us to draw. Needs are primordial, perhaps “genetic”, and values are constructions relative to a group’s linguistic and cultural ethos. However, what are “personal” needs for belonging and identity without their relation to the group? Do they not speak to communal values, which is why he suggests that in times of oppression, our sense of identity seems to hinge upon defending values? And in what way does the pursuit of individual needs lead to the formation of “identity groups”? He describes the individual’s pursuit of cultural identity as a pursuit of a “wider ego”. But is cultural identity merely an expansion of the self? The difficulties here, as I am
interpreting them, lies in the positivistic framework that creates a rift that is not truly there between needs and values. Once they are situated within an appropriately historical and instinctual ontology, we can see that the very formation of needs is shaped by values. I agree with Roy, who believes that the view of the relationship between needs and values that has evolved in NT is either too naïve or too dangerous. It is naïve because it relies on a tacit Compatibility Principle that is not given explicit treatment, but is nonetheless relied upon. It is the faith that individual pursuits will naturally lead to moral goodness. It is dangerous because it does not acknowledge the negative possibilities of egoism (Roy, 1990: 129).

V.B. The Relation Between Needs, Values, and Power According to Marcuse

Burton does recognize that socialization is pervasive and influences us to a great extent. He writes, “There can be no doubt that there is in all human relationships a large degree of adjustment, leading to conformity and in this sense socialization” (Burton, 1990b: 31). This is what common sense suggests, and would be a point of agreement by most of the thinkers I have discussed. It is the metaphysical framework that causes one thinker to interpret the same “facts” in a different way than another. For Burton, socialization can be a separate issue from the influence it installs in the individual. This reflects the positivistic view that anything non-biological in us is not a meaningful component. The problem is that he keeps running into the social problem in his analyses of needs. Not able to integrate the two sides, he often skirts the issue with claims such as this: “The issue whether behavior is determined genetically, environmentally, or both, is not a profitable one for us to engage in at this stage of knowledge” (Burton, 1990b: 37). I do not imagine, given the positivistic scheme, that the appropriate stage will ever be reached to open that metaphysical discussion.

It is not simply a case of a distaste for the metaphysical. Burton sees in the biological foundation for NT the theoretical support for the universal protection of human rights. If needs are biological, then they cannot be changed, trampled on, and manipulated. To continue the first quote I cited above, Burton acknowledges that we conform to a great extent to socialization, “[b]ut the traditional view of behavior implies that this socialization process has no limits. This convenient construct presupposes that the person has no needs to be satisfied that are inherent or human” (Burton, 1990b, 31). Burton is concerned to limit the social influence where it may obstruct the satisfaction of needs, which he sees as somehow inherent or human. But I think this view is misleading in several ways. Firstly, I argue that needs themselves are shaped by socialization, and therefore “corrupts” the individual well before she could be politically obstructed from satisfying them. Secondly, that “corruption” is not always a bad thing. Social movements have lead to the recognition of certain rights and values in individuals that were not recognized previously. The concern then is to decipher which kinds of
influences should be encouraged, and which should be limited. But biological explanations are not adequate to deciphering such influences.

Marcuse and Ricoeur adopt the ontology that I reconstructed in Freud above in Part III.B. They take for granted that the social influence is at the core of individual development. What we learned in this account is that part of the very process of socialization entails the obstruction of instinctual wishes or needs in the individual. As Marcuse writes in *Eros and Civilization*, “According to Freud, the history of man is the history of his repression. Culture constrains not only his societal but also his biological existence, not only parts of the human being but his instinctual structure itself” (Marcuse, 1955: 11). Part of becoming civilized is to renounce absolute and immediate gratification in any and every situation. This is necessary for self control, discipline, education, art, achieving higher goals, altruism, and the list goes on. It does come at the wounding of happiness, but is seen as necessary if we are to etch out an existence within group life. The censoring mechanism that I associated with Freud’s topographies earlier was not an arbitrary mechanism or due to some characteristic of instinct, but necessitated by our goals and meaningful pursuits, which are conditioned by culture.

Marcuse calls this mundane, everyday repression, “basic repression”. We are limited in what and how we express and satisfy certain needs that are antithetical to group cohesion and survival (which, by the way, conditions the very survival of the individual). But our need to tolerate this generalized repressive state does that entail we accept repressive political forms such as totalitarianism. Marcuse distinguished basic repression from *surplus* repression. Surplus repression involves demands for renunciation of needs that are over and above what is required for the necessities of group life. Such excessive repression in our day is indicated by the fact that 1. the reality principle has become the performance principle and 2. true needs are obstructed (v. false ones). The solution for overcoming surplus repression is to recover the realm of phantasy wherein, according to Marcuse, one finds one’s originary freedom and primordial desires. I disagree with his solution, but agree with his analysis of culture and its relation to the formation of needs.

For Marcuse, because of the way individuals are ontogenetically formed, needs are as suspect as the social forms that help shape them. He finds that in modern day society the apparent needs people pursue are the ultimate vehicles of social engineering. People’s preoccupation with “false” pleasures is the sugar that lets repressive tactics go down easily. Indeed, Freud thought that authority must be internalized for it to be effective, at least for the conditions of modern life. Modern people are not willing to accept the sheer flexing of might as a legitimate form of authority. That only works for the “primitive” mind, whose primary moral response was the *fear* of getting caught by an *external* authority figure. The super-ego is the modern-day *internal* manifestation of authority – it is the watchful eye of “conscience”, a sense in us that feels guilty, not only of wrongful *acts* but of wrongful *thoughts*. We cannot evade the authority of the super-ego as we may external authority.
But the super-ego is no less shaped by external sources of authority. Indeed it is a much more efficient system, for those under its power are left to police themselves. Interestingly, Freud connects the super-ego to the id, the realm of instinctual wishes and phantasy! He writes,

> The ego ideal [his early label for the super-ego] is therefore the heir of the Oedipus complex, and thus it is also the expression of the most powerful impulses and most important libidinal vicissitudes of the id. By setting up this ego ideal, the ego has mastered the Oedipus complex and at the same time placed itself in subjection to the id (Freud, 1996c: 36).

Mastering the Oedipus complex is equivalent to achieving moral mastery, for it signals the individual’s overcoming his instinctual inheritance. He ends his reliance on his former love-object and begins to identify with the ego ideal his “father” represents which formerly seemed distant and irrelevant to him. This renunciation of his love-object represents the boys’ ability to limit his desires for the sake of his “higher” life in the realm of the ideal. Of course that also entails the adoption of his “father’s” values, which has its history and is the inlet of the entire system of cultural values. But what I wanted to point out here is that the overcoming of one aspect of instinctual life embeds the child more deeply into the id, according to Freud. What accounts for this odd consequence?

Power and desire are both manifestations of instinct. The desires of the conqueror motivate his flexing of power and fuel his need to dominate. This in turn shapes the desires and feelings of power (or lack thereof) in the conquered, who may in turn determine the fate of the conqueror. Every culture has had a determinate history of such power struggles and struggles for the occupation of sources of satisfaction. Underlying this is the ultimate, unyielding necessity, which is the one forced upon by nature itself. We must survive – that is the stark goal of the reality principle. And ironically, the reality principle ultimately serves the pleasure principle because it preserves the individual and achieves in fact what the pleasure principle can only wish for. None of these vicissitudes of instinct are motivated rationally. Fundamentally, instrumental reason is at the service of an irrational master.

For Marcuse, the intimate relation between the super-ego and the id, the reality and pleasure principles has lead to a strange union between liberation, oppression and satisfaction in modern-day society. In order to analyze more specifically what the mechanisms are, we need to look at how society has actually evolved. The determinate history that has led up to current states of affairs, according to Marcuse, has been shaped by industrialization and its attendant values. The shape that the reality principle has taken in modern industrial society is what Marcuse calls the “performance principle”.

The performance principle is the internalization of the values industrialization has established – they include technological advancement, efficiency, materialism, mass-production, and excessive demands upon the time and energy of a segment of the population who are the laborers. One’s role in society (which determines her value)
becomes a simple matter of the performance of a repetitive function that Marcuse thinks is modeled upon the machines that made industrialism possible. He writes, “This is the pure form of servitude: to exist as an instrument, as a thing...reification tends to become totalitarian by virtue of its technological form...” (Marcuse, 1964: 33). We are alienated in this form of culture because the means and ends of this production system are valued over the people and labor that make this system possible. We do not even ask why this system is in place anymore. We simply take it as a matter of fact. It has also overly restricted the satisfaction of our needs. And by constraining them, such a society has over-valorized them – has made the pursuit of hunger, sex, and comforts more urgent by constraining the possibilities of satisfaction. This is one way that society may shape the very expression of needs, which is a point I made in analyzing Burton’s contention that conflict results from society’s failure to meet needs. Perhaps it is society itself that created conflicted needs.

We need not be a factory worker to assimilate the values of industrialization. We buy into the system simply by being okay with it. The uncritical consumer buying that cheap trinket at the store helps to perpetuate a system that subjects millions of people, sometimes children, to harsh conditions for very little pay. But more indirectly, the values of industrialization may seep into all arenas of our society. By expecting uniformity in student performance, for example, rather than emphasizing their uniqueness, may be a symptom of the performance principle. Critical thought helps us to evaluate this reality and not simply accept it.

What we think of as needs is a part of that very system because it is creative of those needs and is also perpetuated by them. Some needs, however, seem to transcend the system, seem to be more natural and essential than others. Marcuse, as well as many NT scholars, seek to define “true” needs; needs that we may stand on when we judge the rest to be “false”. Such an aim can be seen as far back as Ancient Greece. Epicurus may have advocated a life filled with pleasures, but only those which would otherwise lead to pain, such as hunger and friendship. Only pleasures which would lead to pain if left unsatisfied could count as real “needs” versus desires. Desires were creations of the imagination and constituted cravings, which if left unsatisfied would simply disappear.

For Marcuse, true or vital needs are those that do not serve social repression (Marcuse, 1964: 4). Jeff Noonan characterizes Marcuse’s definition of true needs this way: “‘True’ needs are those which are life-preserving...” both organically and culturally (Noonan, 2008: 273). False needs would be “those which are superimposed by particular social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery, and injustice” (Marcuse, 1964: 5). Marcuse considers most pleasures people take today as constituting false needs. Drugs would be an extreme example of a pleasure whose satisfaction perpetuates misery. But any need that serves the interests of the very few for the sake of the many would count. The rise in obesity that has been the consequence of eating unhealthy foods by large numbers of people to the benefit of a few corporations, or the huge debt many people have undertaken to
acquire more material goods for the benefit of shareholders would be examples as well. The uncritical consumer exercises his “freedom” to satisfy his desires, not realizing that it may be a manipulated satisfaction.

The only way to be truly free from the cycle of oppression, according to Marcuse, is to use critical thought to evaluate true and false needs from a relatively autonomous point of view. But how do we reach this point of view if Marcuse acknowledges that in many cases, “the transplantation of social into individual needs is so effective that the difference between [true and false needs] seems to be purely theoretical” (Marcuse, 1964: 8)? Agnes Heller, a CT scholar in her own right and a contributor to *Human Needs: A Contribution to the Current Debate*, argues that for the reasons Marcuse gives, a distinction cannot be made between true and false needs. This would require a perspective no one has (Heller, 1980: 214). Noonan, too, agrees that such a distinction cannot be maintained, and that such a suggestion could lead to negative consequences. Imposing “true” needs would be totalitarian (Noonan, 2008: 274), which is something Heller also suggests. This is a definite problem in Marcuse’s thought, and one which I do not think can be revived. I think this criticism can be extrapolated to NT scholarship as well. I think there are needs that seem to be more important than others, but I do not think that these distinctions can be made based on which is “truer” or more “natural” than others. These must be decided based on *values*, which are open to judgments of the good and bad, and such a discussion is closed off if needs are seen as biological.

Marcus’s search for the basis of autonomy is equally problematic. He advocates returning to the imagination and the realm of phantasy as the original source of one’s freedom and true desires (Marcuse, 1955: chapter 7). Free from the ideological constraints that may invade reason (which is susceptible to the rational guise of ideology), imagination may envision the possibilities of a utopia. This imagined utopia would lay out the external social conditions which would make society adequate to the true needs of individuals. It would allow them to work in non-alienating labor, and would allow ample opportunity for the satisfaction of true needs without undue constraints. Once we had the time and space to articulate the vision for such a utopia, we would then set ourselves the task of implementing it in reality and discerning the right conditions and limitations of that vision. But there are so many questions that come up in regards to this project. Principally, it is a big question whether the id is truly free at all. As we have been characterizing it, the id is subject to the force of instinct as well as to the ideological force of society. What makes the realm of phantasy exempt? Even if we could describe the realm of phantasy as free, we can still question whether it is the construct that we should rely on in deciphering the virtues and benefits of certain forms of society.

I prefer Ricoeur’s project. Ricoeur does not think we can ever achieve true autonomy given the conditions that Freud laid out for us. We are never outside of ideological constraints and power dynamics. However, we do have a certain amount of freedom in how we may transform that reality through sublimation. We may make
misery into a beautiful song, may transform a dirt lot into a garden, and turn anger into political action. Those deeds are not the ones of the id, but the ego. The ego is situated in domination, but is the only construct that may change it through relative freedom and activity.

We may ask questions of this project as well. Where does the ego derive its freedom and meaning? How does it make choices and on which values does it rely? So much of the ego is pre-constituted by the id as Freud demonstrated. However, is not the very definition of freedom that which is uncaused? Perhaps there is a part of the ego that is undetermined and groundless. There is an idea in the history of thought that postulates that the fear that we are ultimately groundless, rooted in nothingness, motivates the search for something, anything to ground us. This idea is in Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, existentialism, and in Buddhist thought. But even if our actions come out of a vacuum, they may nonetheless change our entire future. Individuals have changed the landscape of human culture through brave, artistic, and moral acts. It does happen, and to use the logic of phenomenology, if it is actual in fact, then it is necessarily possible. The mechanisms of change, however, are the basis for another paper entirely.

VI. Conclusion

In opening the “black box” of needs, I have shown that the status of needs can be quite complicated to decipher. This is so because they are at the juncture of the diverse elements that make up the human condition – our biological make-up, society, norms, power, desire, and freedom. But perhaps it is a good thing not to accept needs as tacitly simple and benign. Marcuse shows us that they may actually be vehicles for social repression. And if there is one great lesson we have learned from history, it is that it is important to be vigilant against that possibility.

What is or should be a need and which of them should be given priority? I am not sure that this question can be answered in advance. So that is my own question that I will leave unanswered. But whatever the answers are, I think the approaches of CT and PA are helpful in finding them. It advocates a commitment to social justice by the inquirer or mediator of conflict. This is, at bottom, ideological and something we need to take responsibility for. CT and PA help us to recognize that this commitment is also creative of the very outcome of social justice. Needs are not these biological things waiting for the right moment to show themselves, but have been shaped by historical conditions and the deeds of people. The approaches also embrace negative tendencies as an inherent part of needs, and neither rejects them nor encourages those tendencies. Indeed, irrational motives sometimes drive the satisfaction of needs that get in the way of conflict resolution. We must not treat the negative tendencies in us as mere side-effects, but as a fundamental piece of the puzzle.
Notes


3. One finds this idea in *Totem and Taboo, Civilization and Its Discontents*, and *Moses and Monotheism*. His use of “primitive” is rather unreflective and certainly politically incorrect. But I find his basic distinction a valid and useful thought experiment. It reconstructs a time when people merely submitted to an external authority and its punishments in contrast to the modern-day expectation that it be validated internally before consent.

References


