UN BLUE: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN
UN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

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Abstract
In this article the author examines how the interaction between the political and military elements of multi-track approaches to UN peacekeeping and peacemaking have played out in the field and at Headquarters in conflicts where the UN rubric is attached to both tasks but where they are not united under one operation. The author offers the United Nations efforts in Cyprus and Lebanon as illustrations to aid in the interrogation of how well the institution harmonizes peacekeeping and peacemaking. Drawing on the academic literature and the author’s experience as a practitioner, the analysis traces how public developments as well as considerations internal to the UN have influenced the course of action. The author explores the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to analyze the issues, with the objective of shedding light on how better to tailor the UN structures to move the process to sustainable peace.

Introduction
A critical and insistent theme for the analyst of United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking is that of success and failure. Why else bother reviewing and evaluating if the ultimate objective is not to ascertain how to make these ventures succeed? Certainly, this must be the case for the practitioner analyst. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) when designing an operation, aims for a concept that will bring about success; the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) when strategizing with a mediator has the same goal. When I make presentations on UN peacekeeping, students consistently ask me to relate the success stories (if indeed I believe there are any). However, judging success or failure – conventionally considered mutually exclusive – is a tricky business.

While in the throes of crises, we in the UN debate among ourselves and with our counterparts in the diplomatic corps how best to address an emerging or exploded conflict, and often differ pointedly if not heatedly on method, approach and mandate. At the same time, those outside the UN who are in the business of assessing the outcome of
the decisions made on these matters differ substantially on how to go about evaluating the UN’s (or international community’s) efforts. There is obviously no one dispositive factor, though evaluation is furthered by focusing a lens on individual elements.

In this article I propose to examine a particular framework for UN peace efforts that has not been extensively analyzed: that where the political diplomacy and peacekeeping undertaken by the UN itself is bifurcated. In this context, I intend to examine how the interaction – interdependence – among the political, military and what I would term “civilian-operational” elements of dual-track approaches to UN peacekeeping and peacemaking have played out in the field and at UN Headquarters in conflict situations where the UN rubric is attached to both tasks but where they are not united under one operation. My aim is to shed light on how better to tailor these arrangements to move the process to the end-goal: an exit for the peacekeepers through the attainment of sustainable peace.

“Peacekeeping” and “peacemaking” have been, and continue as, evolving concepts. To start the discussion, the definitions set out in UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace” are useful. Peacemaking is defined there as “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.” The use of political diplomacy is implicit in this activity. Peacekeeping is set out as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military … personnel and frequently civilians as well.” The ensuing statement of aims elaborates: “Our aims must be … where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict; through peacekeeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers” (UN A/4/277, 1992).

I will offer UN peace efforts in Cyprus and Lebanon, comprised of traditional peacekeeping missions and separate UN political tracks, as illustrations to interrogate how well the institution harmonizes various aspects of peacekeeping and peacemaking, looking at where the different roles merge, complement, overlap, and/or contradict one another. My analysis will trace the process by which strategic decisions are made and how public events and developments as well as considerations internal to the UN influence the course of action and dynamics in a UN directed multi-track approach. I intend to explore the particular characteristics of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), their military and civilian roles and the inter-connection with the political undertakings. UNFICYP exemplifies a traditional operation, but one which from the outset had a diplomatic process annexed to but not incorporated within it; UNIFIL, also traditional in concept, constitutes however a departure in certain respects from both the traditional ceasefire maintenance model of peacekeeping and the contemporary multi-dimensional UN operation. (In fact, it has evolved from a more or less traditional peacekeeping
mission to a large complex mission that, unusually, has a military lead). I will analyze such issues as how the military effort can (or sometimes may not) support the political intent and vice versa, and how the civilian and military operational elements work together (or sometimes do not) to make a mission function. At all times, the peacekeeping missions have been adjunct to but integrally involved in a multi-track approach with other UN actors pursuing the political agenda. These characteristics set them apart from the newer multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation which has direct involvement in the political process.

Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution

The history of UN peacekeeping has been extensively detailed in countless academic texts, conference papers, books, media outlets, journal articles and of course, UN documents. For present purposes it is hardly necessary to reiterate the sum total but it will be useful to summarize some of the highlights, both chronological and conceptual. Traditional (or classical peacekeeping as it is called in the UN’s own Blue Helmets) as conceived and embodied in the earliest operations was almost exclusively a military oriented effort intended to ensure the maintenance of a truce or ceasefire between belligerent states (UN/DPI-The Blue Helmets, 1996). It involves buffer zones, separation of opposing forces, the inter-positioning of UN troops, ceasefire monitoring, and a degree of military mediation, liaison and persuasion. It rests firmly on the three paramount principles of impartiality, consent of the parties and the non-use of force except in self-defense. It derived from the Security Council’s responsibility to assertively counter threats to international peace and security, which in the first 40 years of the Organization’s existence were viewed almost exclusively as phenomena of interstate conflict.

It is generally accepted that the significant break from this framework took shape immediately following the end of the Cold War, when the UN launched one multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation after another and was forced to overtly broaden the scope of threats to the peace to encompass civil conflict and large scale violations of human rights.1 Thus a fairly strict delineation of interstate conflict as the red flag to prompt Security Council action gave way to a looser framework, over time touching upon or eventually embracing concepts such as state denial of self-determination, massive humanitarian crises whether internal to a state or cross-border, the thwarting of a democratic process or deposing of democratically elected leaders and civil war. This progression makes manifest the move from the concept of what scholars have come to call “negative” peace to “positive” peace.

The UN General Assembly (GA) has described these concepts. First, the 1984 Declaration of the Rights of People to Peace emphasized, consistent with global thinking/values at the time and historically, “negative peace” or the notion of peace as
absence of war: “the exercise of the right of peoples to peace demands that the policies of States be directed towards the elimination of the threat of war, particularly nuclear war, the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means” (UN/GAR A/39/11, 1984). By contrast, in 1991 global thinking on the standards for true peace had developed to the point that when the GA passed a resolution that year entitled Promotion of Peace, it defined the concept, consistent with “positive peace,” as follows: “peace is not merely the absence of war, but that interdependence and cooperation to foster human rights, social and economic development, disarmament, protection of the environment and ecosystems and the improvement of the quality of life for all are indispensable elements for the establishment of peaceful societies” (UN/GAR A/51/10, 1996).

Addressing these complex multi-layered aspirations began at this time to be woven into the fabric of UN peace operations, both of diplomatic and peacekeeping missions. These in turn gave rise to the second generation of peacekeeping, that of the multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation. It could be said that this evolution described a shift in emphasis for UN Security Council mandated operations from de facto crisis management to full-scale conflict resolution. Immediate peace, or elimination, or at least substantial reduction in conflict was no longer seen as adequate by the international community; if the Security Council was going to launch a UN peace operation, it would now mandate a means toward obtaining a durable and comprehensive peace for a stable society. The veritable frenzy of launching peacekeeping operations in the late 1980’s/early 1990s suggests that the Security Council was at first caught up in a snowball effect more than conscientious implementation of a new doctrine. Only over time did the new “positive peace” direction come to be a result of design. Be that as it may, the orientation of UN peacemaking and peacekeeping had changed. A not insignificant manifestation of the shift in Security Council intent was the move from Force Commanders as heads of peacekeeping operations to civilian Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The latter, generally speaking (UNFICYP and the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara are two exceptions), had a much broader set of responsibilities than the former, with overall UN authority in theater and substantial political/diplomatic responsibilities.

This change of course did not materialize out of thin air. Without rehashing here the historical analyses of Cold War to post collapse-of-Berlin Wall Security Council dynamics, I will note that the thaw enabled unanimous Security Council action to address many more conflict situations deemed to pose a threat to international peace and security, and to do so more comprehensively. However, what did not change was the perception by the major powers that there were conflicts over which each of them was entitled to exercise their prerogative; or conflicts which may warrant action but which were not quite as pertinent to their strategic interests as others. It can also be said, both historically and currently, that when there is not a cohesive international, or regional, political strategy to address a conflict, or where powerful global or regional interests find the need
for a scapegoat or a stopgap or an excuse, pressure is brought to bear on the Security Council to establish a peacekeeping operation. Thus there are numerous examples of peacekeeping operations that were set up after the thaw with grossly inadequate resources even with an expansive mandate, leading to problems on an enormous scale, Bosnia and Rwanda being outstanding in this regard.

In Cyprus and the Middle East, UN efforts have been severely handicapped by a combination of several of these factors. In both, key powers have felt exclusively entitled to exercise their prerogative. In both, UN peace efforts have been used as a scapegoat and an excuse. I would also contend that in neither has there been a cohesive international or regional political strategy to address the conflict; while there is likely to be little argument on this being true for the Middle East in general and Lebanon in particular, observers might dissent in the case of Cyprus. Nevertheless I find persuasive the analysis that despite the designation of a mediator and the various plans for a solution, an effective solution to the problem has generally been a distant secondary concern for the key international actors (the United Kingdom, the United States, Greece and Turkey), with Turkey and Greece having overriding domestic agendas and the UK and US first and foremost wanting to maintain stability and influence in this critical eastern Mediterranean outpost (See inter alia, Richmond, 1998; O’Malley and Craig, 2004; Hitchens, 1997). The fact that the European Union accepted a divided Cyprus is also revealing in this regard. As a consequence, UN peace operations and diplomacy in Lebanon and Cyprus have for many years had structures that were inadequate to the task of conflict resolution, though in their respective peacekeeping operations they have seen success in crisis management, or “negative” peace. And because of these structures, the UN missions have suffered from the institutional shortcomings of the UN Secretariat.

I will detail the operational constructs and give a brief history of the missions in just a moment. It is not the purpose of this endeavor, however, to delve into the conflicts themselves, or to analyze the substance of the peace processes. It is to offer an analysis of the UN’s approach and structures in Cyprus and Lebanon in an effort to determine where these might have contributed to the failure of international initiatives to obtain a lasting solution to the crises. The dynamics and structures that have hindered the UN have been of a piece over the duration of these protracted messes even as events have differed. Because I have personal familiarity with the last ten plus years of the UN’s activity and for reasons of manageability, I will focus on this recent history. While not a thorough chronological overview it is nevertheless emblematic. Regarding Cyprus, I will discuss UNFICYP and the Good Offices operations. As to the Middle East, I intend to focus on Lebanon to make my observations and arguments since attempting to cover the UN structures and activities in all sectors of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be too unwieldy in an article of this length and scope. Both UNFICYP and UNIFIL are longstanding peacekeeping operations in the classical mode. However, what sets them apart is that both have been functioning in tandem with UN peacemaking initiatives on the ground. Both have co-existed with representatives of the Secretary-General who
were pursuing diplomatic courses of action and were accountable to the Secretariat’s political department rather than to the peacekeeping department. Interestingly, both have seen a shift in the past three years away from their historic modus operandi: UNFICYP was headed by an SRSG from 2006 to 2008 who integrated the peacemaking and peacekeeping roles of the UN in Cyprus, and UNIFIL since August 2006 has seen its mandate revised to incorporate certain limited characteristics of a complex peacekeeping operation. Nevertheless, the peacekeeping/political dichotomy prevails.²

Cyprus

Upon establishing UNFICYP in 1964 in the wake of inter-communal conflict in Cyprus, the Security Council mandated a Force to be headed by a military commander, and recommended that the Secretary-General designate a mediator “to promote a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus.” The function of the Force was set out to be, “in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions” (UN/SCR 186, 1964). UNFICYP, and indeed the mediator, has been operating under this same mandate since its inception.

Constructive discussion of the structure and operational parameters of a UN peacekeeping or peacemaking initiative is aided by factoring in the political context in which the Security Council acted at the time it established the mission(s) – for present purposes, my treatment will necessarily be perfunctory. In the case of Cyprus, the United Kingdom had recently relinquished its colonial rule of the island, but not its military presence. Greece and Turkey, both members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but with a seething historical enmity, had starkly opposing interests in the new country, with Athens alternatingly favoring union of the island with Greece or a Greek dominated self-government, and Ankara having a vested interest both in protecting the Turkish minority as well as wielding its own influence on Cyprus. The United States had a behind the scenes role and interest, paramount among them in balancing the NATO relationships, in benefiting from Britain’s military positions on the island, particularly in relation to the Middle East, and in keeping a hand in its ally’s activities so close to that region. The UK and the US in 1964, and ever since, saw the need for UN involvement, knowing that there were limitations on how Britain could act and what it could achieve given its ambiguous position as recent colonial power. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did not have a strategic interest in Cyprus that would call for obstructing Security Council action. In brief, these are the main ingredients that allowed for the establishment of UNFICYP and the Mediator’s office. At the same time, however, because of the Cypriot constitutional mandate for Guarantor roles for Greece, Turkey and the UK, the
UN role had to be a narrow one and had to meet with the approval of the three powers as well as the Government of Cyprus.

Thus a peacekeeping operation was set up with its own military command structure, and a Mediator was appointed as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), but with a separate task and no direct operational relationship with UNFICYP. This was to remain the arrangement for the next 30 years, though the efforts of both were tied to the same resolution and the same mandate review and renewal. In 1974, ten years after these structures were put in place, a simmering situation of civil unrest was catapulted into military confrontation when a Greece backed coup d’état against the Cyprus Government provoked military action by Turkey. When a ceasefire was brokered, monitoring that ceasefire and maintaining a demilitarized zone became UNFICYP tasks, but the original mandate and respective roles for the Force and the Mediator did not change.

Over time, the Mediators, or SRSGs, consolidated their authority to some degree, acting more and more independently of the Guarantor powers in the exercise of the good offices of the Secretary-General, and more closely with the Cypriot leadership. UNFICYP on the other hand has had little authority or influence and the two facets of the UN peace effort on Cyprus have generally functioned separately, despite the ties of their reporting cycle to the Security Council. Until the 1990s, and then only in a confused fashion, and again in the past two years (though without a formal good offices mission), UN peacemaking and peace negotiating were not in any concrete way accountable to one another. The chronology of UN leadership in Cyprus over the last decade and a half makes a statement in and of itself about the oft-times convoluted dynamics of UN peacekeeping and peacemaking. In the mid-1990s, after the SRSG became a non-resident position, the SRSG was “double-hatted” as Chief of Mission for UNFICYP. The position of Deputy SRSG, to be resident in Cyprus, was created, and within two years, the Deputy was designated Chief of Mission (COM). Two years later, the DSRSG/COM became SRSG for UNFICYP but at the Assistant-Secretary-General level, and the Secretary-General continued to appoint non-resident Special Envoys at the Under-Secretary-General level to carry on the Good Offices function of the Mediator, distinct from UNFICYP. Following the failure of the referendum for unification of Cyprus under the Annan Plan in 2004, the Secretary-General suspended his good offices efforts and did not again find conditions conducive to the re-appointment of a Mediator until late 2008, although in January 2006 he assigned certain political/diplomatic tasks to his new SRSG for UNFICYP. One way however that UN peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives have been linked from time to time has been through threats, either implicit or explicit, by international players to withdraw the Force if no progress was made on negotiations. Reviewing this history one commentator has observed, “Even when peacekeeping operations do include mechanisms for conflict resolution, as was the case with UNFICYP, they are limited and not always a logical extension of the peacekeeping operation” (Diehl, 1993: 104).
Cyprus has become firmly embedded in the category of intractable conflict, and when asking the question why, an element that should be taken into account is what factors internal to the UN, structurally, institutionally and within the Security Council may have undermined UN efforts. Taking the last factor first, it has been plausibly argued that one major shortcoming of all the apparent fanfare at the international level is that the true concern of the international community has been to prevent the Cyprus problem from igniting a wider conflict, and as explained above, of the key powers to maintain stability and influence. Notwithstanding the sincere, painstaking and committed efforts of individual mediators and their staffs, the meaningful harmonized push from key capitals was never exerted. So long as the active hostilities were contained and indeed nearly eliminated, undue pressure was not going to be brought to bear on NATO partners, and neither was Britain’s turf going to be tread upon (Richmond, 1998: xvi). At the same time, it has been argued and would indeed seem to be the case from my own interaction with the leadership on both sides of the island, that the parties also came to rely on the absence of violent confrontation effectively ensured by the peacekeeping operation as a failsafe and were, therefore, less inclined to make the hard choices required by negotiations. “UNFICYP both retards the progress towards a lasting political settlement … and prevents serious violence,” one close observer of UN efforts in Cyprus has proclaimed (Richmond, 1998:14). Former Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding has noted that in 1986 when he joined the United Nations, the lack of progress in peacemaking had undermined support in certain quarters for UNFICYP, and added that “in Washington and elsewhere” UNFICYP’s peacekeeping success had become “part of the problem” as it minimized consequences for the Cypriot leaders of their “intransigence” (Goulding, 2002: 49). Paradoxically, UNFICYP was created with the explicit objective of generating conditions that would facilitate a peace process.

Thus the bifurcated approach to UN peace efforts arguably allowed for a certain cavalier attitude on the part of those it suited at the international and local levels. But the bifurcated approach also, and significantly, had undermining consequences institutionally, and these were reinforced in a cyclical manner by structural factors. UNFICYP’s Force Commander reported through one line and the SRSG for Cyprus through another. (In the 1990s these organs of authority would be institutionalized as the Department of Peacekeeping and Political Affairs, but prior to that under different guises peacekeeping and political authority flowed through different Offices or individuals.) Turning again to Goulding’s documentation of the dynamics extant during his tenure, he describes certain developments in the early 90s that are illustrative. At the time there was a move to shut down or sharply reduce UNFICYP. Goulding describes the resulting dynamic: “within the secretariat this caused a certain tension: [Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali] and the peacemakers welcomed the imminent collapse of UNFICYP because it demonstrated the urgency of the need for a settlement; the peacekeepers worried about how to maintain the ceasefire and buffer zone and wanted to discuss with the troop contributing countries which of its tasks a smaller UNFICYP could still
perform. I was told by Boutros not to do this; let the Cypriot parties fear the worst. This illustrated well the dangers of putting peacemaking and peacekeeping into separate departmental boxes; mistakes would be made if the peacekeepers were not au courant with what the peacemakers were up to” (Goulding, 2002: 55).

It has not been unheard of for the Secretary General’s Envoy to be dismissive of the SRSG of UNFICYP or of UNFICYP itself. My own experience of Cyprus a decade later corroborated this observation; when I arrived as Special Advisor I overlapped for some weeks with the outgoing SRSG and Chief of Mission who had been serving in that position for six years, during which time a Special Envoy of the SG had been furiously mediating between the two parties to the conflict to broker a solution. It was freely and widely discussed and acknowledged in UNFICYP that the peacekeepers had had little substantive knowledge of the activities of the Envoy’s office, as it was also openly marveled at when the mission became much more privy to UN diplomatic developments under a new SRSG for UNFICYP who was given the political portfolio. There is no question that the separation of peacemaking from peacekeeping in Cyprus has had the effect of depriving each of complete knowledge of the other’s activities and priorities.

Another factor at play in the UN structures in Cyprus was the disparity between the military (peacekeeping) and civilian (peacemaking) roles and perspectives. UNFICYP was more closely connected with the situation on the ground, while the Mediator was closely connected to the political leadership. Functioning as two separate operations without built-in mechanisms for day-to-day interaction, neither fully benefited from what the other learned in its unique sphere of activity. And as alluded to above, their interests could diverge; the peacekeepers saw a need to stay in business so long as the risk of conflict remained, notwithstanding a political view that might argue in favor of disbanding the force. I would contend too that over time, in accordance with human nature, each actor becomes more attached to its own orientation. Thus the tendency of the military actor in a conventional peacekeeping role, particularly when operating to a large extent on its own, to emphasize ceasefires, establishing stability, separating the combatants becomes more pronounced. Not only was UNFICYP not mandated to address the underlying causes of the conflict, but over time the bifurcated UN peace structure ensured that UNFICYP carried on doing its work while the Good Offices mission pursued its course, and seldom did the two strategize together. Even with the mutteredings in the 80s and 90s about the “successful” peacekeeping operation contributing to the problem, there was no systematic joint effort to analyze, firstly, if indeed this was the case, and secondly, if so, how better to make UNFICYP work in support of the political objectives. By contrast, when the “double-hatted” SRSG arrived in 2006, UNFICYP initiated an exercise to this end, which did take place on the ground – though not at UN Headquarters.
UNIFIL was established in 1978 with possibly the shortest mandate and greatest haste of any UN peacekeeping operation. Immediately following Israel’s military incursion into Lebanon, primarily in pursuit of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Security Council passed resolutions 425 and 426 establishing UNIFIL in southern Lebanon “for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area” (UN/SCR 425, 1978). While few peacekeeping operations are set up with a long lifespan in mind, UNIFIL was especially perceived as a short term arrangement, the interim nature contemplated having been spelled out in the mandate and the title. Unlike UNFICYP, there was no parallel mechanism set up to pursue a political process, and long term conflict resolution was not envisaged.

Contextually, the determining geopolitical factor in the establishment of UNIFIL was that the United States wanted a peacekeeping mission. The American President was in the midst of the Camp David Peace Accord process and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon stood a great chance of scuttling it. In consequence, the decision to create a peacekeeping force and the drafting of the attendant resolution took only four days. As is well known, resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict has long been understood to be an American project. Israel-Egypt (peace accord), Israel-Syria (disengagement agreement), Israel-Jordan (peace accord) and Israel-Palestine (peace process) dynamics have all been mediated by the United States. In essence, the United States being the only broker trusted by Israel places it in this position. Both countries have historically shied away from “internationalizing” the conflict. Accordingly, American vetoes will stop any Security Council action that is deemed unpalatable in Washington or Tel Aviv, but an action favored by the US can move forward. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union had its own reasons not to block certain limited initiatives in this region in the Security Council – as regards the peacekeeping operations established, its allies (Egypt, Syria) favored the action and there was no overriding national Soviet strategic interest to counter it.

UNIFIL was wholly a traditional peacekeeping operation and headed by a Force Commander not a civilian. UNIFIL was consistent with the post-1974 UNFICYP in that its primary task was to ensure a ceasefire after a unilateral intervention into a country by an external power. Unlike UNFICYP however, there was no parallel political track; indeed as commentator Naomi Weinberger describes, the “customary link” between peacekeeping and peacemaking was not drawn at the time of the establishment of the Force. She goes on to note that there was no diplomatic response to the situation until the level of violence exceeded the “tolerable” in the escalations of 1981, when temporary efforts were launched by the US and UN (Weinberger, 1995: 163). One huge disadvantage for UNIFIL was that it was launched into a country with a barely functioning central government whose authority did not reach into UNIFIL’s area of
operation. Lebanon was wracked by civil war and, in the south, Lebanese and Palestinian militias ruled the day. Nevertheless, UNIFIL was able initially to fulfill the first part of its mandate as key international actors, including the UN, were able to secure a withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) within three months of the deployment of UNIFIL – something neither the diplomatic nor peacekeeping tracks were able to effect with the Turkish army in Cyprus. A hollow success it was however, as the IDF turned over most of its positions to its proxy Lebanese militia. The year 1982 saw a thorough disintegration of the situation when Israel re-invaded Lebanon and stayed put for the next 18 years. Israel next withdrew in 2000, this time definitively, also putting its proxies out of business.5

Throughout most of this period the UN was a marginal player in Middle East diplomacy, in any theater. In the mid to late 1990s though, the Secretary-General took steps to enhance the UN’s influence and access, both through the commencement of a diplomatic effort to improve relations between Israel and the Organization, and through the designation of a UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process. Subsequent regional and geopolitical developments affecting the Security Council led to an enhancement of the UN’s diplomatic role in the Israel/Palestine arena when the US, EU, Russia and the UN formed “the Quartet,”6 and in Lebanon with the eventual appointment of a panoply of high-level UN political actors focused on that country. Because of its civil war and Israel’s occupation, Lebanon had been unstable, explosive, tragic and headline-grabbing for nearly two decades. For mainly the same reasons, Lebanon had been essentially dormant in terms of its connection to any larger peace process or international initiative. But after the civil war ended and Israel withdrew, the Secretary-General appointed a Personal Representative for Southern Lebanon (PRSG) as a political structure (elevated to Special Representative status in 2007, now UNSCOL [United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon]), distinct from but meant to coordinate with UNIFIL. Later, in an effort to force the disarming of all militias in Lebanon and to eliminate Syrian control and influence in the country, the Security Council passed resolution 1559 and the Secretary-General appointed a Special Envoy for its implementation. All of these individuals reported through DPA. In recent years then, UNIFIL has had to carry on its work in the company of no fewer than three high-level UN political representatives with a Lebanon portfolio, all of whom operate independently and under distinct but inter-related mandates.

Do these UN operations work substantially in harmony? The short answer to that is yes and no. On occasion, it can appear that certain of the actors work at cross-purposes. The Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process has had no substantive role to play vis-a-vis Lebanon because the Lebanon track has not been tackled seriously in years (even when there was brief momentum on the Syrian track, which has implications for Lebanon, at the end of the Clinton presidency, the UN was not a party to it). The Special Coordinator in 2000 was, however, involved in the drawing of the UN line to mark and confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and frequently since
then has been called upon to make diplomatic overtures in support of UN and UNIFIL efforts to de-escalate crises along the line. But the overwhelming emphasis of that role has been on the Palestinian track. The later designated Special Envoy for resolution 1559 has not worked closely with UNIFIL, nor particularly with the Special Coordinator for several reasons: his mandate is distinct from both, that mandate has been deemed so sensitive that much should be undertaken confidentially, with information held closely, and there has been strong sentiment in the other UN missions that the connection should be minimized so as to distinguish the different objectives. The PRSG/UNSCOL has coordinated the most directly with UNIFIL – the mandates are linked and reporting is coordinated; on the whole information is shared. Nevertheless, the two missions have different chains of command, are not integrated, and at times have had difficulty with information sharing. It must also be said that at different junctures, UNIFIL and the PRSG/UNSCOL have agreed that they should act separately and emphasize their uniqueness when plausible deniability has seemed an astute course of action, either for political or security reasons.7

Asking the same question about Lebanon as about Cyprus, what factors internal to the UN, structurally, institutionally and within the Security Council may have undermined UN efforts to bring about conflict resolution in Lebanon rather than mere crisis management? I recognize that in talking about the Middle East, the catalogue of failures and their origins is at this stage beyond tallying. But the purpose of my inquiry is to isolate particular elements of the UN approach for cautionary benefit.

To dispense with the geopolitical context in a starkly abbreviated fashion, Lebanon is one of those places where one or more of the major powers has not only a vital stake, but also exerts a steely control over Security Council action (or lack thereof). Because Lebanon is a neighbor of and officially at war with Israel, the US keeps a close watch, but because it is a francophone former colony, France takes a keen interest. The Council has tended to cede the larger political ground to these two nations. While Lebanon’s civil war and domination by Syria ensured relegation of pursuit of a Lebanese peace with Israel to the bottom tier, a substantive UN political role would not in any event have been sanctioned. Thus UN peacekeeping has not been tied to a UN peacemaking effort in Lebanon. The UN political envoys and representatives are not the peace negotiators, to the extent that there are or have been any focused on Beirut. Reading the reports of the Secretary-General on their activities (not to mention the cables to Headquarters – unfortunately not in the public domain) reveals, and my backstage view on these activities confirms, that diplomatic crisis intervention, information gathering, monitoring and a good deal of hand-ringing have comprised the roles of the high level UN political envoys.8 The 1559 Envoy has been of a different stripe, in place to push for and monitor compliance by Syria and Lebanon with a resolution meant to “normalize” relations between the two countries and erase “militias,” most particularly Hizbullah from the landscape. Passed in 2004, the resolution was the result of a concerted effort by France and the United States to bring extraordinary pressure on Syria
and Lebanon. Events since then would seem to have demonstrated that it was a pressure that Lebanon could hardly bear.9

UNIFIL has historically stood very much on its own; for many years as far as the UN was concerned, it was the “only game in town,” and even since the appointment of the high-level political representatives, its mission has been largely distinct. Traditionally, UNIFIL by its mandate is separated from the politics … or is it? Institutionally, the Secretariat has treated it so, with DPKO in charge of the Force and DPA the point of entry for the other UN entities named above. Interestingly, the passage of resolution 1701 in the summer of 2006, which greatly complicated and enhanced the UN’s political role in Lebanon, imposed a whole raft of demands on the parties and substantially increased the activities and numbers of the peacekeeping force, did not alter this approach (UN/SCR 1701, 2006). Indeed the Organization went through visible contortions to maintain the peacekeeping/political distinction – in part, certainly, at the behest of member states with a variety of agendas (some of which did not embrace the notion of an SRSG) but in part to conform with institutionally guarded turf.

As in the case of Cyprus, one result has been that UNIFIL may not be apprised of the activities of the political representatives (though this has been far less often the case with the PRSG), and vice versa, or that positions or messages are not harmonized. My own view is that the institution has drawn a false dichotomy and peace and stabilization activity has suffered for it. It is not a controversial assertion that peacekeeping is a highly political and politicized endeavor; in addition, a large part of the role of UNIFIL’s Force Commander, also head of mission, is diplomacy – indeed, in a Chapter VI operation where use of force is not an option, it is perhaps the job’s most central feature. The difference is that the military commander engages in diplomacy with the military leadership of the parties to the conflict, while the Secretary General’s representatives engage with the political leadership. Institutionally the Force Commander takes his guidance from DPKO and the political envoys take theirs from DPA. Or, as the empowered implementers of their own mandates, each may take stances according to his own, certainly legitimate interpretations of or reactions to events. The result has been that, for example, where one agent of the institution emphasizes one Security Council resolution pertaining to Lebanon, another agent prioritizes another, not always compatible resolution. Also, for example, while UNIFIL must maintain functional non-hostile informal relations with Hizbullah, at the same time a UN political envoy has a mandate that requires a confrontational position putting the UN at odds with the group; and, for yet another example, a UN political envoy refers to a disputed piece of land along the border area as territory of one entity while the peacekeepers adhere to the formal position that this remains to be determined. Some of the inconsistencies are minor, but the lack of integration has resulted in conflicting messages on some politically loaded issues. I would maintain that the discrepancies that have proliferated between parallel UN peace support tracks in Lebanon, though not fatal in and of themselves to a peace process, have weakened the overall effort.
The structures of UN peacekeeping and political efforts in the Lebanon-Israel theater give form to the institutional disconnectedness. This is not an awkwardness of which the Secretariat, both DPA and DPKO, have been unaware. From the inception of the designation of a PRSG, the possibility, advisability and desirability of collapsing the office of the PRSG and UNIFIL into one another has been a periodic topic of discussion. Conversations have also been known to occur about anointing the Special Coordinator as an SRSG for the peacekeeping operations. Dealing with the dynamics of multiple UN high-level entities in the sector has been a quiet matter of complaint and an occasional source of mirth in several quarters: at UN working level, in the offices of local authorities, with NGOs, in diplomatic circles. Both peacekeeping leadership and political envoys have been known to devise ways to try to go around the other to have their perspective on a particular event or policy heard (and adopted) by the Secretary-General, and have deployed the same tactic with Member States. Not infrequently, in the drafting process for memos to or reports of the Secretary-General, UN political and peacekeeping leadership dealing with the Lebanon-Israel theater have employed certain ruses to try to ensure that the views of their colleagues were not fully aired. I do not mean to suggest that there is not at the same time constructive coordination and collaboration, but the manner and posture of the current structures have not fostered an integrated approach.

From a practical point of view, there are admittedly times when the flexibility of distinct small missions like UNIFIL and the PRSG can be useful. There are times too when in the Secretariat or on the ground we have believed it advantageous for UNIFIL or the PRSG to invoke a certain cover in being linked, but responsible only for the actions of their own outfit. However, taking the long view, I would deem these as advantages for expediency’s sake, outweighed by the dangers of lack of information which can be critical, and of the provision of multiple openings for the parties or spoilers or the media to exploit – allowing for a type of divide and rule tactic to function, perhaps more accurately depicted as “divide and outsmart.” Time and again I have seen this tactic employed, both by parties to the conflict and other interested international players. In a frequently cited article on civil-military relations in peacekeeping, Michael C. Williams asserts that peacekeeping missions are “fully political-military enterprises in which civilian leaders and military commanders together contribute to decision-making. Political leaders must therefore understand the military tools at their disposal, and military commanders must understand the political aims and constraints of the missions that they carry out” (Williams, 1998: 68). While Williams is referring to integrated missions, the claim seems a matter of common sense and an antidote to “divide and outsmart”, applicable to these other structures. My experience of UNIFIL and the UN’s political representation dealing with Lebanon – the result to be sure of Security Council contortions but reinforced by the dynamics of Secretariat structures – is that this fundamental premise is neglected. I believe that few who are familiar with the UN peace structures concerned with Lebanon would contest that the myriad missions and messengers extant have hindered unity of purpose and message.
Peacekeeping and Peacemaking

One hallmark of orthodox assumption about peacemaking and peacekeeping, also reflected in common definitions, is the presumption of a sequential relationship. However as shown in the discussion of expectations in Cyprus and Lebanon, at the same time as peacekeeping is presumed a successor to a peacemaking initiative, it is also considered and in fact used as a tool to create the conditions for peace. The relationship tends in fact to be symbiotic. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 2007 published its “Capstone Doctrine”, wherein the Department reviewed the accepted definitions and observed, “the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred … While UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or peace agreement, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts” (UN/DPKO “Capstone Doctrine”, 2007: 19). The fiction of bright line distinctions arguably has served two purposes, one constructive and one with detrimental effect. The former was to allow for UN action that contributed to peace, the latter was to allow for a non-integrated approach.

It is a common criticism of classical peacekeeping operations that they do not solve the conflict or bring true/fundamental/sustained peace. One framework put forward to explain this “failure to promote conflict resolution” has been offered by Paul Diehl. Diehl posits four possible explanations: first, traditional peacekeeping operations often fail to adequately limit armed conflict (UNIFIL would be a prime example); second, traditional peacekeeping underestimates the interconnection of peacekeeping and negotiation (both UNIFIL and UNFICYP come to mind); third, a traditional peacekeeping operation can in fact create a counterproductive environment for negotiations (UNFICYP would be the example here), and fourth, peacekeeping strategy can be inappropriate to the task (Diehl, 1993: 100). Diehl ultimately insists that limiting armed conflict and peacemaking are two fundamentally different missions. Security Council actions related to peacekeeping over time would seem to corroborate Diehl’s position; when the Council is unwilling or unable to mandate peacemaking, as in the case of the Middle East, but has some room in which to act (unlike Chechnya for example), it has tended to cobble together peacekeeping operations. Pointing out the contradiction in using military forces as agents of peace dates back at least to Dag Hammarskjold’s (1962 speech) famous line, “peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers but only a soldier can do it,” (and remains alive in current debates on the use of military force in humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect). Nowadays it is a given that soldiers are integral to peacekeeping but the fact is that in Cyprus and Lebanon, a military peacekeeping operation has been an agent only of a “negative” peace. In both situations, and predominantly in the first 50 years of UN peacekeeping, sending a peacekeeping force in to address a conflict situation often meant that the Council was not going to provide adequate resources or political muscle to a concomitant peacemaking effort.
In those first 50 years, should a role be carved out for the UN, (civilian) peacemaking would almost always be a separate venture from (military) peacekeeping. In this classical structure the assumption, sometimes explicit as with the UNFICYP/Mediator set up, was that the peacekeeping would facilitate or create conditions for negotiations for a more permanent peace (UN/DPI-The Blue Helmets, 1996: 4). If we accept Diehl’s framework, this assumption is, at a minimum, paradoxical; given that history has shown that the Security Council would set up peacekeeping knowing that it could or would not meaningfully follow through on peacemaking, it becomes cynical or hypocritical. But accepting for the time being that the Council as a whole was not acting cynically even though individual member states might have been acting at the least, expeditiously, what then got us to the point with Cyprus and Lebanon where Diehl’s framework rings true?

In my view, two structural dynamics played significant supporting roles to the larger geopolitical dynamics. First, the institutional separation of the peacekeeping and political, and second, the non-integration of the civilian and military. As has been discussed, UN political and peacekeeping efforts have long been pursued through separate channels in both the Lebanon/Israel and Cyprus conflicts, but it is especially in the last 20 years that there has been marked institutional division co-extant with murkiness and competition over what responsibility resided where. During the past 20 years, peacekeeping and other UN peace initiatives – enforcement and peacemaking – really took off, with the attendant exponential expansion of the work, the stakes and the visibility. The christening of Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs formalised and made more rigid the distinctions, and, according to one chronicler, made life more complicated “by formally separating [the peacekeepers] from the peacemakers (the mediators and preventive diplomatists)” (Durch, 1995: 157). Complicating matters further, Secretary-General Boutros Ghali determined to make DPA responsible for the political aspects of a peacekeeping operation, the idea being loosely that DPA would therefore resemble a type of foreign ministry, with DPKO as defense ministry. Durch writing in 1994 foresaw that this spread of responsibilities would make for operational and political difficulties institutionally; I would add that it also made for that murkiness and competition to which I referred above. Durch urged that DPKO oversee all aspects of a UN peace operation, reasoning that it was often impossible to separate neatly and cleanly the political and military aspects, and that one SRSG was a more efficient way to get results from UN Headquarters. He did believe, however, that when the UN was engaged in active political mediation in parallel with a peacekeeping operation, that DPA should be the point of contact for the former and DPKO for the latter, “provided there is good liaison between the two tracks, both in the field and in New York” (emphasis added) (Durch, 1995: 164-165).

Marrack Goulding, the former and first Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Political Affairs, was much of the same school, though with more fervent views based on his own experience as an Under-Secretary-General in the Secretariat from
1986 until 1997. As he participated in the transformations of that period, he argued against some of the decisions being taken, pointing out that, “peacekeeping is a political activity; it serves a political purpose; it can take place only on the basis of a political agreement between hostile parties; and those doing it, even at the administrative level, are in an essentially political relationship with the two sides” (Goulding, 2002: 32). He also believed that diffusion of responsibilities would undermine the already difficult project of ensuring uniform application within the UN and among its peace operations of principles, standards and procedures. Goulding was never happy with the division between political and operational; in making his point he describes an array of experiences, from the awkwardness and even dangers of a military command being out of the loop of the political initiatives in Lebanon, Western Sahara and Iran/Iraq, the petty disputes between DPKO and DPA over report drafting, and by way of contrast, the successes – El Salvador being the prime example – when even though separate the diplomatic and peacekeeping tracks worked in close coordination, sharing and complementing each other’s strategies and tactics. My internal dealings on the Lebanon and Cyprus files corroborate Goulding’s experiences. Moreover, I would add that I have noticed a phenomenon during my years with the UN of institutional structures having a tendency to take on a personality of their own. Thus even the well-intentioned can fall prey to institutionalized dynamics: I have numerous colleagues who, like me, place a premium on collaboration and bridging any gaps between the departments, who identify as “of the UN” more than any territory within it, but, nevertheless, who have found themselves in the position of waging policy battles through competitive memo drafting rather than through conversation and coordination.

Generally speaking, different internal components of UN missions and different UN agencies each have their own organizational culture and approach and run the risk of operating in isolation or even in opposition to one another. Compounding the difficulties of parallel UN peacekeeping and peacemaking is that this is particularly true of military and civilian cultures and roles. These distinctions have an impact at the micro level, that is, in the way the two interact and in how they structure and conduct themselves, and at the macro level of theoretical and practical approaches to the task at hand. Drawing a sample from the multiplicity of studies of the military-civilian dynamic in humanitarian and peacekeeping contexts, certain characteristics have been enumerated as applying to each: militaries are highly structured and strictly hierarchical, and the officers are systematically educated in the principles of war; they are also closely controlled, replete with SOPs [standard operating procedures], prefer precise tasking and aligned with “the establishment” (Arbuckle, 2006: chapter 14). Civilian operations have more autonomy, ambiguity, are more consultative, idealistic and, until recently in the UN anyway, have few SOPs and little familiarity with them. The military officer will therefore often perceive civilian operations as haphazard, ad hoc and undisciplined. It is also still the case in most armies that it is the exception rather than the rule for soldiers to work with women as equals or in positions of authority. Anthropologist Robert Rubinstein
interviewed a number of UN peacekeeping military commanders and found that they were often frustrated by mandates and other political direction crafted by civilians that were vague or ambiguous – generally crafted this way deliberately for political reasons but frustrating from the point of view of a military oriented toward order (See Rubinstein, 2008). Much energy has been expended in DPKO and its multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations in trying to bridge this cultural divide, but where the military and political tracks are pursued separately, this does not occur.

Oddly perhaps, when the military and political are not integrated, hierarchy issues can play out in an inverse fashion, with the more hierarchical institution having a more “grass roots” perspective. Lebanon and Cyprus are both places where the peacekeepers, military and civilian, have had more quotidian contact with the communities in the conflict areas than the UN political envoys. In these situations the peacekeeping force can be more “tuned in” to what is happening on the ground. Analyst Tamara Duffey has offered one explanation of this phenomenon: Diplomacy has a state/political leadership focus, thus rendering it inherently top-down in its orientation. By contrast, a peacekeeping force on the ground – one not confined to barracks obviously – may be in much closer touch with the local population. The diplomats pursuing the good offices mission interact with leaders, sometimes almost exclusively, which can be limiting. The peacekeepers on the other hand may have first-hand awareness of critical realities on the ground. The efforts of both can be substantially impaired through failure to integrate these perspectives (Duffey, 2000: 148-153). I found all of these dynamics at play in UN peace implementation efforts in Lebanon and Cyprus.

The consequences of these distinct cultural orientations on the macro level are that the military and civilians will approach a conflict situation from very different angles and will bring divergent perspectives to the solution of the problem. With integration, these perspectives can inform each other and benefit the entire endeavor. Without it, the result can be as negative, for example, as it was in Bosnia with the United Nations Protection Force and the International Conference of the Former Yugoslavia – the hybrid UN-EU body with the political mandate – often tragically uncoordinated. It is important also to remember that a Force Commander, especially of a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, is called upon to perform a diplomatic role more often than not, dependent on the art of persuasion, not the use of force, and political messages, rendering his connection to the political process even more important.

**Judging Success or Failure**

Some of the dilemmas encountered in endeavors to evaluate peace efforts are set out in an article documenting a conversation among five scholars of peace operations (Druckman and Stern, 1997: 151-165). Among the avenues they identify that the assessor might pursue are the relative merits of quantitative vs. qualitative assessment;
i.e. whether to emphasize “transcendant” goals like peace and security, justice and the human condition over the simple terms of the mandate, or to give more weight to concrete indicators such as the number of people fed and housed, how long cease-fires hold, relative social stability etc. Alternatively, they posit, judgment can be reached on the basis of how accomplishments, if any, were achieved – for example, was the operation efficient, did it remain impartial, were results produced without coercion? There is also the oft visited question of whether it is enough that a conflict is contained – or in a successful mission must hostilities be completely suppressed? If hostilities are suppressed, is that enough? Or is true success contingent upon the elimination of the underlying causes of the violent confrontation?

The period of time covered by an assessment is another key component; a short-term peace operation establishing stability and an apparent political coming-to-terms which unravels within a couple of years can be considered a success or a failure, as can a long-term peace operation that forestalls hostile activities for many years but where a peace agreement remains elusive. The experts evaluating the peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts of the UN must also take into account which stakeholder’s lens they may be using. William Durch poses the question, “success for whom,” noting in essence that UN practitioners, troop contributors, Security Council members, the belligerents, and I would add, even the UN peace “maker” vs. the UN peace “keeper,” may each have different defining terms (Druckman and Stern, 1997: 159).

For success in UN peace efforts, the necessary supplements to UN impartiality, objectivity and universality are leverage and legitimacy. This can be translated to the Security Council making it possible for the UN peacemaker and peacekeeper to substantiate and follow through on promises or threats, and the Secretariat ensuring institutional unity of purpose toward those ends (Hampson, 2004: 81). Furthermore, as the UN has itself recognized and implemented through the acceptance of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations, it requires that the military effort be exerted in conformity with the political strategy. This point is well articulated in an article on UN peace support operations: “[M]ilitary effectiveness cannot be had at the expense of collective political control, except at the price of undermining collective political legitimacy. For the UN, as for its member states, the institutional capacity to integrate military effectiveness and political legitimacy is fundamental” (Whitman and Bartholomew, 1995: 173). To be read, in other words, as integration of peacekeeping and peacemaking.

It is obvious that UN peace implementation efforts up to 2008 in Lebanon and Cyprus have failed. Looking at the last ten years, can the peacekeeping in these two theatres be judged a success? UNFICYP was originally given a rather amorphous job to do. Cyprus was not a place of raging conflict or clear boundaries between the hostile communities. Nor were the communities uniformly hostile. It was logical to emphasize the role of the Mediator as the situation on the ground was not one that lent itself to military peacekeeping. Even the UNFICYP police, arguably more appropriate to deal
with the civil strife that was plaguing much of the country, were limited in what they
could accomplish with low numbers and no executive authority. But with the failure of
the early mediation efforts and the ensuing military hostilities, a situation developed
whereby the peacekeeping role was made more straightforward and more comfortably
within the bounds of the traditional. Thus, while on the political side Cyprus has been a
roller coaster of crescendo and diminuendo replete with drama, for the most part the
peacekeeping since 1974 has been a success – if success is defined as conflict
management not conflict resolution.

UNIFIL has had a long and volatile history. Looking back, one is best served by
judging it in segments of time. UNIFIL saw a modicum of success in its earliest years,
prior to 1982. From a humanitarian perspective, it has rendered critical humanitarian
support throughout its tenure, but an honest appraisal of the years 1982 to 2000 would
unfortunately have to judge the peacekeeping effort on the whole as a failure. The
years 2000 to 2007 are more difficult to categorize. Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in
compliance with resolution 425 would have to be judged a success, but how much credit
is due to UNIFIL is debatable. Israel’s action was unilateral, and widely considered to
have been taken because there was utterly diminished domestic support in the face of
incessant Hizbullah rocket attacks. However, it can also be fairly safely asserted that
despite its historic and ongoing ambivalence about UNIFIL, the IDF would not have left
if a UN force had not been there. UNIFIL’s subsequent activities running interference
between Hizbullah and the IDF were certainly a significant contributing factor to the
relative stability and calm in the south and along the border for six years, both desirable
developments. It can be said with certainty that without UNIFIL’s on-the-scene impartial
assessment of incidents and liaison to contain them, that any number of the violations of
the ceasefire that did occur in this period would have escalated. But July of 2006 arrived
and full-scale hostilities erupted again. Still, a massively reinforced UNIFIL is there
keeping that post-conflict renewed ceasefire today.

Conclusion

One analyst of UNIFIL in an article published in UNIFIL’s 17th year found that
UNIFIL suffered from the paucity of progress in peacemaking (specifically related to
Lebanon’s civil war) both prior to and during its deployment. She proceeds to ask the
question, “Who is best suited to conduct the diplomacy – the sponsors of an international
force (providing parallel diplomatic auspices) or an alternate negotiator? She answers,
“It seems to me that it is desirable to separate the auspices of peace making from those of
peacekeeping. If the identity and sponsorship of the peacekeepers is distinct from those
of the mediators charged with resolving underlying disputes, there is a better chance of
insulating the one from a negative outcome of the other” (Weinberger, 1995: 162). It is
not entirely clear from the article what in her research of and exposure to Lebanon led her
to this conclusion and I would argue that it has not held true in Lebanon or Cyprus, but I
cite this text to make a point. Even on a small scale – and I have been more than once in
the position of advocating that the distinct identities of UNIFIL and the PRSG or UNIFIL
and the Special Coordinator/1559 Envoy served this purpose in an isolated crisis – I
wonder if the protagonists in a conflict or even the general public buy this fiction for
more than an instant. Locally, UN agents are fundamentally viewed as one, or at least
threads in one fabric. So the false dichotomy is not really believed but is manipulated.
More closely capturing my experience is an observation made by former UN Special
Coordinator’s office staffer Bruce Jones, pertaining to civil wars but more widely
applicable, that international actors’ “efforts to end … wars suffer from an inconsistency
in conflict management strategies across different phases of the peace process; those who
mediate agreements sometimes fail to coordinate with those who must implement them”
(Jones, 2002: 89).

To aid reflection, I would like briefly to call attention to a theory of organizational
behavior developed to explain how organizations like the UN are able to respond to
conflicting pressures in their external environment. “Organized hypocrisy” refers to
“inconsistent rhetoric and action – hypocrisy – resulting from conflicting material and
normative pressures,” which is ‘organized’ in the sense that it is a product of formal
organization and results from systematic contradictions in organizational environments”
(Lipson, 2007: 5-34). Advocate of this theory, Michael Lipson, defends this organizing
principle as useful in certain contexts, perhaps especially the UN, and in so doing
addresses peacekeeping specifically: “Organized hypocrisy,” he says, “has both positive
and negative effects on peacekeeping. Organized hypocrisy can cause international
organizations to betray their missions, cause reforms to fail, undermine efforts to resolve
critical global problems, and create or exacerbate gaps between organizational
commitments and the resources needed to meet them … On the other hand …
[d]ecoupling of talk and action can permit the UN to satisfy contradictory demands from
its environment, allowing it to act or authorize others to act in ways that are necessary to
the success of peace operations in the field but inconsistent with the norms to which the
UN is expected to conform” (Lipson, 2007: 23).

I see this as an accurate description of some of the UN’s actions which does allow
the work to proceed (consider the Human Right Commission); however the question must
be posed of whether this is a good thing in the long term for the organization’s legitimacy
and credibility (again, consider the Human Rights Commission). Organized hypocrisy
may allow, for example, peacekeeping and its principles to co-exist with peace
enforcement and its incompatibility with those principles – a phenomenon the benefits of
which the jury remains out on – but decoupling talk and action (to crudely delimit the
functions) has not shown itself to be a productive contribution to the formula for peace in
Cyprus or Lebanon, or for the organization of DPA and DPKO. The result has often been
that the aims and objectives of the two interdependent integers of the equation –
peacekeepers/military and peacemakers/diplomats – are insufficiently mutually understood and embraced.\textsuperscript{14}

The flip side of the question I have been posing as to whether UN peace efforts in Lebanon and Cyprus have suffered as a consequence of the bifurcation of peacemaking and peacekeeping is whether UN peace efforts would have been possible at all without the division, and from there, one might logically ask whether these countries would have been better off without it. The answer to the first part of the question is almost certainly that no, the Security Council would not have been able to agree on an integrated political/peacekeeping mission in either arena. As to the second part of the question, UNFICYP and UNIFIL illustrate that limiting or eliminating armed conflict does not always lead to peace. Weinberger espouses the view that “there is inevitable tension between a static force mission and a dynamic diplomacy. If the presence of peacekeepers engenders a tolerable status quo, the incentive for aggressive diplomacy declines” (Weinberger, 1995: 162). Is this a given? Then why set up peacekeeping operations? If we embrace the view that UNFICYP through its very success in bringing stability has stood in the way of a genuine resolution of the conflict, and that UNIFIL by its presence has contributed to stalemate rather than a definitive outcome, have we accepted that persistent truce but no peace is necessarily a bad thing? I would argue no; that truce is far preferable to violent confrontation, and that stability is preferable to civil chaos. Returning then to the idea that UNIFIL and UNFICYP are peacekeeping operations intended to establish or facilitate or maintain conditions that enable progress on a comprehensive peace, one must return to the imperative that the peacekeeping and peacemaking proceed hand in glove.

In his study of military involvement in peacekeeping, James Arbuckle (2006: 157) observes: “It seems that the surest way to create divisions among the international agencies who are supposed to be cooperating, and who must cooperate, is to have similar organizations pursuing similar goals – we lose no time in running Occam’s Razor down nearly invisible lines, separating from each other elements more alike than different. Is the similarity of roles itself a threat, making competition a perceived imperative, like the territorial behavior of human (as well as other animals)? Is it, on the other hand, a basic dissimilarity in goals, which, despite the similarity in means, is the fundamental conflict? Do we need conflict with other agencies to maintain the cohesion of our group? Perhaps our most serious differences will indeed arise when we do the same or nearly the same things for different reasons” (Arbuckle, 2006: 157). Rubinstein describes peacekeeping as an act of intervention that involves “claims about legitimacy, standing and authority” with legitimacy defined as appropriate actions, standing as appropriate status to carry them out, and authority as the power to intervene (Rubinstein, 2008: 19). Perhaps in part because of the syndrome Arbuckle identifies, the unfortunate truth is that when UN peacemaking and peacekeeping tracks proceed independently, the different entities tend to crash into one another on all of these fronts. This has demonstrated to me one source of the failure of UN efforts to bring to a conclusion the problem of Cyprus and the
quagmire of Lebanon. Experience led DPKO in 2007 to conclude that “conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement … should be seen as mutually reinforcing. Used piecemeal or in isolation, they fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of the conflict that, thereby reduces the risk of conflict recurring” (UN/DPKO “Capstone Doctrine,” 2007: 20). Inescapably, the bottom line in these conflicts is the political will of the parties and the predisposition(s) or national interests of the major powers. It is from these elements that the Security Council arrives at proposed remedies putting the UN in whatever position it must assume. The Security Council has traveled a long way, accepting the integration of peacemaking and peacekeeping and even adding peace building to the formula. But in Cyprus and Lebanon, as well as other arenas where the missions mandated were not established as integrated initiatives, the duty of the key international actors after these many years is to commit to a cohesive UN political strategy, and the responsibility of the Secretariat and its officials is to act seamlessly for the desired outcome.

Notes

1. However, the progression in the collective thinking of the Security Council was in fact more nuanced than that, as is revealed by looking back into the history of UN treatment of the Congo and Cyprus in the early 1960s and South Africa in the 1970s (the latter though not generating a peacekeeping venture was an internal conflict deemed a threat to the peace by the Council in 1977 and on which the Council did act). See White, 2002: 49-51. In addition, a foreshadowing of the expanded role of UN peace operations seen commonly after the Cold War (Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, Kosovo) was afforded by the little known United Nations operation in West New Guinea (UNSF/UNTEA) established by the Council in 1962.

2. The personal experience on which I am drawing for this paper is service with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations from 1995 until the present, in particular my role as Senior Political Affairs Officer leading the Office of Operations’ Middle East desk in the Secretariat 2000-2005 and 2006-2007, and as Senior Advisor to the United Nations Force in Cyprus, posted to Nicosia 2005-2006. The views expressed in this article are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

3. My own early assessment shortly after arriving in Cyprus to work for the peacekeeping operation, was that the march to a solution, whether of unification or division, could well be expedited if the entire international apparatus were to be loaded on a plane and shipped out in the middle of the night. When morning came, the parties would have only one another to deal with and might therefore have to do so.

4. Perhaps as a sign of the different eras in which UNFICYP and UNIFIL were established, or of the different stature of Turkey and Israel in the Security Council, resolution 425 indirectly invoked paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter; whereas resolution 186 quoted it directly. Article 2 can be called the “sovereignty” article of the Charter, and paragraph. 4 sets out one premise upon which Security Council action can be based: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

5. Notwithstanding claims put forward by the Government of Lebanon that a small area known as the “Shab’a farms” remained occupied Lebanese territory, the Security Council deemed the IDF to have withdrawn in accordance with resolution 425. See UN/SCR 1310, 2000.

6. The Quartet is a quasi-official affiliation, recognized by the Security Council, to coordinate and harmonize the Middle East peacemaking efforts of these four key entities involved in mediating the Middle East Peace Process. Launched in 2002, the first inklings of this initiative manifested at a dinner in 2001 at the residence of the UN Special Coordinator, Terje Roed-Larson. High level representatives from the UN, the US and the EU were present, and in conversation someone noted the unusual compatibility at the time in the Middle East foreign policy positions
of these entities and Russia. Speculation followed as to prospects for unified action to harness the good will and exert effective diplomatic pressure.

7. Departing Special Coordinator Alvaro de Soto in his end of mission report of 2006 (an internal UN document that nevertheless received some publicity) lamented, and criticized, the lack of coordination and the UN policies that progressively over the course of his tenure weakened his role.

8. See especially Reports of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the Situation in the Middle East from 1999 through 2006.

9. It is not within the scope of this article to document or analyze the security and political deterioration in Lebanon from 2005 until the present, but incidents of note include the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, the war between Hizbollah and Israel in 2006 and the paralysis of the Government up through the time of writing in 2008.

10. All parties have taken advantage of this but the Israelis have proven themselves especially adept at exploiting gaps in information or coordination among UN players.

11. I would note that the Security Council did not authorize a single new UN peacekeeping operation between 1978 and 1988 and, prior to 1988, had authorized approximately 13 operations while since 1988 has authorized 50.

12. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan are examples of operations that can be labeled as such.

13. Analyzing UNIFIL’s difficulties, Goulding posits that resolution 425 was premised on certain assumptions that all turned out to be false: “that Israel would entrust its border security to the UN, that the PLO would accept the Security Council decision and stop its attacks, and that the Government of Lebanon had some authority to restore”. (Goulding, 2002: 60)

14. Williams makes a similar general observation. (Williams, 1998: 22)

References


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