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INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, a number of studies on the causes and dynamics of civil wars pointed out that activities of diasporas[2] in general, and the activities of conflict-generated diasporas in particular, tend to increase the risk of armed conflict.[3] One of the underlying fundamental assumptions is that, partly as a result of 'exclusion' or 'marginalization' in hostland societies, conflict-generated diasporas tend to nurture grievances as a way of asserting their continued belonging in the homeland society, and are thus less willing to compromise (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Lyons, 2007). Thus, there is a presumed causal process linking lower levels of integration among diasporas to their increased encouragement of armed conflict via the mechanism of less reconciliatory attitudes (Anderson, 1992). The supposed existence of such a causal mechanism raises an important question that we try to answer in our study: among conflict-generated diasporas, does more 'integration' encourage more reconciliatory attitudes?

In order to answer this question, in this paper we put forward a nuanced explanation of the relationship between hostland integration and the attitudes of diasporas. To that end, we distinguish between *structural integration* and *socio-cultural integration* (Snel et al., 2006). Structural integration may be distinguished from social and cultural integration as 'social positioning', such as one's level of education or position within the labor market. Socio-cultural integration refers to informal social contacts with natives and the endorsement of "prevailing moral standards and values" (Ibid. 287).

Our approach differs from the existing understanding of the effects of hostland integration on diasporas. Until now most authors, when discussing exclusion and marginalization, spoke of the need for more hostland integration to induce moderation among diasporas (Hansen, 2008; Koinova, 2009; Shain, 1999:137; 2002:136-7; Shain & Barth, 2003:450; Zunzer, 2004:44).

Although speaking of integration in very general terms, the underlying assumption seems to be that culturally and politically integrated diasporas will play a crucial role in transferring

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[1] To contact the authors, write to the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Box 514, 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden or email them at Jonathan.Hall@pcr.uu.se and Roland.Kostic@pcr.uu.se.
[2] Diasporas may be defined as migrants, and their descendents, who describe themselves as belonging to a common origin and homeland, and who engage in transnational activities (Hall, 2008).
[3] For a recent example of the prevailing arguments see the state of art article on civil wars by Blattman and Miguel, (2009, p. 43). For similar summaries see Byman et al. (2001), Collier (2000) and Collier, et al. (2003).

liberal values to homeland societies and thus contribute to homeland stability. These explanations, however, remain underdeveloped and lack a solid foundation in systematic empirical evidence. Thus, we base our argument on findings in social psychology and social work. According to these findings, structural integration empowers members of diasporas. Through providing psychological coherence structural integration enables them to deal with the past and to envision a common future with other groups in both the host- and homeland. At the same time, socio-cultural integration, particularly the identity and normative aspects of it, if pursued top down and assertively, are likely to make the norms and prevailing identity of diasporas more salient.

The basis for our claims is a unique set of survey data on integration and reconciliatory attitudes among immigrants from the former Yugoslavia in Sweden, the majority of whom identify themselves as belonging to the Bosniak, Croat, Serb or Yugoslav people. These diasporas are theoretically interesting as many arrived to Sweden in the 1990s as a result of upheavals in the former Yugoslavia. This enables us to test the effects of socio-cultural and structural integration on their attitudes towards the nature of the recent war, societal organization, forgiveness and prospects for peaceful coexistence in their homelands.

Our results indicate that socio-cultural integration in general does not have an effect on reconciliatory attitudes of Balkan diasporas. When looking at different aspects of socio-cultural integration, there are some indications that identification with native Swedes may have the potential to increase certain aspects of reconciliatory attitudes, mainly those dealing with ethnic comparisons. At the same time, structural integration – greater incorporation into central societal institutions, such as citizenship, language, education and the labor market – encourages more reconciliatory attitudes among diasporas. Respondents with higher structural integration express smaller social distances to other groups originating from former Yugoslavia. In addition, they are less ethnocentric and are more positive towards the cultural traditions of other people groups in the region. Overall, these respondents are more likely to acknowledge the past suffering of other groups as well as to be forgiving towards those who persecuted their compatriots, and are less likely to justify ethnic cleansing. Finally, they are more optimistic towards prospects for unsupervised coexistence among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, we argue that structural integration based on citizenship, incorporation into the labor market, education and language training supports moderation among diasporas, and subsequently through their transnational engagement, has the potential to encourage lasting peace in their homelands.

DATA AND METHOD

This study is, to our knowledge, the first of its kind. Our approach goes beyond previous empirical research (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al. 2008; Regan & Frank, 2008) by investigating the causal mechanism proposed, and by crafting measures of key concepts using survey data that help us to get at the individual level of analysis, the focus of previous influential theories, better than aggregate national-level indicators. Meanwhile additional earlier studies are based on anecdotal evidence and case study research, at best relying on snowball samples of

interviewees.[4] These methods are biased insofar as their data represent the opinions of interpersonal networks rather than broader populations. To overcome the bias inherent in previous studies, we developed a unique sampling method; respondents were identified using common Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian family names selected systematically from publicly available online listings made primarily by and for diasporas. These surnames were then used to search online public listings in Sweden through the website Eniro.[5] Each respective surname search resulted in a list of individual names with addresses, including a map with their geographic positioning in Sweden. Surveys were mailed to the respondents, filled out at home and mailed back to us. Considering that many tend to remain in geographical proximity to their families, the guideline was intentionally distributed in different parts of Sweden. This means that we are able to measure the attitudes of as many members of different families as possible, and in that way increase the representatively of the sample. Each survey was translated into the native languages of the respondents (Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian). Most of the respondents identified themselves as belonging to the Bosniak, Serb, Croat or Yugoslav people. Swedish was also provided as a choice, however none of the respondents identified themselves this way.[6] Thus, our data are the result of an extensive survey of diasporas originating from the former Yugoslavia living Sweden (sample size 239). The response rate was approximately thirty percent.

The analysis involves two steps. First we estimate linear regression models for the effect of structural and socio-cultural integration on reconciliatory attitudes *as a whole*. Since we have ten separate indicators of reconciliatory attitudes on hand, we combine them into an additive index ranging from zero to ten. Each measure is first transformed into a dichotomy (0-1), the cutoff point being a strict test of high reconciliatory attitudes. Then the measures are added together. The more measures respondents score high on, the higher up the additive index they climb. At the top of the index are those who display a wide range of reconciliatory attitudes, while those at the bottom display only a few.

In the second step of the analysis we get into more detail. Here we estimate separate regression models for the relationship between each of the ten measures of reconciliatory attitudes discussed above and socio-cultural and structural integration. In these regressions it is not necessary to transform the dependent variables into dichotomies and thus we explain more of the variation captured by each indicator. For example, in relation to the statement "My people deserves and should play a leading role in the Balkan region," respondents could answer "Totally Agree," "Partly Agree," "Don't Know," "Partly Disagree" or "Totally Disagree." These answers are arranged to form a dependent variable ranging from zero to five that is then regressed upon structural integration and socio-cultural integration.[7] In both steps of the analysis, we examine socio-cultural integration's effects as a whole, but also along two dimensions, *social contact with natives* and *identifications with natives* (see below).

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[4] See for example Fuglerud (1999).

[5] See website at www.eniro.se.

[6] The category 'Other' was available in order to write in an alternative to the choices provided. Responses in this category were a handful of other minorities from the Balkan region.

[7] As a robustness check, we also define the dependent variables as dichotomies: for each, the cutoff point is a strict test of high reconciliatory attitudes. Each is then analyzed using logistic regression. Doing so does not substantively alter the results.

In order to examine whether differences in reconciliatory attitudes are explained by differences in structural and socio-cultural integration, we control for a number of other potential causal factors. These include identity, war-related grievances (whether a loved one is missing as a result of the war, or whether one was personally wounded during the war), downward social mobility (whether one is employed in a less qualified position in Sweden than they were in their country of origin), religious participation, urban/rural homeland background, total level of education, the age at which one came to Sweden, the number of years spent in Sweden, age and sex.[8] Below we describe the operationalization of our key dependent and independent variables.

KEY CONCEPTS AND MEASURES

We are interested in what explains reconciliatory attitudes on the inter-personal level among diasporas. Reconciliation may be understood in terms of both processes and goals. The process of reconciliation establishes relationships built on mutual acceptance that is both cooperative and sustainable (Ericson, 2001; Galtung, 2001). Acknowledging past experience and forgiveness provide the starting point for building a common future where trust, positive attitudes and the mutual consideration of needs underpin social relations (Rigby, 2001; Bar-Tal, 2001; Lederach, 2002; Long & Brecke, 2003).

As mentioned above, we use ten indicators to capture the extent to which reconciliatory attitudes are present among survey respondents.[9] Answers to these questions represent respondents' views on: whether their people fought only defensive wars; whether ethnic cleansing is ever justified; historical views of the relative strength of other cultural traditions and the suffering of other ethnic groups in the region; the acceptable level of closeness in their contact with Bosniak, Croat and Serb ethnic groups;[10] the amount of importance the respondent gives to their own ethnic belonging; attitudes towards forgiveness; belief in the possibility of unsupervised coexistence among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the belief that the respondent's people deserve and should play a leading role in the Balkan region; and views on the ideal arrangement of multicultural societies in the region, including the role of ethnicity, cultural mixing and intermarriage.

Integration is divided into two measures: structural and socio-cultural integration (Snel et al., 2006). Structural integration refers to the incorporation of individuals into central societal institutions, including citizenship, language, education and the labor market. Structural

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[8] Significance tests are based on robust standard errors. All regressions include the explanatory variables socio-cultural integration, structural integration, and the controls. The results presented here are based on data imputed using Multiple Imputations by Chained Equations (MICE), implemented with the program ICE available in Stata 10. As a separate robustness check, missing values were also imputed using mean value substitution. The results for all three datasets, including the non-imputed data, are nearly exactly the same.

[9] While reconciliatory attitudes may meaningfully be included under the same umbrella concept of reconciliation, they often measure very distinct views. Attitudes towards forgiveness, for example, should not be thought of as synonymous with historical views of the comparative strength of other cultural traditions. Thus we would expect moderate and positive correlations among these variables; Cronbach's alpha, which measures the internal consistency of a set of indicators (on a 0-1 scale), is 0.681 for the standardized z-scores of these measures.

[10] The instrument used is the Bogardus social distance scale that measures the amount of closeness the respondent will accept in their contact with other social groups (Bogardus, 1925).

integration is measured using six indicators combined using an additive index: citizenship, qualified employment, completion of at least upper-secondary education in Sweden, earnings at or above the national mean, a high Swedish language competency, and no reliance on social benefits during the last five years.[11]

Socio-cultural integration refers to informal social contacts with natives and identification with the host societies moral standards and values Snel et al., 2006: 287). There are thus two distinct aspects of socio-cultural integration. Contact with native Swedish people (the first aspect) is measured by the number of native Swedes one can rely upon when it comes to important matters in life and the amount of time spent with natives. The second aspect, identification with the host societies moral standards and values, is measured by the amount of closeness acceptable to the respondent in their contact with native Swedes[12] and several questions that serve as identity markers (support for Swedish sports teams, identification with the Swedish national anthem 'Du Gamla, Du Fria', and two statements of identification with Swedish norms and general outlook on life). These seven measures are combined using an additive index in order to represent socio-cultural integration as a whole.[13] When each aspect of socio-cultural integration is examined separately, two separate additive indexes are constructed (social contact with natives vs. identification with natives).

OUR FINDINGS

Does higher structural integration lead to more reconciliatory attitudes?

The results of our research suggest that structural integration has a strong and positive effect on reconciliatory attitudes. A one-step increase in structural integration (0-6 scale) corresponds to a half-step increase in reconciliatory attitudes (0-10 scale), and is significant at the one percent level. This effect is extremely robust. For example, stepwise removal of individual measures from the structural integration index does not substantially change the results. Nor is the relationship affected by which controls, or whether or not any controls, are included in the model: excluding and including various combinations of controls has little effect on the point estimates and no effect on their significance; when including controls, the effect only increases. When a result is not sensitive to model specification, there is very good reason to believe the effect is causal; stable results when including relevant controls means that other third variables will likely not affect the relationship between the explanatory variable of main interest and the dependent variable either. Structural integration appears to be an important explanation for reconciliation among diasporas.

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[11] While these aspects of structural integration should be positively correlated, they are in fact different aspects of integration rather than separate measures of the same latent variable and thus should not be expected to correlate very strongly. This is confirmed by a Cronbach's alpha of 0.526.

[12] This is a Bogardus social distance scale (Bogardus, 1925).

[13] Socio-cultural integration is an umbrella concept that encompasses both informal social contacts between diasporas and natives and identifications with natives. A Cronbach's alpha of 0.613 for the standardized measures of these variables thus points to their positive but not perfect correlation.

The index of reconciliatory attitudes is more likely to adequately represent reconciliation than considering each of the ten reconciliation indicators separately. However, one might ask whether the significant results presented above are driven by the effect of structural integration on only a few aspects of reconciliation. In order to offer a more fine-grained analysis, we disaggregate the dependent variable into ten separate measures of reconciliatory attitudes. The results show that structural integration has a significant, positive effect on seven of the ten measures of reconciliatory attitudes when each is analyzed separately.[14] Respondents with higher structural integration express smaller social distances to Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs; more positive views of the cultural traditions of other people groups in the region; greater acknowledgement of past suffering of other groups; more optimism towards prospects for unsupervised coexistence among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina; more forgiveness towards those who persecuted the respondent's compatriots; more support for the statement that ethnic cleansing is never justified; and less support for the notion that the respondent's people group deserves and should play a leading role in the Balkan region.

Does higher socio-cultural integration lead to more reconciliatory attitudes?

Our study indicates that on the whole socio-cultural integration does not affect reconciliatory attitudes: the estimated relationship is very small and statistically insignificant. In line with a two-dimensional understanding of socio-cultural integration, we disaggregate the socio-cultural integration index into two aspects: informal social contact with natives and social identifications with natives. Neither is statistically significant in the model, however it is interesting to note that the association between social contact with natives and reconciliatory attitudes is *negative*. Were it statistically significant, this finding would mean that more informal social contact with native Swedes would lead to *less* reconciliatory attitudes.

One might ask whether this overall finding masks the effects of social contact with natives and identifications with natives on specific aspects of reconciliatory attitudes. For a more nuanced analysis of the relationship between socio-cultural integration and reconciliation we again disaggregate reconciliatory attitudes into ten separate dependent variables. Each is regressed on both measures of socio-cultural integration. Informal contact remains statistically insignificant in all the models. However, when treated separately identification with natives has a statistically significant and positive effect on four of the ten measures of reconciliatory attitudes. Three of the measures directly relate to ethnic comparisons: respondents who express higher socio-cultural identification with natives also exhibit smaller social distances to Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs; ascribe less importance to one's own ethnic belonging; and are more positive toward multiculturalism in the homeland, including less importance put on ethnic identities and more support for interethnic mixing and intermarriage. These respondents also express more support for the statement that ethnic cleansing is never justified.[15] These findings provide for the

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[14] In these regressions the outcome variables are defined as continuous scales in order to maximize the variance to be explained. As a robustness check, we also define them as dichotomies: for each, the cutoff point is a strict test of high reconciliatory attitudes. They are then analyzed using logistic regression. Doing so does not substantively affect the results.

[15] This result is only marginally statistically significant.

possibility that identification with natives has a limited potential to increase reconciliatory attitudes, mainly those related to ethnic comparisons. However this result is not very robust.[16]

We want to stress that socio-cultural integration appears to have no effect on the level of reconciliatory attitudes as a whole, and there is no indication that social contact between diasporas and natives leads to more reconciliatory attitudes among diasporas. It is however interesting to note that identification with native Swedes may have the potential to influence certain ethnic comparisons but not others. Unaffected, for example, are historical views about the relative value of other cultural traditions and the suffering of other ethnic groups in the region. Turning to the attitudes that most directly concern armed conflict, identification with natives does not appear to influence in any way the respondents' views about the nature of their identity group's participation in the wars, their attitudes towards forgiveness, prospects for unsupervised coexistence or the desire for more equitable power relations among ethnic groups in the region.

None of the respondents chose to identify themselves as belonging to the Swedish people, even while simultaneously identifying in other symbolic ways with Swedish natives in other parts of the survey. It is possible that increased identification with native Swedes, if not forced or aggressively pursued through assimilationist policy measures, will lessen the sense that one's ethnic identity is under threat. Lessening this sense of threat allows for the possibility of holding more moderate attitudes towards other ethnic groups from the Balkan region, evidenced by a decrease in the respondent's perceived social distance from other ethnic groups.[17] The positive effect of social contact with natives on respondents' views toward ethnic cleansing may be explained in this manner as well; respondents feel less of a desire to defend the most terrible atrocities committed by members of their own group during the wars, or feel less desire for 'an eye for an eye' punishment of the behavior of out-groups. As in-group/out-group distinctions weaken, so do threat perceptions. This conjecture however finds only limited support in the data.

CONCLUSION

In our paper, we show that the relationship between the integration of diasporas and their reconciliatory attitudes is a complex one. In our sample, most of our respondents immigrated to Sweden as a result of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. As refugees the majority have experienced war-related traumatic events. There is thus ample reason to expect grievances among the population to be amplified by a lack of socio-cultural integration. Yet our findings challenge this notion. Contrary to the previous theoretical expectations, our findings indicate that socio-cultural integration in general does not have an effect on reconciliatory attitudes of diasporas. When looking at different aspects of socio-cultural integration, it is identification with

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[16] As part of our sensitivity analysis we redefine the dependent variables as 0-1 strict tests of high reconciliatory attitudes, and analyze them using logistic regression: the effect on "social distance" becomes insignificant, and the effect on another variable, the historical view of the comparative suffering of other ethnic groups in the region, becomes significant and *negative*: the higher the level of socio-cultural identification with native Swedes, the lower the probability of totally disagreeing with the statement that one's own ethnic group has suffered more than others in the region throughout history. The fact that the latter relationship is negative is at the very least an indicator of the sensitivity of the relationship to model specifications.

[17] Bogardus social distance scale (Bogardus, 1925).

native Swedes that may potentially increase certain reconciliatory attitudes, in particular those dealing with ethnic comparisons. However this finding is not a robust one. At the same time, more social contact between diasporas and natives does not lead to more reconciliatory attitudes among diasporas.

On the other hand, on the whole, structural integration – greater incorporation into central societal institutions, such as citizenship, language, education and the labor market – encourages more reconciliatory attitudes among diasporas. Respondents with higher structural integration express smaller social distances to other groups originating from former Yugoslavia. In addition, they are less ethnocentric and are more positive towards the cultural traditions of other people groups in the region. Moreover, these respondents are more likely to acknowledge the past suffering of other groups as well as to forgive those who persecuted their compatriots, and are less likely to justify ethnic cleansing. Finally, they are more optimistic towards prospects for unsupervised coexistence among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Our findings have important implications for host-state policy. Clearly, widely held views of the positive effects of social integration through cultural and normative absorption do not translate into the desired moderating impact on norms and attitudes of diasporas. Instead, it is citizenship, labor market policy, education and language competence that have the potential to encourage reconciliatory attitudes. Structural integration, through the mechanism of a higher sense of coherence (SOC),[18] empowers diasporas to process and contextualize war-related experiences and make sense of daily life, and to deal with the new challenges they face in the hostland environment. It is probably this sense of context and purpose that allows for the development of forward thinking and a sense of optimism about prospects for meaningful life both in the hostland and in relation to homeland developments.

This conclusion points to the potential of the host-state to alleviate homeland conflicts and support homeland peace through the structural integration of conflict-generated diasporas. However, the relationship between reconciliatory attitudes and transnational activities ought to be given more attention and systematic examination before firm conclusions are drawn.

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[18] SOC, according to Antonovsky, consists of three aspects: comprehensibility, manageability, and meaningfulness. These three aspects ("I understand, I can, and I want") together make up an individual's feeling of being in charge of their own life situation. Understanding makes daily existence manageable, structured, clear and comprehensible, regardless of unexpected traumatic experiences that one may have to face. Management is about the resources an individual has at their disposal to deal with past and future events. The concept of meaningfulness concerns the presence of will in an individual to deal with setbacks and difficulties, and to find meaning and essence in the situations they may have to face (Antonovsky, 1979 and 1990).

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